著者

湯浅 泰雄

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1969, no.19, pp.108-146, 1969-03-31 (Released:2010-01-20)

参考文献数

37

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It seems that the modern philosophers in Japan, Nishida, Tanabe, Watsuji and Miki, are not so interested in Confusiasm in proportion to Buddhism. They have been bred in Confusiastic education in their boyhood, and in their youth they were strongly influenced by modern European philosophy which made them critical to the feudal Confu-siastic moral in their beyhood. I think, however, the framework of their philosophical thought are based upon the Confusiastic tradition unconsciously. Unfamiliarity with the Western thought, which grew by degrees, led them back to the Eastern tradition and Buddhism. Confusiastic education in their boyhood had survived here uncon-scionsly. For, the orthodox Confusiastic school in Tokugawa Era (Sogaku) had been established from the first under the strong influ-ence of the medieval Cninese Buddhism, Zen and Kegon sect, so buddhistic and confusiastic ways of thinking are inseparable in their philosophies.They seek the unified or undivided horizont of theoretical and practical philosophies. In the tradition of western philosophy, the unity between “theoria” and “praxis” may be a metaphysical ideal that can be never possible in our dayly experiences in this world. They insist, on the contrary, that this unity is the most immediate experience in human life. For instance, Nishida's “Pure Experience” means the fundamental unity of Good and Reality. This way of thinking, I think, has its origin in “Kakubutsu-Chichi” (Intuition through things) in modern Confusiasm (Sogaku).Then, they divided two kinds or directions in practice: introverted and extroverted. Extroverted practice means social and ethical activities, and the introverted practice means the religious and metaphysical “inner way”, through which man can ascend to the height of “hierophany”. This “inner way” to the great religious awakening, which has its origin in the fundamental spirit of Mahayana Buddhism, Sunya, bring the true human personality to its perfect realization and also make possible the unity of theoretical and extroverted practical human activities in this world.By the way, their ways of thinking have been influenced not only by Buddhism but also by the traditional culture in Japan. For, the Chinese culture does not like the mystical “inner way”, so the Zen and Kegon sects in medieval China attach more importance to the moral custom in the dayly-life in this world, compared with the same sects in Japan. In the tradition of Japanese culture, I think it is possible to find the powerful tendencies to seek the dialectical unity between the “inner way” and the daily ethics, for instance as in Kukai's Mystical-esoteric Buddhism.

著者

小林 登

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1963, no.13, pp.16-30, 1963-03-31 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

屋良 朝彦

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1996, no.47, pp.276-285, 1996-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

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Merleau-Ponty qualifiait la réversibilité de «vérité ultime». «La réversibilité» exprime la fonction ontologique d'alterner les deux termes <le voyant-le visible>, <le touchant-le touché>, tout en les faisant demeurer dans la même chair. Et plus il soulignait l'importance d' «une réversibilité toujours imminente et jamais réalisée en fait». Je ne parviens jamais à me toucher touchant. Il y a quelque chose qui déborde cette réversibilité. Le but de cette essai est rechercher le sens de l'imminence de la réversibilité. Est-ce la latence de l'Être ? ou la transcendance de l'Être ? ou la transcendance même au-delà de l'Être ? La possibilité de déchirer l'ontologie de la chair serait montrée, qui est «l'impensé» dans la dernière philosophie de Merleau-Ponty.

著者

村上 陽一郎

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1977, no.27, pp.1-9, 1977-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

山口 まり子

出版者

The Philosophical Association of Japan

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.53, pp.227-236,241, 2002

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Discussions about fictional names provide us an interesting perspective when we try to make clear important notions in the philosophy of language, such as sense and reference, because, so far, few theories have been successful in treating fictional names.<BR>In this paper, I first point out that fictional names raise problems for two influential views in the philosophy of language, namely, Mill's view that proper names do not have meaning but only refer to their object, and Frege's view that proper names do have both reference and meaning(or sense). And then we shall examine three options to overcome the difficulties, namely, the predicate view, Walton-Evans' make-believe theory, and Thomasson's theory of dependent abstracta. Each view has its own merit and demerit when sentences/statements containing fictional names are divided into two types: internal and external. Internal statements express what is the case in a story(say, 'Sherlock Holmes is a famous detective)and external statements express what is the case from the real-world point of view(say, 'Sherlock Holmes is created by Conan Doyle'). I would like to propose that the make-believe theory would be the best option for internal statements and Thomasson's view for external statements. But what about statements that are both internal and external at the same time, such as 'Sherlock Holmes is a detective created by Conan Doyle'? This problem is discussed in§4 and one option is proposed there.

