著者

三浦 聡

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.124, pp.27-44,L7, 2000-05-12 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

69

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The last quarter century has witnessed a rising scholarly interest in international institutions. Various reviews of the study have identified several schools of thought. Popular among them is a variable-focused typology: power, interests, and ideas, which in turn produces a neorealism-neoliberalism-constructivism trilogy. Also widely accepted is a distinction based on ontology, epistemology, and methodology, the schism of which is between rationalism and constructivism.While building on these works, I pose different questions: How can we conceive of actions and institutions, and how are we to characterize and explore the relationship between them? I would argue that we can answer them in three ways, namely, instrumental, deliberative, and cognitive approaches to international institutions. Appropriating insights of “new institutionalisms” in social sciences, I develop these approaches by explicating three faces of concepts such as rationality, interaction, communication, decision-making procedures, compliance, interests, and ideas.Relying upon the logic of consequentiality, instrumentalists focus on actors' calculation and ask how institutions intervene in the process. Actors live under uncertainty so that exchange of private information becomes an important aspect of strategic interaction. They regard institutions as various types of information and as procedures for aggregating various interests. Institutions are only one among many instruments, and actors utilize them as long as they serve their own interests.The deliberative approach adopts the logic of appropriateness and argues that actors match their choices not with expected consequences but with situations they find themselves in. Actors live in a world of multiple and potentially conflicting roles and rules. Appropriateness of actions, therefore, can be contested so that common standards need to be established in the process of deliberation. Consensus constitutes the basis of communicative action. Actors can change their conception of appropriateness—norms and rules—while transforming their own conception of interests and identities through socialization. Institutions construct the practice of deliberation, serve as reasons for action, and situate deliberation within the overall decision-making process.Cognitivists, with the logic of orthodoxy, explore how actors perceive the world as they know it, and argue that institutions make social cognition possible. Actors live under an ambiguous world. As templates for cognition, schema, scripts, frames, and symbols enable actors to divide the world into many components, to categorize and classify themselves to formulate their identities, and to make the world meaningful. Actors can strategically appropriate these templates from the “cultural toolkit” and construct historical narratives, through which they transform the tools themselves.I conclude with considering some implications of this typology for the furure of theories of international institutions. I propose that we should view rationality as “embedded, ” and inquire conditions under which a particular mode of rationality is dominant. Also, I suggest a need for elaborating and expanding the “theoretical toolkit” presented herein.

著者

納家 政嗣

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.143, pp.1-11,L5, 2005-11-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

19

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The study of international relations today requires some consolidation of the growing debates on normative inquiries. The expansion in normative writing since the 1980s has included both new substantive justice claims and new approaches for studying them. Three main developments at the end of the last century accelerated such reassessment of IR norms. First, globalization brought with it a heightened sense of our material and ideational interdependence, that we coexist in a single world and effective and sustainable solutions to shared problems cannot be achieved without regard for justice. Second, the end of the Cold war led to a renewed interest in the promotion of a just world order on account of the strengthened perception that certain sets of values concerning the well-being of mankind were now more widely shared. Third, constructivists have challenged the neoutilitarian mainstream of IR-the synthesis of neo-realism/liberalism- and attempted to rectify biases caused by its strict rationalist assumptions by placing the ideational aspects in the center of IR theory.International society has long embraced a view that, to borrow the words of R. Aron, focused on “the minimum conditions for coexistence of states”. The pursuit of morality or justice was seen as a challenge to the maintenance of international order. However, there are now some signs that this perception has given way to a concern with individual justice, to support for humanitarian intervention, human security, protection of the global environment, sustainable use of natural resources, and demands for distributional justice from rich to poor states. But existing responses to, or implementation of the new normative claims also suggest that traditional ideas of international order, depending on such norms as non-interference, are still very attractive to the majority of states. Furthermore, the apparent revitalization of liberal norms mentioned above cannot easily be differentiated from the policies of hegemonic America. Thus, while we acknowledge the importance of investigating the process of constructing new norms and coordinating conflicts among norms, we still require a more consolidated framework for dealing with the relationship between the norms of inter-state order and global justice claims.The eight articles appearing in this issue all represent insightful responses to the theoretical challenge briefly suggested above.

