著者

沼田 哲

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.85, no.1, pp.75-84, 1976-01-20 (Released:2017-10-05)

著者

井上 勝生

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.101, no.3, pp.448-449, 1992

著者

前田 亮介

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.120, no.9, pp.1560-1569, 2011-09-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

著者

山田 徹

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.123, no.9, pp.1644-1669, 2014

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Goryosho 御料所, which are thought to have been the feudal estates under the direct jurisdiction of the Muromachi Bakufu shoguns, have been the focus of historians interested in medieval affairs beginning from regime of Ashikaga Yoshimasa on and have been characterized as being placed in the charge of the Bakufu's direct military vassals (hokoshu 奉公衆) and managed by its Bureau of Household Affairs (Mandokoro 政所). Due to this rather unbalanced image, it has become difficult to proactively evaluate various important aspects of Goryosho, such as its fiscal revenues. To begin with, if we focus on Goryosho during the Muromachi period as estates entirely prioritized as feudal holdings totally exempt from taxes and duties, the conventional characterization of them all having been placed in the hands of hokoshu becomes too limited, for such holdings had also been bestowed on kinsfolk of the Muromachi Shogunate Family, the patriarch of which the author of this paper refers to as Muromachi-dono 室町殿. Moreover, not only the Bakufu's hokoshu, but also its military provincial governors (shugo 守護) were the recipients of Goryosho holdings; and when we consider the Bakufu's golden age from the regime of Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, through that of Yoshinori, focusing exclusively on the estates managed by the Mandokoro becomes very problematic. Bringing into view such inconsistencies in the research to date, the author of this article attempts to reexamine what is known factually about Goryosho during the Bakufu's Yoshimatsu-Yoshinori golden age, in order to show that among Goryosho, there existed estates that were huge in terms of both capacity and the revenue they generated. The author also argues that the importance of Goryosho among the provinces should be reevaluated, indicating that the large scale revenues from its estates (shoen 荘園) were also generated in even the remotest regions, making the Ashikaga Shogun Family one of the elite among all shoen proprietors. Finally, turning to the fact that Goryosho estates were also bestowed upon kinsfolk of the Ashikaga Family, and often replaced and redistributed by each Muromachi-dono, the author again points to the importance of the Ashikaga Shogunate Family as a full-fledged shoen proprietor, a characteristic that has not been given sufficient attention in the research to date.

著者

板垣 哲夫

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.86, no.11, pp.1597-1628,1689-, 1977-11-20 (Released:2017-10-05)

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By examining with whom and how frequently Okubo Toshimichi met with different people during the December 1867 (Keio 3)-March 1877 (Meiji 10) period, the author has come to the following conclusions about Okubo's political relationships. First, his political relations with court nobles and feudal lords (daimyo) who had held high places in the traditional hierarchy of status and authority, including Iwakura Tomomi and Sanjo Sanetomi, became gradually estranged. The decline of the influence of nobles and feudal lords in politics and the contrasting rise of Okubo's influence can be regarded as causes of that trend. Second, Okubo's relations with those who came from the same Kagoshima clan were very intimate throughout this period. After around January 1876, however, he came to rely slightly less on these relations, because with his rise in politics it became more and more possible for him to win over competent officials directly without using intermediaries based on factional ties. Third, those who came from the Yamaguchi, Saga and Kochi clans worked in cooperation with Okubo during the period of the Boshin Wars. After the Boshin Wars antagonism between Okubo and Kido Takayoshi increased. At the same time opposition to the government led by these two men increased from those outside the government. Many men from these three clans played important roles in this arena of political rivalry, and it seems that the inclination towards supporting Okubo was comparatively strong among those from Saga compared to the other two clans. As his relations with the Kido group improved from around December 1870 and the centralization of the government increased, the number of officials from the three clans who attempted to secure closer relations with Okubo increased gradually. However, this trend was also influenced by Okubo's rivalry with the Kido group, the Saigo group and others in the government. Especially after the debate on the expedition to Korea, the status of Okubo rose while the strength of those who had opposed him declined and officials from the three clans tried to consolidate their relations with Okubo. Fourth, clans other than Kagoshima, except for the above-mentioned three, had relatively few persons of importance in the government. Few from such clans played important roles in the political rivalries after the Boshin Wars to 1871. On the whole the relationships between Okubo and those from such clans were not intimate. But as his political status rose rapidly after the expedition to Korea debate, many of them developed closer relationships with him as officials in the middle rank. Fifth, those who had intimate political relations with Okubo shifted, from those who held a high rank in pre-Restoration organizations to those in lower ranks.