著者

原 健一

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.71, pp.208-219, 2020-04-01 (Released:2020-05-12)

参考文献数

7

著者

馬場 智一

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.63, pp.233-248_L13, 2012 (Released:2012-10-16)

参考文献数

18

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Levinas est un philosophe d'inspiration juive. Il est connu de tous que la source principale du judaïsme dans son oeuvre est le Talmud. Pourtant, à faire du Talmud l'unique référence des recherches d' inspiration juive de Levinas, on néglige le rôle important qu'a joué Maïmonide—le plus grand philosophe juif de la période médiévale—dans la formation de sa première philosophie. La présence du «docteur de la Synagogue» dans l'un des écrits des années 30 du jeune Levinas s' explique elle-même par la relation intellectuelle féconde qu' il a entretenue avec son collègue Jacob Gordin. L'influence de ce dernier sur sa pensée apparaît évidente lorsque l'on compare, chez ces deux philosophes, les arguments qui font référence à leur lecture de Maïmonide: l'actualité de la pensée de Maïmonide au temps de la crise en Europe ou la singularité assez forte de sa pensée éthique au sein de l'aristotélisme médiéval par exemple. En outre, le rapport au Dieu qui individualise chaque homme, que Gordin a dégagé du Guide des égarés, se transforme en rapport d'autrui à l'homme chez Levinas. Par ailleurs, sur ce plan éthique où l'on ne recourt jamais à la méthode de l'analogia entis, Gordin, lui, stimulé par le travail d'Etienne Gilson sur la «philosophie chretienne», semble avoir révé de la possibilité d'une «philosophie juive». L'élan de renouveau de cette philosophie fut donc transmis par Gordin à Levinas et constitua, il nous semble, le premier moteur de sa critique de la «philosophie occidentale» dont le développement atteindra son apogée dans Totalité et infini.

著者

和泉 ちえ

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.69, pp.48-52, 2018-04-01 (Released:2018-08-01)

著者

倉田 剛

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.71, pp.49-68, 2020-04-01 (Released:2020-05-12)

参考文献数

21

著者

佐藤 暁

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.62, pp.253-266_L15, 2011 (Released:2011-12-09)

参考文献数

9

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Inquiry into the theory of meaning (hereafter refered to as “inquiry”) is a new method of inquiry in the philosophy of language proposed in the 1960s. It was considered new in terms of both its subject and method. In this paper, we identify the subject and method of Dummett's analysis, as he advocated his anti-realist theory of meaning. For Dummett, inquiry is the analysis of the ability that a person who can speak a language actually has, that is, a practical ability to speak a particular language. The ability to speak a language is not the ability to speak sentences or a set of such abilities, because one learns to speak a language not by memorizing sentences or their use. An analysis of the ability to speak a language is parallel to that of an ability to cook a particular dish. Dummett says a theory of meaning is a description of linguistic ability.However, it is not clear how we can philosophically “describe” an unobservable ability that is distinguished from any observable act. In justifying his project, Dummett asserts that practical abilities can be classified as knowledge or nonknowledge. The former abilities, being knowledge themselves, have propositions the knowledge of which translates to the ability itself. These propositions are not a description of the ability from the outside but an “internal description” of such an ability. The propositions themselves are components of an ability, and abilities can be philosophically analyzed by clarifying these propositions. Dummett states that the abilities to speak a language and cook a dish are both knowledge.In cooking, the recipe of a dish is an internal description of the ability to cook the dish. Therefore, we can clarify propositions corresponding to a recipe in cooking as an analysis of linguistic ability. Clarifying such propositions is inquiry, and the propositions constitute a theory of meaning for language.