著者

中井 和夫

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1997, no.114, pp.135-150,L13, 1997-03-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

21

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The first Ukrainian state already has lasted five years. But it does not mean the end of long dreamed of statism, but the beginning of hard ways for building a nation.The border of Ukraine has a peculiar character. Almost all border lines were drawn by dividing regions, each of which comprised historically one region. This condition also makes the task of building a nation difficult.In the western part of Ukrainian border, such regions are Galitsia, Carpathian, Bukovina and Bessarabia. If you turn to the east, there are two divided regions, the Donbass and the Slobidska Ukraine.The Ukrainian border was made by dividing regions that caused difficulties in building the Ukrainian nation-state. Because of the dividing the regions automatically made Ukrainian Diaspora or irredenta outside Ukraine. In Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Moldova and Russia, Ukrainians have been living as a minority group. At the same time the opposite sides, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Moldova and Russia, consider the regions which were incorporated with Ukraine their irredenta. Between Ukraine and Russia there is another but major border dispute on the Crimean Peninsula.Ukraine herself is divided into two parts, Eastern and Western. The Western part of Ukraine, called Galicia, has some characteristics which are not seen in other parts of Ukraine.On the contrary to the Galicia, eastern and southern parts of Ukraine have different characteristics. The Donbass and Crimea belong to these regions. These regions have strong tles with Russia although they belong to Ukraine. The Crimea, now an autonomous republic in Ukraine, belonged to Russia until 1954. A part of the Donbass was belonged to Russia before the 1917 revolution as the Don Army District.The contrast between the West and the East in Ukraine can be seen on the map. There is an interesting piece of evidence to show the dichotomy between the West and the East. It shows the change of support for the first president Leonid Kravchuk and the second president Leonid Kuchma. In Ukraine we can hear a new Ukrainian proverb, saying, “Ukrainian Presidents born in the East will die in the West”. This proverb well explains the dichotomy between the East and the West in Ukraine.For Nation-building in Ukraine there are some obstacles in terms of integration of people into one consolidated group. Ukraine is divided not only by geography but also by culture and identity.Language problems may be the most visible problem in today's Ukraine. The second obstacle for the integration of the Ukrainian nation-state is religious splits among the people. Ukraine is, of course, a secularized state. But the history of the suppression of national churches such as the Uniate Church (Ukrainian Catholic Church) and Ukrainian Orthodox Church made these churches political factors.Ukrainians have failed to form a nation-state. Russians have also failed to form their own nation-state. Russians have always been a subject of a big empire, first the Russian Empire and next the Soviet Union. Above all things they carried out their mission to build and maintain an empire. Ukrainians, in contrast, are eager to build their own nation-state, not an empire. This is an identity difference between two nationalities. And this difference reflects the dichotomy in Ukraine between the East and the West.The geopolitical position of Ukraine in the International arena has been a factor of difficulties for the building a nation state. For Ukraine, located between the West and the East, between Germany and Russia, inevitably it has been geopolitically in either a buffer zone or a battleground. In the Northern War in 18th century, the Napoleonic War, Crimean War, World War I and World War II, Ukraine was one of the major battlefields. After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union the region which includes the territory of Ukraine became a battlefield between Europe and Russia b

著者

臼井 勝美

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1961, no.15, pp.119-133, 1961-03-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

竹中 佳彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.109, pp.70-83,L9, 1995-05-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

52

被引用文献数

1

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When did the Japanese begin to regard the United Nations as the ideal organization? Most of Japanese intellectuals must have advocated the construction of the “Greater East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere.” When and why did the switch from the regionalism to internationalism occur? This article's purpose is to answer these questions, focusing on the Japanese intellectuals' perception of the postwar international organization in the Pacific War.In 1942, the Association of International Law in Japan established four committees in order to serve their country by pursuing and constructing the Greater East Asian International Law. It made a plan to issue the Greater East Asian International Law Series.The first volume of this series was written by YASUI Kaoru, who was an associate professor of international law at Tokyo University. He introduced the idea of the national socialist international law initiated by Carl Schmitt to Japan. He expressly wrote in this book that he could select neither liberal international law, nor Marxist international law, nor national socialist international law as his own position. But he was purged from Tokyo University in 1948. Why? Because he never denied establishing the Greater East Asian International Law. After the Pacific War he became a Marxist student of international law, and he played an active part in the movement to prohibit the atomic and hydrogen bombs.One of the faculty members to oppose Yasui's promotion to a professor in 1943 was YOKOTA Kisaburo, who was the head professor of international law at Tokyo University. Both Yokota and Yasui were followers of TACHI Sakutaro, but Yokota considered that Yasui was unprincipled and went with the current of the times. Yokota studied the non-belligerency phenomena in World War II, dissimilar to belligerency or neutrality on the international law. He never converted from liberalism to militarism, though he criticized the United Nations for attacking Japanese hospital ships and merchant ships. And he paid attention to the international organization plan discussed among the United Nations at the Dumberton Oaks Conference before the surrender.He foresaw that the United Nations would be the name of the new international organization, and he temporarily translated the word of the United Nations with “Kokusai Rengo, ” which meant not Allied Powers but the international union of states, as if it were an ideal organization. This free translation might only be in imitation of the precedent that the League of Nations had been translated into the term “Kokusai Renmei” which implicated the international league in Japanese, but it was fixed as the formal translation in postwar Japan. It has given the United Nations the image of the ideal international organization for the Japanese.

