著者

中山 俊宏

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.143, pp.12-27,L6, 2005-11-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

53

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Since it first appeared, Louis Hartz's The Liberal Tradition in America (1955) has had a major impact on the interpretation of American political thought and America's understanding of itself. His aim was to study the logical consequences of naturalized liberalism in the United States and show that ‘ideological consensus’ rather than ‘absence of ideology’ is what defines the uniqueness of America. This essay attempts to apply the concept of ‘natural liberalism’ in understanding the ‘normative character’ of U. S. foreign policy.Hartz has argued that since the United States lacks a feudal past, liberalism is perceived as a natural phenomenon. However, precisely because liberalism is seen in this light, it could sometimes become fixed and dogmatic. The belief that the ultimate moral question of the regime is settled comes from this dogmatic reception of liberalism. Hartz argues that as a result of ethics being taken for granted, all problems emerge as ‘problems of technique.’ He further argues that when the U. S. is simply solving problems on the basis of a submerged and absolute liberal faith, it can depart from liberalism with a kind of ‘inventive freedom’ which others cannot duplicate. This tendency, when applied to international relations, tends to bring about an attitude of mechanically applying its own cultural pattern to the rest of the world. The result is double-edged; the U. S. can become a norm builder as well as a norm destroyer.Hartz argues that interactions with the rest of the world will mitigate the dogmatic nature of naturalized liberalism and will force the United States to realize the relative nature of American exceptionalism. However, contrary to Hartz's expectations, the resulting tendency of the United States' contact with the outside world has been to further reinforce American exceptionalism and strengthen the sense of missionary liberalism.This essay will explore the foreign policy implications of natural liberalism and how these reinforce American exceptionalism. It will show that the United States will act as a norm builder when it can comfortably project its self-image to international relations. This was the tendency immediately after World War II when the United States successfully created the normbased post-war world order. However, the recent tendency has been to act unilaterally, in some cases even neglecting the international norms that the United States itself has played a major role in establishing. This attitude, sometimes referred to as ‘deinstitutionalization of the Wilsonian project, ’ has widened the gap between the United States and the rest of the world. Two domestic trends, namely the increasing religiosity and the conservative turn in U. S. politics has accelerated the widening of the gap. The U. S.' image of itself as a norm builder and the fact that the world no longer sees it so will continue to pose difficult questions for the U. S. and the world.

著者

五月女 律子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.168, pp.168_88-101, 2012-02-29 (Released:2014-03-31)

参考文献数

39

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This article examines Sweden's “non-alignment” as a core of its security policy. This analysis especially focuses on changes of the Swedish security doctrine and Sweden's relations to the United Nations, NATO and European regional organizations after the Cold War.In 1992, Sweden changed its security doctrine from broadly defined “neutrality” to narrow “military non-alignment” in order to adjust itself to changes in Europe after the end of the Cold War. Then, in the middle of the 1990s, Sweden joined the European Union (EU) and established close relations with NATO and Western European Union (WEU).Though Sweden has not been a member of any military alliance, it has actively participated in peacekeeping operations under the UN mandates since the 1940s. Sweden has played a very large role in peacekeeping missions with close cooperation with other Nordic countries. This can be seen as Sweden's strategy not only to contribute creation of “a better world” but also to enhance its own national security using an advantage of “non-aligned” status in international relations.Even after the Cold War, participation in peacekeeping operations and crisis management has been a self-evident Swedish contribution to international peace and security. As long as there was some form of UN resolution or consent, Sweden has allocated its troops to the NATO-led peacekeeping operations and crisis management. Sweden's close cooperation with NATO and European states has also aimed to enhance Swedish national security avoiding isolation in the post-Cold War world.As the promotion of EU crisis management fitted well into the Swedish security doctrine, Sweden, together with military non-aligned Finland, proposed to introduce the Petersberg tasks into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1996. Sweden and other Nordic countries have insisted that effective crisis management has to be comprehensive and include both civilian and military means, and this approach is now the hallmark of EU crisis management.Since the middle of the 1990s, Sweden has been moving away from a military-oriented concept of “total defense” to a more civilian-oriented approach for international crisis management. At the same time, Sweden has started more open and intense military cooperation with other countries, but it still explicitly excludes mutual defense arrangements and participation in any defense alliance.Though Sweden's policy of “non-alignment” has been narrowed down to military dimension, it remains as a fundamental element in Swedish security policy. Being a military non-aligned state, Sweden still wants to preserve ability to make decisions based on its own analyses and seeks to maintain national freedom of action in external relations. In this sense, “non-alignment” continues to be a core of Swedish security policy.

