著者

三浦 雄城

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.101, no.4, pp.31-60, 2020-03

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Along with development of the study of the Confucian classics (jingxue 經學) during the Han Period, there also appeared a related strain of mystic doctrine (chenwei 讖緯), related to the power of the emperors. The research to date on the use of chenwei-related works has indicated the possibility that although the writings on divination (tuchen 圖讖) done at the time of the enthronement of Later Han Emperor Guangwu (Guangwudi 光武帝; r. 25–57 CE) had no ideational connection to either Confucius or the Confucian classics, by the time of the fengshan 封禪 festivals of heaven and earth at Mt. Taishan 泰山, such prophetic writing was being influenced by Confucian ideas. The present article follows this research in considering exactly how Emperor Guangwu came to deal with chenwei works in connection with Confucian thought. To begin with, despite the fact that the theory that Confucius had written chenwei books to testify to the establishment and continued existence of the Han dynasty (Kong Qiu Mijing 孔丘秘經 Theory) had already appeared during the last years of the Xin Dynasty, the influence of Confucian chenwei thought was no widespread; and even after the uprising and enthronement of Emperor Guangwu, little interest was directed at the connection of chenwei to Confucianism. Rather, it was a time when the Emperor regarded chenwei as being effective in more concrete matters connected to rural life, the conquest of Hebei, etc. It was not until around the 6th year of Jianwu Era (30 CE) that Gongsun Shu 公孫述, the independent warlord of the Sichuan region, began operations to incite people by spreading the word of Confucian chenwei throughout Zhongyuan 中原. Meanwhile, beginning in the previous year, Emperor Guangwu had initiated various programs aimed at stabilizing the social crisis and chaos in the midst of military conflict through the introduction of Confucian ideas. Both movements were attempts to appeal to, agitate among and win the hearts of the people of Zhongyuan, who were by no means steadfast in loyalty to the Emperor Guangwu’s regime, by appealing to them, even if symbolically, with the then widely shared authority, i.e. Confucian ideas. The author concludes that the preconditions for these efforts, i.e. the penetration of Confucianism into Chinese society, led to the utilization of Confucian chenwei by Emperor Guangwu, through the political tensions at the beginning of the Later Han Period.

著者

村田 遼平

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.100, no.4, pp.31-60, 2019-03

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This article examines the background to the government’s operation of soup kitchens (zhouchang 粥廠) in Beijing in the late 19th century. During that time, especially in Beijing, soup kitchens deemed important in providing famine relief. It has already been pointed out in the research to date that soup kitchens in Beijing were frequently operated from the beginning of the 19th century in response to such urban problems as transients and wealth discrepancies between the rich and the poor. What seems to be lacking, however, is ascertaining the government’s overall logic regarding famine relief efforts and analysis of individual cases based on long-term trends. That is why the present article focuses on the case of soup kitchens temporarily operated during the 9th year of the Guangxu 光緖 Era (1883), based on documents written by Zhou Jiamei周家楣, then governor of Shuntian 順天 Prefecture, to examine the process of the project. Soup kitchens in Beijing during that time can be divided into three types: government-operated regular and provisional facilities, and private sector kitchens. Provisional kitchens would be set up near the gates of Beijing and in its suburbs. Then from the Tongzhi 同治 Era (1862–74) on, opening provisional kitchens became more and more frequent, with kitchens operating in both locations during the same year. In 1883, Shuntian Prefecture did not follow the locational formula for provisional soup kitchens, deciding rather to choose sites which did not overlap with existing ones. Moreover, the rule that provisional kitchens at the gates be located at the Inner-City gates was expanded to include kitchens at the Outer-City gates. The closure of the provisional facilities was implemented first in the suburbs, then at the gates, indicating that the Shuntian Prefecture government planned the operation of soup kitchens in and around Beijing Castle in holistic, organic terms. It was in this way that provisional soup kitchens were designed to serve transients in the region rather than the resident population of the suburbs, in response to changes occurring both in Qing Dynasty governance and social conditions during the latter part of the 19th century.

