著者
坂口 太郎
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.122, no.4, pp.459-497, 2013-04-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

In recent years, particular attention has been drawn to the retired Emperor Go-Uda's 後宇多 promotion of esoteric Buddhism and it surrounding cultural and political environment as the staging ground for the "anomalous (igyo 異形) monarchical regime" of his son Emperor Go-Daigo 後醍醐. This paper discusses the relation between the Daikakuji 大覚寺 line of imperial descent and its "monzeki" 門跡 (Buddhist temples designated for tonsured members of the imperial family, also referred by the title of monzeki) during the late Kamakura and Kenmu 建武 Regime periods, by focusing on prince-monk Shoen 性円 (Go-Daigo's brother), who was chosen as the Daikakuji Monzeki. Little is known about the early life of Shoen, who is generally referred to as "Daikakuji-miya"; however, the author's investigation of yet unpublished historical sources place him at Yasui Monzeki 安井門跡 (Rengeko-In 蓮華光院), which was affiliated to the Ninnaji-Goryu 仁和寺御流 branch of Shingon Buddhism. Given the additional fact that Go-Uda originally planned to take control of Ninnaji-Goryu, the author concludes that Shoen's assumption of Yasui Monzeki was part of his father's overall religious policy. Then Go-Uda founded the Daikakuji Monzeki, providing it with proprietary estates and sub-temples, and transfered his son to Daikakuji, making Shoen his possible successor. The author also points out that in his struggle with Ninnaji, Go-Uda bestowed on Shoen the second highest princely rank and such imperial household treasures as the cintamani jewel. Moreover, in his later years Go-Uda repeatedly performed esoteric Buddhist rituals for the protection of the Daikakuji line, and had Shoen participate in them to train him for his future calling. After Go-Uda's death, Shoen became the abbot of Daikakuji, supporting Go-Daigo, who sent his own son Gosho 恒性 to serve as a priest at Daikakuji, and the fact that Gosho would later be banished to Etchu 越中 Province by the Kamakura Bakufu and then assassinated shows without a doubt that he was part of the plan to overthrow that military regime. Hence, it is likely that because of its control over a large number of proprietary estates, Go-Daigo depended heavily on the Daikakuji Monzeki in his plans to overthrow the Bakufu. As for Shoen during the Kenmu era, in addition to his performance of esoteric Buddhist rituals, he served as a general on the field of battle. Moreover, after the fall of the Kenmu regime, Shoen continued to serve the Southern Court. Since the publication of Amino Yoshihiko's seminal work on the period in question, the research has been focused on the Shingon priest Monkan 文観, in order to elucidate the religious aspects of Go-Daigo and his reign. However, if one considers the historical developments from the time of Go-Uda, it becomes clear, as this article shows, that it was not Monkan, but rather the Daikakuji Monzeki allying with the Daikakuji line of descent led by Shoen, which lent the primary support to Go-Daigo's regime from within the walls of Shingon Buddhism.
