著者

吉川 洋子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1983, no.75, pp.130-149,L13, 1983-10-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

58

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Japanese-Philippine negotiations on war reparations lasted from 1951 through 1956, often interrupted by disagreements on the terms of payment. Significantly, the diplomatic deadlocks were often broken by informal channels of communications and secret talks. A host of political and business leaders who had varying degrees of interests in each other's country participated.A most important breakthrough in deadlocked talks was made in New York and Washington in November 1954 by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and Senator Jose P. Laurel, whose secret meetings were arranged by the Premier's confidants on Philippine affairs, Nagano Mamoru and Shiohara Tamotsu. Nagano, a leading steel industrialist, had business interests in the Philippine iron mines and other resources, and had his own proposal on a variety of development projects to be financed by reparation funds. Shiohara, Executive Director of the Philippine Society of Japan, had been a personal friend of Senator Laurel since the Japanese occupation period when Laurel was President of the Republic and Shiohara served his government as an advisor on internal affairs.Nagano played several other roles during the whole process, including one as a member of the Japanese delegation for reparations talks. So did many other leaders such as former Ambassador Murata Shozo, Minister Takasaki Tatsunosuke, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro, and businessmen like Furukawa Yoshizo who had lived in the Philippines before the war and claimed to be experts about the country.Another diplomatic breakthrough was achieved in May 1955 by Ferino Neri, chief Philippine reparations negotiator, who ran a series of secret meetings in Tokyo with political and business influentials regarding the terms of payment. He finally obtained Prime Minister Hatoyama's confidential endorsement of his proposed terms. This success was made with the skillful help of Hatoyama's Deputy Cabinet Secretary Matsumoto Takizo, who apparently had many Philippine acquaintances primarily through the Free Masonry whose members pointedly included Hatoyama, Senator Camilo Osias, and most probably Senator Laurel.The long negotiations demonstrated the significant roles played by informal contact-makers on both sides. Many of them were those with official capacity seeking secret contacts, but some without official capacity also volunteered secretly to help the talks. Both Japanese and Philippine political cultures weigh personal ties, particularly, ties based on clientelism, in political dealings. The interaction of the two cultures over such difficult negotiations multiplied the effectiveness of informal contact-makers.

著者

斎藤 聖二

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1991, no.97, pp.154-177,L14, 1991-05-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

104

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Japanese warships transported five hundred million yen in gold bullion (about 450 tons) equivalent to about one trillion five or six hundred million yen at current prices, from Russia to Canada in the middle of the First World War. This bullion was the specie which was transferred to the Russian account at the Bank of England in Ottawa to supplement the overseas specie reserves. These reserves were for the purpose of purchasing munitions from America. Japan undertook to take part in this operation for the sake of showing cooperative unity with the Allied Powers. The supreme commander of the operation was the president of the Bank of England who oversaw allied finances. The operation was carried out according to a secret treaty between Russia and Britain which had been concluded at the urging of the American government.As the First World War developed into a major conflict, the Allied Powers relied heavily on imports of munitions from America which was at the time neutral. Russia had purchased vast amounts of munitions from America with the financial support of Britain. When the limit of this support was reached the trade finance situation between Russia and America reached an impasse. Britain wished to relieve the situation and enable the munitions trade to Russia to continue, as it was strategically vital that Russia maintain the Eastern front. The most effective method would have been for Russia to make one colossal transfer of specie. However, the threat of German U-boats in the sea near Europe had made that idea unfeasible. Therefore, a plan was worked out whereby Japanese warships would transport the gold across the Pacific Ocean to Canada. By taking on the role of transporter, Japan was able to impress upon the Allied Powers her cooperative attitude and turn Allied indebtedness to her advantage at the peace conference and in post-war deplomacy. Further, during the war the Japanese government had had difficulty in repatriating her foreign specie holdings. When Britain offered to sell Japan a part of the specie gold if she agreed to the transport plan, the Japanese government was more than happy to accept. In all, Japan imported a total of about 65 tons (worth about 80million yen)of gold in this way.During the First World War the center of international finance shifted from London to New York. The colossal specie transfer operation from Russia mentioned above was one of the events which symbolized the change. Japan played an unusual role in this event, a role which helps us to understand both Japan's position and in what ways she coped with international relations during First World War which pivoted on the international financial situation.In the first chapter, we look at the tight financial situation governing the munitions trade between Britain, Russia and America and consider how this gave rise to the necessity for the Russian specie transfer. In the second chapter, we discuss the process of the Japan-Russia munitions trade and the negotiations regarding the settlement of accounts. The third chapter gives a detailed description of the negotiations between Japan and Britain concerning the transportation of the gold and actual voyages of the Japanese warships.

