著者

森田 安一

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.108, no.1, pp.102-109, 1999-01

著者

高木 昭作

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.101, no.10, pp.p1717-1742, 1992-10

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In 1613 Tokugawa Ieyasu had Konchiin Suden draft the Decree Banishing Christians. This decree, which stated that Christianity was to be prohibited because Japan is the land of buddhas and kami, has long been quoted by historians as evidence of the existence in that period of the view of Japan as a "divine land". Particularly, in recent years this decree has been cited as an expression of the ideology of the Tokugawa state promulgated domestically and abroad by Ieyasu himself. However, when examined more closely the text of the decree is not at all easy to understand. Some scholars, in fact, have described it as "gibberish," or "having no coherent logic to it". Though the individual words of the text may be clear, they seem to make little sense when put together into sentences. Especially the initial section, in which the author seemingly argues that Japan is the land of buddhas as well as kami, is incomprehensible without knowledge of the Shinto-Buddhist literature of the preceding period. By examining the language of the decree in the light of medieval Shinto writings, the present article demonstrates that it was written according to the theory of "kami as essence, buddha as trace" held by the Yoshida school. This theory is famous in the history of Shinto as the doctrine that the "three teachings [Confucianism, Buddhism and Shinto] are the branches, leaves, flowers, fruits and the root". This article further discusses the shinto view of Japan expressed in Toyotomi Hideyoshi's 1591 letter to the viceroy of Goa, and shows that it, too, was based on the ideas of Yoshida Shinto. According to the belief of the Yoshida school, Mahavairocana (Dainichi Nyorai) appeared at the time of the origin of the universe and the creation of the Japanese islands as described in the Nihonshoki. The tenno was thus held to be the descendent of Dainichi, who is identical to a kami. The present article argues that Hideyoshi and Ieyasu likely shared this view of the tenno.

著者

鹿毛 敏夫

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.112, no.2, pp.153-190, 2003-02-20

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The Otomo family (大友氏), which dominated a large part of northern Kyushu (九州) had a firm intention to trade in Southeast Asia. The Muromachi shogunate (室町幕府) ordered them to remit sulfur for export. Then Otomo Ujitoki managed two sulfur mines in the mountain district of Bungo (豊後). Otomo Chikayo expanded the mining business geographically, and built a big ship called the "Kasuga-maru (春日丸)". The Otomos dispatched trade ships to Korea, China, the Ryukyus (琉球), and several countries of Southeast Asia. In particular, Otomo Yoshishige and Ouchi Yoshinaga, who were brothers, dispatched a fleet to China for trade, but they were considered as smugglers by the government. They went to the coastal areas of the South China Sea, and traded with the merchants who passed through there.

著者

内藤 一成

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.106, no.2, pp.234-260, 319-318, 1997-02-20

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The political crisis that occurred in Japan in 1916 (Taisho 5) is represents a crucial stage in the transition between 1913 and 1918 from the "Keien" settlement to the era of parliamentary government. Although many historians have investigated the process of this political crisis, which lasted from February to October 1916, they have not fully understood the political situation during 1913-1918, known as "Taisho-zenki". This paper mainly investigates the complicated situation in the House of Peers at the time of the crisis, a subject that has here-tofore been ignored by almost all historians. First, the author attempts to elucidate negotiations concerning succession to the premiership among Okuma, Terauchi and Yamagata, a "Genro", during this crisis. It is generally thought that the crisis was caused by the stubbornness of Terauchi. However, he was the only one with the flexibility to solve the problem. On the contrary, it was Okuma who refused to compromise. Secondly, the House of Peers' Saiwai club, the largest group in the House, was split into many factions. Therefore, they did not have enough power to support the Terauchi Cabinet. Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives three main government Parties, the Rikkendoushi-kai Kensei-kai and Koyu Club, were united. into the "Kensei-kai" to support Takaaki Kato as prime minister. Okuma advised the Emperor to select Kato as his successor; but Yamagata opposed this move and selected Terauchi. Although Yamagata rejected Kato as primier, he did not think the new administration could stand up against both Houses. Nevertheless, contrary to Yamagata's expectations, Terauchi did not receive the support of both Houses, resulting in a new ministry that was fragile legislatively.

