著者

永井 均他

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.2, pp.181-188, 2000-11-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

佐藤 徹郎他

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.27, pp.125-134, 1994-11-18 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

西勝 忠男

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.103-115, 1974-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

松王 政浩

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.26, pp.81-93, 1993-11-20 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

野家 啓一

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, pp.33-47, 1985-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

戸田山 和久

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.2, pp.1-19, 2003-12-30 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

17

被引用文献数

1

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There seems to be a consensus among philosophers who are interested in Russell's early philosophy of mathematics. They hold that we can best understand the process of its development on the assumption that Russell kept trying to reconcile a type-theoretical solution to the paradoxes with the doctrine of univocality of being. This assumption have worked well in so far as to reconstruct the history of Russell's endearvor from Principles of Mathematics (1903) through the invention of substitutional theory (1905-7). Taking Principia Mathematica (1910) into consideration, however, this assumption seems to fail. There are many questions left unanswerable concerning the relation between PM and his former position. In this paper, I will survey some of the recent findings in the Russell Archives and Gregory Landini's works based on these findings, and clarify the relevance they could have to the "unanswered questions" mentioned above.

著者

川野 洋

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.15-25, 1974-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

3

著者

永井 均

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

no.21, pp.43-55, 1988

著者

三浦 俊彦

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.2, pp.69-81, 2002

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The question "How can I be a?" ("a" being a proper name) has been recently referred to as "The Harder Problem of Consciousness", which would remain mysterious even after "The Hard Problem" about how subjective experiences arise is solved. Since both the indexical "I" and an exemplifying name "a" are ambiguous in their references, a formal analysis is required. Then, it turns out that any disambiguated version of "Harder Problem" is logically reduced to "The Hard Problem" or its special case "How can there be a?". There is no "Harder Problem" with its additional philosophical value. This is simply a matter of logic, independent of any ontology on whether metaphysical self exists or not.

著者

浪岡 淳

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.43-55, 2002-05-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

19

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Is the concept of "person" a substance-concept (i.e. a sortal which determines the primitive mode of being for the entities falling under it), or a phased-sortal (a sortal such that its instance need not fall under it throughout its existence)? Recently some philosophers opposing to the traditional view maintain that we are not always persons and that what determines our identity-criterion fundamentally is the biological concept of "human animal". In this paper I argue that this "Animalist" conception is unsound and that the primitiveness of our animal nature should not exclude the concept of "person" as our substance-concept. I suggest, however, that "person" as a genuine substance-concept requires a fresh understanding, foreign to the traditional definition in terms of a set of certain psychological attributes.

著者

東 克明

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.2, pp.81-94, 1999-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

6

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This paper deals with van Fraassen's 'no-collapse' interpretation, or 'modal interpretation'. In this interpretation he avoids 'collapse' by supposing that quantum mechanical states, unlike classical states, specify possibilities rather than actualities. But my argument will show that van Fraassen's interpretation is confronted with some difficulties concerning values of observables.

著者

藤村 龍雄

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, pp.111-125, 1972-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

19

著者

鴻 浩介

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.113-125, 2019

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<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In this paper, I aim to clarify and vindicate Anscombe's concept of practical knowledge by way of suggesting that some intentional actions are artifacts - i.e. artificial events. Like other artifacts, actions are ontologically dependent upon agents' intention and hence agents can know what they are intentionally doing without any evidence. However, this view comes under attack from skepticism about the reality of artifacts themselves. If artifact kinds are mind-dependent, doesn't it follow that they are nothing but nominal, arbitrary groupings? In reply, I shall argue that artifacts, including actions, are still real in the world we live in because they have characteristic built-in normativity.</p>

著者

信原 幸弘

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.2, pp.1-14, 2000-11-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

12

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Classical computationalism sees cognition as manipulation of syntactically structured representations while connectionism sees it as transformation of syntactically unstructured representations, namely, activation patterns of neurons. J. Fodor and Z. Pylyshyn argue that connectionism fails because every cognitive ability is systematic so that representations in any cognitive domain are syntactically structured. But I argue that some cognitive abilities are not systematic. Classical computationalism holds only for some cognitive domains. But I do not think that our brain is a hybrid of a classical model and a connectionist one. It is wholly connectionist. Syntactically structured representations exist not in our brain but in our environment as external representations. Consequently, eliminativism is right in that propositional attitudes such as belief and desire do not exist in our brain.

著者

渡辺 博

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, pp.63-76, 1982-11-13 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

大出 晁

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.1, pp.1-6, 2001-05-30 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

藤本 隆志

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, pp.19-30, 1975-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

四津 雅英

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.1, pp.35-46, 2012-07-30 (Released:2013-06-05)

参考文献数

18

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In speech act theory, there are two typical views about illocutionary acts. According to the conventionalism, they are essentially governed by conventions or the like. According to the dichotomous view, some of them (such as naming a ship) are so but the others (such as asserting) should be analyzed along the line of Griceʼs analysis of nonnatural meaning. However, it seems that both of the views have problems. I will attempt to analyze illocutionary acts on the basis of the two concepts of “socially regarded" and “ostensible attitudes". It appears that various difficulties with existing views can be resolved by such an analysis.

著者

鈴木 秀憲

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.2, pp.2_47-2_63, 2011 (Released:2012-06-06)

参考文献数

20

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Robert Kane developed naturalized version of Libertarianism in his The Significance of Free Will. In this paper, his free will theory is critically examined.    My criticism consists of two parts. In the first part, I argue that Kane’s theory is troubled by the problem of choice’s being matters of chance, and his account of ultimate control does not provide any solutions. It is also pointed out that though his position satisfies UR (the condition of Ultimate Responsibility), since it is only vacuously satisfied, the source of an agent’s purposes cannot be said to lie in the agent.    In the second part, I compare Kane’s theory with a compatibilist theory, showing that his position gives no more freedom-elevating features than compatibilism. Thus it is concluded that Kane’s attempt fails as a libertarian theory.

著者

石黒 浩

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.2, pp.2_17-2_28, 2011 (Released:2012-06-06)

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I have developed a teleoperated android of myself, which is called Geminoid. Both of the visitor who talks with the geminoid and the operator who operates the geminoid adapt to the geminoid. The visitor recognizes it as me and I, the operator, recognize the geminoid body as my own body. This unique robot system is not only state of the art technology, but also a platform to study cognitive science and philosophy. This paper introduces various phenomena in the use of the geminoid and discusses the philosophical meanings.