著者

黒崎 宏

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, pp.35-48, 1983-11-26 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

石木 新

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, pp.57-69, 1976-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

23

著者

野村 恭史

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.1, pp.61-75, 2004-07-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

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One of alleged problems of Wittgenstein's Tractatus logico-philosophicus (TLP) is that we could give no example of its basic concepts such as elementary propositions, names, states of affairs, simple objects, and so on. The problem is so serious, because it means that the whole theoretical system of TLP could have no applicability. Noya, in his recent book on TLP, proposes to regard ordinary objects familiar to us in our daily life, such as persons, dogs, mountains, rock bands, and so on, as examples of simple objects of TLP. But, I think, we cannot interpret TLP in the way his proposal suggests. In this paper I shall show there is no sense in which we can say ordinary objects are simple objects of TLP. There are two main reasons. One concerns TLP's requirement of logical independency of elementary propositions, and the other concerns TLP's requirement that simple objects should exist independently of what is the case.

著者

伊勢田 哲治

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.1, pp.1-15, 2003-07-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

9

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Alvin Goldman has proposed various versions of reliabilism, trying to resolve its counter-intuitive consequences. In this paper, I critically analyze some of them, and find all of them unsatisfactory, especially in their treatment of the relationship between external world and reliability. My proposal is to incorporate an internalistic aspect into reliabilism, by revising Goldman's notion of 'normal worlds'. This notion is too relativistic to be used as a basis of epistemic justification, but adding some more conditions may make it more useful. I propose the notion of 'the most successful set of normal worlds' as a replacement, which avoids difficulties with both externalism and individualistic internalism.

著者

小山 虎

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.2, pp.165-177, 2003-12-30 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

16

被引用文献数

1

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D. Lewis said that there are three solutions for the problem of temporary intrinsics, namely, relationalism, presentism, and four-dimensionalism. Lewis also argued that the only tenable one is four-dimensionalism. But advocates of the other solutions reject it. Although objection is possible, it seems that Lewis' argument is not enough to show that four-dimensionalism is the best. However, it doesn't mean that four-dimensionalism is not worth considering. For relationalism and presentism are inconsistent. Moreover, relationalism must deny.ordinary talk and presentism doesn't contradict with four-dimensionalism. So it is concluded that four-dimensionalist doesn't have to throw away his position.

著者

有田 隆也

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.2, pp.73-91, 2000-11-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

17

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Adaptation is an essential characteristic of living organisms, which can be grasped clearly by formulating the concept of dynamic fitness-landscapes. We constructed minimal models whose behavior depends on linguistic interaction between individuals and conducted computational experiments based on a constructive approach so as to capture realistic images of dynamic fitness-landscapes. Then, we focused on the effects of phenotypic plasticity on the adaptive walk on complex fitness-landscapes by conducting computational experiments. The results of the computational experiments suggested a new image of adaptation of living organisms.

著者

菅沼 聡

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, pp.47-60, 1995-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

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We define "absolute truth", like "absolutely a priori truth" of H. Putnam, as a proposition (statement) which is true in every epistemically possible world, namely, true no matter how the world turns out (epistemically) to be.We have yet to know whether there are such absolute truth(s) or not. In this paper, we try to propose, only as a program of course, an argument for the existence of the absolute truth.Our argument utilizes the logical structure of "the modal ontological argument" for the existence of God. Using this logical structure, we can enable what cannot have been done by any types of so called "refutation of relativism": to deduce the necessity (or actuality) of the existence of the absolute truth from the possibility of the existence of the absolute truth.

著者

金子 洋之

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.1, pp.21-35, 2001-05-30 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

16

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It is often said that Brouwer's views on language were extremely solipsistic so that there was noting to learn from him about language. It is true that he held the impossibility in principle of communication. But in some of his works, especially in Brouwer [1929], he presents important insights into language. I would like to insist that Brouwer presents two conceptions of language there-communication-based conception and one that makes semantic analysis possible-and that he criticizes the latter because of the excessive productivity of language. I will also show how such an interpretation of his works is possible in his whole philosophy and what this interpretation brings in our understanding of the foundational debate.

著者

渡辺 茂

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.31, no.2, pp.27-39, 1998-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

13

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Biological explanation in psychology has two aspects. One is explanation of mind as functions of the nervous system. The other is explanation of mind as results of evolution. Two different approaches in study of the evolution of mind can be separated, namely reconstruction of history of evolution and analysis of cause of evolution of specific function. These biological study of mind should be integrated as a discipline so called comparative cognitive neuroscience.

