著者
太田 聡一郎
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.129, no.11, pp.37-60, 2020 (Released:2021-11-20)

本稿は、毒ガスの一種である催涙性ガスの戦間期日本における使用事例から、警察概念の援用が戦時国際法解釈・運用にどのような影響を与えたのか考察した。 第一次世界大戦後の国際社会では、毒ガスの戦時使用を国際条約で禁止しようと改めて試みられる一方で、治安維持やデモ制圧など催涙性ガスの警察使用がアメリカを中心に普及していった。日本陸軍はアメリカ軍人の議論の受容や一九三〇年の日本国内における催涙性ガスの警察使用への導入を通じ、催涙性ガスの警察使用を例外的に人道的と見做す発想を定着させた。 一九二五‐三四年に開催されたジュネーヴ一般軍縮準備会議・軍縮会議では、催涙性ガスの違法性や警察行為の位置づけが初めて問題化した。参加国の大多数が催涙性ガスを含む毒ガスの包括的禁止を求めたが、アメリカは催涙性ガス使用、特に警察使用の特例化を主張し、戦時使用は禁止する一方警察使用は容認するという催涙性ガスの特異な位置づけが条約案として確立していった。 軍縮会議と同時期に進行した第一次上海事変・満州事変において、日本陸軍は戦時国際法遵守の必要性と軍縮会議の議論との整合性を意識し、使用する化学兵器を煙幕に限局し対外的に声明するなど一定の配慮を行った。しかし関東軍‐陸軍中央は催涙性ガスの使用を「国内警察行為」と位置づけて法理的には問題ないと見なし、事変後満鉄警備などで実際に使用するようになる。また第一次上海事変の海軍や日中戦争の陸軍は、警察使用から戦時使用の合法性を導出することで催涙性ガス使用を正当化した。催涙性ガスの事例は、化学兵器を使いたいという陸軍内の軍事的要請と、催涙性ガスに関する国内外の法的位置づけを、事実上の戦争における「警察」概念の多義性によって合法的に結節しようとした試みだったと評価できる。
著者
山口 英男
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.95, no.1, pp.1-37,144-145, 1986-01-20 (Released:2017-11-29)

In this paper, the author tries to clarify the relationship between the general description in the Ryo 令 codes and the more detailed explanation in the Engi-shiki 延喜式 codes concerning maki, state managed pastures for breeding mainly equestrian horses. Then, in order to deduce the origins of the several forms of maki stipulated in the Engi-shiki codes, he describes the transition of those offices in the central government which administered maki. As a result, the author is able to offer the following hypothesis concerning the actual state of public pasture lands. 1)In the Engi-shiki codes, we find Shokoku-no-maki 諸国牧 (provincial pastures), Mimaki 御牧 (those under direct imperial control) and Kinto-no-maki 近都牧 (pastures in the capital vicinity). It also mentions the horses presented to the central government as tribute, which are Kunigai-no-uma 国飼馬 (horses bred in provinces), Tsunagigai-no-uma 繋飼馬 (horses raised on a tether) and horses from Mimaki. The tributary horses from Shokoku-no-maki were Tsunagigai-no-uma. In Kinto-no-maki the horses were not sired but rather were delivered from the province to the capital and raised. The system of Kunigai-no-uma required that provinces sent horses, which were usually bred there, to the capital on the demand of the central government. So it was similar to the system of horse tribute. 2)From the beginning of the Ryo system, the maki in the provinces near the capital sent the horses which were sired there to the central government in the form of Kunigai-no-uma ; and the maki in the provinces far from the capital presented horses in the form of Tsunagigai-no-uma from Shokoku-no-maki. Some of the former maki also took on a function similar to Kinto-no-maki by breeding horses from the latter maki. 3)Mimaki originated from the maki managed by the Uchi-no-umaya-no-tsukasa 内廐寮 (the government agency of horse breeding under the immediate control of the Emperor, established in 765-808 A.D.), and was the most recent form of the various forms of maki stipulated in the Engi-shiki codes. However, the way to establish Mimaki was to shift some of the maki which had already existed under direct imperial control. This was done under the influence of the political situation around the middle of the 8th century. Therefore, each of the maki did not go through any important changes except for the alteration of the government office which had jurisdiction over it. 4)These forms of maki were arranged and reorganized when management failures began to increase at the beginning of the 9th century. The various articles concerning maki in the Engi-shiki codes show the result of such arrangements and reorganizations.
著者
松下 憲一
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.113, no.6, pp.1098-1126, 2004-06-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