著者

松本 繁一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1967, no.33, pp.54-76, 1967-06-01 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

98

著者

三上 昭美

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1964, no.26, pp.1-21, 1964-07-01 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

91

著者

井上 勇一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1982, no.71, pp.173-188,L14, 1982-08-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

30

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Railway construction by rival powers led to conflicting economic and political claims at the close of the 19th century. At the bottom of Russian and Japanese clashes over the issue of the Seoul-Wiju railway lay international competition for control of the northern half of the Korean Peninsula. Britain and Japan constructed the Peking-Mukden, the Seoul-Pusan and the Seoul-Wiju railways respectively to counter a Russian threat in the Far East through the control of the Siberian and the Chinese Eastern railways. This is the basic background of the Russo-Japanese War.Additionally, from the view point of railway construction, the Russo-Japanese War may be said to be a battle over different gauges, because both Russian railways were broad gauged whereas the British and Japanese railways were standard gauged.Even the technological aspect of railway building had political implications. It was no coincidence that the Anglo-Japanese railways were both standard gauged in opposition to the broad gauged Russian railways.

著者

西 和彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1996, no.113, pp.90-102,L12, 1996-12-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

12

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The purpose of this paper is to present a historical and geographic macroperspective on the changes in global politics and economics being brought about by communications networks. The Internet is playing a major role in this revolution. We are in the midst of an momentous age, in which two cultures, which began in ancient Egypt about 6, 600 years ago and spread around the globe, are meeting again in the Asia-Pacific region, which includes Japan. The information revolution is making this possible.We can use the Venetian civilization as the dividing line between the Middle Ages and the modern industrial world. Since then, the phases of global prosperity were punctuated by the industrial, manufacturing, and commercial revolutions made possible by the development of the steam engine, and later the internal combustion engine. The fourth phase of global prosperity began when the American-invented transistor was reborn as the microprocessor.A key aspect of the information revolution is the migration of publishing onto online services, and making those resources available in real time. This is being made possible by the microprocessor. In turn, this provides us with the ability to use communications networks to improve dialogue among nations, access to education and health care, and solutions for the planet's ecology.The roots of this information revolution lie in the US's attempt to deal with such problems as its budget deficit, trade deficit, and increasing difficulties with its systems of education and health care. But as the US makes the transition from a National Information Infrastructure to a Global Information Infrastructure, this information revolution also offers opportunities for solving East-West and North-South problems. Communications networks are now linking not only the world's major economic powers, but also post-Soviet Eastern Europe, the Asian-Pacific region, South America, and Africa. From the standpoint of this information revolution, the major power in the twenty-first century—in terms of human resources, language, economic strength, military ability, and communications technology—will not be China or India, it will be the US. The US is the only nation with sufficient resources to leverage communications networks as a means toward peace and prosperity in the twenty-first century. The US can use the information revolution to extend its dominance and prosperity for another hundred years. Rather than compete against the US, Japan should choose to support the cause of world peace by contributing to the expansion of information networks.

著者

秦 郁彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1982, no.70, pp.47-66,L5, 1982-05-22 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

63

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While the United Nations were devoting their last efforts towards the defeat of the Axis Powers, strategists within the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had started to prepare for the “next war.” The USSR appeared as the most probable enemy in the war plans from the fall of 1945. Rapid demobilization and resulting reorganization of American armed forces, however, curtailed effective deterrence toward the USSR which maintained relatively superior forces along the “Iron Curtain.”Official declaration of the Cold War by President Truman in 1947 accelerated the rapid strengthening of the U. S. armed forces and a number of emergency war plans, short and long term, were drafted.In this article, the author has endeavoured to trace the evolution of the American strategy toward the USSR between 1945 and 1949, based chiefly on the JCS Official History. Special attention has been paid to the changing role of nuclear weapons within the overall strategy.The Far East was always given low priority by war planners and it led to the retreat of the U. S. defense perimeter in Asia since the “loss of China” in the fall of 1949. Japan under the occupation was, however, enjoying calm and peaceful days.

