著者

奥 雅博

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1985, no.35, pp.74-88, 1985-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

堀 栄造

出版者

The Philosophical Association of Japan

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.50, pp.244-252, 1999

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本稿は、一九〇六年のフッサールの未公開の遺稿AVIlと一九〇七年のフッサールのホフマンスタール宛ての書簡に基づいて、一九〇六年頃のフッサールの美学がどのようなものであったのかを、そして、その美学がフッサールの現象学的方法とどのように密接に関連していたのかを、解明しようとするものである。<BR>一九〇六年から一九〇七年にかけてのフッサールは、信奉者たちやホフマンスタールとの交流を通じて、美学的問題に大きな関心を寄せている。例えば、一九〇六年四月一七日には、ダウベルトとフィッシャー博士がゲッチンゲンのフッサールを訪問し、「美的客観性」をめぐって会談しているが、その会談は、取るに足りないとは言えぬ深化と先鋭化を生み出したのだった。また、一九〇六年一二月六日には、ホフマンスタールがゲッチンゲンのフッサールを訪問し、一九〇七年一月一二日には、フッサールは、「現象学的観取と美学的観取」に関するホフマンスタール宛ての書簡を書いている。<BR>それでは、その当時のフッサールにとって、何が問題だったのか。それは、「主観的体験の中でのみ遂行されるにもかかわらず、即自的に存在する客観性を把握する認識、の可能性という、底知れぬ問題」だったのである。われわれの認識は、主観的体験の中で遂行されるにもかかわらず、認識対象は、主観的体験の外にある「即自的に存在する客観性」であり、それは、主観的体験には到達しえない「超越的な現存[transzendenteExistenzen]」である。それは、通常われわれが認識していると素朴に思い込んでいる「現実」であるが、フッサールが前掲の「底知れぬ問題」に気づくやいなや、それは、「僣称された現実[prätendierte Wirklichkeit]」へ一変する。われわれが素朴に信じている「現実」は、フッサールにとって、もはや「真の現実」ではなくなるのである。<BR>「底知れぬ問題」と苦闘していたフッサールは、一九〇七年一月一二日付けのホフマンスタール宛ての書簡の中で、次のように述べている。すなわち、長い間求められていた諸々の思想的総合が、天から降って来たように、突然、私に与えられた。私は、それらを、即座に、書き留めなければならなかった、と。ここで言われている「諸々の思想的総合」とは、「現象学的方法」のことに違いない。そして、「現象学的方法」つまり「現象学的還元」は、「僣称された現実」に代わる「真の現実」を、「即自的に存在する客観性」に代わる「現象学的な本質的客観性」を、捉えるのである。<BR>「現象学的還元」という「現象学的方法」を着想するこの頃のフッサールが、美学的問題に大きな関心を寄せたのも、実は、「即自的に存在する客観性」としての「実在的客観性」と、「本質的客観性」としての「美的客観性」との問題を、めぐってのことである。そこで、さっそく、次の第一節において、「像芸術」と「純粋空想芸術」とのフッサールによる対比を通して、この問題を究明しなければならない。

著者

早川 正祐

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.59, pp.261-276,L20, 2008-04-01 (Released:2010-07-01)

参考文献数

12

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Until now, mainstream philosophers of action have never taken seriously the fundamental fact that human agents are beings who care. Most philosophers have attempted to clarify the features of human agency mainly by analyzing intending, planning, and policy-making. In this paper, however, by introducing and analyzing the concept of care, I have tried to analyze human agency in the light of caring. Recognizing that the meanings of care are manifold, I focus first on one of the most central meanings of caring about/for X; if we care about/for X, we are continuously interested in X, and we consider X as important and significant to ourselves over an extended period of time. I then elucidate the distinctive features of caring by considering what kinds of patterns caring is embedded in, and explaining how these patterns are distinguished from the patterns that characterize future-directed intention, and particularly policy.The common aspect between care and policy is that both involve a commitment to the repetition of various kinds of activities that concern their intentional object. However, there are important differences between care and policy. One of the essential aspects of policy is to fix the understanding of the object of policy, and to control beforehand the activities that concern the object. In contrast, one of the essential aspects of care is to deepen the understanding of the object by trial and error, and to change our activities flexibly, according to our developing understanding of the object. These features of caring enable us to recognize and understand the receptive modes of human agency, which mainstream philosophers of action have disregarded. We will obtain a more well-balanced conception of human agency if we analyze these receptive modes, as well as the regulative modes which most philosophers of action have concentrated on.