著者

御厨 貴

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1992, no.99, pp.201-206, 1992-03-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

秦 郁彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1961, no.17, pp.130-133, 1961-12-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

森山 優

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1996, no.113, pp.152-166,L17, 1996-12-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

64

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This article analyzes how the Tojo Cabinet arrived at an agreement to go to war with America, Britain and the Dutch East Indies. The Tojo Cabinet would not to be bound by the ‘Guidelines for Implementing National Policy’ that were adopted by the Third Konoe Cabinet and would ‘return to white paper’. But the Guidelines which were adopted after two weeks reconsideration, specified a deadline for concluding talks with Washington, after which war was to be decided upon. Does this decision meant that The Tojo Cabinet overcome the structural defect of the Meiji Constitution? The decision-making system of the Third Konoe Cabinet was characterized by Ryoron-heiki that incorporate the interests of all the opposing government institutions and Evasion of Decision-Making that evaded decisions in order to avoid conflict. The prime minister could not override the interests of the various government organs. It was owing to the structural flaw in the Meiji Constitution which saw legislative power shared between the Cabinet and the General Staff.Togo agreed to be Foreign Minister on condition that The Tojo Cabinet was committed to work hard to bring negotiations with the United States to a success. Togo and Finance Minister Kaya stated that if Japan could not win a long war, there was no reason for going into it. Then, how did the Tojo Cabinet come to such a conclusion? This paper examines the following points.1) Analyzing the logic of ‘Reconsideration of National Policy’. The main purpose of the reconsideration was to deny the possibility of the policy of ‘perseverance and patience’. There were not enough reasons to conclude that the war was the better selection. The reconsideration did not examine the situation of a long drawn-out war. Nevertheless, to get such a conclusion, it was essential for it to be reinforced by uncertain factors such as a favorable change of the international situation, the establishment of ‘selfsufficiency and economic invincibility’.2) Examination of the ‘concessions’ of Japanese Foreign Policy to America. Foreign Minister Togo adopted, many ‘concessions’. Fixing a term to withdrawal from China, preparation to remove the Japanese troops stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the nothern part, were the most important proposals. The Third Konoe Cabinet had collapsed when war Minister Tojo resigned in rejecting plans for the Japanese Army to withdraw from China. The explanation of why and how Togo could succeed to reach an agreement with the Cabinet and the General staff. Can be drawn from the complex decision-making system of the Meiji Constitution.

著者

安岡 昭男

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.33, pp.1-9, 1967

著者

臼井 勝美

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.109, pp.197-200, 1995-05-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

安岡 昭男

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1967, no.33, pp.1-9, 1967-06-01 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

39

著者

鈴木 陽一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.144, pp.69-84,L12, 2006-02-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

57

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In 1998, the Public Record Office released a top-secret file. The file contained Britain's 1945 war plans against Russia, her ally at the time. Just after the German surrender, Winston Churchill, the then British Prime Minister, instructed the Joint Planning Staff (JPS) to draw up war plans against Russia. This apparently contradicted the British policy towards the wartime grand alliance. Through reviewing these war plans and their background, this essay will re-examine Churchill's image as a wartime leader. In particular, it will consider the following questions: Why did Churchill enter the World War II? Why did he instruct war plans against Russia to be drawn up? Why did the planned war never eventuate? What was the implication of the failure of these plans?In May 1940, just after the German advance into the Low Countries, Churchill took the office of the Prime Minister. Despite this crisis, he decided to continue the war, calling for the New World to enter the war. It seemed, however, that Britain's dependence on America might trigger the dismemberment of her empire. Churchill, unlike conventional statesmen, envisioned a new world order under the Anglo-American tutelage. He believed that with common citizenship and the common use of military bases, Britain and America could work together. His vision was, however, obstructed by Russia's unexpected victory over Germany in 1941, which was considered to be a serious threat to the British Empire and Western civilization.To save his civilized world, Churchill instructed the JPS to make two war plans against Russia just after the German surrender. The first plan, “Operation Unthinkable, ” was an offensive war plan. The object of the plan was “to impose upon Russia the will of the United States and British Empire.” The planned date for the opening of hostilities was 1 July 1945. The Allied powers were to count upon the use of German forces. However, the JPS concluded that UK-US numerical inferiority on land rendered even a limited and quick success doubtful, thus proving Churchill's surprise attack plan ultimately unthinkable.The second plan, retaining the codeword “Unthinkable, ” was a defensive one. Wearying after the pessimistic first report, Churchill asked the JPS to study how Britain could defend her islands against a possible Russian advance into France and the Low Countries. This time, they concluded that Russia, without rockets and other new weapons, would not develop into a serious threat to the security of Britain.Churchill was a statesman who fought for his ideal of a civilized world order under the Anglo-American tutelage. His war, however, spawned unexpected and disastrous results. Russia became an enemy of the Empire. The Cold War, an Anglo-American imperial war, became inevitable. Thorough inviting the Americans into her empire, and also decolonizing her empire, the British fought the war against communism. This became a basis for a new globalizing world order under America and her allies.

