著者

小泉 義之

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1986, no.36, pp.118-128, 1986

著者

鴻 浩介

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.68, pp.169-184, 2017

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<p>According to G. E. M. Anscombe's proposal, agents have a special way of knowing about their own intentional actions - they have the capacity to know what they are intentionally doing without relying on any evidence from observation, inference and so on. Anscombe dubbed this special knowledge "practical knowledge" and took it to be an essential mark of agency. This article attempts an explanation and vindication of this Anscombean approach to agency.</p><p>The discussion falls into four sections. In the first section, I clarify the nature of Anscombe's practical knowledge and argue that the principal task for us is to spell out how one can be justified in believing not just what one intends, but what one is intentionally doing without any evidence. In Section II, I discuss what is generally considered to be the most promising way of dealing with this task: the reliabilism strategy. On this view, practical knowledge is justified because there is a reliable efficient-causal link between an agent's intention to φ and his/her actually doing φ. I am willing to accept the reliabilism strategy as being basically on the right track. However, in Section III, I argue that the reliabilism strategy overlooks an important element of Anscombe's discussion, namely that practical knowledge is the "formal cause" of what it understands, i.e., intentional actions. With this observation in place, we can give an even more comprehensive account of the nature of practical knowledge. In Section IV, I close with a suggestion that the structure of practical knowledge so understood is surprisingly similar to the structure of the knowledge that makers of artifacts are said to have, and this similarity can support the claim that practical knowledge is knowledge about an objective, public world.</p><p></p>

著者

宮地 たか

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1966, no.16, pp.158-170, 1966-03-31 (Released:2010-01-20)

参考文献数

18

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Dieser Versuch wünscht eine Antwort darüber zu sein, ob die Fähigkeit der Erkenntnis mit der Wesensanschauung als der neuartigen Funktion, die Wesenserkenntnis zu begründen, a priori versehen sei oder nicht. Ich finde den Anfang dieses Versuches in dem Analyse der Wesenserkenntnis. Nach Husserl hat die Wesenserkenntnis zwei gründliche Seiten : das Urteil über “Was” des Individuums und das “rein eidetisches Urteil”. Als einen passenden Typus des letzteren Urteils ziehe ich die Geometorie in Betracht. Dann finde ich zwei Bestimmungen der Wesensanschauung in den Husserls Erörterungen : 1.der mit der Wahrnehmung gemeinsame Charakter, das Wesen originär erfassen zu können. 2. der Charakter, durch die “Blickwendung” auf ein Individuelles dadurch, “die Bildung des exemplarischen BewuBtseins” vorauszusetzen, eine Ideation zu vollziehen. Nun, es wird klar, daß für die Ideation von “, Was” des Individuums die zweite Bestimmung der Anschauung wichtig ist, und die Ideation inadäquat ist, wenn diese Voraussetzung unsicher sei.Nun, Husserl meint, die geometorische Erkenntnis könne nur auf der Wesensanschauung, die “Eidos überhaupt” originäl erfaßt, beruhen, und diese könne die schlechthin unbedingte Allgemeinheit für die Form des Raums, das Wesen des Dinges, begründen. So stelle ich auf dem heutigen Zeitpunkt, wo die nichteuklidischen Geometorien bestehen, zwei folgende Fragen. 1. die Frage auf die schlechthin unbedingte Allgemeinheit der geometorischen Erkenntnis fur den realen Raum. 2. die Frage auf die Figur überhaupt, den sogenannten Gegenstand des geometorischen Universalurteils, d. h. des Lehrsatzes. In Beziehung auf die erste Frage : solange ich den Grund der Bestehung jeder Geometorie betrachte, schließt sich theoretisch, daß die Geometorie nicht eine Wissenschaft, die dem realen Raum entspricht, sondern eine Wissenschaft über einen imaginären Gegenstand ist, der gemüß den das System konstruierenden Axiomen besteht, und jedes System bezeichnet sich also als eine Wissenschaft, deren Sätzen verbürgt sind, nur in demselben System die Allgemeingültigkeit zu haben. In diesem Punkte findet dieser Versuch eine wichtige Verschiedenheit gegen Husserls Meinung.In Bezug auf die zweite Frage : nach dem praktischen und theoretischen Versuch, wie die Lehrsätze aus Axiomen bestehen, kann ich klar feststellen, daß das Universalurteil der Lehrsätze nicht, wie Husserl behauptet, auf die Wesensanschauung, die “Eidos überhaupt” originär erfaßt, sondern auf die Verallgemeinerung vom individuellen Urteile über individuelle Figuren zum Universalurteile besteht.Nach obengedachtem Versuch kann ich folgendes beschließen, in der Tat besteht die geometorische Erkenntnis, ohne auf der Wesensanschauung nach Husserls erster Bestimmung zu beruhen, sogar solche Anschauung nicht sein können. Aber, die Anschauung nach der zweiten Bestimmung kann in dem bedingten Sinne sein. Jedoch ist der durch solche Anschauung erfaßte Inhalt nicht das Wesen des natürlichen Dinges, sondern nur das imaginare Wesen, gemäß den vorausgesetzten Bedingungen konstruiert.