著者

髙村 武幸

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.99, no.3, pp.1-34, 2017-12

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This article examines the kinds of people who passed through Jianshui Jinguan 肩水金關, a Han period garrisoned checkpoint in the northwestern frontier region, in order to clarify the mobility of commoners and the actual relationship between frontier and interior commanderies (jun 郡), utilizing mainly the Han period bamboo slips unearthed at Jianshui Jinguan.Although carrying a passport (chuan 傳) was required when travelling during the Han Period, there were no strict institutional restrictions on long-distance travel, even in the case of commoners on the road for personal reasons. The author’s examination of the Han bamboo slips from Jianshui Jinguan reveals that not a few people from the interior commanderies passed through this checkpoint, a considerable number of whom had obtained passports for the purpose of “private commerce for family business,” and shows that many people were transporting goods from the interior to the frontier commanderies to sell and then returning with cash that had been originally sent as taxes from the interior commanderies. Thus, not only did frontier commanderies obtain from the interior goods that the state alone could not distribute in sufficient quantities, but they were also sending back money to the interior. Such transactions reveal one more link between the interior and frontier commanderies separate from the state-controlled distribution of goods between the two regions.That being said, the majority of the people of the interior commanderies did not directly traded their products with the frontier commanderies of Hexi 河西 and elsewhere, but chose either to stay at home to sell their wares locally, or to commission agents to carry and peddle them in the frontier commanderies. Therefore, most of the private-sector interaction between interior and frontier commanderies was in fact conducted by professional merchants and transport agents acting on behalf of commoners of the interior, passing through Jianshui Jinguan with passports obtained on the pretext of “private commerce for family business.” In the case of Hexi, the overwhelming majority of these agents were from the nearby commanderies of Henan 河南, where commerce had traditionally flourished. In other words, the actual interaction that occurred between the northwestern frontier commanderies, starting with the four commanderies of Hexi, and the interior commanderies was characterized by formal state-operated commodity distribution and military service, on the one hand, and by merchants and transport agents from the commanderies of Henan travelling to and from the interior and the frontier on behalf of clients.

著者

石川 寛

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.84, no.2, pp.255-276, 2002-09

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It is well known fact that the regime of the Rāshṭrakūṭas who extended their power throughout the Deccan and beyond between the 8th and 10th centuries was characterised by dynamic temple-building, including the Kailāsanātha temple of Ellora, and the promotion of Kannaḍa literature. However, a debate still exists over the original homeland and the capital・of the Rāshṭrakūṭas in their early days. A. S. Altekar holds the idea in his reputed “Rāshṭrakūṭas and their Times” (1967) that Dantidurga, the founder of the dynasty, originally hailed from Laṭṭalūra, (modern day Laāṭūr in the Osmānābād district, Mahārāshṭra state) and was a local chieftain under the overlordship of the Chālukyas of Bādāmi. By the time of independence he had migrated to the northern region of Mahārāshṭra where Elichpur, a proposed earlier capital by Altaka, was located.Judging from related records, including a new Kandhār inscription,it is clear that the Rāshṭrakūṭas had never migrated, and that they came from south-eastern and central Mahārāshṭra, the so called “Marāṭhavāḍā” regions, that they comprise the modern day districts of Osmānābād, Nānḍed, Parbhanī, Bīr and Auragabād, and that they used the Kannaḍa language as their mother tongue.Some inscriptions dearly show that Mānyakhēṭa in Gulbarga district, Karnātaka state was the capital city from the days of Amōghsvarsha I, the dynasty’s 6th king. Many scholars have expressed their opinions about an earlier capital. Altekar opines that Achalapura, (modern day Elichpur in Amarāvatī district, Mahārāshṭra state) was the earlier capital. Ellora was regarded as the capital by H. Cousens. But the present state of our knowledge, makes it impossible to identify the earlier capital of the Rāshṭrakūṭas as before establishing Mānyakhēṭa as the permanent capital, even though such locations as Ellora and Mayūrakhaṇḍī seem to have been temporary capitals. The author is of the opinion that Ellora was the capital during the reigns of Dantidurga and Kṛehṇe I, the 1st and 2nd kings, and that Mayūrakhaṇḍī occupied the same position during the time of the 5th king Gōvinda III.