著者

黒野 耐

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.106, no.3, pp.323-356, 1997-03-20

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The volume in the series Senshi-sosho entitled Headquarters of the Imperial Army I holds the view that the imperial defense policy (IDP) was hardly changed by its first revisions and its nature and policy was maintained. Research conducted after the publication of "Senshi-sosho" also basically reinforced this view. This paper argues that the IDP was fundamentally and drastically revised by its first revisions in 1918. The strategic thought behind the original IDP was formulated on the supposition of a short and limited war against one single country either Russia or the U.S.. Therefore, the Army and Navy requested 50 divisions in wartime and 2 fleets consisting of 8 battleships and 8 cruisers. On, the contrary, the revised IDP was devised on the assumption of a long, all-out war against the U.S., Russia and China at the same time from the lessons Japan learned during WWI. The Army upgraded the strategic force from "divisions" to "corps", and the necessary size was determined as 41 corps in all-out war, and the Navy requested. one more fleet of 16 battleships and 8 cruisers. What changed the nature of the IDP on such a large scale ? "The Necessity of a National Mobilization Plan" proposed by vice-chief of staff Tanaka Giichi was approved in 1917. It assumed that Japan would fight a war against several nations simultaneously and denied the strategic concepts based on the lessons from the Russo-Japanese war. It was proposed to make a defense policy that desired a short and limited war due to limited resouces, but also understood that Japan may have to fight a long and enduring all-out war. In its "Explanation of the Budget" to the Ministry of Finance in 1919 in accordancey with the new IDP, the Ministry of the Army requested funds for the construction and maintenance of a main force of 22 corps in peace time and 41 corps in wartime to fight an all-out war against several enemies. The idea of creating corps-oriented forces, however, was not realized; and the force was returned to the 40-42 divisions structure in 1920, because of popular opposition to any kind of enlargement of the army, the financial crisis caused by the depression, and disagreement inside the Army over how to organize an all-out war posture. The first IDP revision had two significant points. First, the concept of "National Mobilization Posture" made clear the vulnera-bility of Japan's limited resources and low manufacturing capacity. Therefore, a consensus was built up not only within the military, but also among politicians, that Japan should seek its insufficient resources in China and build a self-sufficiency structure. As a result, the strategic area of the new IDP was expanded to all of East Asia, including mainland China. As more and more Japanese made their way into China, the U.S.-Japandde rivalry grew more fierce, and the possibility of Anglo-Japanese confrontation heightened. Soon Japan became internationally isolated. Secondly, ideological confrontation over the posture fot an all-out war emerged within the military. Tanaka Giichi and Ugaki Kazushige found an all-out war posture essential and advocated a transformation of the army, while Uehara Yusaku and Fukuda Masataro regarding an early stage of war as vital, insisted on the maintenance of the status quo. This rivalry continued into the Showa era.

著者

加藤 陽子

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.96, no.8, pp.1257-1291, 1407-1408, 1987-08-20

