著者

水本 正晴

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.1, pp.1_45-1_59, 2010 (Released:2010-09-26)

参考文献数

20

被引用文献数

2 2

---

The Blinking Qualia Argument is the argument presented in Mizumoto (2006), which is to establish that zombies are impossible a priori. In this paper I will defend the argument from the actual and possible criticisms. Since such criticisms mainly focus on the premise “If qualia blinks, the subject can notice the qualia blinking,” I will give arguments to specifically defend that premise. This will bring into light the critic's misunderstandings on the argument, and more generally, typical misunderstandings surrounding the debates over the possibility of zombies, concerning the very concept of qualia.

著者

櫻木 新

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.1, pp.1_61-1_77, 2010 (Released:2010-09-26)

参考文献数

20

---

This paper is concerned with a well-known problem concerning the retention of propositional knowledge. Although most of what we currently believe ourselves to know originates in the past, we usually do not know how we originally acquired that knowledge. But then, on what grounds can we still know it? In this paper, I outline two different types of approaches to the problem in light of notable epistemic theories, and then examine difficulties faced by them.

著者

村上 祐子

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.1, pp.1_91-1_97, 2010 (Released:2010-09-26)

参考文献数

7

---

This proposal for Philosophy of Science Society Japan and its members presents recommendations toward improvement of logic education, outline of logic curriculum to be shared among community, and requisite components of logical skills and knowledge for philosophers of each field. It also provides information on the past workshops on logic education by PSSJ as well as a summary of ASL guideline and ASL inquiry on logic education (1995).

著者

立花 幸司

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.2, pp.2_41-2_58, 2009 (Released:2010-02-15)

参考文献数

55

---

Neuroscientific claims have a significant impact on traditional philosophy. This essay, focusing on the field of moral neuroscience, discusses how and why philosophy can contribute to neuroscientific progress. First, viewing the interactions between moral neuroscience and moral philosophy, it becomes clear that moral philosophy can and does contribute to moral neuroscience in two ways: as explanandum and as explanans. Next, it is shown that moral philosophy is well suited to contribute to moral neuroscience in both of these two ways in the context of the problem of ecological validity. Philosophy can play the role of an agent for ecological validity, since traditional philosophy shapes and reflects part of our social reality. Finally, based on these arguments, I tentatively sketch how a Kantian account of moral incentive can play this role.

著者

神山 和好

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.2, pp.2_75-2_87, 2009 (Released:2010-02-15)

参考文献数

24

---

According to contextualism, the content of the predicate ‘know’ changes with the context of utterance, in other words, the truth conditions of knowledge attributions depend on the attributor's context. Invariantists object it and argue that the assertability conditions of knowledge attributions, but not the truth conditions, depend on the attributor's context. Keith DeRose has recently proposed a new argument against such an invariantist response. His argument uses the knowledge account of assertion and the context sensitivity of assertion. I argue that DeRose's argument fails to rule out invariantism so that invariantism is still an important option for us.

著者

榊原 英輔

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.1, pp.1_1-1_14, 2010 (Released:2010-09-26)

参考文献数

12

---

D.Davidson argued that shared conventions learned in advance are not essential for the success of communication. In this paper, holding the validity of his contention in suspense, I argue that linguistic conventions play essential roles when communication fails. In everyday communication, when discrepancies are detected between what the speaker intended to inform the hearer and what the hearer actually understood, it becomes necessary to determine whether the speaker or the hearer caused the communication failure. For in everyday communication, the hearer often changes her position based on her misunderstanding about the intention of the speaker, and it is sometimes too late when the hearer realizes the speaker's true intention. In such cases, it is necessary to determine who is responsible for the hearer's loss. What the speaker said, which is determined by linguistic conventions, arbitrates the conflict between them. From the fact that shared conventions mainly relate to the evaluation aspect of communication, it follows that the speaker and the hearer need not learn shared linguistic conventions in advance of the conversation, and have only to learn them later, when failures are detected among past communication.

著者

荒磯 敏文

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.1, pp.1_65-1_81, 2009 (Released:2009-09-30)

参考文献数

16

---

In this paper, I try to characterize reference and introduction as two distinct modes of making de re statements. Roughly speaking, introduction differs from reference in that an introducing utterance makes its hearer to get to know some new particular. In cases of discourse anaphora whose antecedents are indefinite descriptions, pronouns seem to have a characteristic feature, which I shall call “inheritance requirement,” that they must be interpreted as bearing, if any, the same particulars introduced by their antecedents. And I give a brief remark on how this feature relates to two semantics purposed to handle discourse anaphora, namely Discourse Representation Theory and E-type Pronoun Theory.

著者

森元 良太

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.1, pp.1_83-1_96, 2009 (Released:2009-09-30)

参考文献数

22

---

Probability concepts are an integral part of modern evolutionary theory. This raises a philosophical question. Which interpretation of probability is appropriate for evolutionary theory? Alex Rosenberg argues from the Laplacian worldview that the probabilities used in evolutionary theory shouldn't be interpreted realistically because they only reflect our ignorance of details. This paper gives a critical appraisal of his arguments. I show that the probabilities reflect not merely our ignorance but some aspects of reality. I also show that in evolutionary theory we may update the probabilities rationally depending on what we know. Then I suggest an alternative interpretation, which is the Bayesian interpretation.