Epigaphical sources from the Northern Wei period reveal examples of the kingdom being referred to as "Dadal" 大代. During the Song period, Ou Yangxu 欧陽脩 pointed this fact out in his attempt to supplement the historiographical sources, but in the later research, no attempt was made to either list or analyze examples of the name "Dai," resulting in conflicting explanations : one that it is was a common usage, the other that is was not. The present article has gathered together and examined examples from both the historiography, including the Weishu 魏書, and the available epigraphical sources, resulting in the conclusion that even though the term "Dadai" can be found in the Suishu 随書, there is no example of the term in the Weishu (although Emperor Daowu 武道 did use the term Dawei 大魏 apparently). We do find the terms huandai 皇代 and youdai 有代. However, the former is not the name of a kingdom, but means "dynasty," while youdai was used for poetic purposes, leaving us with no concrete examples of their usage as names for the kingdom. On the other hand, Dadai appears frequently in the Northern Wei epigraphy, and from an analysis of four examples, the author concludes the following. With respect to form, examples appear on monuments and in epitaphs and Buddhist inscriptions. As to dating, the term was used beginning in the reign of Emperor Mingyuan 明元, increasing in frequency during Xiaowen's 孝文 reign, then continuing through the reign of Emperor Wen 文 of the Western Wei. Geographically, the examples are limited to the Northern Wei territory, mainly the caves of Yunkang 雲崗, Longmen 龍門 and Dunhuang 敦煌. The terms were used widely by high ranking imperial bureaucrats, Buddhist monks and commoners alike. The name Wei was established by Emperor Daowu as a diplomatic move to legitimize his kingdom vis-a-vis the Western Jin Dynasty. However, internally the term Dadai continued to be used, emphasizing its affiliation with the Dairen 代人, a group which had been formed as a means of integrating the people residing in the vicinity of Pingcheng 平城 during the transition from the Dai 代 Kingdom to the Northern Wei Dynasty.
著者
長谷川 順二
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.123, no.3, pp.333-371, 2014-03-20 (Released:2017-07-31)

The changes that have occurred in the course of the Yellow River over the ages has been considered to be an important theme in the historical geography of China, and many researchers have conducted studies of the subject using various methods. The various explanations in the extant bibliographic sources about river course change in dynastic China were first summarized during the early Qing period by Hu Wei in his Yugong Zhuizhi 禹貢錐指 (Brief Study of "Tribute of Yu"), which proposed that major changes had occurred in the River's course. Hu's argument then formed the basis of various opinions that six or seven significant changes had occurred leading up to the existing course as of 1855, in such works as Zhongguo Lishi Ditu Ji 中国歴史地図集 (Collected Historical Maps of China) and Huanghe Zhi 黄河志 (Gazetteer of the Yellow River). In particular, as to the pre-Eastern Han era, all argued that the river's course had changed twice: one being observed during the Warring States period in the fifth year of the reign of Eastern Zhou King Ding (602 BC), the other occurring between the third year Wang Mang's Xin Dynasty (11 CE) and the 13 year of the reign of Later Han Emperor Ming (70 CE), in The flood control works of Wangjing 王景. However, as observed in Yugong Shanchuan Dilitu 禹貢山川地理図 (Geographical Maps of "Tribute of Yu") by Cheng Dachang 程大昌 of the Southern Song Dynasty, there was in pre-Ming Dynasty times a great deal of emphasis placed on the river course change project named after Provincial Governor Donqui 頓丘 in the third year of the reign of Former Han Emperor Wu (132 BC), while no mention is given to the Wangjing Project. The author has elsewhere reconstructed via remote sensing data the old course of the Yellow River between the Warring States and Former Han Periods and has shown, based on that reconstruction and micro upland topography, the changes that occurred in the river near Liaocheng, Shandong Province in 132 BC. In the present article, the author reexamines the traditional discourse concerning the changes that occurred up through the Latter Han Period, based on his previous findings. In addition, there is also information in the Hanshu's 漢書 "Gouzu Zhi" (Treatise on Canals and Rivers) section about the first Yellow River levee of the Warring States period, which Kimura Masao argues signifies the existence of state-operated irrigation projects in the lower reaches of the Yellow River, indicating one basic condition of ancient Chinese despotism. However, the author's reconstruction of the ancient river course and the present topographical data concerning the region shows these levies to have been formed by the Yellow River naturally, making it very difficult to concur with the conventional discourse that large scale irrigation projects were already underway in the lower Yellow River basin as early as the Warring States period.
著者
飯島 直樹
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.128, no.3, pp.1-36, 2019 (Released:2021-08-26)