著者

松尾 正人

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1986, no.81, pp.161-178, 1986-03-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

69

著者

植田 麻記子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.151, pp.54-72,L9, 2008-03-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

99

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This paper examines “Ashida Amendment” and “Ashida Memorandum” with particular focus on his views on the international affairs. Both are known as the origin of the Japanese postwar security problems: Article 9 of the Constitution and the Japan-U. S. Security system.It illustrates the basis of Ashida's view on the international affairs. He always saw contemporary issues from the perspective of global history. After the World War I, the establishment of the League of Nations and conclusion of Treaty of Locarno and Treaty for the Renunciation of War promoted the idea of renunciation of war. Ashida had a hope that “international partnership” would be advanced in the post-World War I era. At the same time, he understood its uneasy reality. Indeed, the progress toward “international partnership” by the League of Nations, Treaty of Locarno, and Treaty for the Renunciation of War was frustrated by World War II.Right after the war, the world pursued afresh the ideal of “international partnership.” Ashida served as chairperson in the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Revision of the Imperial Constitution from July 25 to August 20, 1946. Ashida had the idea that Japan's decision to renounce war should be guaranteed both domestically and internationally by making the Article 9 serve as de facto diplomatic documents. Thus he made a point of the autonomy of the article. This led to the making of the “Ashida Amendment”. At the same time, Ashida consistently knew that the right of self-defense was the natural right of the nation despite the trend toward the abandonment of war.The conflict between the United States and Soviet Union became inevitable and overt. With the MacArthur's statement for the early peace with Japan, Ashida, as Foreign Minister, was made to consider the security after the independence. The “Ashida Memorandum” was submitted as a response to the Eichelberger's question about a time of withdrawal of the occupation army. It was handed to Eichelberger on September 13, 1947. The conception in “Ashida Memorandum” was that the best measures of guaranteeing Japan's security was to conclude a specific agreement with the United States and to reinforce the domestic police forces.Ashida had an intention that the “Ashida Amendment” should target international community rather than domestic one. He sought to grasp Japanese opportunity to be actively involved in shaping the postwar international order by acting as a leading advocate for the renunciation of war. At the time of the issuance of “Ashida Memorandum”, the most pressing concern in Japan that was sovereignty might be limited with the stationing of the Allied forces even after the independence. With the deterioration of the conflict between the United States and Soviet Union, Ashida thought Japan could resolve security problem while defending its sovereign right by the conclusion of the treaty with the United States which is independent from the peace treaty. Accordingly, “Ashida Memorandum” limited the right of stationing of US forces only at the time of emergencies, and emphasized the necessity of the build-up of Japanese police forces.By examining the process of making “Ashida Amendment” and “Ashida Memorandum”, this paper argues that Ashida had the strong desire for the achievement of participation in the postwar international order and early peace with a full sovereignty, so contributed to realization of them with the view on international affairs.

著者

毛利 敏彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.66, pp.128-147,L7, 1980

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In 1871, the Japanese government sent a goodwill mission to the United States of America and the European countries. This mission was led by <i>Tomomi Iwakura</i>, vice-president of minister (<i>Udaizin</i> _??__??__??_). <i>Takayoshi Kido</i>, the member of council (<i>Sangi</i> _??__??_), was appointed a vice-ambassador of the mission.<br><i>Kido</i> who belonged to the <i>Chôshû</i> faction had rivaled with <i>Toshimichi Ôkubo</i> who was the minister of finance (<i>Ôkura-kyô</i> _??__??__??_) and belonged to the <i>Satsuma</i> faction. <i>Kido</i> had opposed <i>Ôkubo's</i> policies.<br>So <i>Ôkubo</i> tried to reduce <i>Kido's</i> influence in the government. Then <i>Ôkubo</i> succeeded to isolate <i>Kido</i> from the government as a vice-ambassador of the mission.