著者
鈴木 裕子
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.86, no.2, pp.177-195,242-24, 1977-02-20 (Released:2017-10-05)

In March Cf 1868, the Meiji government's regulations against Christianity were made public. These new regulations in terms of content were inherited directly from the Bakufu. This decision was due to the complicated state of national affairs which included attacks on the government by the remnants of the Bakufu army and the ongoing clashes between foreigners and anti-foreigners. However, once these regulations were issued as law, the government had to preserve them, lest any change weaken its own authority and become a source of criticism against the government by those elements opposed to the new Meiji regime. The exiling of the thirty-four hundred Christians from Urakami Village in Nagasaki was the largest concession the Meiji government could make to foreign countries. This decision was implemented in December of 1869 despite delays resulting from the war. At first, the regulations concerning Christianity had no connection with the plan to make Shinto the established religion. However, this link was made during the government's efforts to retain the anti-Christian regulations. Accordingly, though the government promised generous treatment to foreigners after the Urakami villagers had been exiled, the government did not have any concrete plans to carry out its promise. Only in the fall of 1870 did Christianity become a subject of lively debate in the government, and that was simply because there was a fear of a problem possibly taking place in Kagoshima, the home of many important people in the government. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had been receiving a constant stream of protests from foreign countries, understood that the problem of Christianity in Japan was an important one in foreign affairs. Yet, it had little power in the government and so did not participate in the making of government policy decisions concerning this issue. Nonetheless, the Foreign Ministry had continued to appeal to the government to keep the promises it had made to other countries. In the spring of 1871 the central government's suppression of the rebel forces ended in success. In July of the same year the "han" system was dissolved and replaced by the "ken" system of local government. As the government continued to centralize power and to institute organizational changes in the governmental system, it then began to show its willingness to change its policy by its handling of the Imari Incident in Saga and its release of those Urakami villagers who had given up their belief in Christianity. Also emerging at this time were demands for the end of any anti-Christian regulations by members of Japanese governmental missions in Europe and America. In February of 1872 when the government's concern over the discontented elements in Japan had come to an end, the enforcing of anti-Christian regulations also came to an end. In this way we can see that while the Meiji government's policy towards Christianity was a concern of Japanese foreign policy, essentially it was influenced more by domestic political factors and changes during this Period.
著者
池田 勇太
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.115, no.6, pp.1041-1078, 2006-06-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

The present article attempts to clarify the birth of monarchical constitutionalism on the occasion of a debate over a popularly elected parliament in 1874, by focusing on Motoda Nagazane (or Eifu) 元田永孚, who was Emperor Meiji's tutor in Confucianism. The introduction of a constitutional polity in the absence of a government not only displayed the strong character of a modernization measure and was thought to realize a political society supported by the masses and open public opinion, but also a parliament, constitution and separation of the legislative and administrative branches of government were expected to solve real problems that existed in local administration and politics at the time. The article begins with an examination of the actions taken by the Governor of Fukushima Prefecture Yasuba Yasukazu 安場保和 in order to clarify the era's parliamentary movement against the background of local administration and to argue that the fair and just nature (ko 公) of a constitutional polity was thought to be identical to traditional Confucian political ideals. Secondly, the introduction of a constitutional polity at that point in time was not the result of power politics fought along vertical, class lines, but was rather a specific political expression of what the Restoration bureaucracy thought desirable. On the other hand, the introduction of such a polity under well-meaning auspices from above also meant that the bureaucracy did not always seek broad pluralistic opinions on the subject, but rather tended to make policy decisions in a more theoretical manner. The 1874 debate over a popularly elected parliament brought the issue of mass popular political participation to the forefront in terms of "joint rule by king and citizen." It was here that Motoda Eifu suggested that in a monarchical state it was necessary to make a distinction between "public opinion" and "the just argument," arguing that it was the monarch who should employ the latter. Any parliamentary system in which the monarch enjoys ultimate prerogative, moreover, demands that the monarch have the ability to exercise that prerogative properly, which necessitated the development of a system of imperial advisors and educators. At that time there was also the idea that the position of senior political advisor (genro 元老) should be created outside of the cabinet to perform such a function. Motoda, on the other hand, reformed such an idea based on the necessity of a monarch performing his duties with the final say within a constitutional polity. This is why it can be said that both monarchical constitutionalism and the establishment of the emperor's prerogative within it was born out of the 1874 debate over a popularly elected parliament.