著者

安田 将

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.71, pp.232-242, 2020-04-01 (Released:2020-05-12)

著者

菅沼 聡

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.55, pp.179-192,28, 2004-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

39

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Being a highly traditional question of metaphysics, the so-called “Ultimate Why-Question” still interests some contemporary philosophers. To ask this question amounts to asking where, if anywhere, “why-chains” can stop.Whereas the most traditional approach to the Ultimate Why-Question has been to try to answer it by “God”, i. e., “Necessary Existence/Being”; the most usual ap-proach in contemporary analytical philosophy has been to dismiss it as a nonsense pseudo-problem because it is “logically unanswerable”. I call the former tradition as a whole the “old tradition” and the latter the “new tradition”.In this article, I propose a “third alternative”, by suggesting that the Ultimate Why-Question is not necessarily unanswerable but can be answered by a kind of “Necessary Existence/Being”, which cannot be anything in particular at all (in-cluding even “God”) but only the “Absolute Totality of Reality”.The following three procedures would be required to make the above sugges-tions assertions:(1) to show whether the “Absolute Totality of Reality” exists at all, (2) to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be the “Nec-essary Existence/Being” that would stop all possible why-chains, (3) to decide whether only the “Absolute Totality of Reality” satisfies the above conditions.

著者

村上 勝三

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1978, no.28, pp.116-126, 1978-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

野上 志学

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.71, pp.185-196, 2020

著者

綿内 真由美

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.69, pp.58-75, 2018-04-01 (Released:2018-08-01)

著者

荒畑 靖宏

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.57, pp.126-138,7, 2006-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

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Diese Abhandlung zielt darauf ab, die neuerdings in den anglosach-sischen Ländern immer häufiger anzufindende "pragmatische" Lesart von Heideggers Weltlichkeitsanalyse einer Kritik zu unterziehen. Diese Kritik bezieht sich auf die Diskussion Heideggers selbst, auf der eine solche Lesart vor allem beruht, und die mit einem Begriff unverträglich ist, der nicht nur in der Weltlichkeitsanalyse, sondern auch im ganzen Sein und Zeit eine zentrale Rolle spielt. Diese Inkonsequenz besteht zwischen dem Gedanken der quasitranszendentalen Konstitution der Umwelt durch die Praxis des Daseins (Entwurf) and der Struktur der Welt, die Heidegger von der »Welt« als der Gesamtmenge der innterweltlich Seienden unterscheidet, der "Bedeutsamkeit" also. Mein Diskussionsbeitrag geht so vor; i) Heideggers "Be-deuten" ist keineswegs ins "Verweisen" zur uckzuholen, das nach Heidegger die Zeugzusammenhänge ausmacht; ii) Heideggers Analyse der Funktion des Zeichens als "Zeuges" ist merkwüirdig verstellt, was aber in der Tat darin liegt, dass er den Verweisungszusammenhang des "Zeuges" implizite nach dem Modell der Kontextualität und der Bezeichnungsfunktion des Zeichens analysiert; iii) wenn die holistisch-systematische Phanomenalität der "Welt", die Heidegger als die dritte Instanz neben dem Subjekt und Objekt zum ersten Mal zur Geltung gebracht hat, mit der "Bedeutsamkeit" zu erklaren wäre, und wenn wir sie genau in der Weise verstehen möchten, in der er sie auch gemeint hat, dann müßten wir zu der Schlussfolgerung, dass die Welt symbolisch struktuiert ist, oder, genauer gesagt, auf jene Weise konstituiert ist, welche für die sprachliche Bedeutsamkeit charakteristisch ist.