著者

渡辺 祐邦

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1970, no.20, pp.186-198, 1970 (Released:2010-01-20)

参考文献数

47

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本稿の目的はヘーゲルの『論理学』における生命の概念を十八世紀の啓蒙主義的自然哲学の伝統との連関において考察し、ヘーゲルにおける弁証法の問題と十八世紀における生物学的諸発見との間の根本的連関を見出すことにある。ヘーゲルの論理学における「生命」の問題は一見彼の時代の自然科学の諸問題と全くかけ離れている様にみえる。しかし彼がそこで考察した諸問題は彼の時代の生物学的認識の発展と本質的に連関していたのである。とは云えこの両者を直ちに結びつけることは非常に危険である。われわれは彼の弁証法の問題と生物学の問題との連関を正しく考察するためには、十八世紀における生物学者の観察が同時代の哲学に対していかなる問題を提起したかを考察しなければならない。ヘーゲルの論理学における「生命」の理念の諸問題は十八世紀のドイツにおける啓蒙主義的自然哲学において提起された諸問題の伝.承を通じてのみ把握されうるのてある。ロジニは彼の大著 『十八世紀のフランス思想における生命の記学』において、十七世紀と十八世紀に行われた生物学的発見が十八世紀の哲学的精神に及ぼした作用を詳細に考察した。そこで彼は次の様に述べている。「一六七〇年から一七四五年までの生命の科学の歴史はアプリオリな機械論に対する観察それじしんの長い戦いの歴史だった。この戦いの結果は疑うまでもなく機械論の破滅に帰着した。」ところでドイツ自然哲学の諸問題も全く同じ観察によって提起されたのである。ドイツの啓蒙主義的思想家も、超自然主義的信仰や自然神学に対する彼らの戦いにおいて、必然的に生物学の諸問題を考察しなければならなかったからである。

著者

古田 徹也

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.63, pp.265-279_L15, 2012 (Released:2012-10-16)

参考文献数

11

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Discussions of “joint action” or “collective action” that have developed out of English-language works on action theory might be said to have arisen from the intuition that action alone and action in a group are distinctly different things. But is it really necessary to conceptually distinguish joint action from the action performed by individuals? If it is necessary, how should we characterize joint action? This paper seeks an answer to these fundamental questions. In Section 1, I first argue that it is possible to define joint action as distinct from individual action. I then propose a definition of joint action in terms of the interdependency of action by multiple agents. In Section 2, noting that most existing theories of joint action describe it as an entanglement of each individual' s propositional attitude (intention, belief, etc.), I argue that we need to understand joint action not at the level of propositional attitude but, rather, at the level of action. In Section 3, I critically consider the idea that it is necessary to specifically characterize a group as an agent distinct from the individuals performing a joint action. Finally, in Section 4 I show that the scope of an action, as well as the scope of agents of joint actions, can be determined not a priori but only within the context of the particular event, and that the concept of joint action should be examined in association with ethical concepts such as “negligence”, “fault”, and “responsibility”.

著者

井上 達夫

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.52, pp.14-17,312, 2001-04-01 (Released:2009-12-09)

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Philosophical critics of the idea of justice have been motivated by a misperception of this idea: they depicted it as an ideological device for rationalizing our desire to castigate and dominate others in a pharisaic and self-righteous way. They "debunk" the hegemonic function of justice that reproduces and reinforces our self-centered will to power.I will correct this misperception by showing that the truth is the other way around. I argue that the test of reversibility implied by the universalistic idea of justice requires us to carry out a searching self-critical scrutiny of justifiability of our rights-claims and power-claims to others by imagining ourselves not just in their places but in their perspectives. This means that justice requires us to transcend our self-centeredness and seek for public reasons that are intelligible and acceptable both from our own and the others' viewpoints.I also argue that the idea of public justification inherent in the idea of justice guides us in designing a fair political decision-making system that accommodates and resolves the value conflicts about what constitutes public reasons. The political corollaries of the universalistic justice that serve this purpose are the liberal idea of the priority of jusitce over specific conceptions of the good life and the idea of critical democracy that integrates constitutional protection of minority rights on a fair and principled basis with the promotion of the public-spirited democratic deliberation that overcomes the vices of interest-group pluralism.