著者

川本 慎自

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.112, no.1, pp.59-75, 2003-01-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

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In the late medieval period Japan, Zen temples expanded their shoen (estates) and contracted the management of estates of other temples and nobles.Up to this point, it has been a foregone conclusion that this was a result of individual Zen monks'skill in estate management.However, because estate management by Zen temples is seen extensively throughout the entire Zen Sect, it is essencial to consider not only the contribution of individual Zen monks but also the ways in which the Zen temple organizations participated in estate management.Thereupon, taking note of the "knowledge" transmitted among Zen priests within the Zen temples, the author of the article considers whether or not there was something included in this "knowledge" that was related to estate management skills, then the way in which this "knowledge" was comunicated by monks, and family how it was put into practice and applied to estate management.Unsho Ikkei雲章一慶, a priest of Tofukuji東福寺 temple, gave lectures regarding shingi(清規 regulations of the Zen Sect), and one of his disciples Togen Zuisen桃源瑞仙 recorded them in a book entitled Hajoshingi-sho百丈清規抄.In this work, there is description of shosu (荘主 overseers of Zen temples' estates), who were normally monks.This description is based on an actual case in which Tofukuji temple dismissed in 1444 the shosu of Kambara-go 上原郷 in Bicchu 備中.It shows the ways in which it was neccessary for the shosu to cooperate with shugo 守護 when undertaking estate management.Therefore, this is indicative of the fact that within the knowkedge transmitted among the Zen monks there was indeed something included that pertained toestate management.In those days there were many lectures on Confucial learning given at Zen temples, includings the lectures on Hajoshingi by Unsho Ikkei.In addition to Zen priests, court officials like Kiyohara Naritada 清原業忠, known as a master of Confucian learning, attended these lectures.As a result, they were able to exchange not only Confucian knowledge but also such practical knowledge as estate management skills.For ezample, the Zen monks who attended the Confucian lectures by Unsho Ikkei collaborated with Nakahara Yasutomi 中原康富, who was a court offical and a student of Kiyohara Naritada, in the administration of the latter's estate.The author concluded that Zen temples were able to ezpand their estate management activites because they had a system in which Zen priests learned practical knowledge was result of the interchange between the Zen monks and court officials.

著者

本郷 和人

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.112, no.12, pp.1899-1935, 2003-12-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

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The present article offers a new view of the important political disturbance within the Kamakura Bakufu that occurred during the eleventh month (shimotsuki霜月) of 1285 in an attempt to clarify the political situation within the Bakufu during its later years.The conventional political history of the incident is based on the assumption that the warrior class was unconditionally one composed of natural administrators.However,the author is not convinced that they were all that knowledgeable about the art of governance at the time the Bakufu was founded.At that time,the local land proprietors of the Kanto region formed a political mechanism known as a "bakufu" to protect their rights,which led to start their carrers as administrators.They learned how to govern only through experience over time.An analysis of the amendments and revisions made to the Seibaishikimoku成敗式目 code shows that the Bakufu only became serious about politics and governance after the civil war of 1221.An excellent example of this is the "welfare" measures to nurture the people (bumin撫民) adopted during the Kencho建長 era (early 1250s).On the other hand,the order issued during the Einin永仁 era concerning debt remission was aimed solely at Bakufu vassals (gokenin御家人) and can hardly be looked upon as an act of governing the country.In this sence,the Bakufu should be looked upon as having two different aspects : people forming the mechanism for the Bakufu to govern the country,and those forming an organization to protect the interests of gokenin.Focussing on the remission of debt issue,we can observe political conflict arising within the Bakufu at the time of the Mongol invasion,which can be interpreted in terms of opposition between the above "administrator" and "gokenin interest" groups,the former being represented by Adachi Yasumori安達泰盛,the latter by Taira Yoritsuna平頼綱.The clash that occurred between them known as the Shimotuski incident resulted in the defeat and decline in influence of the "administrator" group who felt the Bakufu should be involved in governing the whole country.The resulting Bakufu organization,which became over-concerned with protecting the interests of its gokenin constituency,would sooner or later lose the support if the other elements of society,resulting in its eventual fall.