元帥府とは1898年に天皇の「軍事上ニ於テ最高顧問」の役割を帯びて設置された機関である。一方で、1903年に設置された軍事参議院は天皇の帷幄で重要軍務の諮詢を受けることを目的とし、元帥のほか陸海軍要職者から構成され、多数決制や議長の表決権などの議事規程も備えた合議制諮詢機関であった。 両機関は「軍事顧問府」として宮中に存在し、戦前は枢密院と対比されるような国家機関として位置づけられていたにも関わらず、先行研究では陸海軍の運用統一を図る統帥機関として有効に機能しなかったという低評価が定着していた。 そこで本稿では、大元帥たる天皇が求めた「軍事顧問府」という視点に改めて着目し、軍事輔弼機関としての元帥府・軍事参議院の成立過程を再検討することで、日清・日露戦間期における天皇と陸海軍との関係形成の新たな一側面を描出することを目的とした。その成果は以下の通りである。 元帥府の設置は、日清戦後の軍制改革で焦点となっていた監軍部廃止と特命検閲使の不在化を回避することが直接的な要因であった。ただし、その背景には明治天皇が個人的に信頼し自らの軍事顧問官と認識していた山県や小松宮彰仁親王ら現役大将の現役留置の意図も含意されていた。明治天皇は疑念のある帷幄上奏事項を積極的に諮詢し、元帥全員一致の奉答を得ることで、当局と元帥府との「協同一致」による輔弼を求めていたのである。 一方で、明確な議事規程がないが故に合議の拘束性が弱い元帥府では、陸海軍当局や元帥間でも意見が一致しない事態も生じ、「軍事顧問府」としての限界を次第に露呈するようになる。議事規程を整備し構成員に元帥を含む軍事参議院設置は、天皇の帷幄における「協同一致」の論理を阻害しかねない元帥府の改革が志向された結果であった。このことは、「軍事顧問府」の制度化とともに、大元帥たる天皇の裁可の制度化をも意味していたのである。
著者
遠藤 珠紀
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.111, no.3, pp.293-322,441-44, 2002

In the study of how the Japanese medieval imperial court was actually operated, a concept of "bureaucratic farming" has been offered, and when considering auch an idea, the role played by bureaucratic families (ie 家) becomes very important. In the present paper, the author takes up the Benkan 弁官 and Geki 外記 Bureaus at the time and examines the "medieval family" institution existing among the secretaries (shi 史 and geki) who were responsible for the everyday operations of these two bureaus, focussing on the establishment of families as managerial units and primogeniture succession from fathers to sons, especially the political status corresponding to the establishment of main branches and their exclusive inheritance of family wealth. Section one traces the split that occurred in the head of the Benkan secretaries, the Ozuki 小槻 family, into the Mibu 壬生 and Omiya 大宮 lines in relation to the formation process of the "medieval family." As a result, the author shows that the establishment of these two lines into "ie" was finalized in 1273 after several generations of dividing up the official family genealogy. Section two turns to secretarial head of the Geki Bureau, the Nakahara 中原 family, showing the transformation of an ancient uji 氏 (clan) into a medieval ie. Section three examines changes that gradually occurred from the fourteenth century on in the sixth levels of subordinate bureaucrats working at the two bureaus in response to abovementioned changes in secretarial head families, showing that in contrast to their superiors, who were also active as scholarly (hakase 博士) families, these subordinate government officials became an independent class of job-oriented professionals. The author concludes that it was during the late Kamakura era that a transformation occurred in the staff organization of the Benkan and Geki Bureaus, which formed the nucleus of medieval court day to day operations What remains to be studied, then, is the relationship of actual bureaucratic duties to such organizational changes.
著者
田中 一輝
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.125, no.2, pp.39-60, 2016