著者

安岡 昭男

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.14, pp.72-82, 1960

著者

内藤 智秀

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1968, no.36, pp.85-102, 1968-05-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

23

著者

添谷 芳秀

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.151, pp.1-17,L5, 2008-03-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

19

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Postwar Japanese diplomacy has both benefited and suffered from the Yoshida Line of foreign policy, consisting of the peace constitution and the U. S. -Japan security treaty. This set of Yoshida's choices during the occupation period became the foundation of Japan's postwar economic recovery and eventually the rapid economic growth rendering Japan a world-class economic power. Deeply embedded in the Yoshida Line, however, was the structure of “dependence” on the United States for economic growth as well as security protection. This in turn has often invited, rather inevitably, challenges from nationalism attacking the lack of “autonomy” or “independence” of postwar Japan.This structural problem was also a source of criticism by external countries, especially the United States, for Japanese inaction or “free-riding, ” and the lack of a strategy. As Japan grew into an economic power and the negative views became prevalent concomitantly, some analysts rebuffed the criticism by arguing that the Yoshida's commitment to “light armament, economic growth, and the U. S. -Japan security ties” indeed constituted a strategy of postwar Japan. Simply put, the Yoshida Line was elevated to the Yoshida Doctrine.There were three types of discourse on the Yoshida Doctrine, which began to emerge since the end of the 1970s. One was to argue that the Yoshida Doctrine had been a viable strategy of postwar Japan, but that it would now need to be modified in a more proactive fashion. The second argument claimed that nationalistic challenges against the Yoshida Doctrine should be inevitable as Japan had recovered a sense of national pride, but that domestic political balance was still favorable to the supporters of the Yoshida Doctrine. Thirdly, it was contended that the Yoshida Doctrine was a strategic representation of Japan's political realism and should be retained as such particularly against the logic of military realism.The common denominator among the three was that the deep structure of “dependence” on the United States was taken for granted, or even assumed as the source of postwar Japan's successful strategy. This meant that the structural problem, susceptible to challenges by nationalism, was kept intact, which has now re-emerged as an old and new problem for Japan as it gropes for a new diplomacy, including possible revision of the peace constitution, in the 21st century.The articles in this volume traces the development of the Yoshida Line since the occupation period to the 1960s, when the deep structural problem was dodged, rather than rectified, in the evolutionary process of Japan's foreign policy making. There are three sets of propositions relevant for this period. Firstly, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida had not successfully integrated his basic foreign policy with his Asian diplomacy, particularly toward China, demonstrating the lack of independent Asian policy on the part of postwar Japan. Secondly, close examinations of the origins of the peace constitution and the U. S. -Japan security treaty, as well as the origin of economycentered approach, reveals that the leaders, including Yoshida himself, did not expect that their choices should remain unchanged after the occupation period. Thirdly, this in turn calls for the scrutiny of Japanese diplomacy in the 1960s, when Japan grew into a global economic power precisely by putting a lid on the structural problem entrenched in the Yoshida Line.

著者

犬塚 孝明

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.102, pp.22-38,L6, 1993

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During the course of forming the Meiji state, there occurred several examples of senior government officials whose views on foreign affairs and understanding of international relations directly reflected the considerations of internal politics and diplomacy. This feature is, needless to say, deeply related to the question of Japanese nationalism. Such men were constantly preoccupied with the dilemma of how to protect Japan's political independence by matching the strength of the Western powers on the international stage of Eastern Asia. The objective of this paper, therefore, is to accurately reassess Japan's diplomatic stance in the early Meiji period by investigating the international outlooks of two representative diplomatic leaders and ministers of Foreign Affairs, Soejima Taneomi and Terashima Munenori. This is presented through a comparative analysis of their respective perceptions and interpretations of international law and diplomatic relations in addition to the policies they actually implemented while in office.<br>The Confucian ethics particular to a scholar of Chinese classics were central to Soejima's international perspective, generating his argument for discipline through moral influence and inspiring recourse to the diplomatic guidelines of the chronicles of Lu in his approach towards Russia and Asian states, especially Formosa and Korea. This should be recognized as a significant element in effecting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' departure from its hitherto essentially moderate diplomatic policy and the adoption instead of a hard line approach.<br>On the other hand, Terashima was a strong advocate of moderation and attached much importance to ideas of equality and negotiation between sovereign states. His subsequent appointment to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, therefore, should have presented an opportunity for revising Soejima's hard line diplomacy in favour of the more temperate model of the past. This was prohibited, however, by the lateral pressure that the powers of Europe and America were exerting in Asia.<br>In order to ride crises of internal disorder and foreign pressure, the leading voices in government ventured instead on a scheme of sustaining Soejima's uncompromising line while at the same time replacing his rationale with a Western-style logic of power politics. It is perhaps reasonable to accept the view that the double-edged character of Meiji diplomacy, with its aggressive stance in Asia and simultaneously subordinate attitude to the powers of Europe and America, first took shape when this strategy was actually in place and operating in Japanese foreign policy.