著者
河内 春人
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.113, no.1, pp.43-61, 2004-01-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

The Emishi 蝦夷, who resided in the northeast portion of the Jap-anese archipelago, appear in the Chinese sources both as "Emishi" and as "Mojin" 毛人. The description of the former includes their geographical location, customs and year of arrival in China, while the latter merely mentions them as living in northeastern Japan. All of this information was amassed from interviews with foreign emissaries to the Tang Dynasty. Regarding the Emishi, there are both Chinese and Japanese records of them accompanying an envoy from the land of Wa 倭 (Japan) in the year AD 659 and also an account of the Chinese inquiring about them from a Japanese envoy in AD 702 ; however, the latter account, which appears in Shin-Tojo 新唐書, cannot be verified, so 659 is the only time that Emishi became part of a Japanese envoy to China. The information concerning Emishi customs in the Chinese sources matches the content of the report submitted by the 659 Wa envoy to China ; and all of it is characterized by them being introduced through Japan. In particular, the inclusion of Emishi in the 659 envoy was politically motivated to create the image of Wa/Japan as a great empire, but the Tang Dynasty was not impressed. As a result, the Japanese were unable to realize their diplomatic goals, and a gap appeared in the international relations between the two countries. While the Japanese expressed the term "Emishi" with the characters 蝦夷, there is also the strong opinion that the characters 蝦〓 were originally used. However, the source for such an argument being the historically spurious Shin-Tojo, there is no other source to prove that ; and the manuscript of the Nihon Shoki 日本書紀 expresses the term with different characters. The expression 蝦夷 appeared during the late seventh century, together with the creation of a Wa/Japanese ideology concerning its frontiers, leading to the move to take Emishi to China. However, the existence of the Emishi in Tang-Wa diplomacy following the Japan defeat at the Hakuson 白村 River in Korea, had to be covered up, as the term Mojin came into use at the time of the Taiho era Japanese envoys to China. After that time, no new information about the people of northeastern Japan surfaced in Tang China.
著者
水間 大輔
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.120, no.2, pp.180-202, 2011-02-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

In Han 漢 wooden strips from Juyan 居延 and Dunhuang 敦煌 there are mentioned officials attached to a houguan 候官 who are referred to as shili 士吏. "Shili" is also mentioned in Qin 秦 bamboo strips from Shuihudi 睡虎地 and Han bamboo strips from Zhangjiashan 張家山, but here most of them appear as county (xian県) officials. In past research it has been assumed that shili similar to those attached to a houguan were also assigned to counties. In a previous article, however, the author has pointed out that county-based shili, unlike the shili attached to a houguan, was not the name of an official post but rather a collective term for a group of officials, and that at the very least, the xiaozhang 校長, or head, of a local police station (ting帝) was included among these officials. This article examines what sort of officials were actually designated as this group of county officials known as shili. After an analysis of examples of the use of shili with reference to counties, the author concludes that they were officials who met at least all of the following six conditions: (1) they were under the command of the county defender (xianwei県尉) ; (2) they had jurisdiction over a district; (3) their responsibilities consisted of military duties and police work; (4) in places at some distance from the county office, they were authorized to hear legal charges and complaints, and accept voluntary surrenders to the authorities; (5) their duties included the dispatch of manpower to meet state needs; and (6) they had to be junior subalterns (shaoli小吏) other than those known as sefu 嗇夫. According to these conditions shili might also have subsumed such officials as jiazou 駕〓, maozhang 〓長 and hou 候. The officials subsumed under county-based shili had in common duties (3)-(5) mentioned above; and (3), in particular, involved patrols and the pursuit and arrest of criminals. It is already known that the duties of county defenders included military affairs and police work, and it is evident that these duties were discharged primarily through shili. The last instance of the word shili used as a collective term is found in the Ernian Luling 二年律令 codes. The author surmises from this disappearance that because of growing domestic stability, the military preparedness of counties was thereafter gradually scaled down, and the majority of official posts included among shili were abolished. Therefore, shili as a collective term was no longer needed and fell into disuse.