従来、西晋末の永嘉の乱については、五胡十六国史・北魏前史の観点から研究が進められてきたが、五胡諸族の主体的な発言・行動に注目した研究が多く、当時彼らと戦っていた晋朝系勢力との角逐を踏まえ、彼らの行動を相対的に把握するという視点に乏しかった。本稿では、五胡と晋朝系勢力の相克の過程を、厳密な編年と史料批判により復元し、永嘉の乱の実像を解明することを目指した。<br>西晋と戦った劉淵・石勒らは、乱の初期においては晋朝系勢力に圧倒されており、とりわけ西晋の并州刺史劉琨は、南方の劉淵(漢)を終始圧迫し続けていた。劉淵は劉琨の圧力に押される形で南方への進出(遷都)を行わなければならなくなったが、それを継続すればいずれ西晋の首都洛陽にぶつかることが避けられなくなった際に、漢の皇帝を自称し、西晋打倒の姿勢を最終的に明確化し、洛陽に進攻した。しかし折から洛陽に帰還した東海王越に撃破され、劉淵は死去してしまい、西晋側はこれが契機となって劉琨―東海王越による対漢挟撃戦略がはからずも形成される。以後の漢はこの挟撃戦略の克服が課題となったが、このときより晋朝系勢力の東海王越からの離反などの動揺が続き、また東海王越の洛陽からの出鎮・死去など、洛陽からの戦力流出が続出したため、挟撃戦略は弱体化し、永嘉5年(311年)に漢の攻撃により、洛陽が陥落した。北方の劉琨も漢の攻撃により撃破され、挟撃戦略は破綻することとなった。<br>以上の経緯から、永嘉の乱は必ずしも劉淵ら胡族の主体的な戦略や、西晋に対する一貫した優位により進んだのではなく、自勢力内外の軍事的・政治的環境に左右された結果であったことが判明した。
著者
曽我 良成
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.92, no.3, pp.279-317,413-41, 1983-03-20 (Released:2017-11-29)

In the later Heian period, the officials who were in charge of political affairs used to keep the official documents issued in the process of fulfilling their duties in their own hands. These documents were handed down from generation to generation as the hereditary property of the aristocratic families From the viewpoint of the aristocracy as a whole, this practice means that they were entrusted with official documents by the government. Therefore it was considered to be a national loss when a fire broke out in one of these residences and the documents were reduced to ashes. Under such circumstances, in the Benkankyoku (弁官局) which issued orders as to the Daijokan (太政官)'s policies, it was the Daifushi (大夫史) who took custody of the documents. The main duties of the Daifushi were as follows : i)to investigate the former examples of political affairs, ii)to draw out the Daijokanpu (太政官府), the Kansenji (官宣旨) and the Senji (宣旨), and iii)to take charge of the Kanfudono (官文殿), the house for storing documents, which belonged to the Benkankyoku. Originally the Daifushi was supposed to be chosen among a wide range of nobles, but this position had never been occupied by the upper nobles of such as the Fujiwaras and the Minamotos. The Daifushi was an important post, but never thought to be a high and noble status. Around the middle of the 11th century Takanobu Ozuki (小槻孝信) was appointed as Daifushi, and from then on, the position was inherited by the Ozuki family. As a result, the Ozuki family was called as "Kanmuke", which means a family that inherits the Daifushi. The main reasons for the choice of the Ozuki family to this position can be assumed as follows : firstly, they had an excellent Skill of preserving documents ; secondly, their family was a specialist of mathematics, who fixed the amount of taxes to be imposed on and collected from various provinces. Moreover, since the middle of the 11th century, in Ochokokka (王朝国家), the government tended increasingly to intervene directly in affairs of the provinces. Accordingly, the Benkankyoku became the administrative center to deal with political matters. And, by making the position of the Daifushi hereditary, the government entrusted main duties of the Benhankyoku to a family -the Ozukis.
著者
荒船 俊太郎
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.122, no.2, pp.147-184, 2013

