著者

武藤 滋

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.100, no.9, pp.1637-1638, 1991-09-20

著者

泉 卓也

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.101, no.1, pp.133-135, 1992-01-20

著者

小澤 実

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.116, no.8, pp.1414-1415, 2007-08-20

著者

後藤 敦史

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.124, no.9, pp.1583-1606, 2015-09-20

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The research to date on the fleet of the United States North Pacific Exploring and Surveying Expedition (NPSE), which visited Shimoda in May 1855, has concluded that the fleet's aim was to test the effectiveness of the treaty of peace and amity between Japan and the United States, known as the Kanagawa Convention (concluded 31 March 1854), under direct orders issued by the US Secretary of the Navy, despite the fact that the Convention had not yet been concluded when the NPSE departed from Norfolk, Virginia, in June 1853. The purpose of this article is to reveal more concrete detail the diplomatic purposes and reasons behind the NPSE's visit to Japan. It was in August 1852 that the NPSE was scheduled to be dispatched to survey the North Pacific maritime region, as part of US Navy and State Department policy aimed at challenging British hegemony and protecting whale fisheries in the region. While these objectives were similar to those of Commodore Perry's expedition to Japan, the NPSE also intended to negotiate with countries that Perry had not visited. This means that both Perry's expedition and the NPSE were equally important to US diplomacy regarding the North Pacific region. However, the two expeditions did not always cooperate. For example, the NPSE had to suspend its surveying activities when it arrived at Hong Kong in May 1854, because Perry had concentrated his vessels in Japan, leaving no US ships in the South China Sea to protect American merchants during the confusion created by the Taiping Rebellion. Finally, the author shows that when the NPSE did arrive in Shimoda, its aim was to open negotiations with Japan, not on the orders from the Navy, but on the decision of the NPSE Commander John Rodgers himself. Before heading for Japan, the NPSE visited the Ryukyu Kingdom, where Rodgers judged that the treaty between the Ryukyus and the United States, which had been concluded by Perry, was being violated by the government of the Ryukyus, a perception that probably influenced his decision to proceed to Japan. Contrary to the widely held view, the author shows that the Secretary of the Navy did not order the NPSE to visit Japan with the purpose of testing the effectiveness of the Convention of Kanagawa and calls for a reconsideration of the character of US diplomacy regarding the Pacific Ocean region, in general, and Japan, in particular during the mid-19th century.

著者

羽田 正

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.103, no.9, pp.1694-1696, 1994-09-20

著者

廣瀬 憲雄

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.118, no.7, pp.1306-1329, 2009-07-20

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This article examines diplomatic protocol from the latter half of the Tang to the Northern Song period by comparing the political system during each respective period, in order to trace the change of the Chinese World Order. The examination of the late Tang period discovers that 1) before AD 759, the diplomatic protocol was based on the provisions contained in Da-Tang Kaiyuan Li 大唐開元礼, and 2) after which a political system based on new principles was established, showing that changes in diplomatic protocol were closely related to changes in political system. The examination of the Northern Song period discovers that 1) with the exception of Khitan 契丹, the diplomatic protocol was observed as a part of the political system (the dui 対 system), and 2) the diplomatic protocol pertaining to Khitan, which was treated as an equal relationship, was not directly related to the dui system. Concerning the foreign countries treated as sovereign-subject relationship, Chinese dynasty continued to observe diplomatic protocols closely related to the current political systems, despite drastic changes in actual international relations between the late Tang and Northern Song period, and thus maintained the intention to preserve the Chinese World Order. On the other hand, with the appearance of Khitan as an equal relationship, the diplomatic protocol with no relation to the political system came into existence, thus bringing about changes in the Chinese World Order.