著者

上野 修

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.57, pp.77-92,5, 2006

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Spinoza's system, startling indeed with its strange appearance-<I>Deus seu Natura</I>, or God as the immanent cause of everything-, will be made more understandable if we consider it as a systematic attempt of nailing down a necessitarian concept of truth and existence. I shall examine his denial of contingent truth in the <I>Tractatus intellectus emendatione</I> which is closely related to Cartesian idea of certainty, and show how it brings Spinoza to the concept of the <I>omne esse</I>, the whole Being, where truth, existence and actuality are all flattened out into one reality <I>sub specie aeternitatis</I>. After reconstructing from a modal point of view the theory of human knowledge in the <I>Ethica</I>, I shall briefly discuss a strong notion of actuality Spinozan idea of necessity might convey, together with its ethical import.

著者

加藤 泰史

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.60, pp.9-31_L3, 2009 (Released:2010-11-09)

参考文献数

28

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Aufgabe dieses Beitrags ist es, die Probleme in Bezug auf die „Armut“ in der sich gegenwärtig vollziehenden Globalisierung über den Bereich der Wirtschaft hinaus umfassend darzustellen und philosophisch zu analysieren. Dazu stellt der vorliegende Beitrag vor allem die folgenden Fragen:1.Wenn die Unterscheidung zwischen einfacher und reflexiver Modernisierung, wie sie z. B. von Beck vertreten wird, übernommen werden kann und wichtige Vorkommnisse in der modernen Gesellschaft auf dem Weg zur reflexiven Modernisierung durch das Konzept der „Individualisierung“ besser charakterisierbar sind, worin bestehen dann die besonderen theoretischen Schwierigkeiten angesichts der gegenwärtigen Armut?2.Wenn die Globalisierung die staatlichen Funktionen zunehmend fragmentiert, welche Rolle spielen dann die Nationalstaaten noch bei der Beseitigung dieser Armut?An dieses Projekt knüpft sich die Hoffnung, die modernen Debatten über „Umverteilung“ (Fraser) und „Anerkennung“ (Honneth) von einer Kantischen Perspektive aus (und ergänzt durch die im Neukantianismus erneut interpretierten kantischen und fichteschen Ansichten) verständlich zu machen, um dadurch die Armut in der Globalisierung umfassend als Verletzungen der Menschenwürde verstehen zu können. Hierbei greift das folgende Kantische Konzept: „Der ursprüngliche Kontrakt“ (Gemeinspruch, AA, VIII, 297) lässt sich als „Institutionalisierung von Institutionen“ oder „Institutionalisierung der Institutionalisierung“ (Schönrich) interpretieren und wiederum lässt sich durch „den öffentlichen Gebrauch der Vernunft“ (Aufklärung, AA, VIII, 38) realisieren, durch den man Verletzungen der Menschenwürde finden und dem „Publikum“ oder der Öffentlichkeit aufzeigen kann.Um die Armut zu bekämpfen, ist diesem Konzept zufolge der Kampf um das Recht durch das Recht bzw. der Kampf um die Institutionen durch eine Institutionalisierung von großer Wichtigkeit. Als problematisch erweisen sich in diesem Punkt Frasers Argumente, da ihnen, wie von Honneth detailliert ausgeführt, die rechtliche Dimension fehlt. Zudem fehlen sowohl in Frasers als auch in Honneths Argumentation entscheidende Einsichten in die Rolle der multinationalen Unternehmen als „Global Players“, die sich in der Globalisierung einerseits außerhalb von staatlichen Kontrollen betätigen, andererseits aber, wie Rosanvallon hervorhebt, dabei tief in die Interessen der Staaten eingreifen. Folglich müssen wir es uns zur Aufgabe machen, eine Theorie zu entwickeln, die für Staaten und Unternehmen zugleich gültig sein kann. In diesem Zusammenhang erweist sich eine Erörterung des Kantischen Konzepts des Weltbürgerrechts als ausgesprochen fruchtbar.