著者
季武 嘉也
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.96, no.6, pp.979-1009,1105-, 1987-06-20 (Released:2017-11-29)

From the late years of Meiji to the Taisho period, Goto was brilliantly active in such fields as colonial policy, transportation policy, foreign policy and National Enlightenment. As a politician as well, he had an unusually unique and splendid political career, joining Katsura's New Party, serving first as the Home Minister under Terauchi's "National Unity" Cabinet and again under the second Yamamoto "National Unity" Cabinet, and joining the movement of the Preliminary Committee on universal Suffrage. Previous studies on Goto have been so mesmerized by this brilliance that they have consequently neglected the fundamental problem of his basic political attitude or his position in the political arena during this period. This article represents an exhaustive reconsideration of his political activity. The conclusions reached herein may be summarized as follows : first, concerning Goto's fundamental political attitude, we find that his basic goal was that, rather than the military and political foreign expansion which Japan had been continuously carrying out since the Meiji Restoration, Japan needed to realize external economic expansion and thus truly. become an accepted member of the inner circle of most powerful nations, and a State relatively independent of the Western powers. Secondly, he had a strong interest in the National People's Organization that would be able to realize this goal. It was most characteristic of him at this time that he tried to mobilize scholars and journalists, regardless of their political persuasion or ideology, and to organize, according to their age or ability, those people (for example, members of youth organizations, physicians, educators, etc.) those who were even more committed to the localities than were the class of so-called "Chiho Meiboka". He also cooperated with men such as Okuma Shigenobu and Tanaka Giichi. But it was not possible to fully organize the nation in the Japan of his day. If we look next at his activities within the political arena, we notice that, first, in order to accomplish his goal, he responded to the power of the political parties and the bureaucracy with great flexibility. In particular, he was on constantly good terms with party politicians of the Seiyukai and the Kenseikai. Further, due to his emphasis on "reform", he had many supporters in both the bureaucracy and in the political parties that served him well as a political asset. However, the expectations of his supporters were varied and he ultimately failed to meet them all. Thirdly, and most importantly, he placed the greatest political importance on cooperation with Inukai Tsuyoshi and Ito Miyoji (the "Triangular Alliance"). Moreover, he fundamentally tried to adiministrate political affairs in tune with them and men of the same generation (including the Head of the Seiyukai, Hara Kei, and the Head of the Kenseikai, Kato Takaaki). However, the Second Constitutional Preservation Movement rendered support of his third position difficult. Finally, in the end, this significancy reduced Goto's political power and fixed his place in history as only a minor politician on the periphery of the Seiyukai.
著者
樋口 秀実
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.113, no.7, pp.1223-1258, 2004-07-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

The research to date dealing with the assassination of Yang Yuting by order of Zhang Xueliang on 10 January 1929 focuses on the belief that Yang was pro-Japanese. What the research fails to consider, however, is the assassination of Chang Yinhuai on that same date, which pan by no means be attributed to pro-Japanese sentiment, since Chang never studied in Japan, which is the only proof offered for Yang's pro-Japanese position. Could these assassinations have had some other motive? The author of this article believes so, based on two points yet to be considered in the existing research. The first has to do with the public careers and political ideas of the two victims. Studies have clearly shown the political ideas and actions of Zhang Xueliang from the time of the bombing death of Zhang Zuolin at the hands of a Japanese agent on 4 June 1928 to the hoisting of the Nationalist flag on 29 December of that year ; however, a similar analysis of Zhang's activities during that time has yet to be done, due to the a priori assumption that Zhang and Yang were political enemies. Consequently, we have no idea of Yang's policy stances or how they conflicted with Zhang's, other than the former's alleged pro-Japanese sentiment, leading to the conclusion that Yang's assassination was motivated by personal conflict between the two. This is why the author of the present article has felt the need to delve into the political ideas and actions of Yang and Chang Yinhuai. The author's second point focuses on the power structure of the Sandongxing 東三省 Regime and the political roles played in it by Zhang, Yang and Chang. Whenever conflict occurs in any political regime, clashes usually occur between factions, not individual politicians. In the case of the Sandongxing Regime, conflict not only occurred along generational lines (between the old timer and newcomer factions), but also geographically between the leading province in the triad, Fengtian, and the other two, Jilin and Heilongjiang. What remains unclear is where Zhang, Yang and Chang stood within the Regime's structure of conflict, which may be the key, to why the latter two were assassinated. One more factor that must be taken into consideration is the situation of the three countries bordering on the Sandongxing region : China, the Soviet Union and Japan. The research to date has tended to emphasize the actions of Japan in the framework of the historical background to its relationship to Manchuria. However, even if it can be proved that Yang was pro-Japanese, it is still important to identify his place in the Regime's structure and the Regime's relationship to its other two neighbors. Also, within the fluid international situation at that time, the Regime's structure was probably also in flux, one good example of which being Yang's assassination. With respect to China, it was being ruled by two central bodies, the government in Beijing ruling over Changcheng 長城 and all points south and the Nationalist government. However, these bodies did not exercise full control over the country in the same manner as the former Qing Dynasty or the later People's Republic. This is why the author deals with the "China factor" focussing not only on the two central ruling bodies, but also the, movements of the various warlord factions.
