- 著者
-
東中野 多聞
- 出版者
- 公益財団法人 史学会
- 雑誌
- 史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.108, no.9, pp.1619-1638,1713-, 1999-09-20 (Released:2017-11-30)
In 1960, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke revised the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. He was a well known politician, having been Minister of Commerce and Industry in the Tojo wartime cabinet. When Tojo requested Kishi to resign in order to reshuffle the Cabinet, Kishi declined, causing Tojo to yield and dissolve his Cabinet on July 18,1944. After the war, Kishi explained that his anti-Tojo actions were aimed at avoiding accusation as a war criminal after the War. There are only a few studies about his wartime politics. Kishi said that he spent his days in idleness after the resignation of the Tojo Cabinet and every study so far acccepts this explanation. The author of the present article doubts this point. After resignation of the Tojo Cabinet, Kishi and 32 others organized a political club called the "Gokoku Doshikai" within the House of Representatives. It consisted of socialists, generals, admirals, and nationalists. They adopted a committee system, established an office, and held study group once a week. Kishi was the virtual leader of this club. They carried out a nationwide campaign called the "National Defence Movement". Kishi also established an ultranationalist association, the "Bocho Sonjo Doshikai", in his hometown of Yamaguchi city. Author also investigates this group, and concludes that both Kishi and the Bocho Sonjo Doshikai were opposed to the end of war. The Gokoku Doshikai was based on one concept of national defence, a "productive Army", (seisan-gun), which aimed at strengthen the economic control. By unifying the munitions industries, Japan could use the materials more efficiently, in preparation for the decisive battle of the Japanese mainland through self-sufficiency. The Gokoku Doshikai was opposed to the Japanese government, because then Prime Minister Suzuki was aiming at ending the war, they denounced the government's policy vehemently; and when Suzuki decided to surrender, the Gokoku Doshikai and the Japanese army resisted. The author concludes that while Kishi contributed to the anti-Tojo movement, he was opposed to surrender. We can see the root of the Kishi's postwar faction in the "Gokoku Doshikai". After the war, two of its members entered the Kishi Cabinet, and five socialist members became the leaders of the Socialist Party. Here we see another point of continuity and discontinuity between prewar and postwar politics.