著者

戸川 貴行

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.96, no.3, pp.1-26, 2014-12

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The research to date on Shishuo Xinyu 世説新語 compiled by Yiqing, Prince of Linchuan, has relied on the interpretation that it was a work extolling the reign of Liu-Song (Southern Song) Dynasty Emperor Wen (407-553) as the last great achievement of the Han aristocracy and decrying the present decay of the aristocracy through comparisons with the golden ages of the past.On the other hand, a question should be raised as to why all the sequels of Shishuo Xlnyu ending in Liao Dynasty Emperor Yuan's Jinlouzi 金楼子, compiled by members of generations from whom even the last flourish lay far into the past and thus had no personal experience of what a golden age was really like.In an attempt to reply to such an inquiry, the author of this article points to the necessity of focusing on the historical background of the Sahishuo Xlnyu genre and offers the hypothesis that the compilation of the original work was deeply affected by cultural changes caused by the indigenization of non-Han people fleeing from the northeast (qiaomin 僑民), which also influenced the tone of all its sequels.In more concrete terms, the article begins with the comment that there is no research to date that seriously engages the question of why Shishuo Xinyu contains both positive and negative evaluations of the qingtan 清談 style of intellectual discourse.Secondly, since the main political objective of the Eastern Jin Dynasty's Jiangnan Regime was the recovery of the Chinese heartland, the decision was made that cultural policy, beginning with state protocol and also including qingtan institutions, should not be given priority.Next, the term shenzhou 神州, which indicated the center of the universe, and during the early Eastern Jin Period was geographically identified with the Chinese heartland, gradually moved to the Yangzhou region centered upon Jiankang 建康, which had become prosperous due in part to the successful indigenization of foreign refugees.This change in universal nucleus required cultural adjustments that brought about such phenomenon as the revival in popularity of qingfan as far as the Liao through reforms in state protocol implemented during the reign of Emperor Wen. Therefore the writing of Shishuo Xinyu reflects the decision to abandon recovery in the Chinese heartland and a period of cultural transformation made possible by that decision.Finally, in the background to the parts of Shishuo Xinyu critical of qingtan from the standpoint of Chinese heartland's recovery and those not critical, lurks the two views concerning where the center of the universe actually lies.

著者

三王 昌代

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.91, no.1, pp.130-104, 2009-06

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According to such Chinese sources as Da Ming Shi Lu and Da Qing Li Chao Shi Lu, several diplomatic missions were sent from Sulu to China during the years 1417-24 and 1726-63, during the Ming and the Qing Periods respectively. The present article deals with a Malay document written in Arabic script, called Jawi, which consists of a diplomatic message dispatched by Sultan Muhammad Azim al-Din of the Sulu Sultanate to China in the ninth month of the hijra year 1198 (1784 AD), some twenty years after the aforementioned missions. This diplomatic message was submitted to Emperor Qianlong through the hands of many officials, including the tongzhi 同知 of Xiamen (Amoy), the xunfu 巡撫 of Fujian, and the zongdu 総督 of Fujian and Zhejiang.After describing the circumstances that led to an exchange of documents between Sulu and China, the author deciphers this Jawi document and conducts a detailed analysis of its contents, including a comparison with a public letter addressed to Sulu in 1782 and with the Chinese translation of the document, which was included in a Qing official's memorial to Emperor Qianlong in 1784.The results of the comparison show that both countries shared a common view of a villain who, engaged in foreign trade, and embezzled the takings, and of the quantity of silver and other merchandise that must be returned to Sulu. On the other hand, there are differences in expression or in recognition as to whether the Emperor's instructions had been widely transmitted throughout the Sulu Sultanate. Moreover, the honorific expression for the Sultan himself in the opening sentence of the original was replaced in the corresponding part of the translation by some words that express deference to the Chinese Emperor. Also added is a tribute of respect and gratitude to the Emperor, which was nonexistent in the original. It may be reasonably concluded that the translation was not so much a literal rendering of the original as something close to the expressions in the 1782 public letter addressed to Sulu.Although Jawi documents in general have rarely been used in historical study, this particular source seems to be of great value in understanding diplomatic as well as economic relations between the two countries.