著者

横路 佳幸

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.69, pp.259-273, 2018

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<p>The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (hereafter the PII) states that ifany individuals exactly resemble each other, then they are necessarily identical. Intuitively,the PII seems valid, but Max Black attempted to refute it by introducingthe possibility of a symmetry universe in which two iron spheres <i>c</i> and <i>p</i> can resembleeach other exactly. This counterexample (hereafter BU) seems easy to ruleout using a weak discernibility strategy (hereafter WD) according to which <i>c</i>, beingspatially separate from <i>p</i> and not from <i>c</i> itself, is not indiscernible from <i>p</i>. WD, however,leads to 'the presupposition problem', because obtaining <i>c</i> as spatially separatefrom <i>p</i> presupposes the distinctness of <i>c</i> and <i>p</i>. In this discussion, I will give an outlineof a defense of the validity of the PII that evades the presupposition problemthrough the elucidation of some aspects of 'identity'.</p><p>In my view, 'identity' has two aspects: one is simply self-identity as a universalmonadic property (hereafter identity-1), and the other is identity as an equivalencerelation entailing indiscernibility (hereafter identity-2). The basis or ground for identity-1obtaining with regard to an individual <i>x</i> can be called the individuator for <i>x</i>,but it is no wonder that the individuation and articulation of <i>c</i> and <i>p</i> are prior to orground for obtaining <i>c</i> as spatially separate from <i>p</i>. So far as the PII is concernedwith identity-1, it may not be valid. However, we can characterize identity-2, followingDavid Wiggins's lead, in terms of what is called the sortal dependency of identity-2and the extended Locke's Principle (hereafter ELP), according to which, for anysortal concept <i>F</i>, <i>x</i> falling under <i>F</i> is identical with <i>y</i> falling under <i>F</i> if and only if <i>x</i>is the same <i>F</i> as <i>y</i>, and <i>x</i> is the same <i>F</i> as <i>y</i> if and only if a) <i>x</i> and <i>y</i> share <i>F</i> and b) <i>x</i>is not spatially separate from <i>y</i>. If ELP is valid, we can regard BU as merely a generalcase to which WD is applied. And if the Wigginsian idea of the sortal dependencyof identity-2 is also right, there is no longer a presupposition problem. I hence conclude that the PII is valid to the extent that it is concerned with identity-2.</p>

著者

澤井 哲

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.70, pp.91-105, 2019-04-01 (Released:2019-04-18)

参考文献数

32

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In this essay, I will first describe what constitutes a model in natural science both in the physical and biological disciplines and give a brief overview on its relationship to constructive experimental approaches. Interesting parallels are noted in the key defining inventions and models starting from Voltaic for the early exploration into electrophysiological mechanisms behind muscle contraction, Lillie’s ironwire for nerve impulse conductance, Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction for feedback regulation in the Krebs cycle. The were not meant to faithfully reproduce the intended phenomena as a whole, however sucesstully captured the very essence of nonlinear dynamics as we know them today. Drawing from the basic concepts that eventually emerged from these studies, the present day natural science awaits further exploration into the constraints and geometries in high dimensional systems. The present day natural science is witnessing closer encounter to their unique dynamic properties or life ‘process’ at the cellular level such as cell growth and cell deformation, but how close are we from understanding such complex phenomena?The new challenge may require further inteination of machine and nature that drives synthesis of classic hypothesis-driven approach with data-driven quantification.