This article investigates the characteristic features of the political career of Matsukata Masayoshi at the end of the Taisho Era, in order to clarify his role in the process of reorganizing the institution of Genro 元老 (Chamber of Elder Statesmen) after the death of Yamagata Aritomo. In contrast to the research attention given his activities as an expert in fiscal affairs during the Meiji Era, Matsukata's career during the Taisho Era has been little studied, and the evaluation of him as a politician has so far been quite unfavorable, depicting a senescent figure bereft of political influence. This is one reason why the actual political leadership style of Matsukata is virtually unknown. This article is an attempt to clarify Matsukata's strong commitment to integrating the Satsuma (Matsukata and his fellow politicians from Kagoshima Prefecture) and the Choshu (Yamagata and his fellow politicians and soldiers from Yamaguchi Prefecture) and to show how important a commitment it was. The author begins at a time several years after Matsukata's appointment as Inner Minister of State (Naidaijin 内大臣), showing that indeed he held no political influence to the extent of being unable to freely appoint his ministerial subordinates. However, in dealing with problems involving the Imperial Court, Matsukata won the firm trust of the empress, which began a process by which he strengthened his political leadership after the fall of Yamagata. Finally, the author turns to Matsukata's political leadership after his retirement from the post of Naidaijin, showing the fear that fellow Genro Saionji Kinmochi held towards him, attempting to respectfully distance himself and pointing to Matsukata's continuing supervision of the Kenseikai Party even into his twilight years. The author concludes that the period in question should be rightfully called the "Dual Genro Regime" under the leadership of both Matsukata and Saionji.
著者
石井 裕
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.114, no.6, pp.1071-1096, 2005-06-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

When the Alien Land Law prohibiting land ownership by aliens not eligible for citizenship (mainly Asians) was passed in the California Assembly in May 1913, Japanese officials and immigrants alike realized the merit of swaying US public opinion. To quell the rising anti-Japanese movement, the Japanese Foreign Ministry set up in 1914 two publicity bureaus-the Pacific Press Bureau (PPB) in San Francisco and the East and West News Bureau (EWNB) in New York City-disguising both as private "press agencies". Kiyoshi Kawakami, who had been invited to San Francisco by the Japanese Association as manager of the Campaign of Education, was appointed chief of PPB, a low cost operation designed to placate the local California press and contribute news items to influential papers throughout the country. The Japanese consul-general, who held the ultimate responsibility for PPB, was pleased with Kawakami's capability as a propagandist. At the onset, PPB activities were hindered due to poor cablegram communications with Tokyo; however, on the occasion of the declaration of war on Germany, the Japanese Foreign Minister took a more positive attitude and imposed upon PPB the role of an agency for war propaganda. Therefore, Kawakami came to play a dual role as a promoter of Japanese military policy in the Far East and debunker of prevalent anti-Japanese public opinion, especially the rumors of a pending US-Japanese war being spread by propagandists for the German and Chinese governments. Kawakami was also involved in intelligence work, obtaining confidential State Assembly documents for the Japanese Consulate and lobbying against anti-Japanese bills introduced during the Assembly's 42nd Session. After the war, PPB was forced to tone down its blatant propaganda due to public antipathy towards such activity on the part of Japanese and pro-Japanese Americans, conflict within the Bureau between Japanese and American staff members, and a threat that Kawakami's secret arrangements with the Japanese government would be become public. From 1917 one, Kawakami was frequently absent from his San Francisco headquarters, travelling to the Far East, New York and Washington DC courtesy of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Kawakami was expected of wide-ranging activities as a Ministry intelligence agent, not merely a kind of propagandist in San Francisco. Both PPB and EWNB were shut down because of the establishment in August 1921 of the Foreign Ministry's Intelligence Office which changed the tone of its information policy from "active" and "wartime" to "moderate" and "peaceful". Kawakami left San Francisco for Washington DC in January 1923, where he continued to maintain secret connections to the Japanese Embassy.
著者
大谷 伸治
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.124, no.2, pp.237-260, 2015-02-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