著者
尾崎 修治
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.104, no.10, pp.1756-1776,1838-, 1995-10-20 (Released:2017-11-30)

Die Rheinischen Loslosungsbestrebungen hatten zum Ziel, die rheinische Region von dem PreuBenstaat loszutrennen und so eine selbstandige Republik innerhalb des Deutschen Reiches zu grunden. Diese Bewegungen genossen vor allem in der politischen und verfassungsrechtlichen Ubergangszeit vom November 1918 bis Februar 1919 Unterstutzung durch Politiker und durch Teile der Bevolkerung im Rheinland. In diesem Artikel wird versucht, neben der Betrachtung der Entwicklung dieser Bestrebungen auch die Reaktionen der rheinischen Parteien und der zentralen Regierungen zu analysieren, um die Hintergrunde und die Tragweite der Loslosungsbestrebungen zu klaren. Unter den rheinischen Loslosungsbestrebungen dieser Zeit lassen sich zwei wichtige Richtungen erkennen. Zum einen der "Westdeutsche AusschuB", in dem sich Vertreter aller rheinischen Parteien zusammenschlossen, um eine mogliche Loslosung von PreuBen zu erortern. Diese Bewegung war durch die Furcht vor der Annexion durch Frankreich motiviert, und ihre Mitglieder waren sich daher darin einig, daB man das Konzept einer "westdeutschen Republik" nur dann in die Tat umsetzen durfe, wenn es die einzige Moglichkeit darstelle, um die Annexion durch Frankreich zu vermeiden. Diese Gefahr war jedoch niemals ernst geworden. Zum anderen ist die Richtung der Kolner Zentrumspartei zu nennen. Sie war im Gegensatz zum Westdeutschen AusschuB die aktivere treibende Kraft fur die sofortige Erfullung der Loslosung von PreuBen. Sie kritisierte die Unordnung in Berlin und die Machtlosigkeit der gegenwartigen Regierung und warnte vor der Gefahr der Annexion durch Frankreich. Diese Begrundung fuhrte zur Behauptung, daB das Rheinland sofort zur Selbsthilfe greifen musse. Die ungeduldigen Aktionen der Kolner Zentrumspartei wurden jedoch sowohl von den anderen rheinischen Parteien als auch von der Reichsund preuBischen Staatsregierung heftig kritisiert. Nicht zuletzt wegen dieser Gegenaktion wurde diese Bestrebung zuruckgestellt. Die Handlungen der Kolner Zentrumspartei wurden zwar kritisiert, doch die Motive, die hinter dem Konzept der Selbsttindigkeit von PreuBen steckten, wurden auch von den anderen rheinischen Parteien geteilt. Der Angriff der preuBischen Regierung auf die Rolle der Kirche stieB nicht nur auf den Widerstand des Zentrums, sondern auch auf den des ganzen rechten Lagers. Auch die Abneigung gegen die Revolution war im ganzen rechten und konservativen Lager zu beobachten. AuBerdem spielte das MiBtrauen gegen die zentralen Behorden eine wichtige Rolle. Es wurde dadurch geschurt, daB die Bevolkerung des Rheinlands in Berlin wenig Verstandnis fur ihre Bedurfnisse erkennen konnte und den Eindruck gewann, daB das besetzte Rheinland von der Regierung im Stich gelassen wurde. Daher lag die SchluBfolgerung nahe, daB die Rettung in der Selbsthilfe liege. Die Entstehung der rheinischen Loslosungsbestrebungen laBt sich daher nicht nur von der uberlieferten konfessionellen Besonderheit des katholischen Rheinlandes, sondern auch von den politischen und sozialen Bedingungen nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg, vor allem der Revolution und der Besatzung, erklaren.