著者

村井 章介

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.127, no.2, pp.1-41, 2018

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室町幕府の首長が明皇帝によって日本国王に封じられるという、日中関係史における画期について、1402(建文4)年でなく1404(永楽2)年が正しいとする学説が有力になっている。しかしそれらは厳密な史料の読みに裏づけられた学説とはいいがたい。<br>根拠とする史料が原態からどれくらい隔たっているかを正確に測定しながら、一歩一歩史実を確定していくという、古文書学的な手法を用いて検証してみると、1404年説を採った場合に受封者と認定しうるのは、足利義満・豊臣秀吉の二人しか残らない。室町幕府の首長が東アジアの国際社会で日本国王として承認されるという、「封」の実質を重視する観点からは、1402年のほうがはるかに重要な画期である。皇帝が「封」の実質を実現するために発給する文書には、誥命・詔書・勅諭など、対象者のランクに応じて多様な様式が使い分けられていた。<br>琉球の中山・山南・山北の三王に目を転じると、三山相互、あるいは明との関係の推移にともなって、皇帝が王を「封」ずる文書のほか、暦・印・冠服などがさまざまなタイミングと順番と目的に従って与えられていく状況が観察できる。「封」をめぐる多様な皇帝文書の使い分けは琉球の場合にも認められ、しかも比較的短い間に移り変わっていた。<br>さらに対象を「東南夷」(東アジア~インド沿海部の諸国)に拡げて見ていくと、洪武・建文年間には「封」が最高ランクの文書「誥命」でおこなわれたのは高麗・朝鮮のみだったが、永楽年間には一変して、印とのセットで遠距離の諸国に気前よく与えられるようになる。その背景には、鄭和の大遠征に象徴されるような、天下に威と徳を及ぼそうとする永楽帝の対外姿勢があった。<br>最後に、琉球をふくむ日本列島地域に伝えられた史料、すなわち何通かの外交文書の原本や『歴代宝案』『善隣国宝記』という外交文書集には、明代の国際秩序の解明にとって他に換えがたい価値があることを指摘した。

著者

藤井 讓治

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.124, no.3, pp.372-374, 2015-03-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

著者

池田 勇太

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.125, no.2, pp.61-79, 2016

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東京大学大学院法学政治学研究科附属近代日本法政史料センター原資料部が所蔵する「安場保和関係文書」マイクロフィルム中にある「政体」と題される史料は、政体書の草案であると考えられる。慶応四年三月に起草され、執筆者は副島種臣と推定される。ただし、なぜ安場家文書中にこの史料があるのかは不明である。本稿では政体書作成の経緯を確認したのち、他の草案や政体書などとの条文比較を行い、本史料が政体書の草案であることを論じた。<br>本史料からは、明治政府がその最初の段階において、西洋の立憲制を参照しながら国民規模の政治参加にもとづく政治体制をつくろうとしていたことがわかる。また天皇が二十四歳になるまでは名代を置くことや、神祇官が制度のなかに書き込まれていないことなど、維新政権の性格を考えるうえで重要な構想が少なからず見られる。ただし「政体」は案としては廃棄され、もう一つの草案である「規律」を下敷きに政体書が書かれ、その過程で「政体」も参照されるという位置に置かれたと見られる。<br>従来、政体書は発布直後から議政官・行政官の兼任が行われて議政・行政を分離する原則に矛盾し、議政官下局も有名無実の議事機関となっていた状況が指摘されてきたが、「政体」に書かれた議会制度構想を念頭に置くと、政体書が高邁な理想をかかげつつも、草案より現実に即したかたちで書かれていたことがわかる。また、戊辰戦争で国内の形勢がほぼ固まった慶応四年冬以降、明治政府によって試みられた議会制度の導入についても、「政体」の影響が考えられる。明治政府発足当初の立憲政体導入の試みについて、再考を迫る史料と言えるだろう。