著者

井上 正也

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.151, pp.36-53,L7, 2008-03-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

77

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On December 27, 1951, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru sent John F. Dulles a letter that explained “Counter infiltration” against China. Yoshida thought the best way to wean Chinese from the Communist regime was by sending people into China through trade activities and encouraging an anticommunist movement in China. He believed that Japan could have a major role in such an operation. The purpose of this paper is to examine Yoshida's “Counter infiltration” plan against China from the standpoint of intelligence. Yoshida, taking a special interest in intelligence, established intelligence organs such as the Public Security Intelligence Agency and the Cabinet Research Chamber (CRC) in quick succession soon after the San Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect in April 1952. Worried about indirect aggression from communist countries, Yoshida concentrated his efforts on developing an interior intelligence framework. At the same time, he tried to foster the growth of a Japanese intelligence organization that could gather information and perform covert operations it Mainland China.This study shows that Yoshida proactively tried to strengthen intelligence cooperation with governments of both Taiwan and the United States. Yoshida appointed Ogata Taketora Chief Cabinet Secretary and made him supervisor of Japanese intelligence organs. Ogata urged the Nationalist government on Taiwan to cooperate in establishing a Communist information exchange organ, and asked the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for assistance in creating a Japanese CIA. On the other hand, Yoshida let retired lieutenant General Tatsumi Eiichi recruit ex-military personnel for service in the CRC. With the assistance of Tatsumi, the CRC started actual intelligence activity against China after January 1953. The CRC interrogated repatriates from China, and proposed a joint operation with the CIA to use Japanese agents. Thus Yoshida tried to establish a Japanese intelligence system and backed U. S. strategy against China in the intelligence field.Yoshida's idea, however, was frustrated by rapid changes at home and abroad. After the Peace Treaty came into force, Yoshida couldn't maintain a firm hold on power. Not only the opposition parties but also the media criticized Ogata's plan to launch a Japanese CIA. In the end, Ogata had no choice but to downscale his ambitious plans, and eliminate overseas covert operations. Moreover, Yoshida's confrontational approach against the Chinese government was criticized for being behind the times after the Indochina armistice in 1954. In the last days of his ministry, Yoshida encouraged both Britain and U. S. to set up a “high command” on China in Singapore. His aim was to use overseas Chinese based in Southeast Asia to infiltrate Mainland China, but his idea wasn't put into practice because he was unable to gain the support of either Britain and the United States or even his own entourage.

著者

福田 茂夫

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1961, no.17, pp.107-120, 1961-12-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

64

著者

信夫 清三郎

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1960, no.11, pp.99-110, 1960-01-31 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

42

著者

大木 毅

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1989, no.91, pp.101-119,L11, 1989-05-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