著者

松井 貴英

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.55, pp.243-255,32, 2004-04-01 (Released:2009-12-09)

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In Plato's Phaedo 74b2-3, at one stage of the argument for the theory of recollection, Socrates and Simmias agree that they have knowledge of equality itself. The aim of this paper is to answer the following two questions concerning this agree-ment : (1) What is equality itself, which they claim to know, the Platonic Form of Equality or some mathematical object different from Platonic Forms?(2) Is recollection a form of ordinary learning accessible to ordinary people or some kind of higher learning?In our approach to question (1), we deal first with 76b10-12. This passage suggests that only Socrates is capable of giving an account of Forms, including the Form of Equality, and this can be taken to imply that Simmias does not know this Form. The knowledge he has attained so far concerns only mathematical objects. This conclusion may be supported by 74c1-3, where the equality itself which Sim-mias is said to know is represented in the plural.As to question (2), Socrates says that whenever we recollect something through something like it, we necessarily recognize that the latter is defective in its similarity to the former (74a5-7), and this statement suggests that recollection is not simple concept formation, but rather a kind of higher learning, which requires reflective thought.Now in this process of recollection, where does Simmias, who doesn't have knowledge of Forms, stand? The 'Divided Line' in the Republic and the comparison with the slave boy in the Meno help us to answer this question : his state of mind corresponds to 'dianoia' in the 'Divided Line', but is nearer to 'noesis' than the slave boy in the Meno, who is supposed to have just begun his attempt to reach 'dianoia' starting from 'pistis'. Recollection is supposed to be a long and arduous process of learning in the journey toward 'dianoia' and 'noesis', starting from 'pistis'.

著者

田村 圭一

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.55, pp.206-217,30, 2004-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

10

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Cognitivism in ethics can be divided into two branches. One is naturalism and the other is intuitionism. Intuitionism is cognitivist internalism, that is, the claim that cognitive states, i. e., beliefs, can motivate an agent to action without the assistance of desires. But cognitivist internalism faces two kinds of problems, i. e., weakness of will and accidie. In order to clear cognitivist internalism of these difficulties, we have to revise Humean motivational theory. Humeanism is the claim that beliefs cannot motivate an agent without the assistance of relevant desires. Only desires can motivate in their own right and their motivation is necessary. T. Nagel's cognitiv-ist internalism and J. McDowell's are partially committed to Humeanism, because they tacitly admit that cognitive states should necessarily motivate. J. Dancy tries to revise Humeanism. According to him, cognitive states can motivate in their own right, but their motivation is contingent.Dancy's cognitivist internalism accepts particularism, which adopts a holistic un-derstanding of the behaviour of moral reasons.Particularists reject the generalist as-sumption that a cognitive state which behaves in a given case in favour of an action should behave similarly in every case. Cognitivist internalists, therefore, can escape their traditional difficulties when they adopt particularism.

著者

横路 佳幸

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.69, pp.259-273, 2018-04-01 (Released:2018-08-01)

参考文献数

26

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The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (hereafter the PII) states that if any individuals exactly resemble each other, then they are necessarily identical. Intuitively, the PII seems valid, but Max Black attempted to refute it by introducing the possibility of a symmetry universe in which two iron spheres c and p can resemble each other exactly. This counterexample (hereafter BU) seems easy to rule out using a weak discernibility strategy (hereafter WD) according to which c, being spatially separate from p and not from c itself, is not indiscernible from p. WD, however, leads to ‘the presupposition problem’, because obtaining c as spatially separate from p presupposes the distinctness of c and p. In this discussion, I will give an outline of a defense of the validity of the PII that evades the presupposition problem through the elucidation of some aspects of ‘identity’. In my view, ‘identity’ has two aspects: one is simply self-identity as a universal monadic property (hereafter identity-1), and the other is identity as an equivalence relation entailing indiscernibility (hereafter identity-2). The basis or ground for identity-1 obtaining with regard to an individual x can be called the individuator for x, but it is no wonder that the individuation and articulation of c and p are prior to or ground for obtaining c as spatially separate from p. So far as the PII is concerned with identity-1, it may not be valid. However, we can characterize identity-2, following David Wiggins’s lead, in terms of what is called the sortal dependency of identity-2 and the extended Locke’s Principle (hereafter ELP), according to which, for any sortal concept F, x falling under F is identical with y falling under F if and only if x is the same F as y, and x is the same F as y if and only if a) x and y share F and b) x is not spatially separate from y. If ELP is valid, we can regard BU as merely a general case to which WD is applied. And if the Wigginsian idea of the sortal dependency of identity-2 is also right, there is no longer a presupposition problem. I hence conclude that the PII is valid to the extent that it is concerned with identity-2.