著者

水上 たかね

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.122, no.11, pp.1876-1902, 2013

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When selecting capable personnel to man its Army and Navy, both of which were founded during the last years of that regime, the attribute known as "wazamae" 業前, meaning certain rare and desirable skills, was a key point for the Tokugawa Bakufu. Although there has been previous research on personnel selection, an analysis of the actual situation, particularly actual cases among the lower ranks, has been lacking due to limited historical materials. Furthermore, the situation of the Navy is not as well understood as that of the Army. Therefore, in this article, the author examines the actual conditions under which naval officers were appointed by utilizing the documents formerly stored in tamonyagura 多聞櫓 (the battlement enclosures) of Edo Castle. The article begins with an analysis of the changes that took place in the posts held by naval officers and the way in which appointments were made according to their social status. Methods differing from the norm were adopted in the case of lower ranking officers, putting great emphasis on "wazamae," regardless of individual social or family status and hereditary stipend. These methods made it possible for capable people to play important roles in the Navy, while minimizing changes in social status and expenditures. However, the Navy was not satisfied with these methods and attempted to grant social status and privileges appropriate to their officers' "wazamae" and assigned duties. Next, the author considers the ideas of both the Navy and the Bakufu's central authority during the Keio 慶応 era (1865-68) concerning "meshidashi" 召出 (lit. to summon; but also meaning to grant fiefs or stipends as reward for being taken into the service of the shogun) held by the sons and brothers of direct Bakufu retainers and indirect vassals (baishin 陪臣) demonstrating exceptional "wazamae". Despite the Navy's hope to employ their new personnel selection method, an obstacle existed based on the principle that the recipient of such a fief or stipend served the shogun as the head of a "family" in accordance with that family's status and hereditary stipend. Therefore, while the Navy continued to request that their officers receive meshidashi, the grants were controlled by the Bakufu's central authority, in particular, through restrictions against forming branches of direct retainer families. This occurred against a backdrop of the expansion of departments requiring "wazamae" and the establishment of shared precedents regarding appointments and promotions. Finally, the author takes up reforms in the naval officer personnel system carried out after the battle of Toba-Fushimi. Although the reforms were epoch-making in basing appointments upon "wazamae" rather than family status, the gap between the treatment of the heads of direct retainer families and that of other members was not easily bridged. Even after the reforms at the end of the Tokugawa period dismantled Japan's premodern military system, the warrior class continued to exist firmly upon the basis of the traditional "ie" 家 (family) institution.

著者

渡辺 金一

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.92, no.2, pp.227-237, 1983-02-20 (Released:2017-11-29)

著者

森田 朋子

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.105, no.4, pp.59-81,144-146, 1996

著者

根占 献一

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.124, no.2, pp.284-292, 2015-02-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

著者

山中 恭子

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.90, no.10, pp.1481-1519,1618, 1981-10-20 (Released:2017-10-05)

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Officially sealed orders (印判状) issued by the sengoku daimyo Go-Hojo can be divided into two distinct forms : those issued directly by the daimyo himself (直状式) ; and those which expressed the daimyo's wishes and were issued by his underlings (奉書式). In this essay, the author, as a result of an investigation into the particular characteristics of these two forms of sealed documents, is led to the following conclusions. First, the sealed orders issued by the daimyo's underlings, in principle, were issued on an individual basis to endow special rights and privileges. The attainment process for this type of order involved initial application to an underling who would in turn petition the daimyo himself. Therefore, this kind of order could only describe exceptional cases and not the general conditions of the time. Indeed, this form of document can be thought of as reflecting the reverse side of general conditions. In the case of sealed orders issued by the daimyo himself, issuance was not made through the petition of underlings, but rather at the initiative of the daimyo. This kind of order can be found distributed in multiplicate over a very wide area. Therefore, it can be considered as a form of document reflecting directly wide-spread, general historical realities. In this way, the positions of these two forms viv-a-vis historical reality can said to be in a state of 180° opposition. In other words, in the case of the sealed orders issued by the Go-Hojo during the Sengoku period, by simply ascertaining the form of a particular document, one can know whether it expresses general social conditions or exceptional cases. This presents an extremely fortunate set of circumstances for the historical researcher.