著者

野口 和彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.153, pp.175-185, 2008-11-30 (Released:2010-10-01)

参考文献数

40

著者

藤井 昇三

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1964, no.26, pp.22-35, 1964-07-01 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

49

著者

梶浦 篤

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1987, no.85, pp.97-114,L12, 1987-05-23 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

74

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One of the causes of the Northern Territories Problem was the failure to apply to the territories “the principle of non-aggrandizement” which the Allied countries, including the Soviet Union, confirmed during World War II. Why did such a thing happen? In an attempt to solve this problem, I will analyze how the Northern Territories were dealt with in the policy of the United States when the Japanese Peace Treaty was drafted by John Foster Dulles.The provisions of the treaty concerning the Northern Territories are as follows. In Article 2, Japan renounces the Chishima Islands and Southern Karafuto. We can find two problems here. First, “the Chishima Islands” are not defined. Second, the future status of the Chishima Islands and Southern Karafuto are not defined. According to Dulles, Article 22, which provides that a dispute concering the interpretation or execution of the treaty could be referred for decision to the International Court of Justice, is of use for solving the first problem. But, the article is practically useless, because the Soviet Union would not sign the treaty. Moreover, due to Article 25, the Soviet Union cannot gain “any rights, titles or benefits” by the treaty. Therefore, the second problem also was not settled in the treaty.Article 26, too, has a problem. It says, “Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.” In 1956, when Japan was about to recognize the possession of the Chishima Islands and Southern Karafuto by the Soviet Union in the bilateral peace negotiations, Dulles intervened on the grounds that if such a settlement was realized, the United States also should be rewarded with the Ryukyu Islands by Article 26.Why has the treaty, drafted by Dulles, a competent lawyer, presented so many problems regarding the Northern Territories? Dulles tried to make the Soviet Union sign the treaty with the bait of the Northern Territories, and he had to overcome the difference of opinions regarding the disposition of Taiwan with the United Kingdom. He also had to take the opinions of the Senate and the Pentagon into consideration. Moreover, Dulles was afraid that the Japanese would be dissatisfied with the separation of the Ryukyu Islands and would then arouse anti-American feelings. Therefore, he devised such provisions that the Japanese would be more frustrated with the Soviet Union over the Northern Territories.Dulles adopted realism and power politics, treating the Northern Territories as a bargaining chip. This was one of the main reason why “the principle of non-aggrandizement, ” which conformed with idealism and democracy, was not applied to the Northern Territories.

著者

大畑 篤四郎

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1961, no.17, pp.91-106, 1961-12-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

48

著者

石田 淳

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1998, no.117, pp.49-65,L8, 1998-03-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

40

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Realists regard the anarchic structure of international relations as exogenous constraints on the foreign policy decisions of sovereign states. They do not explain but assume anarchy. They explain, instead, that the absence of centralized authority, which enforces international agreements, hinders the efficient solution of political conflicts among states, as in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. But why is this anarchy as an inefficient institution sustained by rational actors? Why don't the rational states attempt to establish international institutions that would facilitate the centralized making and enforcement of international agreements?They do not do so because the centralized making of agreements would fail to serve their common interest for the following four reasons even if the centralized enforcement would serve their common interest. First, the decentralized control of information by sovereign states can be a bargaining advantage. Second, even if states comply with agreements without centralized enforcement, as in the case of policy coordination, they often have divergent preferences over which policy to choose as a common policy. Third, it is extremely difficult to establish a centralized authority which clearly defines property rights beyond national borders even if the clear definition of property rights could improve the efficiency of decentralized bargaining over the regulation of economic activities with international externalities, as Ronald Coase argues. It is because the international definition of property rights is expected to generate serious distributional consequences. Fourth, developed and developing countries have divergent interests in agreements that would have redistributional effects among them.

著者

石田 淳

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.125, pp.224-227, 2000-10-13 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

渡邉 昭夫

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.155, pp.155_148-157, 2009-03-20 (Released:2011-07-10)

参考文献数

1

著者

木村 昌人

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1991, no.97, pp.14-31,L6, 1991-05-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

