著者
中川 久嗣
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1998, no.49, pp.271-279, 1998-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

ミシェル・フーコーの思想を前期と後期に分けるよく知られたやり方に従うならば、『知の考古学』 (L'archéologie dusavoir, 1969) は、前期最後の著作として位置づけられ、一般には知のシステム性へと向けられた彼の前期の思想内容を方法論的レヴェルで総括したものと言われている。そこでのフーコーの主要な眼目は、言表や言説の特殊な規則性とその自律的性格を明確化し、それに基づいて知の特殊な布置の構造を、実定性やアルシーヴや歴史的先験性といった諸概念を用いて分析する、いわゆる考古学的方法論の理論化を行うことであった。ところでドレィファスとラビノーの研究 (以下、D/Rと略記) は、フーコーの前期の考古学を、あまりにも自律的な言説の構造に捕らわれ過ぎた点で方法論的失敗であるとし、フーコーがそれを放棄して権力分析を目指す後期の「系譜学」へ移行したことをより高く評価する。実際フーコー自身、考古学にかわって系譜学を自らの方法として全面に打ち出すようになるであろう。しかし前期フーコーの思想と言われるものは、D/Rの言うように、本当に失敗であり、つまりは意味のないものなのであろうか。本稿ではこのような視点から、構造主義に最も強く影響されていたとされるこの時期の著作『知の考古学』における「言表/言説」と「実定性」の概念を取り上げ、そのうちに、後期の権力論へと続いてゆく基本的な考え方と可能性が存していることを明らかにしようとするものである。
著者
林 誓雄
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2012, no.63, pp.249-263_L14, 2012 (Released:2012-10-16)
参考文献数
16

Hume insists that the rules of justice are established by a convention, that is, ‘a general sense of common interest’, not by our ‘promise’ or ‘consent’ as the social contract theory advocates. Nonetheless, Hume's theory is sometimes regarded as a kind of social contract theory. Furthermore, Hume is often interpreted as a kind of utilitarian, since he says that utility is the chief foundation of justice. One of the reasons why such interpretations arise, in my view, is that Hume uses the words ‘interest’ or ‘utility’ very ambiguously in his arguments. Because of this ambiguous usage, it is difficult for us to understand clearly the specific contents of such phrases as ‘common interest’, ‘public interest’, and ‘public utility’. As the result, the readers of Hume's works are put into confusion. In this paper, I attempt to clarify what Hume means by these terms in order to resolve this problem. First, considering the relation of ‘common interest’ and ‘public interest’, I maintain that they are different kinds of interest. Second, I turn to consider what Hume means by ‘public interest’. In considering ‘public interest’, I draw attention to the distinction of societies which Hume makes: the distinction between a small society (such as the family) and a large one. Given this distinction, we will see that there are two kinds of ‘public interest’: one applicable to a small society and the other to a large one. Finally, I show that what Hume means by ‘public utility’ is not ‘public interest’ but ‘the common interest’ by which we human beings establish the rules of justice.
著者
佐藤 和夫
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1980, no.30, pp.158-169, 1980-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)
著者
水野 俊誠
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2011, no.62, pp.315-328_L18, 2011 (Released:2011-12-09)
参考文献数
19

Three main theories exist concerning the concept of happiness: the hedonism theory, the desire fulfillment theory, and the objective list theory. The hedonism theory states that happiness has pleasure or pleasurable mental states as its only required component. According to the desire fulfillment theory, happiness is obtained when one's desires are fulfilled. In the objective list theory, the pursuit of certain things contributes to happiness, regardless of whether these are desired or lead to pleasurable mental states.John Stuart Mill is often labeled a hedonist because he wrote, “By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure”. However, some of his writings also indicate that he accepts the desire fulfillment theory and the objective list theory as well. Many different interpretations have therefore been presented concerning Mill's concept of happiness, and in this paper I examine some of the main interpretations and clarify Mill's concept of happiness.I propose that Mill's fundamental position is hedonism, but argue that his concept of happiness was consistent with some elements of the objective list theoryes. When considering elements of the objective list theory, he admits that happiness comprises the pursuit of certain things for themselves; however, he does not agree that such things contribute to happiness regardless of their pleasantness.My interpretation of Mill's concept of happiness is consistent with the evolution of his thought as it developed away from Benthamic hedonism and later incorporated Romanticism.

1 0 0 0 OA 行為論の現在

著者
岡部 勉
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2000, no.51, pp.33-46, 2000-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

The origins of the current philosophy of action, it might be said, are G. E. M. Anscombe (Intention, 1957) and D. Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes, 1963). But I suspect we are now in a dark forest, not to say desert, remote from those origins. From the 1980s, philosophers have accumulated books and papers on intentionality and on causation. I contend that the philosophy of action must be appropriately connected with the philosophy of mind, on the one hand, and with the philosophy of language, on the other. I make enquiries in this paper whether arguments about intentionality, which is said about action, consciousness, and language likewise by philosophers, can give a basis for the connection expected among those; and whether arguments about causation can contribute towards giving such a basis.