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Dai Hon'ei 大本営 (Imperial Military Headquarters) refers to the highest office organizing wartime military operations. This office was set up in the 1894 Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the War with China which extended into the Pacific War. This paper deals with Dai Hon'ei established at the beginning of the War with China in November, 1937. It has been said that the Dai Hon'ei was very much the same in function as its Russo-Japanese War counterpart, or that it was merely a kind of the General Staff Office whose function was reorganized to meet the demands the war. World War I, as the first total war in human history, however, must have greatly influenced Japanese military authorities and stimulated them to study seriously the war tactics and the wartime systems of the participating countories. We may therefore conclude that the Japanese military authorities took into consideration the results of this careful study when establishing the third Dai Hon'ei. Based on this assumption, this paper discusses the formation process and characteristics of the Dai Hon'ei during the Japan-China War. The first chapter discusses the great changes which took place in the Dai Hon'ei set up in the Japan-China War in comparison with its predecessors. At the time of establishment it increased the authority of such military administrative authorities as the army minister, the vice minister, the director and the chief of military affairs, and the military chief, vis-a-vis the supreme command authorities. The Dai Hon'ei's functional emphasis on the military administrative authorities theoretically should have caused the Prime Minister to be concerned with the Dai Hon'ei, since the army minister was also Minister of State. What leads us to believe that more emphasis was now being placed on the minltary administration is the recognition that in the case of total war the administration and the supreme command should not be separated, but unified in terms of policy and strategy. The second chapter examines the fact that the establishment of the Dai Hon'ei was not an isolated decision, but was made in relation with the Councillor System (Shangi-Sei 参議制), which was created by the government during roughly the same period, and was regarded as a cause of those government reforms which went as far as to totally revamp the cabinet system. Therefore it becomes clear that Konoe Fumimaro and the military authorities attemped to reform the government at the time of the establishment of the Dai Hon'ei, out of consideration that any dualism between state affiars and the military command would cause severe limitations on war mobilization efforts. While the move to the separate the Ministry of State from the Director of the Administrative Affairs was not realized, the successful establishment of the Sangi-Sei, was significant in empowering a minister without portfolio (Muninsho-Daijin-Sei 無任所大臣制). By including the unrealized cabinet reformation plan in the discussion, this paper emphsizes that the establishment of the Dai Hon'ei in the Japan-China War played a number of important roles not only in improving the capabilities for meeting the war demands, but also by being part of the reform plan for a wartime government system.

著者

森山 優

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.101, no.9, pp.1587-1622, 1713-1714, 1992-09-20

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This paper analyzes the political processes of 'Guidelines for Implementing National Policy' (Teikohu Kokusaku Suiko Yoryo) which was adopted by the Third Konoe Cabinet. During the term of the Third Konoe Cabinet, Japanese foreign policy was formulated at the Imperial Court by the Imperial Head-quarters-Government Liaison Conference (Dai-hon'ei Seifu Renraku kaigi). The decisions of this Conference were more influential than those of the Cabinet. Issues concerning National Policy (kokusaku) proposed by the Army and Navy were debated and constructed at the Liaison Conference. However, the Liaison Conference was unsuccessful in overcoming the structural flaw in the Meiji Constitution which saw legislative power shared between the Cabinet and the General Staff. The Liaison Conference could not override the Cabinet or General Staff in decision making. In cases where the interests of the various government organs conflicted, the Liaison Conference either avoided making a decision, or forwarded policies for imperial ratification that incorporated the interests of all the opposing government institutions by processes called Ryoron-Heiki. It is through these processes of compromise that National Policy was formulated. The formation of the Guidelines for Implementing National Policy is seen as the cornerstone for Japan's decision to go to war. This paper analyzes the political processes involved in the formation of National Policy. It examines the following points. 1)The political goals of the Army and Navy immediately after the establishment of the Third Konoe Cabinet. 2)The reaction of the Army and Navy towards the 'freezing' of Japanese funds in the United States by the United States Government. 3)The influence of assertions as to attacking the Soviet Union. 4) How the Army and Navy perceived the domestic and international situation when the Guidelines was first adopted. The chief aim of the Guidelines originally proposed by the Navy was to accelerate its arming against its potential enemy, the US. The summit meeting between Roosevelt and Konoe was the other dimension of the policy, as Navy Minister Oikawa was optimistic that a successful diplomatic agreement would be reached by the two leaders. The war Offlce stated that if diplomacy failed, the next step was war. The General Staff Office's position was that Japan must set a date for the commencement of war, but at the same time must persist through all diplomatic avenues available to try and reach some agreement. The stance of the Navy office was to continue to prepare its forces for war, but refuse to commit itself to a date when hostilities would commence. In the end, however, a compromise was reached with the deadline for any diplomatic solution being set for early October. This deadline was set immediately after Japanese authorities received a telegram reporting that Roosevelt was positive towards a summit meeting. Furthermore, the Navy Office was also successful in increasing the number of political procedures required in reaching a decision for war, effectively making any such decision harder to obtain. In the opinion of the Navy, a Japanese victory depended on a favourable change in the international situation. In short, the Guidelines was an ambiguous move to compromise. On one hand, diplomatic negotiations were still being pursued. On the other, preparations were being made for war. Yet, the success of either of the two objectives depended upon a change in the prevailing international situation. The inability to reach a decision led to Konoe to dissolve his cabinet in the middle of October, 1941.