This article discusses the development of political scientist Yabe Teiji's ideas about democracy in relation to the debate over how Japan's constitutional monarchy should function (kokutairon), based on an analysis of a critique of Yabe's seminar at Tokyo Imperial University submitted in 1938 by one of his students, Odamura Kojiro, as the answers to the final examination. The author begins with an examination of the copy of Odamura's list of criticisms about the seminar, which contain corrections and revisions made in Yabe's handwriting prior to Odamura's expulsion from the university after the publication of his ideas in the national press. Yabe's glosses pertained more to adding comments about the kokutai question than merely correcting a student's final exam. With the exception of the comments devoted to Japan's "sovereign dictatorship", Yabe's comments attempted to substantiate the kokutai question in more concrete terms, in an attempt to place it within the context of the discourse regarding democracy. In the correspondence that ensued between teacher and student, Yabe was again challenged by Odamura and again made revisions to his ideas, upon examination of which, the author of the present article notices wide-ranging changes occurring in Yabe's approach to democratic institutions. In sum, in response to Odamura's demands Yabe, while not referring specifically to Japan, is found emphasizing his patented understanding of "democracy as an institutional mechanism", but also attempting to more accurately describe its connections and interaction with the idea of "kokutai". However, an even more significant change occurred in Yabe's thinking on the subject after his study of the legalistic arguments on the rule of law posed by National Socialist German Workers Party jurist Otto Koellreutter and a consequent attempt to place kokutai within the fundamental norms prioritizing the positive (as opposed to natural) constitutional legal order. Therefore, Yabe offered the possibility of providing legal legitimacy to interpretations and constitutional amendments indispensable to the implementation of the further centralization of executive powers desired by the new regime. This development in Yabe's political science was, the author argues, first given impetus by Odamura's critique. Nevertheless, since Yabe was of the fundamental opinion that kokutai was a non-entity, he did not go into concrete detail on the subject. That is to say, although kokutai exists as a fundamental norm, it has no actual function as a frame of reference for constitutional interpretation. Consequently, Yabe came to the rather illogical conclusion that constitutional interpretation was ultimately determined extra-legally within the struggle for political power, an idea that became, quite unintentionally on Yabe's part, fraught with the danger of having the reverse effect on the actual process of kokutai-based reforms.
著者
出岡 学
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.112, no.4, pp.477-497, 2003-04-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

This article intends to analyze the religious policy of the Japanese Navy, which occupied Micronesia in 1914, in relation to the international situation at that time. At the beginning of its occupation, the Navy permitted German missionaries to inhabit the Islands and educate the natives out of "respect for civil rights". However, after schools were established in the Islands by the Japanese, the missionaries were sent into exile from the Islands. Their absence caused difficulties in ruling over the native people, so the Navy decided to introduce Japanese priests into the Islands. After the Germans were exiled from the territory occupied by the Allies, the Japanese Navy commanded the German missionaries to leave the Islands in June 1919. The introduction of Japanese missionaries was determined by the Japanese cabinet out of fear that American missionaries would flood the Islands. Because their activities were remarkable in the movement for the independence in Korea beginning on March 1, 1919. To banish missionaries of American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions from the Islands, the Navy, first, negotiated with the Japanese Congregational Church, but the Treaty of Versailles obliged the Navy to assign Catholic missionaries to Catholic Churches. So the Navy also began negotiations with the Vatican. Consequently, Japanese missionaries of the Japanese Congregational Church and Roman Catholic Spanish missionaries were introduced into the Islands. The author concludes that the Japanese Navy became interested in introducing missionaries into Micronesia, not simply because ruling the natives would have been difficult without religion, but because the international situation in those days compelled the Navy to introduce missionaries into the Islands, with extreme subtlety and minute attention.