著者

富山 豊

出版者

日本哲学会 ; 1952-

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.68, pp.155-168, 2017-04

著者

真田 美沙

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.68, pp.139-153, 2017-04-01 (Released:2017-06-14)

参考文献数

4

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Diese Abhandlung zielt darauf ab, die Rolle der Unendlichkeit in Hegels Seinslehre, also in Bezug auf Qualität, Quantität und Maß in der Wissenschaft der Logik, zu erklären. Weil der Unendlichkeitsbegriff eine wichtige Stelle in Hegels Philosophie einnimmt, wurde er einerseits im Abschnitt über die Qualität bisher oft diskutiert. Andererseits wurde der Begriff des mathematischen Unendlichen in der Forschung auch schon teilweise behandelt. Der Zusammenhang zwischen beiden und die Unendlichkeit im Abschnitt über das Maß sind aber immer noch nicht genügend erklärt. Um diese zu klären, müssen der Verlauf der Veränderung der Seinslehre in Hegels Logik und der Zusammenhang zwischen dem Maß und dem Unendlichkeitsbegriff aufgezeigt werden. Diese Abhandlung betrachtet deshalb anfangs die Unendlichkeit in den Abschnitten zu Qualität und Quantität, zeigt dann das Zustandekommen der fundamentalen Konstruktion der Seinslehre (Qualität, Quantität und Maß) und betrachtet abschließend die Gemeinsamkeit und den Unterschied zwischen dem Maß und der Unendlichkeit.Erstens ist die Beziehung zwischen dem Endlichen und dem Unendlichen im Abschnitt der Qualität absolut und abstrakt. Dagegen sind beide im Abschnitt über die Quantität wirklich und gesetzt. Sowohl im Abschnitt über die Qualität als auch im Abschnitt über die Quantität gibt es das schlechte Unendliche und das wahre Unendliche. Das mathematische Unendliche gilt als höher als das metaphysische Unendliche. Zweitens ist die Unendlichkeit im Hinblick auf das Zustandekommen der fundamentalen Konstruktion der Seinslehre bis 1809 dasjenige, das Qualität und Quantität aufhebt. Nach 1810 werden aber die Qualität und die Quantität durch das Maß aufgehoben. Drittens sind das Maß und die Unendlichkeit nicht unbedingt beziehungslos, wenn man die Bedeutung des Maßes in einem Gedicht Hölderlins und im Fall der Erhabenheit bei Kant betrachtet. Das Unendliche im Zusammenhang mit diesem Maß wird in der Seinslehre Hegels als das schlechte Unendliche aufgefasst. Das hegelsche Maß ist eine Grundlage, welche die Auseinandersetzung der Wahlverwandtschaft vorbereitet, die durch zwei Momente, Qualität und Quantität,zustande kommt. Außerdem lässt sich der Einfluss von der Philosophie Schellings, in Anbetracht von Schellings Versuch der Rekonstruktion der Kategorien,im Inhalt des Abschnittes über das Maß erkennen. Im Übergang vom Sein zum Wesen erreicht die absolute Indifferenz zwar die Setzung; dieser Übergang lässt sich jedoch nicht mehr direkt durch die Unendlichkeit erklären.

著者

氣多 雅子 高橋 哲哉

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.68, pp.98-100, 2017-04-01 (Released:2017-06-14)

著者

山田 圭一

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.59, pp.309-325,L23, 2008-04-01 (Released:2010-07-01)

参考文献数

18

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In his last writing, Wittgenstein suggests that the border between empirical propositions and logical or mathematical propositions is continuous (I call this idea the ‘continuity thesis’ in this paper). The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate what brought about this idea and what it means.In the system of language games, just as the basic form of calculation cannot be mistaken insofar as far as it functions as the measure for other calculations, so the basic form of judgment cannot be mistaken since it functions as the measure for other judgments. However the basic forms of our language games are supported by various contingent and natural facts and therefore we cannot preclude the possibility that exceptional states of things which cause mistakes might change into ordinary states, and consequently our present scaffolding would break down. The doubt about Moorean propositions (e. g. ‘Here is a hand’) implies doubt about the background conditions or scaffolding of our ordinary judgments and to refuse these doubts means to refuse doubts about this basic form of judgments. In this respect Moorean propositions possess the logical status of a norm of inquiry which is similar to what mathematical propositions possess.It was the encounter with epistemological skepticism that led to Wittgenstein's continuity thesis. And this thesis shows the contingency of our epistemic norms and implies that the hardness of the epistemic ‘must’ consists in the fact that we must start from this scaffolding when we see this world from within the world.