著者

大谷 弘

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.65, pp.135-150_L10, 2014-04-01 (Released:2016-06-30)

参考文献数

22

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On the standard interpretation of the later Wittgenstein, it is supposed that he accepts the view that language is governed by rules. Many interpreters, explicitly or implicitly, think that Wittgenstein is committed to the view that the correct uses of words are determined by their rules.In my paper, I argue that the standard interpretation is incorrect as an interpretation of Wittgensteinʼs later thought on language and rules. First, in my view,Wittgensteinʼs position is that we explain the meaning of a word by rules, when it is necessary. However, when it is not necessary, we do not operate according to rules.Second, the standard interpretation ascribes to Wittgenstein a dogmatic philosophical method, which he in fact tries to avoid. On the standard interpretation, a rule for a word is supposed to be the source of normativity, so that, by citing the rules that Wittgenstein or Wittgensteinians identify, we can reject some philosophical assertions as nonsense. To think that only Wittgenstein or Wittgensteinians can identify the right rules in philosophical discussions is dogmatic, however, and by carefully surveying the text of Philosophical Investigations we can see that he avoids such dogmatism.In section 1 of my paper, I explain the standard interpretation. In section 2, I review the general points of Wittgensteinʼs discussion of rule-following and argue that the standard interpretation has a problem here. In section 3, I show that the Wittgensteinʼs texts cited by Glock, a prominent supporter of the standard interpretation, as the evidence for his interpretation do not support it. In section 4, by carefully investigating the remarks that concern rule-following in Philosophical Investigations, I argue that the standard interpretation misunderstands the method and aim of Wittgensteinʼs argument. Finally, in section 5, I argue that the standard interpretation has serious flaws as an interpretation of Wittgensteinʼs view of rules.

著者

本間 義啓

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.69, pp.244-258, 2018-04-01 (Released:2018-08-01)

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Le mal peut se dénier lui-même en se cachant lui-même. L’expérience montre que l’être humain peut faire le mal sans avoir aucune mauvaise volonté. Tout se passe comme si la mauvaise intention n’existait pas. Comment et pourquoi peut-on rejeter le savoir de son propre mal ? Selon Rogozinski, le sujet mauvais peut s’illusionner sur lui-même au point de croire qu’il fait le bien. En interrogeant le phénomène de la chasse aux sorcières, Rogozinski décrit comment le persécuteur, sous la poussée de la haine, construit des innocents en ennemis à exterminer. Tout en croyant résister aux ennemis mauvais, c’est la résistance même qui constitue leur menace. Le mal est alors un objet illusoire qui est construit par la résistance illusoire au mal. Le mal en tant qu’illusion, tel est le fil conducteur qui nous permet de tracer le développement de la pensée de Rogozinski sur la question du mal. Dans Le Moi et la chair, Rogozinski analyse la haine comme la matrice affective du mal. La haine est mauvaise dans la mesure où elle défigure la vérité de l’ego. Si je haïs l’autre, c’est que je projette sur lui la haine que j’éprouve envers l’étrangeté en moi. L’autre en tant qu’objet de la haine est construit par la projection d’une part de moi-même sur l’autre pour dénier que j’en suis. Ce déni de soi s’accomplit au moment où je détruis dans l’autre l’objet de la haine que j’ai éprouvé en moi. C’est ainsi que Rogozinski définit la haine comme une « puissance de la contre-vérité ». Dans Ils m’ont haï sans raison, Rogozinski analyse le « dispositif de persécution » pour nous montrer comment la haine persécutrice défigure la vérité du moi. Ce dispositif a une fonction essentielle de « faire dire » la vérité. En faisant avouer « être sorcière » sous la torture, le persécuteur construit lui-même son Ennemi. Ce qui est étonnant, c’est que la victime fait librement l’aveu de son crime imaginaire pour renier la vérité de son moi. Tout se passe comme si le « deceptor qui pousse le moi à se renier lui-même, à se laisser dérober sa vérité par un Autre » était la victime lui-même. Comment la résistance au mal est-il possible pour l’ego qui est dérobé de lui-même par lui-même ? Tel est la question que Rogozinski nous invite à discuter.

著者

見附 陽介

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.71, pp.220-231, 2020-04-01 (Released:2020-05-12)

参考文献数

23