著者

神谷 正昌

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.116, no.5, pp.659-661, 2007-05-20

著者

栗田 禎子

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.99, no.1, pp.128-129, 1990-01-20

著者

高山 博

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.121, no.1, 2012-01-20

著者

森谷 公俊

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.104, no.6, pp.1094-1114, 1209-1208, 1995-06-20

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The Thessalian Confederacy played an important role in the course of the conquest of Greece by Philip II. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relation between the Third Sacred War and Philip's invasion in the context of Thessalian history. At the time of the outbreak of the Sacred War in 356 B.C., we find no conflict within the Thessalians, but the next year, tyranny was revived in Pherai and set to recover the rule of Thessaly, in alliance with Phocis, who had occupied Delphi and provoked the Sacred War. In oppositon to them, the Thessalians urged Philip to support them, which forced him to concern himself directly with the Sacred War. In 354 B.C., the allied forces of Phocis and Pherai defeated the Thessalians and the Macedonians, and gained superiority in Thessaly. Then, at least three polis stood for Pherai. In 353 B.C., Philip marched south again. In the Crocus Plain, the Macedonian and the Thessalian army enjoyed a great victory over the Phocians and the Pheraians. Philip banished the tyrants from Pherai and recovered the unification of the Thessalian Confederacy. During the same year, the Thessalians appointed Philip as archon of the Confederacy for life. It was the Aleuadai, the great aristocrats of Larissa, who proposed this appointment. They had had friendly relations with the Macedonian royal house since the fifth century, but it was unprecedented for a Greek state to entrust their supreme power to a foreign king. Why did this occur ? In the first place, the Aleuadai aimed at exterminating the Pheraian tyranny and unifying Thessaly under their hegemony. Because they have not been able to control the Pheraian tyranny by themselves since c.400 B.C., they decided to rely on Philip, even if it meant that they had to be content with the position of an ally subordinate to Philip. Secondly, the offensive of Pherai and Phocis in 354 B.C. was so critical to the unification of Thessaly that the Thessalians welcomed Philip as a liberator of the confederacy. Thirdly, there was a profound suspicion among the Thessalian cities. The Aleuadai chose to give the office of archon to Philip, who was a reliable ally rather than to share it with the other cities. Finally, Philip was not a mere foreigner to the Aleuadai, because they and the Macedonian royal house alleged that the Heracleidai were their common ancestors. On the other hand, Thessaly was extremely valuable to Philip both in securing the south frontier of his kingdom and in its abundant resources. Now Philip 'legitimately' gained it. In the end, the complicated situation of Thessalian politics, connected with the course of the Third Sacred War, opened the way to Philip' invasion of the south.

著者

吉田 律人

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.114, no.12, 2005-12-20

著者

大高 広和

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.123, no.10, pp.1887-1888, 2014-10-20

著者

楊 典〓

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.114, no.12, 2005-12-20

著者

中野 良

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.114, no.4, pp.四九五-五一八, 2005-04-20

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This article analyzes the problem of Japanese Army military exercises conducted during the Taisho Era, a topic to which the research to date on the Army has paid little attention. Nevertheless, such military exercises during that time were very important in the influence they exerted on various relations between the Army and local communities. The author first finds that the military exercises conducted by the Army's 13th Division met with difficulty due to a lack of interest in such activities on the part of residents around where the Division was stationed and their reluctance to supply the Army with recruits. The reason behind such difficulty was, according to the division commander, the tendency to conduct exercises repeatedly in the same area, leading to the suggestion that alternative regions be selected. Actually, alternating sites had been stipulated in the Army manual for military exercises, but the 13th Division had failed to comply with such regulations. Secondly, during that same time, the tactics being employed in military exercises had come under criticism among Army officers, who complained about contradictions in exercise planning and terrain, as well as in coordinating troop movements. Many suggestions were made as to how to improve the situation, but were not implemented, leading to the decision to repeat exercises in a given region and the dilemma encountered by the 13th Division and the local communities around it. Finally, the Army did take steps to correct the problem, such as loosening regulations concerning terrain and geographical conditions, thus increasing the number of regions where exercises could be conducted, in the hope of improving relations between Army divisions and local residents. Armament reductions also helped alleviate fixed military burdens, but in earnest solutions to the problems at hand were put off for later generations.