83

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In 1941, England was determined to continue the war against Germany, and the collapse of German blitzkrieg-strategy against Soviet Russia was evident to any one. Despite the situation, Germany declared war on the third great power, the United States. Why? The purpose of this paper is to answer the question and to analyze its political process.Adolf Hitler who had failed to defeat England in 1940, decided to overthrow Soviet Russia with the intentions of taking over the hegemony of the Continent and of compelling England into peace negotiations. But in the meantime the United States was applying strong measures against Germany. Germany would have to fight the United States sooner or later, but American rearmament was not yet complete. So judged Hitler the state of affairs from the reports of military attache in Washington, D. C. and other Capitals. And he expected Japan to enter the war on England, or England and the United States with the hope of diverting Anglo-American military efforts into the Pacific.But Joachim von Ribbentrop, German foreign minister, had another conception: the conception of a continental bloc of four powers, Germany, Japan, Italy and Soviet-Russia. He had the same perception of America as Hitler, its incomplete militarization, and he intended to bring England to its knees, to detain the United States in neutrality and to turn over the warlike policy against Soviet Russia indirectly, by enticing Japan into the war against England. Yet the “traditional group” in foreign ministry (Ernst Frh. v. Weizsäcker and others) was anxious about war in Russia, and dissented from the underestimation of America and anti-American measures. It was important above all for them that Germany put all her energies into the Anglo-German war, so they attempted to urge Japan into the war with England.German navy insisted that they had to carry out the war on merchant shipping to defeat England, even if it caused war with America. But Hitler who was afraid of accidental war against England and America while fighting in Russia, prohibited the navy from the use of arms against American ships. The Navy also expected Japan to take action against England for the sake of tying down Anglo-American forces in Far East. From so various reasons, “actors” in the German decision-making process consented in appearance to drive Japan into the war against England before the beginning of Japan-United States negotiations and the German invasion into Russia.However the outbreak of Russo-German war in June, 1941 deprived Ribbentrop and diplomatic “traditional group” of the precondition of their one-front war policy-only against England. So they made overthrowing of Soviet-Russia their primary object, and switched from “against England” to “against Soviet Russia” in cooperation with Japan. But Hitler was so optimistic in the conflict with Soviet Russia that he expected victory before Japan entered the war against England. Here was displayed the duality of German policy towards Japan, the Hitler-Navy vs. Ribbentrop-“traditional group” in foreign ministry. And the escalation of American hostile actions in the Atlantic made the German Navy demand the removal of the restrictions upon attack on American ships more acutely. Hitler also came to consider the war against America more seriously. Yet Ribbentrop's policy was to keep the United States out of the war, and the diplomatic “traditional group” approved of this. Thus in the policy towards America, confrontation between the Hitler-Navy and Foreign ministry appeared.But this opposition in the political process did not become serious during the German advance into Russia. However the obscure attitude of Japan concerning Japan-United States negotiations and American hostile actions stalemated German foreign policy. And once the lack of ability to conquer Soviet Russia within 1941 became clear from