著者

谷 徹也

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.123, no.12, pp.2125-2148, 2014-12-20

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The large body of research literature that has accumulated to date on the direct landholdings (kurairi-chi 蔵入地) of the Toyotomi Hideyoshi regime, which formed its power base, has run the gamut from identifying the locations of those holdings to the role they played in funding Hideyoshi's military forays into the Korean Peninsula. The present article attempts to reexamine this research by focusing on the means by which the regime's leaders who administered kurairi-chi went about settling accounts related to it, and in so doing describe in substantive terms such aspects as the regime's internal structure and the remission of rice (kuramai 蔵米) harvested from its landholdings. The author begins with a review of the various fiscal documents related to kurairi-chi; namely, kirifu 切符, uketori-jo 請取状 and kaisai-jo 皆済状 Kirifu was a document drawn up to indicate how kuramai was to be used, addressed to the manager of a kurairi-chi holding and specifying to whom the rice was to be allotted, while uketori-jo was a certificate of receipt for rice remitted to the regime in the form of cash. Kaisai-jo, which was issued in the settlement of accounts and whose function was assumed in 1590 by the sanyo-jo 算用状, recorded the information contained in the kirifu (allotment) and uketori-jo (receipt) related to any transaction. From these documents and the parts of them written directly by Hideyoshi himself, the author concludes that it was Hideyoshi who held the ultimate authority over the regime's expenditures of rice and cash, as well as the determination of tax exemptions (rates) on kurairi-chi holdings, while his functionaries were charged only with settling related accounts. Next the author turns to changes that occurred in the personnel handling the settlement of accounts, beginning with Ito Yozaemon, a Toyotomi retainer with a commercial background, but later reverting to regime functionaries, called Sanyo Bugyo 算用奉行. The staff first consisted of two members, Nakatsuka Masaie and Mashita Nagamori, to whom Asano Nagayoshi and Maeda Gen'i were added. A document dating back to Asano's removal from office in 1595 verifies the office of Sanyo Bugyo as an important administrative group within the regime. Later Ishida Mitsunari would join the staff, then after Hideyoshi's death, the office's duties were incorporated into the Go-bugyo 五奉行 (Five Deputies) system. Finally, following the Battle of Sekigahara, Katagiri Katsumoto and Koide Hidemasa took over the settlement of accounts. Most of the revenue received from kurairi-chi was spent locally, while the portion remitted to the central government was transferred in gold and silver. However, the kurairi-chi managers were almost always late in their submission of copies of tax exemption (rate) lists (men-mokuroku 免目録) and sanyo-jo, to the extent of being fined by the regime for negligence. In light of such a situation, the author concludes that despite the fact that a system of account settlement was firmly put in place within the Toyotomi administrative bureaucracy, the regime was still not able to gain complete managerial control over its kurairi-chi.

著者

朝治 啓三

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.109, no.12, pp.2163-2188, 2000-12-20

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During the time of the Barons' War and its aftermath, two eyres were held in Cambridgeshire, one in 1261 and the other in 1268. In the rolls of those eyres, kept in the Public Record Office in London, 179 names are found in the jurors' list of 1261, and 200 names in that of 1268, while 63 names appear in both. In 1268, other than the ordinary hundred jurors, some 13 persons were selected as "juratores hundredorum de Comitatu Cantebrigie." They were to present the "seisiatores, " those who seized the land of the Disinherited, namely the adherents of Simon de Montfort. Whenpresenting, did those jurors work with a local concern in mind? Or were they influenced by the king or the magnates? This paper investigates whether the influence from outside, that is from the king or the magnates, influenced jury verdicts by taking up the case of the hundred jury of Armingford, Cambridgeshire in the 1260s. If outside influence was not effective, then we must conclude that verdicts were determined autonomously by the jurors themselves. Generally speaking, hundred jurors commonly tended to avoid presenting theirneighbours.However, in some cases, they presented with a kind of factiously spirited intention. Using Farrer's Feudal Cambridgeshire and some other authorities, the author studies the relations between the jurors and their lords or patrons to see if resident landlords were rarely presented by jurys or not. It is interesting to note that Peter of Savoy, the queen's uncle, was presented by the jury several times, while the Earl of Gloucester, once a leading reformer against the king, was never presented of the charge of trespassing. Regarding Warin de Bassingbourn, who used royal favour to take other people's land for his oun use, thehundred jury, or select jury, showed feelings of hate. As to how the Earl of Gloucester benefited the local people, immediately after the battle of Evesham in 1265, he played a prominent role in seising the land of the Disinherited before the king's favourites could come to disseise their wealth. The Earl's influence on the local people was through patronage in keeping their tenures, while the king planned to grant the land to his favourites for their service to him. Within the Armingford Hundred there was not conflict but rivalry between the king and the Earl of Gloucester during the 1260s.