50

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The purpose of this paper is to describe clearly the effects of the World Monetary and Economic Conference held in London in 1933 on Japan-United States relations.Generally speaking, the London Economic Conference was largest international economic conference between the Wars, but it was not successful because of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's opposition to the European nations'plan. That is, Roosevelt wanted freedom to devalue the dollar in order to raise domestic prices as a counter to the deflationary effects of the depression. The London Economic Conference could not rebuild the international monetary system. However, there have been few studies about this topic in connection with Japanese diplomatic history, but I believe the result of the conference had a tremendous effect on Japan-United States relations, and this analysis will illustrate Japan's cooperation towards the United States after leaving the League of Nations on March 27, 1933.Japan's response to the London Economic Conference was as follows:(1) Japan wanted freedom to carry out its own domestic economic policy. Therefore, Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi was opposed to a return to the gold standard system and did not want to participate in any treaty which aimed at stabilizing the yen exchange rate.(2) Because Japan believed that tariff wars would prevent the recovery of industry and trade for each nation, government and businessmen were anxious to reduce high tariffs and to conclude an international treaty to sweep away limits and embargoes on exports and imports.As a result, the conference could not conclude international treaties not only on a monetary system, but also on trade issues.Japanese businessmen thought that the failure of the conferece became a common symbol of a basic change in the world economy. It brought unstable exchange rates and rampant protectionism. But the Japanese government was calm, because the United States also abandoned the gold standard system and President Roosevelt had exactly the same idea about economic policy, that is, both wanted a managed monetary system. Also, Secretary Cordell Hull's proposal for a reciprocity treaty fascinated Japan, when faced with the European nations' protectionism.In conclusion, the result of the London Economic Conference brought about a situation where Japan could cooperate with the United States economically.

著者

大畑 篤四郎

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1986, no.Special, pp.168-193, 1986-10-18 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

10

著者

永井 陽之助

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1986, no.Special, pp.2-31,L5, 1986-10-18 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

28

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I. Uniqueness of the Postwar Peace. II. The Nomos of the earth-Geopolitics of MAD (i) Bipolar System (ii) Geostrategic Approach to MAD (iii) Informal Rules of Game and Norms of Behavior. III. The Nomos of the Outer Space (i) Sanctuarization of the Space (ii) Ambiguity of the Space Weapons (iii) Issues of ABM Treaty in the Legal Context of SDI.This essay aims to examine the impact of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) on the Nomos of the outer space through revealing the secret of durability of the postwar peace. In calling for a defense that would render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete, ” President Reagan's goal of a perfect area defense stirred the interest of the public who have long sought a moral alternative to deterrence based on the mutual assured destruction (MAD). Yet MAD is not a strategy capable of being changed by political will or strategic considerations; it is rather “existential” condition, not unlike the condition of the market mechanism, resulted by the inevitable consequence of the super-powers having the assured capabilities of mutual destruction, closely connected with the asymmetric geopolitical positon.This condition has created the mutual vulnerability of civilized urban centers, because of the strategic reality resulted from the development of the ICBM and the so-called “reconnaissance revolution.” The detonation of even as few as five or ten Soviet warheads on U. S. cities would cause unparalleld destruction. It might be called the law of “impossibility of area defense”. This unique combination of the bipolar system and the condition of the MAD has successfully drawed a clear distinction between a zone of sanctuarity (a zone of predictability on which mutual interest in common rules based on reciprocal sanction) and a zone of danger (a zone of unpredictabily) in the periphery of the world. They have no choice, in this condition, but to play the game of influence by means of “nuclear cheque” on the security of the nuclear arsenals.Whereas we live in “neither war nor peace, ” we are afraid of a radical discontinuity by turning a zone of predictablity into a zone of danger. The concept of a zone of danger-currently highlighted by the issue of the SDI in outer space-also signals the arrival of an era of opportunity on the formation of the Nomos of the space.Any consideration of a militarization of outer space should not neglect the distinction of two different directions: the sanctuarization of the space (turning into a zone of predictability) through the passive uses such as reconnaissance and communications, in sharp contrast with the militarization of the space by turning into a zone of danger through the development of the ABM and ASAT technology, despite of the ambiguity of space weapons.In all probablity, super-power rivalry in strategic defense will lead to an increased Soviet-American arms race by the exchange of the offensive and defensive in a vicious circle. This is the reason why the development of SDI might be quite different from the Manhattan and the Apollo projects, which involves no less than unlocking nature's secrets; a struggle of man against nature. In contrast, the success of the stratigic defense depends on the reactions or the counter-measureas taken by the Soviet side, as the Fletcher panel project has suggested.Moreover, the SDI poses a real threat to the Outer Space Treaty, not to mention to the ABM treaty which is most significant arms-control agreement of the postwar period. Both treaties should provide us the legal framework (the Nomos), as a fundamental constitution, of the outer space. Such “passive” military uses as the satellites for reconnaissance, surveillance, early warning, and communications are compatible with a doctrine of peaceful purposes and deterrence. Yet the ballistic missile defence (BMD)