著者

酒井 哲哉

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_70-175_83, 2014

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For most Japanese IR scholars, Nagai Yônosuke is known as the most representative realist in Post-War Japan. Given the hegemony of idealism in the discursive space in 1950's Japan, it is not an exaggeration to say that his appearance as a conservative realist in 1960's was a historical event. In the studies concerned with political science in Post-War Japan, however, Nagai is usually depicted as a pioneer in behaviorism inspired by contemporary American political science. This article intends to synthesize these two aspects which were hitherto separately discussed, and by doing so resituate his works in the intellectual history of Post-War Japan.<br>Chapter I examines Nagai's works before his debut as an international political scientist. Influenced by his brother, Nagai in his teens was concerned with the philosophical trend of logical positivism. During the Pacific War, however, fascinated by German romanticism, he went further to accept anti-Semitic theory on conspiracy. Given this experience, after the war, he began to be engaged in research on political consciousness with the theoretical framework of sociological psychology and had soon established himself as a promising political scientist. Nagai's behaviorism owed heavily to Maruyama Masao's work, <i>The World of Politics</i>, published in 1952. Based on Lasswell's works, Maruyama had there presented his behavioristic model of political power and suggested the importance of the activities of voluntary associations as a remedy for political apathy in mass society. In 1950's, Nagai as well as Maruyama regarded his behaviorism as a progressive venture to establish democracy in Post-War Japan. However, Nagai was not a blind advocate of behaviorism. Reviewing Weldon's work, <i>the Vocabulary of Politics</i>, which was founded in logical positivism, he criticized the scientific assumption of American behaviorism and its inclination to social engineering. Nagai did not even conceal himself from his sympathy with Hans J. Morgenthau's criticism to social engineering. Thus Nagai's ambivalent attitude toward American political science was a prologue to his subsequent conversion to conservative realism in 1960's.<br>Chapter II investigates Nagai's works on international politics in 1960's focusing on the relationship between his concern in 1950's. and 1960's His first article on international politics, "American concept of war and the challenge of Mao Zedong" founded its theoretical framework on his behavioristic political science including key concepts such as "situation", "institution" and "organization". His criticism to American concept of war was apparently based on his antipathy to social engineering which had already appeared in late 1950's. Nagai was misunderstood by his contemporaries as an epigone of American scientific strategic studies. Discussing Nagai's ambivalence toward scientific approach, this chapter explains the reason why such misunderstandings had occurred<br>Chapter III depicts how Nagai viewed the political turmoil in 1968. As an expert in the study of mass society, Nagai was sensitive to the impact of rapid economic development commencing in early 1960's upon contemporary Japanese politics. Nevertheless, he did not advocate the end of ideology. He rather appreciated the importance of utopian ideas in the post-industrial society. In his article "Why dose socialism exist in America?", Nagai criticized the stagnant institutionalized American liberalism and appreciated utopian idealists including Riesman and Fromm. Therefore, while adopting conservative realist critique in discussing American foreign policies, Nagai took sides with "utopian socialists" in reviewing American domestic politics. His dual strategy took its root in his consistent criticism to the institutionalized American liberalism.

著者

三宅 正樹

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.47, pp.33-74, 1972

著者

東郷 育子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.145, pp.72-92,L10, 2006-08-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

40

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Since the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, the Chinese government has strongly governed and controlled to constrain democratization. Despite severe limitations, China's citizens have lived better and freer than before 1989 as a byproduct of China's economic reform and opening to the outside world. The enhanced government control following the Tiananmen incident has understandably aroused the civil liberties awareness of the Chinese people vis-à-vis the government, particularly with respect to human rights.The Chinese government has basically rejected western human rights pressure, while at the same time, pursuing a positive strategy at the international level. China has signed and ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and is also a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, although this is not yet to be ratified.In line with the continued development of the market economy, China has promoted legal reform including the adoption of the Civil Procedure Law, the revised Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law, Administrative Litigation Act and others. In 2004, China adopted amendments to the Current Constitution including articles for improving the protection of citizens' lawful private property and provisions on respect for human rights. However, full compliance with these legal reforms and international human rights law is a different problem to be analyzed separately.Since 1991, China has published the so-called white paper on human rights practices to advocate its own view on human rights, and to make public a limited amount of information about human rights in China. A number of NGOs and human rights research institutions have been established and are engaging, albeit under significant government scrutiny and control, in academic research and international exchange about human rights. The China Society for Human Rights Studies is a typical government sponsored NGO. It hosts the country's biggest human rights website and published the first human rights magazine in China. In China, while the number of NGOs is increasing rapidly, only NGOs permitted by the government are allowed to engage in westernized human rights development or democratization. Furthermore, international NGOs that are critical of the Chinese government are barred from operating in China.It goes without saying that the 1989 Tiananmen Incident and subsequent human rights battles with Western nations have heightened awareness and concern amongst the international community of China's human rights record. As a result, the Chinese government has become more accommodating, holding over the years an increasing number of meetings and dialogue on human rights with various governments and private organizations. Tibet and Xinjiang, which had hitherto not been treated as human rights issues, are now the object of calls for improvement by the international community. At the UN Commission on Human Rights, Chinese government has fought year after year to resist Western cosponsored resolution for China's human rights abuses. However, it is significant that the Chinese government has accepted visits and activities of High Commissioner for Human Rights and Special Rapporteurs, and promoted human rights technical cooperation with the UN agencies.However, China's policies and strategies have not necessarily produced a standard of human rights sufficient to satisfy international community. The criticism from international community remains strong. With China now a member of the new UN Human Rights Council, it will come under increasing pressure to fulfill new obligations with respect to this role and the promotion and protection of human rights.Two vectors in China's human rights development can be identified. Firstly, there exists external pressure, such as calls from international community for the improvement of China's human rights situation in addition to diplomatic pressure.