著者

笠木 雅史

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.2, pp.3-27, 2018

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<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;It is commonplace to characterize analytic philosophy in terms of the so-called "linguistic turn." Recent historical studies, however, tell or remind us that analytic philosophy is not unified with regard to its methods or subject matters. The purpose of this paper is to contribute toward the accurate picture of the history of analytic philosophy, with a focus on the group of philosophers that was called "Cambridge Analysis" or the "Cambridge School of Analysis" in the 1930s. Firstly, the paper exposes the methods and conceptions of metaphysics championed by members of the Cambridge School of Analysis, such as G. E. Moore, B. Russell, L. S.Stebbing, and J. Wisdom. Secondly, the paper argues that when the Cambridge School of Analysis was succeeded by Cambridge Ordinary Language School in the late 1930s, metaphysics started being conceptualized linguistically.</p>

著者

秋葉 剛史

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.2, pp.2_115-2_134, 2011 (Released:2012-06-06)

参考文献数

11

被引用文献数

2 3

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According to the “truthmaker maximalism”, every true contingent proposition is made true by something in the world, called its truthmaker. Although at first sight the maximalism seems to be a natural position, it has serious difficulties, especially concerning negative truths. In view of this, many truthmaker theorists adopt some non-maximalist position. It is not clear, however, whether these non-maximalists are justified, since existing reasons to justify the non-maximalism are not good enough. In this paper, then, I shall propose a new reason for the non-maximalism, which consists in the observation that the maximalism cannot acknowledge the widely accepted view that certain inferences involving logical constants are valid in the properly logical sense.

著者

原田 雅樹

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.1, pp.47-61, 2006-06-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

17

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For a philosophical analysis of the sciences, Jean Cavailles introduced the "philosophy of the concept", which he opposed to the "philosophy of consciousness", in which category he placed Kant's transcendental critical philosophy and Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Although he took a position against transcendental philosophy, Cavailles did not make common cause with logical empiricism in this opposition. This paper will first explore Cavailles' reasons for opposing the philosophy of consciousness, and his criticism of logical empiricism. Cavailles' notions of "concept" and of "experience" will be examined in order to shed light on the synchronic and diachronic dimensions of "concept" in his philosophy, i.e. its structure and historical dialectic. The paper will then consider the works of some French philosophers, who adopt the philosophy of the concept as a philosophical method. In these investigations, the paper seeks to clarify the meaning of the philosophy of the concept in the contemporary context of philosophy of science.

著者

井頭 昌彦

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.2, pp.109-122, 2005-12-25 (Released:2009-12-07)

参考文献数

16

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Quine maintained a version of physicalism, for which he did not argue sufficiently. His position seems to have resulted from his methodological assumption that the maximization of simplicity has the highest priority as epistemic norm. But no argument for this methodological assumption can be given within naturalized epistemology, especially within instrumentalist conception of epistemic norms. Consequently, Quine's physicalism can not be asserted positively.

著者

太田 雅子

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.1, pp.17-29, 2005-07-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

9

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We often have irrational beliefs which are not coherent with the others. If they could be explained under "The Principle of Charity", they would no longer be regarded as irrational. How can we explain irrational beliefs as such and give their place in the system of our beliefs? Donald Davidson proposed "the partitioning of mind" as the answer to this question, but his solution is hopeless because it seems to be inconsistent with holism. I propose the idea of Motivated Irrationality as an explanatory strategy of irrationality, because I think it can explain irrationality more simply than the mental partitioning and give the way out of the paradox of irrationality.

著者

岡田 光弘

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.2, pp.79-102, 2003-12-30 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