著者

入江 幸男

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.46, pp.250-258,10, 1995-10-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

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In Geschichtsforschung und Geschichtsphilosophie ist die Form der >Erzählung< als eine Erklärungsform der Ereignisse beachtet worden. Wenn wir erklären, warum ein Ereignis geschehen ist, müssen wir die Veränderung erklären. Eine Veränderung zu erklären bedeutet, die Mitte zwischen Anfang und Ende der Veränderung zu erklären. Diese Erklärungsform hat eine Form der >Erzählung<. Eine geschichtliche Frage, warum eine Veränderung geschehen ist, muß schon die Veränderung erwähnt haben. Die Antwort gibt eine Erklärung der Veränderung an und macht eine Erzählung erst vollständig. Aber in der Frage ist schon die Hälfte von der >Erzahlung< schon enthalten. Also ist in diesem Sinne die >Erzählung< nicht nur eine Erklärungsform der Geschichte, sondern auch die Form der geschichtlichen Frage.

著者

藤井 千佳世

出版者

The Philosophical Association of Japan

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.64, pp.173-190_L12, 2013

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Chez Spinoza, la norme est immanente à l'activité de la vie. De même pour Canguilhem, elle est, primordialement, instituée et constituée par le vivant lui-même. Dans cet article, par la comparaison du concept spinoziste de <i>conatus</i> en tant que développement pratique (de la théorie de la vérité à celle de la vie) de sa notion de <i>norma</i> avec l'idée de normativité chez Canguilhem, nous tâchons d'éclairer le rôle de la norme immanente selon eux, ainsi que sa portée éthique.<br>Pour ce faire, nous analysons, d'abord, les points communs entre la théorie de la norme de la vie sur la base de laquelle Canguilhem définit la santé et la maladie, et celle du <i>conatus</i> à partir duquel Spinoza explique deux modes de la vie : la vie affective et la vie menée sous la conduite de la raison.<br>En outre, pour passer du problème de la norme de la vie à celui de l'éthique, nous examinons la valeur de la négativité pour l'un et l'autre (la position de la pathologie ou de la maladie chez Canguilhem et le problème du mal chez Spinoza).<br>Enfin, nous éclairons l'importance du concept d' <i>exemplar</i> de la nature humaine qui se trouve au noyau de l'éthique spinoziste. Celle-ci nous permet de délimiter la continuité et la rupture des deux modes de la vie et d'y trouver des divergences de perspective éthique entre Spinoza et Canguilhem, qui, tous deux, attachent de l'importance à la norme immanente à l'activité de la vie.<br>Ces analyses proposent une interprétation du problème du projet ou de la possibilité de l'éthique de Spinoza et, par la lecture de Canguilhem, explicitent un certain contexte intellectuel qui prépare la réinterprétation de Spinoza au 20^e siècle.

著者

秋保 亘

出版者

日本哲学会 ; 1952-

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.67, pp.138-152, 2016-04

著者

早川 正祐

出版者

The Philosophical Association of Japan

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.59, pp.261-276,L20, 2008

---

Until now, mainstream philosophers of action have never taken seriously the fundamental fact that human agents are beings who care. Most philosophers have attempted to clarify the features of human agency mainly by analyzing intending, planning, and policy-making. In this paper, however, by introducing and analyzing the concept of care, I have tried to analyze human agency in the light of caring. Recognizing that the meanings of care are manifold, I focus first on one of the most central meanings of caring about/for X; if we care about/for X, we are continuously interested in X, and we consider X as important and significant to ourselves over an extended period of time. I then elucidate the distinctive features of caring by considering what kinds of patterns caring is embedded in, and explaining how these patterns are distinguished from the patterns that characterize future-directed intention, and particularly policy.<br>The common aspect between care and policy is that both involve a commitment to the repetition of various kinds of activities that concern their intentional object. However, there are important differences between care and policy. One of the essential aspects of policy is to fix the understanding of the object of policy, and to control beforehand the activities that concern the object. In contrast, one of the essential aspects of care is to deepen the understanding of the object by trial and error, and to change our activities flexibly, according to our developing understanding of the object. These features of caring enable us to recognize and understand the <i>receptive</i> modes of human agency, which mainstream philosophers of action have disregarded. We will obtain a more well-balanced conception of human agency if we analyze these receptive modes, as well as the regulative modes which most philosophers of action have concentrated on.