著者

石田 淳

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.160, pp.160_152-165, 2012-03-25 (Released:2012-06-15)

参考文献数

50

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As Stanley Hoffmann has convinced us in his 1977 article, it was in the United States in the wake of the Second World War that the study of international relations, IR as is now called, was established as an independent academic discipline. This article explains in what sense it has been an American social science and explores whether it still offers a useful analytical tool with which to better understand the multifaceted political reality of today's international relations.This article first goes back to the origins of IR and reviews its main features in the foundational work of Hans Morgenthau. His work stressed that perception matters in power politics among nations in that the outcome of diplomacy depends upon the perceived persuasiveness of threats and promises. In addition, it devoted attention to the relations between politics and law to explain how the status quo in international order had been maintained and challenged.And then this article examines the way in which IR has been Americanized since his time. In a nutshell, first, the influence of Thomas Schelling's work in the 1960s was profound and far-reaching in the entire field of IR. The intellectual hegemony of rationalism (or the analytical methods of rational choice) in the 1980s meant that the mainstream IR came to pay less and less attention to actors' perception and law. And second, it was totally ironical that the discipline of IR has recently retrieved the sociological discussion on perception, law, and norm, which it intentionally deleted in the process of importing rationalism from economics.This article concludes by emphasizing that the discipline of Americanized IR should expand its horizons: the study of diplomacy should be broadened to cover not only coercion for the purpose of either deterring a challenger from altering the status quo or compelling it to restore the status quo, but also reassurance for the purpose of achieving peaceful change; and the study of international order should highlight the way in which international and domestic orders have co-evolved in history.

著者

梶田 孝道

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.110, pp.1-22,L5, 1995-10-21 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

23

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The rights of foreigners, including their right to vote in local elections, are expanding in the European Union as the integration of Europe not only allows people to freely travel across the borders in the region but also has brought about the new legal concept of European citizenship.Western Europe, however, has experienced an inflow and settlement of Asian and African immigrants and faces a serious problem concerning their social, economic and political rights. The purpose of this article is to explain the current status of the right of foreigners to vote in local elections in Western Europe and to generalize over the issue by comparing Western European countries with each other.The current status of suffrage of foreigners in local elections in Western Europe will be briefly discussed. The countries which have granted foreigners the right to vote in local elections include Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands. The remains of colonialism can be seen in the United Kingdom's approach to the issue, because the country has vested citizenship and suffrage to people from the Commonwealth of Nations. Ireland has also granted foreigners the right to vote, while the country decides whether it grants foreigners suffrage based on the historical relations between the United Kingdom and the countries the foreigners are from. The suffrage of foreigners has not yet been granted in France and Germany which have attracted many foreign workers, of whom Asian and African immigrants and Muslims account for a large percentage, although the issue has aroused much controversy in the two countries. These examples clearly indicate that the situations surrounding each country affect its approach to the issue of the right of foreigners to vote in a subtle way.We will next examine a group of factors which enable countries to grant foreigners the right to vote and a group of factors which prevent them from doing so. The former group of factors includes the history of granting foreigners suffrage in a certain region, such as North Europe, a close relation between the former colonies and suzerains, the diplomatic policy of the country concerned (e. g. Sweden), free trade and the openness of the country. The latter group includes the ideology of a strong nation state (e. g. France), strong nationality (e. g. Germany), the ratio of foreigners to total population, a large cultural and religious distance between society which foreigners come from and society which accepts them (e. g. France and Germany) and the existence of a strong anti-foreigner movement.Next, the logic behind granting the suffrage to foreigners and the logic against it will be discussed, and based on this discussion, the reasons why some countries have granted foreigners the right to vote and why others have not will be examined. The experiences in Western Europe could offer many suggestions to Japan which is facing the problem of whether to grant foreigners the right to vote in local elections. The problem of the suffrage of foreigners tends to be discussed at the level of norms, and there is little discussion on the matter from a positive point of view, such as how foreigners will be granted the right to vote and how heavy their turnout will be. Japan will be able to learn many things from experiences of Western Europe concerning this problem.