著者

張 東翼

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.114, no.8, pp.1387-1408, 2005-08-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

著者

高村 聰史

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.123, no.7, pp.1371-1379, 2014

著者

佐々木 隆

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.88, no.3, pp.309-323,408-40, 1979-03-20 (Released:2017-10-05)

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The political influence of the Japanese military rapidly expanded amid the tense domestic and international events following the Manchurian incident of 1931. For the purposes of coordinating national defense, foreign and financial policies, the Saito Cabinet in October, 1933. convoked the "Five-Minister Conference" as an inner cabinet. An additional significance of the meeting was its role in the political fortunes of Army Minister Araki Sadao and his personal clique within the Army. Following Araki's appointment as Army Minister in December, 1931, the group surrounding the Generals Araki, his close friend Masaki Jinzaburo and Hayashi Senjuro-they are to be called the protetype of the "Imperial Way Faction" -was elevated by factional patronage to a position of dominance within the Army. The institution of the Five-Minister Conference offered Araki, the group's leader, an excellent opportunity to increase his power. The Conference also had its dangers to Araki, however. When he failed to gain the Conference's approval of increased armaments to implement the Army's demands for a hard line against the Soviet Union, Araki found himself politically stymied. He had attended the Five-Minister Conference in anticipation of Foreign Minister Hirota Koki's support and hence had taken no precautions. With the refusal of Finance Minister Takahashi on financial grounds, the Army's request was effectively rejected, and the Foreign Minister also withheld his support. Araki next pinned his hopes for recovery on securing approval for his proposals of domestic reform from the Domestic Policy Conference, held in November and December. Once again, his plans could not gain a firm financial base and were defeated. Araki found himself faced with a dilemma. He believed his resignation would bring down the Saito Cabinet, but he was apparently unwilling to take this action in the fear that new minister might be from an anti-or non-Araki faction. On the other hand, if he stayed on in his present state without prospect his strong position within the Army would be badly shaken. The problem seemed conveniently solved when Araki was incapacitated by an attack of influenza in January, 1934. His successor Hayashi Senjuro, on the contrary, allied himself with Nagata Tetsuzan and Tojo Hideki. Then they formed what I call "the early Control Faction" and together they entered into competition with Araki and Masaki as the "Imperial Way Faction (in a narrow sense)" began to break up. It had been the Five-Minister Conference which had led to these developments.

著者

山田 邦明

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.96, no.3, pp.310-341,412-41, 1987-03-20 (Released:2017-11-29)