著者

笠木 雅史

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.63, pp.171-184_L9, 2012 (Released:2012-10-16)

参考文献数

19

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This paper aims to elucidate various arguments for Cartesian skepticism, reveal their presuppositions, and examine their plausibility. Cartesian skepticism concerns knowledge of the external world in general. Even though there are different arguments for Cartesian skepticism, their differences are often neglected, resulting in serious confusions. By analysing the premises and presuppositions of each argument, I attempt to figure out whether and to what extent it is plausible. The paper consists of seven sections. In Section 1, I introduce the problem of Cartesian skepticism. Then, from Sections 2 to 4, I review three different forms of the argument from ignorance, which appeal to different variants of the epistemic closure principle about knowledge. Among them, the standard closure principle is more plausible than the other two; one requires that S be logically omniscient, and one entails the notorious KK thesis that first-order knowledge requires second-order knowledge. The requirements these two closure principles impose on knowledge, then, are too strong. In Section 5, I discuss how versions of infallibilism are invoked in defending the first premise of the argument, viz., that S does not know that a skeptical hypothesis is false, of the argument from ignorance. On the other hand, some claim that the argument from underdetermination does not require infallibilism, and thereby undermines even fallible knowledge. In Section 6, however, I argue that it is hard to maintain that the argument from underdetermination fares well against fallible knowledge. The underdetermination principle, to which the argument appeals, is supported by premises at odds with fallibilism. In addition, the argument from underdetermination faces another problem: it presupposes that S's total evidence is restricted to sensory evidence, if it works against fallible knowledge at all. Since this presupposition is contentious, the argument from underdetermination against fallible knowledge needs more justification for its presuppositions, in order to get off the ground. Section 7 gives a summary of the paper.

著者

高橋 克也

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.46, pp.91-100,4, 1995-10-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

被引用文献数

1

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L'attention, chez Kant, est un acte où l'entendement et la volonté s'entrecroisent essentiellement. C'est-à-dire que d'abord, elle appartient à la faculté de la connaissance, et elle est déroulée grâce à l'effet du vouloir. Ensuite, il faut remarquer que l'attention volontaire se réalise dans divers objets dont l'existence l'entendement saisit préalablement, et que par suite l'entendement est une des conditions nécessaires de la volonté. En analysant cet entrecroisement, on peut avoir une clef pour s'approcher de la problématique de l'humanité.

著者

長谷川 三千子

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1973, no.23, pp.162-173, 1973-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

10

著者

樫 則章

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.57, pp.43-58,3, 2006-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

26

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In this article, Peter Singer's animal liberation and criticism agaist it is discussed. Singer's animal liberation is based on the principle of equal consideration of interests. However, the basis for this principle is derived from the logical requirement of universalizability of moral judgment. Thus, on the part of people who deny any consideration of animal interests or who think animal interests weigh less than those of humans, there is a responsibility to prove the validity of their views. Though some think animal interests are not the immediate object of moral consideration, they in fact are. Those who feel that more consideration should be placed on human interests compared to animals, in order to justify this inequality, point out the relevant moral differences between the two such as rationality, autonomy, moral agency, and so on. These people must come face to face with the so called, the problem of "marginal cases" in which it is stated that the interests of people lacking these qualities or capacities need not be considered. Though many solutions have been proposed, not one has been satisfactory. Thus, Singer's view that it is an unjustifiable discrimination not to consider animal interests as strongly just because they are for animals, can be indeed labeled as "speciesism." However, there are views stating that no interests worthy of consideration exist for animals because they do not have any sense of self and not even any consciousness. This problem can not be simply solved by physiology or cognitive ethology. Since it contains philosophical aspects such as "what is consciousness"or"what is belief, " its resolution is not at all easy. Though the principle of equal consideration of interests has sufficient ground, there still is room for debate on whether animals possess any interests to be considered. Therefore, animal liberation calls for discussion as well.