著者

高橋 久一郎

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1987, no.37, pp.118-128, 1987-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

林 晃紀

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.71, pp.197-207, 2020-04-01 (Released:2020-05-12)

著者

伊勢田 哲治

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.64, pp.9-24_L3, 2013

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This paper explores how analytic social epistemology has incorporated social aspects of inquiring activities into epistemological research, and how non-epistemic values can be related to it. Since the 19th century, science as a kind of inquiring activity has been socialized in many senses. Scientific community is institutionalized and the research itself is often conducted collectively; outside influence became also visible through national funding system and increase of so-called &lsquo;mode 2&rsquo; knowledge production. Given such socialization of science, analytic social epistemology, such as Goldman's veritism and social falsificationism of several authors, has expanded epistemology to include institutional and collective aspects as objects of epistemic appraisal. Non-epistemic values are also included as parts of such social aspects. However, the standards of epistemic appraisal, such as truth conductivity and objectivity through mutual checking, remain epistemic. Some authors, such as Stephen Stich and Steve Fuller, criticize such epistemological conservatism and advocate non-epistemic evaluation of cognitive processes and scientific institutions. Even though they both make good points, the role of analytic social epistemology as a part of total assessment of an inquiring activity should not be denied. What epistemologists need is the awareness that their enterprise is an indispensable part of such a larger project.

著者

河野 哲也 戸田山 和久

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.65, pp.90-93, 2014

著者

伊藤 邦武

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.54, pp.55-70,240, 2003

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Naturalistic epistemology is generally considered to be a strong antidote to the traditional foundational epistemology, and it is believed to be able to evade the sceptical challenge to the traditional foundational project. This belief, however, should be thought again. Naturalistic epietemology and philosophical scepticism can coexist and mutually sustain each other. This is at least the case in the arguments of Hume's Treatise, which is widely recognized as a precursor of current naturalistic epistemology. According to Hume, sceptical argument against reason suggests the validity of naturalism in the theory of knowledge, but naturalism, in turn, encourages the adoption of further sceptical stance to the claim of reason. We can see the novelty of Hume's argument against classical scepticism in this complex combination of scepticism and naturalism.

著者

伊佐敷 隆弘

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.56, pp.130-141,6, 2005-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

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We can't affect what happened. We can't change the past and the past doesn't change itself.The contents of my expectation may vary according to my actions in the present, but the contents of my memory don't.Thing-individuals endure through time, and they can change and vanish and even regenerate. On the other hand, event-individuals, once they emerge, don't change or vanish or regenerate.The contents of memory include reference to an event-individual. That is the reason why they don't vary according to actions in the present. The source of the fixedness of the past consists in the existence of event-individuals. And their existence, therefore also the fixedness of the past, largely depends on our referring to them.

著者

稲津 阿育

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.71, pp.115-125, 2020-04-01 (Released:2020-05-12)

参考文献数

18

著者

永野 拓也

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.50, pp.234-243, 1999

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ベルクソン哲学において、人間の労働 (travail) とは、道具を作ること、すなわち、知性 (intelligence) と不可分な製作行為 (fabrication) であり、人間の労働の価値についての探求は、この製作行為をめぐってなされる。とはいえベルクソンは、最初から製作行為の価値を考察するのでなく、存在論的な観点に立ち、経験に基づいて、製作行為の存在理由を探るところから始める (『創造的進化』) 。こうした存在論的探求を踏まえて、『道徳と宗教の二源泉』 (以下『二源泉』) は、製作行為を、その極限的な形態である機械産業 (machinisme) として捉え、製作行為の存在理由そのもののうちに、今度は価値と呼べるものを求めるのである。ここに見られるような探求の性格、すなわち、知性的な思索においてでなく、経験に基づく存在論を足掛かりとして、価値論的問題を探るという仕方は、ベルクソン哲学の本質的な一側面である。こうした本質的な側面は、知性と不可分であると理解される製作行為が主題であるからこそ、特に明確に現われると思われる。知性と制作行為の関係を確認した上で、ベルクソン哲学における制作行為の価値づけを、さらに子細に検討することが重要であろう。以下の二つの観点を中心に、この問題の検討を行いたい。<BR>一、ベルクソンの哲学において、知性はいかに純粋な認識能力としての地位を失い、労働との関わりの中で新たな地位を得るか。<BR>二、『創造的進化』、および『二源泉』における、人間の労働の存在理由とはいかなるものか