著者

金山 泰志

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.120, no.11, pp.1856-1880, 2011-11-20

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Much of the research to date concerning how China was viewed by Japan during the Meiji period has focused on specific intellectual strata or individual figures, mostly in a negative vein, and has yet to empirically study shifting trends among the general population. Given this situation, the present article focuses on the country's children, using the medium of children's magazines and how they depicted China to identify a major shift during the period just before and after the 1st Sino-Japanese War. Because children's magazines contain not only topical and amusement features, but also educational ones, content seen as edifying for children was included to a significant degree, therefore presenting an evaluation of China thought to be appropriate in Japanese society as a whole. First, the author finds that the content of children's magazines forces one to make a distinction between contemporary China and the China of the classical world, the common trend from the sample of articles chosen being to portray the former in a negative light, the latter in a positive one. Due to the outbreak of war between the two countries, this negative view of contemporary China shifted greatly along with a significant increase of related features on the subject. However, throughout the period in question, this negative trend continued to appear side-by-side with the positive view of historical China. The research to date has not considered this distinction and coexistence, which made it possible, in light of the centuries of historical interaction between Japan and China, for Japanese public opinion to avoid putting the past in a pejorative context for the sake of contemporary feelings of animosity.

著者

團藤 充己

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.121, no.12, pp.2092-2093, 2012-12-20

著者

上野 雅由樹

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.119, no.11, pp.1870-1887, 2010-11

著者

橋爪 烈

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.114, no.6, pp.一一四六-一一四七, 2005-06-20

著者

東中野 多聞

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.108, no.9, pp.1619-1638, 1713-1712, 1999-09-20

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In 1960, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke revised the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. He was a well known politician, having been Minister of Commerce and Industry in the Tojo wartime cabinet. When Tojo requested Kishi to resign in order to reshuffle the Cabinet, Kishi declined, causing Tojo to yield and dissolve his Cabinet on July 18,1944. After the war, Kishi explained that his anti-Tojo actions were aimed at avoiding accusation as a war criminal after the War. There are only a few studies about his wartime politics. Kishi said that he spent his days in idleness after the resignation of the Tojo Cabinet and every study so far acccepts this explanation. The author of the present article doubts this point. After resignation of the Tojo Cabinet, Kishi and 32 others organized a political club called the "Gokoku Doshikai" within the House of Representatives. It consisted of socialists, generals, admirals, and nationalists. They adopted a committee system, established an office, and held study group once a week. Kishi was the virtual leader of this club. They carried out a nationwide campaign called the "National Defence Movement". Kishi also established an ultranationalist association, the "Bocho Sonjo Doshikai", in his hometown of Yamaguchi city. Author also investigates this group, and concludes that both Kishi and the Bocho Sonjo Doshikai were opposed to the end of war. The Gokoku Doshikai was based on one concept of national defence, a "productive Army", (seisan-gun), which aimed at strengthen the economic control. By unifying the munitions industries, Japan could use the materials more efficiently, in preparation for the decisive battle of the Japanese mainland through self-sufficiency. The Gokoku Doshikai was opposed to the Japanese government, because then Prime Minister Suzuki was aiming at ending the war, they denounced the government's policy vehemently; and when Suzuki decided to surrender, the Gokoku Doshikai and the Japanese army resisted. The author concludes that while Kishi contributed to the anti-Tojo movement, he was opposed to surrender. We can see the root of the Kishi's postwar faction in the "Gokoku Doshikai". After the war, two of its members entered the Kishi Cabinet, and five socialist members became the leaders of the Socialist Party. Here we see another point of continuity and discontinuity between prewar and postwar politics.