著者

坂本 邦暢

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.60, pp.185-200_L11, 2009 (Released:2010-11-09)

参考文献数

97

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The Flemish humanist Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) is well-known for his restoration of Stoicism in early modern Europe. His main works, Introduction to Stoic Philosophy and Natural Philosophy of the Stoics, both published in Antwerp in 1604, prompted the reception of Stoicism in the seventeenth century and laid the foundation for its modern reconstruction.Lipsius tried to reconcile Stoic philosophy with Christian theology. Although the importance of his Christianized interpretation was recognized, scholars have paid little attention to the real motivation that led him to write the Introduction and Natural Philosophy. The preface to Introduction shows clearly that his primary aim was the exposition of Seneca's philosophy. Indeed, Lipsius's heavy reliance on the Roman philosopher and other Latin authors has been criticized since the publication of his works. According to this criticism, Lipsius ignored so many Greek sources that his reconstruction of Stoicism is invalid from a philological point of view. However, can his partial selection of sources not be viewed from different angles? Is it not his reading of Seneca's work that enabled him to harmonize Stoicism with Christian doctrines?To answer these questions I shall focus on Lipsius's theory of evil and the cosmic cycle, expounded in Natural Philosophy. My analysis will show that Seneca's eclecticism played an important role in the Lipsian reconstruction of Stoicism.

著者

坂本 百大

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1985, no.35, pp.1-18, 1985-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

李 明哲

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.73, pp.391-407, 2022-04-01 (Released:2022-07-21)

参考文献数

17

著者

金山 弥平

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.54, pp.71-91,239, 2003-04-01 (Released:2009-12-09)

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Ancient and modern skepticism are said to be different in that (1) ancient skeptics attacked beliefs, while modern skeptics are challenging knowledge (justified true belief); (2) ancient skeptics considered it possible to live without beliefs, following 'appearances', while modern philosophers consider it impossible, as is typically represented by Hume's judgement; (3) ancient skeptics took skepticism to be the best way to attain happiness, while such a demand may be incredible to philosophers today. But are these differences really substantial? As to (1), the state of mind to which justified true belief corresponds in Greek philosophy is doxa (belief) rather than episteme (knowledge); modern skeptics may be regarded by ancient skeptics as challenging belief rather than knowledge. As to (2), when e.g. a car rushes toward them, Pyrrhonists and Humeans will both evade the car, with the processes in their minds being almost the same, and different only in names ('appearances' and 'beliefs'). However, there is at least one substantial difference: if ancient skeptics' claim in (3) is true, Pyrrhonists can lead a better life than Humeans, by following appearances of moral virtues and also suspending judgement about the sufferings their moral activities may cause to them. To Humeans, who hold that reason is the slave of the passions, Pyrrhonists' claim to achieve happiness by rationally suspending judgement may appear to be the result of neglecting observation. But the reason's power that enables men to lead a good life, in which ancient skeptics believed, was what Socrates actually observed in his own mind and handed down to posterity.

著者

青山 拓央

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.65, pp.9-24_L3, 2014-04-01 (Released:2016-06-30)

参考文献数

26

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The titular question can be interpreted as follows: Does future possibility precede logical possibility ─ which provides simultaneous alternatives? In this paper, I defend a philosophical intuition that future possibility is more fundamental than logical possibility, even though the former seems conceptually more complex than the latter. My attempt can be regarded as retreating from Duns Scotusʼs modal semantics to Aristotleʼs (cf. Yagi 2009, Knuuttila 2013). Moreover, I attempt to reconstruct my previous arguments (Aoyama 2008, 2011) on the assumption that the above intuition is correct, and seek to connect Kripkeʼs famous argument about de re modality (Kripke 1980) with Wittgensteinʼs argument on certainty regarding de re beliefs (Wittgenstein 1969). In the appendix, I note that the background of this paper is related to Nietzscheʼs peculiar fatalism (I call a world in which this kind of fatalism is true not an ʻunfree worldʼ but an ʻafree worldʼ; everything in such a world involves no contrast between being free and being unfree that can be found in the determiningdetermined relation).