12

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In this paper we show some logical presumptions for the contradiction-form to really mean contradiction. We first give an introductory note that the same argument-form of Russell paradox could be interpreted to derive a contradiction (as Russell did) and to derive some positive non-contradictory results (such as Gödel's lemma on incompleteness and Cantor's lemma on cardinality), depending on the context. This surprisingly suggests that a logical argument of a contradiction itself is rather independent of interpreting it as contradiction or non-contradiction. In the main section (Section 2) we investigate further in the hidden logical assumptions underlying a usual derivation of contradiction (such as the last step from the Russell argument to conclude a contradiction). We show the logical form of contradiction does not always mean a contradiction in a deep structure level of logic. We use the linear logical analysis for this claim. Linear logic, in the author's opinion, provides fundamental logical structures of the traditional logics (such as classical logic and intuitionistic logic). The each traditional logical connectives split into two different kinds of connective, corresponding to the fundamental distinction, parallel or choice, of the fundamental level of logic; more precisely the connectives related to parallel-assertings and the connectives related to choice-assertions. We claim that (1) the law of contradiction is indisputable for the parallel-connectives, but (2) the law of contradiction is not justified for the choice-connectives. (In fact, the law of contradiction has the same meaning as other Aristotlean laws (the indentity, the excluded middle) from the view point of the duality principle in linear logic, and the disputability of the law of contradiction is exactly the same as the disputability of the law of excluded middle, in the linear logic level.) Here, although (1) admits the law of contradiction, the meaning of contradiction is quite diferrent and, in the author opinion, more basic than the traditional sense of contradiction. (2) tells us that the disputability of the law of contradiction for the choice-connectives is equivalent to the disputability of the law of excluded middle. However, this disputability is more basic than the traditional logicist-intuitionist issue on the excluded middle, since admitting the traditional law of excluded middle (from the classical or logicist viewpoint) is compatible with this disputability of the excluded middle (and equivalently the law of contradiction) with respect to the choice-connectives of the linear logic. Then, the traditional logics (classical and intuitionistic logics) are perfectly constituted from this fundamental level of logic by the use of reconstructibity or re-presentation operator, (which is the linear-logical modal operators). With the use of modal operator the originally splitted two groups of logical connectives merge into a single group, which makes the traditional logical connectives. (The use of slightly different modalities results in the difference between the traditional classical logic and the traditional intuitionistic logic.) With the use of modal operator, the contradiction-form becomes to get the traditional sense of contradiction. This situation shows that the traditional sense of contradiction presumes re-presentation or reconstruction of the inference-resources, which is now explicit by the use of linear logical modal operator(s), and which also makes possible the denotational or objectivity interpretation of logical language. The merge of the two different aspects (the parallel-connectives and the choice-connectives) into one, by the presence of the modal operators, also eliminates the original conflict (on the indisputability of the law of contradiction in the parallel-connectives side and the disputability of that in the choice-connectives side.)

著者

岡本 賢吾

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.2, pp.103-118, 2003-12-30 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

3

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Mathematical structures are identified with classes (in naive set theories, which were based on Comprehension Principle), or with sets (in axiomatic set theories, which adopted the principle in its restricted form). By analyzing abstraction operators and the set-theoretical diagonal arguments, the author indicates both classes and sets could be best regarded as certain self-applicable functions, treated as objects on their own. On the other hand, contemporary higher-order type theories, guided by the Curry-Howard Isomorphism, identify mathematical structures with propositions. According to this conception, formal derivation of a judgment counts both as the proof of a proposition and as the construction of a structure. The author examines its significance to the study of how language contributes to the construction of mathematical structures.

著者

前田 高弘

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.1, pp.67-81, 1999-05-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

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注意されたいのは,私はスワンプマンがある種の生物学的機能や心的特性(ないしそれに似た何か)をもつことを否定してはいないということだ.スワンプマンが通常の照明の下で赤いリンゴを目の前にしたとき,彼はあなたが同様の条件下でもつ経験と同じ経験をもつという直観は,内在主義というより,物理的スーパーヴィニエンスに基づく自然主義に由来するものであるように思われる.だが他方で,心的特性を進化論的な観点によって捉えようとする外在主義も同様の自然主義によって動機づけられており,本稿は,この自然主義の内部における対立を調停する試みであると言える.この試みによって,外在主義者たちがスワンプマンに悩まされなくなれば幸いである.だが,たとえそうならなくても,スワンプマンを自然法則に関する形而上学的問題の中に位置づけることによって,志向性や感覚質に関する哲学的議論の場そのものからはスワンプマンに別れを告げることができれば私は満足である.そこではドッペルゲンガーだけで十分だろう.

著者

鬼界 彰夫

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.31, no.1, pp.35-51, 1998-05-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

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This paper tries to establish the following three points about Wittgenstein's On Certainty. The first is that this book is not a collection of fragments about knowledge but the record of Wittgenstein's systematic thinking that aims at a single question. The second is that it is the explication of the meaning of particular certainty Moore showed when he stated he knew, e.g., he had hands that Wittgenstein's thinking aimed at. The third is that Wittgenstein's answer to this question showed a dramatic shift from the "public" interpretation of Moore's certainty to the "private" one about 10 days before his death.

著者

余地 寛

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, pp.77-94, 1996-11-15 (Released:2009-12-07)

参考文献数

33

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This paper presents general systems theory on the basis of ontology. In this systems theory, systems are epistemic frameworks from a nominalistic point of view, and systems objects are positioned through the systems corresponding to their objects. It is not until the correspondence between a system and its systems object that the reality comes into existence. Systems have to be transformed in conformity with changes in objects' environments. This is in cybernetic processes. Norbert Wiener developed the thought that rigidity must be rejected, so his line of thought is the same as the author's. Thus, postmodern sciences start from ontological commitment and rejection of rigidity.

著者

小林 道夫

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, pp.1-13, 1996-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

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I treat in this article Duhem's philosophy of science to clarify the exact sense and the reach of it, by confronting it with some dominant tendencies in the contemporary philosophy of science.