著者

黒沢 文貴

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.108, no.12, 1999-12-20

著者

大久保 文彦

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.103, no.6, pp.1059-1095, 1222-1224, 1994-06-20

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In this article the author investigates the background and origins of the discharge of Inspector-General of Army Education Mazaki Jinzaburo in July 1935, which resulted in a dispute over army personnel. He focuses on 1)the three Army Chiefs Council (陸軍三長官会議), which was the scene of the discharge procedures, 2)the formation process of 1913 the Arrangement Regulating Duties of three Army Departments and 3)related the Agreement of three Chiefs. In the first chapter, the author analyzes the defense offered by Mazaki up to his discharge, showing, in contrast to conventional opinions, that his views concerning both the Council and the agreement related to the Arrangement surfaced just before the finale to the case. In chapter two, the author demonstrates how Army Minister Hayashi knowing of the Arrangement provision devised counter-measures on how to deal with the Council, intentionally ignoring the Agreement. In chapter three, the author traces the formation process of the Arrangement back to 1913, indicating that the Army Ministry bureaucratic reforms aimed at abolishing the ministerial appointment of active duty military officers was opposed by the Army. This opposition appeared in a revision of the ministerial duties item in provisions. This was the direct cause of the establishment of the Arrangement in the midst of peacetime institutional revisions that the Army feared would enable Imperial edicts to override military decrees. In chapter four, the author takes up the personnel aspect, showing the evolution within negotiations between the General Staff, who wanted to nominalize the authority of the Army Minister and a reluctant Army Ministry over a plan for a personnel section with the three chiefs to be the major decision makers. In opposition to the General Staff who wanted the establishment of such a section according to peace-time organization, the Army Ministry Personnel Bureau Appointments Section attempted to eliminate its effectiveness and authority. What happened in the end was the inevitable division in personnel affairs known in the research literature as "Addenda to Army Secret Memorandum No.120 : The A and B proposals". The "B Proposal", which contained many of the elements for a Personnel Section, should not have gone any farther than simple agreement between the three Chiefs and in fact the authority over the June petition to the throne was held by the Army Minister. But, being only a provisional action, the petition clearly asked for a decision to be made at a later date. After the promulgation of bureaucratic reforms and the consequent resignation of the Army Minister, the right to petition the throne was transferred to the Chief of General Staff, who thus had the last word on the final petition submitted in July. The research up till now has denied the effectiveness of the "B Proposal" on the grounds that its contents were missing from the final petition. However, at the June phase of the petition the "B Proposal" was clearly stated as a subordinate provision to the "A proposal" ; and if the July petition is considered to be a final decision concerning a revised "A Proposal", it is impossible to state for certain that the "B Proposal" was not also accepted. If we keep in mind the sense of urgency shown by the Army, the content of both the June and July petitions should be considered as one entity. Therefore acceptance was given to the June petition through a process that lasted until July. It is for this reason that the effectiveness of the "Agreement" between the three Chiefs cannot be refuted, and the three Army Chiefs Council, given elements of a Personnel section by this petition, became, as Mazaki Jinzaburo reasoned, a personnel decision making apparatus with each Chief having an equal say in the matter.