著者

岩田 和馬

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.101, no.1, pp.031-038, 2019-06

著者

北川 香子

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.101, no.1, pp.01-029, 2019-06

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This article is an attempt to clarify the way in which Princess Malika (1872-1951), the daughter of Cambodia King Norodom (r.1860-1904), managed the household of the “Yukanthor Family” and brought up her children, based on the documents related to the Princess. Prince Yukanthor (1860-1934) is a Cambodian historical hero, known for his resistance to the French colonial regime, resulting in his exile, with such honors as a high school and a street named after him in the city of Phnom Penh, while Princess Malika is well-known for such achievements as the establishment of the first school for young women (École Malika) and the compilation and publication of works of Cambodian classical literature (the story of Kaki) and history textbooks. Moreover, their daughter, Princess Pengpas (1893-1969), served as the minister of education under the post-independence monarchy. However, despite such activity and fame, these two women have yet to be the subjects of any serious research; and not for any lack of source materials, for the National Archives in Phnom Penh presently holds at least 13 folders, containing several hundred individual documents, related to the “Yukanthor Family,” which consisted solely of the Princess Malika and her children, who lived in Cambodia after the exile of Prince Yukanthor and his death. The collection records over forty years of the family’s struggle to improve its living conditions through continual petitions to the authorities and replies issued by both the Cambodian and French colonial powers that be.In the process we find, for example, the Princess’ ideas about educating her children, providing them with the highest levels of education possible, including French lessons, regardless of their gender. In more general terms, the Princess, perceiving that the Khmer including herself were powerless than the French, set out to remedy the situation through the introduction of modern education into Cambodia. For her, the barrier between innately privileged royalty and its commoner subjects was even more unsurmountable. From a debate involving a comparison between “Khmer law” and “the laws of other countries,” we discover her perception of Cambodian traditions being equal in worth to those of any other nation, including France. It seems to be these kinds of ideas that greatly influence the process of administering education in post-independence Cambodia.

著者

森 巧

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.101, no.1, pp.1-30, 2019-06

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The present article examines how the Republic of China (Zhonghua Minguo 中華民國; ROC) attempted to reform its foreign affairs sector under its plan to counterattack the mainland during the 1950s, in order to discover the background against which the ROC regime became internationally isolated from the 1970s on. One important factor cited by the research to date as to why the ROC government under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek was able to represent China on the world scene was the political acumen of the ROC diplomatic corps which continued to serve the regime since its mainland days. Then, as the ROC’s foreign policy tended more and more to stress the One China principle (hanzei buliangli 漢賊不兩立), the influence of those diplomats in policy-making waned, leading to the ROC’s international isolation.Here, the author challenges such an argument by the tracing the process in which the intervention of the Kuomintang Party and the military expanded in foreign affairs within reforms conducted throughout the foreign policy establishment during the 1950s under the implementation of the “Recover Mainland China Plan,” surmising that those reforms were part of a bolstering of what had been loosely termed the area of “oversea struggle affairs” (haiwai gongzuo 海外工作). Given such a state of affairs, the author takes up the specific case of the setting up of the Liaison Committee for Overseas Struggle Affairs (Haiwaiduifei Douzhenggongzuo Tongyizhidao Weiyuanhui 海外對匪闘争工作統一指導委員會) under the reforms.Based the idea of a “united front,” which predated the first Taiwan Strait crisis of 1954-55, oversea struggle affairs were continuously expanded during the post-crisis years aiming at counterattacking the mainland. The Overseas Struggle Operations Team (Haiwai Gongzuo Zhidao Xiaozu 海外工作指導小組) set up around the Kuomintang in 1953 and the Liaison Committee set up in 1957 by military intelligence both formed the leadership in oversea struggle affairs, through which the Kuomintang and the military continued to intervene in diplomatic affairs during the post-crisis era, even after the second Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958. The author’s analysis shows that such intervention, which resulted in two phases of institutional reforms, expanded under the guise of conducting oversea struggle affairs aiming at counterattacking the mainland. Then from the 1960s on, similar intervention by other agencies caused a weakening of the position of professional diplomats in international affairs, leading to the ROC’s political isolation from the world scene during the 1970s.