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Conventional research on Kamakura-Fu (鎌倉府), which ruled the ten eastern provinces of the Kanto region during the Muromachi period, has tended to concentrate more on its relationship with the Muromachi Bakufu in Kyoto and less on what kind of power structure supported it and how this government controlled the various classes in the Kanto area. The present paper starts out to consider Kamakura-Fu's power structure and its control over the Kanto Plain, especially the power base of the Kamakura Kubo (鎌倉公方). Then, the author switches attention to the Hoko-shu (奉公衆) itself, which formed the military and political base of the Kamakura Kubo's ruling power ; and together with identifying that group of attendants from existing documents, he summarizes the Hoko-shu's conditions of existence and its organizational process. Concerning the Hoko-shu's conditions of existence, from the historical source entitled Kamakura Nenchu Gyoji (鎌倉年中行事), describing yearly events and ceremonies in that administrative town, we find three statuses within the Hoko-shu, namely 1)the Hyojo-shu (評定衆), 2)the Hikitsuke-shu (引付衆) and 3)other members. We see clear status discrimination toward those "other members" excluded from (or positioned below) statuses 1) and 2). Also, as the Hoko-shu formed a rotation system for guarding the Kubo's palace (gosho 御所), there were also members located (or living) in the provinces. The author was able to identify from the available sources 74 members of the Kamakura-Fu Hoko-shu. Their names and conditions of membership may be summarized as follows : A)The Ashikaga clan families including the Kira (吉良), Shibukawa (渋川), Isshiki (一色), Imagawa (今川), Kako (加子) and Hatakeyama (畠山). B)The original Ashikaga family vassals including the Uesugi (上杉), Ko (高), Kido (木戸), Noda (野田), Teraoka (寺岡), Kajiwara (梶原), Ebina (海老名), Shidara (設楽) and Yanada (簗田). C)Traditional Kamakura based bureaucrats including the Nikaido (二階堂), Nagai (長井), and Machino (町野). All of the families included in A, B and C served the Kamakura Kubo from the inception of Kamakura-Fu ; and during the era of Kubo Motouji (1349-67), the B group of Ashikaga vassals formed the dominant power group of the Hoko-shu. However, beginning from the era of Kubo Ujimitsu (1367-98) the Kamakura Kubo more and more included in the Hoko-shu many provincial bigmen (kokujin 国人) throughout the Kanto Plain. And so, when Mitsukane became Kubo (1398-1409), the number of Hoko-shu members had greatly increased, and their main source of power had shifted to a new group (D) made up of these same Kanto Plain kokujin. These included the likes of the Ohmori (大森) of Suruga, the Honma (本間) and Miura (三浦) of Sagami, the Edo (江戸) of Musashi, the Satomi (里見), Yamana (山名), Nawa (那波) and Takayama (高山) of Kozuke, the Sano (佐野) of Shimotsuke, the Shishido (宍戸), Tsukuba (筑波) and Oda (小田) of Hitachi and the Unagami (海上), Indo (印東) and Ryugasaki (龍崎) of Shimousa. During Mitsukane's reign such families as the Shishido and Unagami even appear in the elite corps of Kubo palace functionaries (gosho bugyo 御所奉行). As a result of their personal hold over these Kanto Plain kokujin, the Kamakura Kubos were able to expand quite successfully their own direct military bases.

著者

髙鳥 廉

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.130, no.9, pp.41-67, 2021 (Released:2022-09-20)

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足利将軍家の子弟や室町殿の猶子が門跡寺院に入室する目的としては、しばしば門跡寺院支配や統制が先行研究によって挙げられている。室町殿と血縁関係ないし擬制的親子関係を有する僧が門跡寺院へ入室するのだから、彼らの入室により室町殿の寺院に対する影響力が強まっていったであろうことは想像に難くない。 ただし、これまでの研究では、肝腎であるはずの入室の契機に関する検討を欠いたまま室町殿の主体性を自明視してきたため、室町殿と公家・寺院との関係性や、寺院に対して室町殿の影響力が強まっていく背景が適切に捉えられていない。とりわけ、門跡寺院の附弟選定が各権門間における合意形成の場であったにもかかわらず、それまで寺院に子弟を送り込んできた天皇家や公家、あるいはその受け皿となった寺院側の動向が検討の対象とされてこなかった点は研究史上の不備であり、入室の多様な意義を曇らせてしまっている。 そこで本稿では、将軍家子弟や室町殿猶子の門跡寺院入室の契機を検討し、「貴種」の入室がいかなる社会的意義をもったのかについて論じた。その結果として、将軍家子弟が皇族を中心とする「貴種」の払底を補填する役割を演じたこと、競合者(御連枝や庶流などの足利一族)を俗界から追放する意味をもったこと、寺院側から室町殿に対して庇護の要求があったこと、入室者とその尊属への統制を強める意味があったこと、幕府所縁の門跡(三宝院)を継承する僧に対する身位保護などの意味があったことを指摘した。さらに、猶子政策の頂点と評価されてきた足利義政期についても再検討を行ない、義教期こそが最も強力に猶子政策が進められた時期であったと結論した。