著者

小林 道彦

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.98, no.4, pp.488-523, 600-602, 1989-04-20

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Conventional understanding about the 1907 Japanese government's "Imperial Defense Policy" may be summarized in the following three points. 1)This policy shows the extent of the "political independence" of the "military" after the Russo-Japanese War. 2)The conflict between army's "state of Asia" position and the navy's "island empire" position was not dissolved by this policy. 3)Therefore, the army's demand for 25 divisions and the navy's demand for 8 battleships and 8 armour-clad cruisers, an "excessive" military buildup, were both included in the section which outlined military power necessary for national defense. This article aims at reconsidering the above conventional evaluation of the "Imperial Defense Policy", through examining the 'defense environment' and the process by which the post Russo-Japanese War military buildup policy was formed. The author's conclusions are as follows. 1)After the Russo-Japanese War, the "defense environment" became very favorable for Japan because of the virtual disarmament of the Russian navy and of Japan's obtaining a lease over Kwantung region (northeastern China). Under this "new situation", the supreme commanders of the army and the navy shifted from a defensive to an offensive position, in their "1906 Strategic Plan for Imperial Army". Up until this time such a "Plan" was annually formulated upon a hypothetical attack on the Japanese mainland. In contrast, from this time, they began to plan an attack on Mainland China. It should be also noted that both the army and the navy regarded Russia as a real enemy. 2)The favorable turn which took place in the 'defense environment' influenced the planning of the Military Armament Management Plan. Due to the Russian army's retreated from Manchuria more speedily than Japan had expected, a compromise was struck between Yamagata's demand for 25 peace time divisions and Kodama's demand for 19 ; and the army's expansion target was put at 20 divisions for the time being. Due to the disappearance of an urgent "threat" from Russia, and the Russian ships which Japan got as spoils of war, naval strength was maintained as that expansion of the level. 3)The "Imperial Defense Policy" was formulated under close cooperation between the army and the navy. In order to respond to the "new situation" after the Russo-Japanese war, the conception of "small imperialism" was discarded, and the army was conceptualized as a direct military force assuring the maintenance and expansion of the Japanese interests on the Continent, while the navy was put in the context of an assisting force in such expantion through securing sea-lanes to the Continent. In terms of the necessary military force, 19 peacetime divisions and 5 battleships and 7 armour-clad cruisers were decided as the consequence negotiations between the military and the Ministry of Finance. In other words, this decision on the amount of armaments was realized only after agreement was received from the civil government. Therefore, the civilian part of the government did have something to do with this decision. Consequently, the process of deciding the "Imperial Defense Policy" does not prove the political autonomy of the "military" at that time.

著者

長谷川 貴彦

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.111, no.8, pp.93-102, 2002-08-20

著者

平野 正

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.85, no.12, pp.1613-1652, 1720-1721, 1976-12-20

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The December 9 Movement was a starting point of the anti-Japanese mass movement and the anti-Japanese national united front. The students in Peking started this movement after making their own organizational and political preparations. These efforts led to the great December 16 demonstration parade and also to a movement led by the Southward Expansion Propaganda Group, which aimed at student cooperation with workers and peasants. In addition, the December 9 Movement had a great impact on students throughout the nation, as a student movement arose in every city. These provincial movements were spontaneous protests stimulated by the events in Peking. The student movement in Shanghai was markedly so, but it was overtaken by pro-Kuomintang rightist students and its main political line became the organization of the National Salvation Association. Thus the fate of its original goals was quite different from those of its counterpart in Peking. Yet, the leftist politics shown in the Southward Expansion Propaganda Movement created tension between student activists, and the average student, and so local government authorities took advantage of this chance to suppress this movement. So the sthdent movement was obliged to become dormant. However, by adopting a united front policy, the student movement recovered and came to play a role in the national united front. This policy, aimed at consolidating the student movement, consisted of forming a nation-wide student organization. Consequently there arose the Chinese Students' National Salvation Association, an organization that played a great part in forming the united front. Meanwhile the activities of the Southward Expansion Propaganda Group were taken over by the National Liberation Vanguard Group, which was very important in supporting the student movement on the grass-roots level. After the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War it extended its activities in the provinces, playing a vital role also in strengthening the anti-Japanese National United Front and arousing local groups to participate in the effort. But, for this very reason, the student movement was suppressed by the Kuo-mintang government in August 1938 and was compelled to go into illegal underground activities. However, the student movement that had begun with the December 9 Movement not only proved to be the initiation of the Chinese People's Liberation Struggle. But also it proved to be a movement of enormous historical significance both for the formation and development of the anti-Japanese national united front and for the advancement of the unification of student groups with those of the workers and peasants.