著者

山本 英史

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.101, no.2, pp.31-32, 2019-09

著者

松田 孝一

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, no.3・4, pp.219-247, 1987-03

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The Ho-nan Huai-pei Mongol army 河南淮北蒙古軍 was one of the main Yüan armies. According to chüan 86 of the Yüan-shi 元史, which contains details pertaining to all of the Yüan armies, it consisted of four units of 10,000 soldiers and two additional units of 1,000 soldiers. Hsiao Ch’i-ch’ing 蕭啓慶 has already pointed out that the army was one of the Mongol armies concentrated in the Yellow River valley to separate the capital ta-tu 大都 from the southern region. My concern in this article is with the formation of the Ho-nan Huai-pei Mongol army and its activities under Mongol rule.There were two groups of army commanders. One group belonged to a family of Ta’achar from the Hü'üshin tribe, the other belonged to a family of Temütei from the Jalair tribe. Ta’achar and Temütei commanded armies at the campaign against the Chin 金 from 1231 to 1234 in the reign of Ögetei Qa’an. After the conquest Ta’achar built his base at Wen-hsi circuit 聞喜縣 to guard the region along the Yellow River between P’u Tsao 濮曹 and T’ung-kuan 潼關. The army of Ta’achar became one of the so-called Tammachi armies which was stationed in the frontier regions.The earliest record that lists the organization of the army into four units of 10,000 soldiers is dated at 1252. Two of the units were almost entirely made up of Han chinese soldiers 漢軍. The organization seems to have been formed after the conquest of the Chin, incorporating Han chinese.After the conquest of the Southern Sung, the new headquarters of the army was constructed south of Lung-men 龍門. Soldiers of the army were regularity stationed in the Chiang-nan 江南 and Kan-su 甘粛 regions. The army was also often temporarily dispatched to areas far from the bases along the Yellow River (For examples: Annam 安南 and north-western Mongolia). Although soldiers of the army gradually became impoverished due to such excessive military operations, the organization of the army remained in existence till 1350’s.

著者

西田 龍雄

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.77, no.1・2, pp.035-044, 1995-10

著者

久保 亮輔

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.99, no.3, pp.027-035, 2017-12

著者

鶴間 和幸

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.77, no.1, pp.p1-31, 1995-10

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Simaqian the historian compiled the Xia (夏) Yin (殷) Zhou (周) Qin (秦) and Qinshihuang Benji as pre-history of the Han (漢) in order to write the Wudi (武帝) Benji as a modern history. Both Wudi and Qinshihuang's behavior patterns were similar according to Simaqian's account. As Qinshihuang's image in Qinshihuang Benji is unacceptable as the real image, the purpose of this paper is to clarify the real image of Qinshihuang by analyzing the historical background of the writing. Descriptions of Qinshihuang Benji are classified into a chronological section, the traditional section of the Warring States and a section on the legend that Simaqian himself collected from various places. There is no difference in the quantity among chronological descriptions, but Simaqian put legends, inscriptions, imperial edicts and memorials to the Throne in the section of a chronicle with emphasis. We must recognize that Qinshihuang Benji is a Qin history written from a stand-point of Simaqian, seeing how an increased description was inserted. When Simaqian was twenty years old, he visited historic sites and recorded legends of Qinshihuang. Though this trip was not intended to visit the historic sites of Qinshihuang, the route was similar to Qinshihuang's inspection tour. Simaqian attended Wudi as a government official from the second tour of the total seven tours and during these tours he saw more of Qinshihuang's ruins. Other than these experiences, he referred to a discussion on the history for destinies of Qin dynasty advocated by the bureaucrats in the beginning of the former Han, such as Jiayi (賈誼). But he had initiated an original viewpoint that the era of unified empire is distinguished from the era of Warring State Qin, for he had lived in the era of Wudi. Simaqian had drawn a conclusion to the history of the Qin Empire, dividing it into Qin Benji and Qinshihuang Benji.