著者

池井 優

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.23, pp.44-58, 1963

著者

池井 優

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1963, no.23, pp.44-58, 1963-10-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

60

著者

ペルツ ステフェン

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1970, no.41, pp.56-76, 1970-04-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

56

著者

山本 吉宣

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1976, no.55, pp.27-43,L2, 1976-07-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

29

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The aim of this article is to construct several plausible models of war expansion in the major power system, to test them against the empirical data, and to obtain implications from these models for our ever continuing efforts to control war expansion.Among the models developed, the Polya model turns out the best. In the Polya model, it is assumed that once a war occurs, each remaining non-participant major power has an equal probability of entering the war, and that this probability increases as the number of the major powers that have entered the war increases.We find from the Polya model that the major power that makes a decision first whether it enters the war or not has the crucial role in war expansion and that in a multipolar system as compared to a bipolar system, while the probability of a world war will decrease, wars into which one or two major powers enter from the non-participant status will become more likely to occur.

著者

平間 洋一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1989, no.90, pp.169-184, 1989-03-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

93

著者

渡辺 昭夫

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1992, no.100, pp.1-15,L5, 1992-08-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

14

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To commemorate the 100th issue of International Relations, the editorial board decided to compile a special volume on the Cold War and After: Japanese Perspectives.The 14 articles contained in this volume are for the sake of convenience divided into three groups: theory, history and prospects. The article by Yoshinobu Yamamoto gives an overview of the evolutions of international relations theories during the past four decades which, he argues, can be related to the historical developments of international relations in the real world. Since the latter were to an important degree shaped by the Cold War, a dominant paradigm altered from time to time, reflecting the sequence of events in the East-West relations. After tracing the paradigmatic development from the intitial stage of realist domination through the rise of various versions of liberalism during the 1970's to the resurgence of neo-realism in the more recent times, Yamamoto forsees the coming of an age of liberalist-led integration of international theories following the end of the Cold War.This basically sanguine prospect shown by Yamamoto is in line with one of the major theses dealt with by various writers who contributed to this volume. Influenced by John Gaddis' book The Long Peace, they are concerned with the reasons for the continuation of peace between the two superpowers during the Cold War era. Without necessarily denying the idea that such systemic and objective factors as bipolarity and nuclear deterrence were conducive to the long peace, some of the writers for this volume rather emphasized the learning capacity of the policy-makers of the both superpowers as an explanatory factor (Anami, Umemoto and Ishii). To some if not all, the long peace in the Cold War era was part of the longer trend in international relations, i. e. the trend towards no war among the major powers. The lessons of the two World Wars in the 20th century brought about attitudinal change regardiag the issue of war and peace, signs of which were discernible even in the behaviours of the Soviet and American leaders despite their Cold War rhetoric. Democracy is not necessarily regarded as a prerequisite for international peace. In fact, examining the thought of George Kennan on the problems of democracy, one of the contributors (Terachi) casts doubts on the thesis that democracy is by nature conducive to international peace.If one takes a narrow definition of the Cold War with a focus on Soviet-American relations or East-West relations in Europe, the long peace thesis seems largely acceptable, although his or her explanation may differ from the one offered in the above. A more fundamental objection will be raised, however, by those who adhere to the idea that the ‘hot wars’ outside Europe were the essential ingredient of the Cold War. In fact this was the central theme of The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, a volume edited by Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye fifteen years ago. Wit-nessed two hot wars in Korea and Indochina during their life time, many contemporary Japanese (and probably other Asian) historians would choose this broader definition of the Cold War. This thesis is worth remebering, although, apart from a brief reference by Ishii, it was not fully discussed in the present volume. This is so particularly because the relative weight of the Cold War in the entire history of the post WW II era differs from one region to another. Hece the difference in the impact of the end of the Cold War upon the regional international affairs in the years to come, which is the topic of the the third section of the present volume.Koizumi (who deals with the present and future in the latter half of her article) and Ueta are concered with post-Cold War Europe, whereas all others are either with Asia/Pacific (Sakanaka, Kurata, Tamaki, Hara and Purrington) or with more broad themes (Oizumi and Takehiko Yamamoto).