著者
手嶋 泰伸
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.122, no.9, pp.1507-1538, 2013-09-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

This article focuses on the relationship between the campaign to set up a cabinet under the premiership of Hiranuma Kiichiro and the Japanese Navy during the years of the Saito Makoto cabinet (25 May 1932-8 July 1934), in order to place this campaign within the context of the strengthening of the military supreme command system from the 1930's onward and clarify the influence of Hiranuma's plan upon the Navy, and the influence the resulting changes in the Navy exerted upon the campaign. In order to overcome a divided structure of governance, in particular control over military authorities, Hiranuma's campaign won faction leaders over to its side and utilized the authority of the imperial family. Therefore, Hiranuma's plan for controlling the military authorities did call for institutional reorganization, but rather depended on personal connections. Hiranuma made Fushiminomiya Hiroyasu chief of the Naval General Staff (NGS) with the cooperation of the Kantai (Fleet) Faction led by Admiral Kato Hiroharu, going as far as to reorganize the system by extending the authority of the NGS. However, the Kantai Faction lost its unifying position in the Navy when it was criticized for politicizing the NGS and politically utilizing the imperial family. Since Hiranuma's plan to control the military authorities involved winning over the leaders of the various factions, the fall of the Kantai Faction from power brought about the failure Hiranuma to act as the unifier of the divided governance system. Therefore, the campaign to form a Hiranuma Cabinet and the reinforcement of the supreme command in the navy developed under interrelationship of mutual influence. The collapse of the campaign after the Kantai Faction's attempt to utilize the authority of the imperial family resulted in the loss of its unifying position in the Navy means no less than the failure of Hiranuma's efforts to overcome the divided structure of governance by means of personal connections. Only the extension of NGS power-in other words, the strengthened independence of Supreme Command-remained after Kato's retreat and the collapse of the Hiranuma campaign.
著者
吉田 ますみ
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.126, no.6, pp.1-35, 2017 (Released:2018-10-20)

本稿は、第一次世界大戦が日本の海運にいかなる影響を与えたかを、その政治過程を踏まえて明らかにすることを目的とする。従来、大正期以降の日本海運は経済史、経営史の枠組みで検討されることが多く、国家産業である海運業や海運政策の政治との結節は問われてこなかった。本稿では、大戦中の一九一七年一〇月に船腹の流出を防ぐ目的で施行された緊急勅令・戦時船舶管理令の立案、審議、運用過程を検討することを通じて、当該期の政府、政党、当業者の対抗や共鳴の諸相を描出するとともに、日本海運業への影響を論じた。 地方利益欲求の吸収による支持獲得が雛形となりつつあった一九一〇年代、大戦による海運勃興の中心地であった阪神地方は、政治的には未だ空白地帯であった。世界市場での自由活動を制限する戦時船舶管理令の発令は、同地方の海運業者、特に社外船主の陳情活動と政府攻撃を惹起し、彼らは政党への接近により同令の実施緩和を達成することを画策した。他方、同地における反政府の気色を看取した政党も、船主から資金や動員の援助を受けながら同地での党大会を開催した。船主との直接の接触のなかで、政友会は逓相からの緩和言質獲得へと動く。 戦時船舶管理令の起草段階では、田健治郎逓相および伊東巳代治ら官僚閥によって、行政による専断的な海運業の指導が構想されていた。しかし、第40議会での同令への事後承諾獲得にあたって、衆議院第一党である政友会の事前交渉により、逓信省は骨抜きとも言える実施緩和を議事上で明言するに至った。禁止されていたスエズ以東の外国間航海が実態として届出制となり、日本船舶はインドや南洋、南方方面への進出を加速させる。当業者と政党の接近、介入は、行政の構想を挫折させただけでなく、その結末は大戦末期の日本海運の航路発展も規定したと言える。