著者

徳永 佳晃

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.100, no.4, pp.01-026, 2019-03

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Scholars believe that Safavid Iran (1501–1722) and Mughal India (1526–1858) emphasized their friendly relations with each other and peace was established for many years. It is typical of their good relationship that their monarchs referred to each other in diplomatic correspondence as family members since the seventeenth century. However, detailed analyses of this diplomatic practice have not been conducted. Why did these two empires continue this practice over several generations? To investigate this practice, this study analyzed the usages of terms and expressions indicative of their fictive kinship between the Safavids and the Mughals in their diplomatic correspondence of the seventeenth century. The study particularly focused on correspondence about the Qandahar dispute, which was the biggest disagreement between these two empires. This study revealed the following three points. Firstly, Abbas I (r. 1587–1629) and Jahangir (r. 1605–1627), who experienced a military confrontation regarding Qandahar in 1622, justified their operations using the discourse of kinship, thereby preventing a total breakdown of diplomatic relations between the two empires. Secondly, when confronted by the Qandahar dispute, the heirs of these two monarchs followed this diplomatic practice in an attempt to lessen the negative influence of the Qandahar problem on theit relations, Thirdly, their fictive kinship was referred to in their correspondence with the intention of fixing the relationship, while diplomatic relations generally deteriorated in the second half of the century. In sum, to maintain friendly relations between Safavid Iran and Mughal India, the countries’ monarchs used terms of fictive kinship in their diplomatic correspondence. In addition, they each used that kinship discourse to request the other to accede to their political and diplomatic demands and to explain their military actions. In conclusion, the usages of terms of fictive kinship between these two imperial houses in their diplomatic correspondence over several generations reflect their diplomatic policies used to justified pursuit of their greatest interests while preventing full-scale confrontations.

著者

原 實

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.61, no.3・4, pp.384-398, 1980-03

著者

森川 哲雄

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.64, no.1・2, pp.99-129, 1983-01

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In the spring of 1675, Prince Burni, head of the Inner Mongolian Chakhar tribe, rose in arms against the Manchu Ch’ing Dynasty of China, which was then afflicted by a large-scale rebellion in the south started by the so-called Three Feudatories. Taking advantage of this situation, the prince, along with some other Inner Mongolian chiefs who cooperated with him, aimed at liberating his people from the Manchu yoke and bringing back the old glory of the Chakhar Khanate. Not surprisingly, official Ch’ing sources supply only scant information as to what caused this rebellion and how it developed. At that time, the Koreans of the Yi Dynasty Joseon Kingdom, with their barely-concealed anti-Manchu feelings, were keenly interested in the behavior of Burni and his father, Abunai, and information they gathered on the two princes was included in the Veritable Records of that dynasty, Yinjo Sillog. As the Korean source tells us, the Manchu-Chakhar discord originated in the days of Prince Abunai, who had fallen out with Shun-Chih and would not visit Peking even when the emperor died. After the death of Princess Makata, his first wife, Abunai married another woman without asking for permission from the Ch’ing court and ceased to attend the New Year’s celebrations in Peking after 1663 altogether. In 1669 Emperor K’ang-hsi had him arrested and detained at Shenyang, and granted the Chakhar Principality to his son Burni. Deeply offended by the treatment of his father, the young prince prepared for a rebellion while pretending to be loyal to the Ch’ing. Although it was easily suppressed in a short time, the rebellion of Burnj was one of the most politically significant incidents in seventeenth-century Inner Mongolia