著者

松永 泰行

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.167, pp.167_42-56, 2012-01-30 (Released:2013-09-21)

参考文献数

35

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Why has Iran been refusing to comply with the binding U.N. Security Council resolutions and to halt its uranium enrichment program? Why has the apparent cost that it incurs by defying the international community not deterred Iran from furthering its nuclear program? Why has postrevolutionary Iran been opposing the U.S.-led peace processes between Israel and the Palestinians and made it a rule to counter any U.S. influence in the region?In this article, I posit that postrevolutionary Iran's principled opposition to the U.S. is not just rhetoric or an ideologically-driven self-image, but that it may well be considered its self-constructed strategic cultural proclivity. While mindful not to fall into the trap of essentialist or cultural determinist arguments, I find the concept of strategic culture as a context useful. Following scholars such as Stuart Poore, I posit that decision makers perceive and interpret their strategic environment culturally, while what may be considered their constituted strategic culture give meaning to material factors.As a first step toward identifying postrevolutionary Iran's strategic culture, I examine the views of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the paramount leader of the Islamic revolutionary movement and the first head of the postrevolutionary Islamist state, as regards contemporary international relations and the roles of the superpowers therein. Convinced that part of the mission of the Islamic revelation was about providing salvation against oppression and fighting injustice, Khomeini went on to construct postrevolutionary Iran's dominant strategic discourse anchored in the perceived obligation to avoid and counter earthly hegemony or domination. Khomeini preached that Iran must resist the “satanic” moves of the both superpowers and find only sanctuary under the banner of Islam. While finding it logical and necessary to build and maintain good neighborly and mutually respectful relations among states, Khomeini ruled out submitting to any international hegemon.Iran in its post-Khomeini period continued to maintain its counterhegemonic stance. Ayatollah Khamenei, the successor to Khomeini as the head of the Islamic state of Iran, cultivated its counter-hegemonic strategic culture in part to secure his own authority and build his power base. The strategic alliance constructed between Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has proved to perpetuate post-Khomeini-era Iran's anti-American strategic culture.In conclusion, I argue that Iran may be best regarded as a counterhegemon, not an aspiring hegemon and that the kind of power that postrevolutionary Iran has found necessary to possess is not the power for hegemony and domination, but the power to resist and persevere. This proclivity helps explain why Iran has continued its nuclear program despite the cost it incurs by defying the U.N. Security Council resolutions. It also helps explain why it has maintained its principled anti-U.S. stance for the last three decades. It does not, however, seem logical to conclude that Iran's apparent pursuit of the deterrent capabilities through its nuclear or other programs is directly influenced by its counter-hegemonic strategic culture. The argument, nonetheless, supports a view that Iran's strategic posture is almost exclusively defensive and that its apparent pursuit of the means of deterrence should not necessarily be considered posing a threat to the region or the international community.

著者

石井 孝

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.14, pp.1-13, 1960

著者

池内 恵

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_115-175_129, 2014

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Jihad is one of the most controversial concepts in the Islamic political thought. This paper shed light on two dominant trends in the theories of Jihad in Modern Islamic World. Modernist thinkers, on the one hand, were concerned with political consequences of waging Jihad against the Western Powers and devised a theory intended to avoid the implementation of Jihad doctrine in the modern international arena. This "avoidance theorists" conducted meticulous research on the history of early Islam and forcefully concluded each and every wars and conflicts fought by the prophet Muhammad and his disciples were acts of selfdefense. By doing so, modernist thinkers presented Islam as an entity reconcilable with international laws and norms. Fundamentalist thinkers, on the other hand, criticized the modernist thinkers and its "subservient" style. Fundamentalists are not opposed to the "defensive" nature of Islam but expanded the concept of "defense" beyond the ordinary bound and redefined it to encompass fighting to root out the un-Islamic political and social institutions and entities from the earth. Although political implications of the two trends are diametrically opposed to each other, theoretically they are mutually supporting, at least in part. Modernists have paved the way to supremacist notion of Jihad by definitively approving the historical acts of war by the early Muslim nation as totally defensive and righteous. Fundamentalists rode on this theory and expanded the realm of the "defense" to such an extent that even most of the offensive warfare can be legitimized as "defense" in the context of eternal struggle for the sake of the cause of spreading Islam.

著者

田口 幸子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1969, no.40, pp.115-129, 1970-03-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

42