著者

森山 央朗

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.108, no.12, pp.2175-2176, 1999-12-20

著者

斎藤 聖二

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.95, no.6, pp.1007-1042, 1133-1134, 1986-06-20

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The first revision of the "National Defense Plan" in 1918 has not been analyzed sufficiently mainly due to lack of historical materials. This paper intends to make a comparative study of the Army's and the Navy's original plans by using new materials from the HAMAOMOTE Matasuke Papers and TAKESHITA Isamu Papers. First of all, we must understand why the Army and the Navy were able to agree to revise the National Defense Plan that affected their individual basic war plans, despite their sharp opposition on matters regarding the arms budget. Therefore, the first part of this paper examines the process of the dissolution of the arms budget problem in the second OKUMA Shigenobu cabinet that was shocked by the outbreak of the First World War. The First World War made the military even more aware of the importance of Chinese raw materials. At that time, Japan's support for the third Chinese revolution to destroy Yuan Shih-kai's monarchy added momentum to Japanese hopes for a stronger foothold in China. The Army was now joined by the Navy in urging a stronger military policy with respect to China. Therefore, it was the Chinese problem that initiated the first revision of the "National Defense Plan". When the plan was originally made in 1907, the Navy had refused to include provisions for war operations in China, because it feared that the Navy would then be made secondary to the Army. But due to the internal and external changes produced by the First World War, the Navy now accepted the stipulations to for operations in China. Although originally the Army and Navy had different opinions as what nation presented the strongest military threat, Russia or America, now their respective plans offered the possibility of joining together with the China-plan as a bridge. The appearance of this common target together with the internal political structural demands for the banding together of the Army and the Navy, made the first revision of the National Defense Plan possible.

著者

神武 庸四郎

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.97, no.9, 1988-09-20

著者

玉井 力

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.93, no.11, pp.1751-1768, 1857-1856, 1984-11-20

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The purpose of this essay is to investigate the establishing process of the system of appointment in the Heian period. Firstly the present author investigated the indispensable documents for the appointment ceremony : Shichikan Monjo (七巻文書) [7 volumes documents] Kekkancho (欠官帳) [lists of unoccupied posts] and Omagaki (大間書) [a list of candidates]. And the following three points were made clear. 1.Shichikan monjo except Goiijo Rekimyocho (五位已上歴名帳) [a list of higher officials than 5th rank], Kekkancho and Omagaki seems to have been used since the 8th century. 2.Bunincho (補任帳) [lists of appointees which are included in Shichikan Monjo] and Kekkancho began to be presented not only to the Dajokan (太政官) but to the Kurododokoro (蔵人所) in the 9th century. 3.Goiijo Rekimyocho had been presented only to the Dairi (内裏) before about this time, but around this time it also began to be presented to the Dajokan. Secondly through investigating moshibumi (申文) and rocho (労帳) [applications for appointments] the following points are evident. 1.These applications can be categorized into Gekigata (外記方) and Kurodogata (蔵人方). A Gekigata application was presented to the Gekikyoku and a Kurodogata application was presented to the Kurododokoro. It seems that a Gekigata application owes its origin to the koka (考課) system under the Japanese Ritsuryo (律令) system, and a Kurodogata application owes its origin to the system based on the Imperial order. 2.Moshibumi came to be used frequently from the 810s. In those days it seems that the most of them were presented to Gekigata. But Kurodogata moshibumi gradually increased in number, and many Gekigata moshibumi came to be presented to the Kurododokoro. Late in the 9th century or early in the 10th century except only a little part of the applications applied for lower posts, most of them came to be presentd to the Kurododokoro. It can be safely said that the fundamental system of appointment ceremony in the Heian period was formed by the beginning of the 10th century. And the function of the Kurododokoro was increased through this process. The author can say that as to the appointment ceremony the authority of Emperor was relatively increased, and the authority of the Dajokan was decreased in the 9th century.

著者

古川 隆久

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.103, no.12, 1994-12-20

著者

赤江 雄一

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.116, no.7, pp.1257-1265, 2007-07-20

著者

大久保 文彦

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.104, no.12, pp.2103-2104, 1995-12-20