著者

山下 将司

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 : 東洋文庫和文紀要 (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.93, no.4, pp.397-425, 2012-03

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Among the Chinese character epitaphs written for Sogds found to date, we find many instances of appointment to the post of commander of garrisons (junfu 軍府) under the garrison militia (fubing 府兵) system between the Northern Dynasties and early Tang periods. It is also a fact that Sogds were also involved in the formation of local militias that comprised the fighting units of the fubing system. From examples of such Sogdian involvement in military affairs, I had previously pointed out that Sogdian garrisons and army corps may be assumed to have existed at the time in question. However this is merely an assumption based on the existing epigraphy and research to date on the military institutions of the Northern Dynasties, Sui and Tang Periods, concluding that there is still no hard evidence establishing that fact, until now. That is to say, from the epitaph of Cao Yi, which was made public in 2011 in the city of Fenyang, Shanxi Province, we have evidence that a "chejifu 車騎府" of the regional garrison was set up under the "sabao 薩宝" of Jiezhou 介州during the early Tang Period, proving without a doubt the existence of a Sogdian garrison and army corps there. The garrison also joined the Taiyuan uprising led by Li Yuan 李淵in 617, and it had incorporated Sogdian armed forces since before the founding of the Tang. Moreover, when compared to the Sui period epitaph of Yu Hong 虞弘 excavated in 1999, we find that the Tang period garrison had its origins in the local army corps led by Sogdian commander Yu during the last years of the Northern Zhou, and it becomes clear that Sogdian garrisons and army corps existed in the final years of the Northern Dynasties at the latest. Then during the Zenguan 貞観 (627-49) era, as the Tang Dynasty established control, these Sogdian garrisons and army corps were disbanded. In consequence, Sogdian ruling class returned to their former occupations such as commerce, and others became peasants of the Tang Dynasty.

著者

松尾 有里子

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.80, no.1, pp.103-110, 1998-06

著者

髙村 武幸

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.91, no.1, pp.1-34, 2009-06

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Within the study of the history of the Han Dynasty, a subject that relies on excavated historical sources, official documents constitute the main body of primary sources, particularly in the study of government administration. Correspondence, on the other hand, which exists in lesser quantity than official documents, has in the past been considered to be unrelated to administration and the legal system, and consequently, very little research has been done to date on the subject. However, as indicated in even some of the related research to date, there are examples of connections of correspondence to the activities of the government bureaucracy. Hence, this paper examines a selection of correspondence from the Juyan and the Dunhuang Han wooden documents (居延・敦煌漢簡) containing content related to the public sector and considers how correspondence should be placed within the stud of documents related to Han Dynasty administration.There is a surprisingly large and varied amount of correspondence related to many different aspects of public affairs. A survey of the correspondence reveals that documents known as guanji (官記) and fuji (府記), previously thought to be forms of official document, are in fact fundamentally forms of correspondence. It also becomes clear that there are missives that, despite having a correspondence format and style, performed the same function as public records submitted from higher to lower (下行) and lower to higher (上行) organizations. Thus, “official correspondence” was widely used in administrative settings, in the same manner as documents.In most instances, “official correspondence” was used to handle matters that had not yet reached the stage of official document production, or to deal with problematic matters that would be inappropriate for official documents. This correspondence was written in the simple, private writing style of the time and was used when there were matters that needed to be resolved in a “private or secret” fashion. By adroitly dividing their affairs between formal official declarations and private correspondence, Han Dynasty bureaucrats were able to nimbly and organically manage the administrative matters of state.The author concludes that research on this type of dual “document administration” should be turned to the content of government-related correspondence and how this body of documentation functioned, in order to gain a better understanding of the real state of Han Dynasty affairs. Furthermore, the viewpoint taken in this article will hopefully prove effective in studying the large body of correspondence found among the excavated materials related to the late Eastern Han, Wei and Jin Dynasties.