著者

三上 昭美

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.26, pp.1-21, 1964

著者

中村 栄孝

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1974, no.51, pp.1-24, 1974-10-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

95

著者

酒井 哲哉

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_70-175_83, 2014

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For most Japanese IR scholars, Nagai Yônosuke is known as the most representative realist in Post-War Japan. Given the hegemony of idealism in the discursive space in 1950's Japan, it is not an exaggeration to say that his appearance as a conservative realist in 1960's was a historical event. In the studies concerned with political science in Post-War Japan, however, Nagai is usually depicted as a pioneer in behaviorism inspired by contemporary American political science. This article intends to synthesize these two aspects which were hitherto separately discussed, and by doing so resituate his works in the intellectual history of Post-War Japan.<br>Chapter I examines Nagai's works before his debut as an international political scientist. Influenced by his brother, Nagai in his teens was concerned with the philosophical trend of logical positivism. During the Pacific War, however, fascinated by German romanticism, he went further to accept anti-Semitic theory on conspiracy. Given this experience, after the war, he began to be engaged in research on political consciousness with the theoretical framework of sociological psychology and had soon established himself as a promising political scientist. Nagai's behaviorism owed heavily to Maruyama Masao's work, <i>The World of Politics</i>, published in 1952. Based on Lasswell's works, Maruyama had there presented his behavioristic model of political power and suggested the importance of the activities of voluntary associations as a remedy for political apathy in mass society. In 1950's, Nagai as well as Maruyama regarded his behaviorism as a progressive venture to establish democracy in Post-War Japan. However, Nagai was not a blind advocate of behaviorism. Reviewing Weldon's work, <i>the Vocabulary of Politics</i>, which was founded in logical positivism, he criticized the scientific assumption of American behaviorism and its inclination to social engineering. Nagai did not even conceal himself from his sympathy with Hans J. Morgenthau's criticism to social engineering. Thus Nagai's ambivalent attitude toward American political science was a prologue to his subsequent conversion to conservative realism in 1960's.<br>Chapter II investigates Nagai's works on international politics in 1960's focusing on the relationship between his concern in 1950's. and 1960's His first article on international politics, "American concept of war and the challenge of Mao Zedong" founded its theoretical framework on his behavioristic political science including key concepts such as "situation", "institution" and "organization". His criticism to American concept of war was apparently based on his antipathy to social engineering which had already appeared in late 1950's. Nagai was misunderstood by his contemporaries as an epigone of American scientific strategic studies. Discussing Nagai's ambivalence toward scientific approach, this chapter explains the reason why such misunderstandings had occurred<br>Chapter III depicts how Nagai viewed the political turmoil in 1968. As an expert in the study of mass society, Nagai was sensitive to the impact of rapid economic development commencing in early 1960's upon contemporary Japanese politics. Nevertheless, he did not advocate the end of ideology. He rather appreciated the importance of utopian ideas in the post-industrial society. In his article "Why dose socialism exist in America?", Nagai criticized the stagnant institutionalized American liberalism and appreciated utopian idealists including Riesman and Fromm. Therefore, while adopting conservative realist critique in discussing American foreign policies, Nagai took sides with "utopian socialists" in reviewing American domestic politics. His dual strategy took its root in his consistent criticism to the institutionalized American liberalism.