著者

五十嵐 一

出版者

中世哲学学会

雑誌

中世思想研究 (ISSN:03872971)

巻号頁・発行日

no.18, pp.p84-97, 1976

著者

杉森孝次郎 著

出版者

中央公論社

巻号頁・発行日

1937

著者

杉森孝次郎 著

出版者

中央公論社

巻号頁・発行日

1937

著者

杉森 孝次郎

出版者

自由公論社

雑誌

自由公論

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, no.1, pp.2-8, 1948-11

著者

杉森孝次郎 著

出版者

黎明社

巻号頁・発行日

1924

著者

杉森孝次郎 著

出版者

元元書房

巻号頁・発行日

1942

著者

杉森 孝次郎

出版者

経済新誌社

雑誌

経済新誌

巻号頁・発行日

vol.6, no.11, pp.6-7, 1951-08

著者

山内 菜央子

出版者

学習院大学

雑誌

哲学会誌 (ISSN:03886247)

巻号頁・発行日

no.22, pp.87-102, 1998-07

著者

鈴木 祐丞 Suzuki Yusuke

出版者

筑波大学哲学・思想学会

雑誌

哲学・思想論叢 = Miscellanea philosophica (ISSN:02873702)

巻号頁・発行日

no.28, pp.69-79, 2010-01

著者

奥平 康照

出版者

教育哲学会

雑誌

教育哲学研究 (ISSN:03873153)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.87, pp.1-6, 2003

著者

尾形 弘紀

出版者

中央大学文学部

雑誌

文学部紀要 哲学 (ISSN:05296803)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.57, pp.89-121, 2015-02-25

著者

尾形 弘紀

出版者

中央大学文学部

雑誌

文学部紀要 哲学 (ISSN:05296803)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.60, pp.31-64, 2018-03-01

著者

尾形 弘紀

出版者

中央大学文学部

雑誌

文学部紀要 哲学 (ISSN:05296803)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.58, pp.75-94, 2016-02-25

著者

堀江 宗正

出版者

日本宗教学会

雑誌

宗教研究 (ISSN:03873293)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.79, no.1, pp.127-136, 2005-06-30 (Released:2017-07-14)

著者

鴻 浩介

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.2, pp.27-47, 2016

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<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;A normative reason is a consideration that counts in favor of doing something. According to Internalism about reasons, a consideration is a normative reason for an agent to do something only if that consideration is capable of motivating the agent to do that action. Externalism about reasons denies this claim. After surveying the debate between Internalism and Externalism, I defend the oldest version of Internalism, that is, Bernard Williamsʼ deliberative Internalism. My argument is twofold: first I argue that there is a specific motivation for adopting deliberative Internalism, and then try to address the most serious objection against Internalism, <i>i.e.</i>, the undergeneration problem.</p>

著者

石田 隆太

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.67, pp.153-163, 2016-04-01 (Released:2017-06-13)

参考文献数

2

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This paper examines diverse meanings of the term individuatio (individuation) in Thomas Aquinas’s writings. The paper is divided into two sections. The first section focuses on the extent to which diverse meanings of individuatio can be found. In On the Book of Causes (Super librum de causis), Lecture 9, Aquinas presents two kinds of individuatio. One is the case where something (i.e. forma) is received in subiectum and becomes individual. The other is the case where something does not need to be received in subiectum, but is already individual. Similarly, Aquinas posits individuatio through matter (materia), and individuatio by itself separately in A Disputed Question on Spiritual Creatures (Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis), Article 5. Moreover, in Summa of Theology (Summa theologiae), Part I, Question 3, Article 3, Aquinas indicates that the latter individuatio is the individuatio of form (forma) by itself. From these writings, it is obvious that there are a variety of individuationes in Aquinas’s thought.The second section proposes the possibility of formulating diverse principles of individuation (principium individuationis) according to the diverse meanings of individuatio. The proposal is as follows: the principle of individuation can be formulated as matter in material substances, as form (strictly speaking, a separated form different from being) in angels, and as being (esse) in God. This section mainly discusses some related and important texts from On Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Super libros Aristotelis metaphysicae), Book VII, Lecture 11, and Summa against Gentiles (Summa contra gentiles), Book IV, Chapters 10 and 14. The former discussion examines a difficulty in understanding form as the principium individuationis in angels, and seeks to defend that concept. The latter discussion shows how the concept of principium individuationis is applied to God. From these discussions, we can infer that there are also a variety of principia individuationis.

著者

立花 幸司

出版者

東京大学大学教養学部哲学・科学史部会

雑誌

哲学・科学史論叢 (ISSN:13446185)

巻号頁・発行日

no.10, pp.13-36, 2008

著者

酒井 健太朗

出版者

九州大学哲学会

雑誌

哲学論文集 (ISSN:0285774X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, pp.29-46, 2016-09

著者

酒井 健太朗

出版者

九州大学哲学会

雑誌

哲学論文集 (ISSN:0285774X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, pp.19-37, 2018-09

著者

酒井 健太朗

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.70, pp.205-219, 2019

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<p>Aristotle's <i>APo</i>. claims that scientific knowledge requires a cause serving as the middle term in the demonstration. <i>APo</i>. II 11 considers how the well-known "four causes" should be understood in the theory of demonstration. What is key is the relation of the final cause to the other three causes. This paper discusses how the theory of demonstration handles these causes by considering their status and interrelation. </p> <p>Aristotle examines the four causes from the perspective of the major and minor terms in a demonstration. The grounding cause states the essence of the minor term, and the essential and efficient causes state the essence of the major term. However, there are difficulties in considering the final cause. For, in the example of being healthy, illustrating the final cause involves two demonstrations. In the first demonstration, the middle term (food not staying on the surface) explains the essence of the major term (being healthy). In the second demonstration, however, the middle term (being healthy) does not explain the essence of the major term (food not staying on the surface) or the minor term (walking after dinner). In order to answer this problem, we have to mention two points: First, the final cause appears last in generation but arises first as the initial point of the explanation; secondly, the final cause explains the processes to the end as for the end. By considering these facts, I show that the second demonstration explains the major term and the minor term by the middle term from the viewpoint of temporal order that the first demonstration establishes. </p> <p>This paper argues that <i>APo</i>. II 11 divides the four causes into the final cause and the other three causes and claims that the second demonstration includes "hypothetical necessity". Consequently, this paper shows that Aristotle aims to exclude chance from a demonstration having the final cause as the middle term by introducing hypothetical necessity. </p>