1 0 0 0 OA 二つの合理性

著者
神崎 繁
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1999, no.50, pp.42-60, 1999-05-01 (Released:2010-05-07)
参考文献数
44

人が学ぶのは技巧ではなく、正しい判断を学ぶのである。もちろん規則はあるが、それは如何なる体系もなしておらず、ただ経験を積んだ者のみがそれを正しく適用することができる。それは計算の規則とは異なっている。ここで、最も困難なのは、この不定な規則を正しく、しかも改変を加えることなく、表現へともたらすことである。[ヴィトゲンシュタイン『哲学探究』第二部.xi]
著者
若林 明彦
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1995, no.46, pp.201-209,8, 1995-10-01 (Released:2009-07-23)
参考文献数
21

Die beiden Begriffe "docta ignorantia" und "coincidentia oppositorum" bei Nikolaus Cusanus and die Idee der Humanitat bei Pico della Mirandora ubten Einfluβ auf die Humanitat bei Ernst Cassirer und den Aufbau seiner Philosophie. Auf der einen Seite entdeckte Cassirer die sym-bolische Funktion der menschlichen Erkenntnis in jenen beiden Begriffen bei Cusanus and erwies die Harmoniezwischen den verschiedenen symbolischen Formen durch ein methodisches Prinzip, "coincidentia oppositorum". Auf der anderen Seite bekam er bei Pico die Glaube an die reine Schopferkraft des Menschen and an die Autonomic dieser Schopferkraft, namlich die Idee daβ der Wille zur Gestaltung das Sein bestimmt and setzt.
著者
矢嶋 直規
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2010, no.61, pp.293-307_L18, 2010 (Released:2011-01-18)
参考文献数
21

The question of “why be moral?” has been the leading problem in every moral philosophy since Socrates. Hume tackles this problem in the concluding chapter of An Enquiry concerning the Principle of Morals. Many commentators take it that Hume does not commit himself deeply to refuting the “sensible knave,” who is always seeking to commit injustice for personal gain while pretending to be a moral person. I maintain, however, that it is possible to read a fully convincing response to this problem into Hume's theory. The significance of this problem to Hume is, more than anything, its connection to the fierce controversy of Hume's time between the moral sense theories and the egoist moral theories exemplified by Hobbes and Mandeville.Hume presents mainly two grounds to deny the claim of the “sensible knave.” One is that he is unlikely to successfully follow through with his wicked plan because his wisdom fails to bear up to public scrutiny, and the second is that if he is successful in his injust action, by exchanging the most precious treasure, that is reflection on his own character, for the worthless rubbish that he mistakes for his private interest, he is decisively defeated. I clarify that Hume's claim must be understood based on his comprehensive theory of custom. As moral individuals, we are dependent on the general perception of natural, psychological and moral things, a perception which can be mutually understood among members of a stable community. Moral perceptions also rely on the same psychological mechanism of human nature. Our human nature exerts the same binding force on moral perceptions as natural perceptions do. In this way, I seek to show that Hume's entire theory of the Treatise provides a naturalistic foundation for morality which culminates in the authority of government.
著者
中村 大介
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2010, no.61, pp.277-292_L17, 2010 (Released:2011-01-18)
参考文献数
17

La position philosophique de Jean Cavaillès (1903-1944), dans son ouvrage posthume Sur la logique et la théorie de la science, est considérée généralement comme «spinoziste», position qui n'apparaît guère dans sa thèse principale Méthode axiomatique et formalisme. Notre objectif est ici de montrer en quoi consiste le spinozisme de Cavaillès, en insistant sur la transition entre ces deux écrits. Nous examinons d'abord le «formalisme modifié», conception défendue par Cavaillès dans sa thèse principale sur le fondement des mathématiques. Cette conception s'organise selon deux axes. Le premier axe concerne la théorie de la généralisation qui montre la fécondité du processus des mathématiques. Il faut cependant justifier l'introduction d'une nouvelle théorie qui présuppose l'infini actuel. Le deuxième axe concerne l'«expérience sur le signe», qui joue précisément ce rôle de justification. Selon Cavaillès, c'est le signe qui est la condition de la possibilité de l'expérience et le «geste» ou l'expérience sur le signe justifie toutes les théories des mathématiques. Il défend par ailleurs l'idée d'une transformation du monde par les mathématiques. En développant cette position, Cavaillès aboutit, dans son ouvrage posthume, à «la philosophie du concept». Le rôle de justification d'une nouvelle théorie étant absorbé dans le devenir des mathématiques elles-mêmes, l'expérience se transforme en un simple aspect de ce dernier, l'autre aspect résidant dans la transformation du monde. C'est ainsi que la philosophie du concept apparaît comme une théorie du sens qui analyse le devenir comme auto-développement des concepts pour élucider des états du monde ainsi que l'élargissement de l'expérience. Nous interpréterons enfin le spinozisme de Cavaillès de deux manières : l'auto-développement des concepts rappelle «l'idée de l'idée» de Spinoza ; le parallélisme entre deux aspects du devenir correspond à celui de Spinoza entre l'ordre des choses et celle des idées.
著者
尾関 周二
出版者
The Philosophical Association of Japan
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
no.48, pp.54-68, 1997

J. D. Bolter considers the transformation of "writing space" in the Computer age, and finds the essence of the electronic book which the print book does not have to the character of "Hypertext", which also corresponds to the direction of "Network culture" of the society. On the other hand, Bolter considers the image of man (and the mind) in the informationalized society to be "Turing's Man (i.e. information processor/semiosis)." From such viewpoints he criticizes the Cartesian view on man at the West modern ages. However, I doubt that "Turing's Man" is only a reflection of the tendency of systematization and "Versachlichung" which becomes strong more and more in society from modern ages to present age. Therefore, I think that we should understand the meaning of the informationalized society for man not only from the perspective of "writing space" like Bolter, but also the perspective of new "Oral culture" on which W. J. Ong insists. And, I related Ong's thought of the revival of the community with electronic media to Marx's community thought. In addition, I attempted to mediate them by the thought of communicative subject of Habermas and referred the "Mode of information" of M. Poster critically. Finally, I pointed out the importance of the introduction of the viewpoint of the environmental problem into the community problem because of "virtual reality"