著者

塩野 直之

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.2, pp.2_1-2_16, 2008 (Released:2009-08-31)

参考文献数

18

被引用文献数

1

---

In “Free Agency,” Gary Watson distinguished two aspects of wanting something, namely, to evaluate it as good, and to be motivated to pursue it. In the same paper, he also paid attention to the distinction between satisfying a desire and getting rid of a desire. In the introductory part of this essay, I will present a characterization of the phenomenon of weakness of will that depends on the distinction between evaluation and motivation. In the main part, I will examine the role that the distinction between satisfying a desire and getting rid of it can play in circumstances where an agent exercises techniques of self-control in order to avoid succumbing to weak-willed action. The aim of this essay is to show that the evaluational judgment of an agent can be efficacious in important ways in leading the agent to action.

著者

浅野 光紀

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.2, pp.2_17-2_29, 2008 (Released:2009-08-31)

参考文献数

14

---

Socratic Skepticism of akrasia denies the existence of free and intentional action contrary to one's best judgment. The rationalistic assumption behind this idea is that we can reinterpret the central cases of akrasia as preceded by the preference reversal, or the change of best judgment which is caused by the temporal or physical proximity of the rewards, i.e., the immediate pleasure. I will show that the skeptic substitute for akrasia has exactly the same structure as what Pears calls “self-deceptive akrasia” and examine the scope of this approach to cover all the cases of akrasia, with a view to confirming the ontological possibility of genuine cases.

著者

柏端 達也

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.2, pp.2_45-2_58, 2008 (Released:2009-08-31)

参考文献数

23

---

We, as deliberating agents, are temporal beings and can face the general problem of maintaining diachronic rationality. However, this problem has various aspects, and “akrasia” can be understood as one of them. In this paper, I define akrasia as acting against one's higher-order judgment, which includes the consideration of future alternatives. Indeed, there are objections to this type of definition of akrasia that involves higher-order attitudes. Some philosophers have concluded that akrasia is not necessarily hierarchical. However, contrary to this belief, I defend the hierarchical character of the concept of akrasia by appealing to a constructivistic and functionalistic characterization of a higher-order definitive evaluation or judgment. Moreover, I distinguish akrasia from other types of phenomena that share common elements with it, although they are not hierarchical. The view that the higher-orderness (i.e. the hierarchy) of attitudes is essential to the concept of akrasia is, if my argument is correct, more tenable than some philosophers have considered it to be.

著者

山田 友幸

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.2, pp.2_59-2_73, 2008 (Released:2009-08-31)

参考文献数

19

---

Inspired by the recent development of dynamic epistemic logics, an investigation into logical dynamics of speech acts has been launched and a few logics have already been developed. We will review closely logics that deal with acts of commanding and promising, and show how they can capture the conventional effects of these illocutionary acts. We will also take a quick look at other logics that deal with perlocutionary acts of preference upgrading, and illocutionary acts of asserting, conceding, and withdrawing, and then conclude with a brief discussion of remaining problems and prospects for further research.

著者

村瀬 智之

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.2, pp.2_75-2_87, 2008 (Released:2009-08-31)

参考文献数

10

---

In this paper, I claim “Knowing-how is a species of abilities.” This means “Ascription of the determinate knowing-how entails ascription of the determinate abilities.” For the purpose of defending this claim, I show that the case of “pianist without arms” is not counterexample of it. In addition to that, I show benefit of counterfactual analysis by pointing some criterion of determination, ascription of knowing-how. Counterfactual analysis can provide the ways which explain some ordinary intuition about knowing-how ascription.

著者

山本 麻衣子

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.1, pp.1_45-1_57, 2008 (Released:2009-07-31)

参考文献数

8

被引用文献数

1

---

It is known that Aristotle tackled the problems concerning akrasia. But how he solved them has not been made clear. I propose an interpretation of his idea.    Aristotle presents two types of arguments. One is the 'grammatical' argument, where he shows that in some sense of 'know', acting against one's knowledge is possible. The other is the 'factual' argument, where he shows that an akrates does not need to have inconsistent judgments.    Some scholars say that Aristotle does not refute Socrates' thesis that akrasia is impossible. But I argue that they are wrong, and that Aristotle succeeds in solving the problems concerning akrasia.

著者

古田 智久

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.1, pp.1_95-1_119, 2008 (Released:2009-07-31)

参考文献数

8

---

In this review, I review both volumes II and III of Takashi Iida's Book: Gengo-Tetsugaku Taizen, and examine two arguments proposed in vol. II. One is concerning criticism against conventionalist's explanation of truths of logic which was approached by Quine. I think that truths of logic should be comprehended in Quine's holistic view of knowledge. The other is concerning criticism against Quine's holism which was suggested by C. Wright. I hold that the statement W:θ |- L I → P which Wright proposed can be also abandoned together with theory θ to which W relates if the θ is abandoned.

著者

Shin Sakuragi

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.1, pp.29-45, 2006-06-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

18

---

The redundancy theory of truth is normally considered to be a form of the deflationist theory of truth. Frege is sometimes counted as an advocate of the deflationist theory, because he emphasizes the redundancy of the truth predicate. In this paper, following Thomas Ricketts's interpretation, I will argue that this is a misunderstanding of Frege's view. Even if Frege is a deflationist, it cannot be because he accepts the redundancy thesis. Indeed, truth plays an indispensable role in Frege's picture of judgement and assertion. In light of his notion of judgement and assertion, what the redundancy of the truth predicate means to Frege will be clarified.

著者

Masaharu Mizumoto

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.1, pp.1-15, 2005-07-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

16

---

Merely saying that someone believes that p does not imply anything about whether the .belief is held consciously and/ or held with certainty. In this paper I will give some analysis of such subjective differences of belief and try to express them in terms of the combinations of familiar epistemic operators such as the knowledge operator K and the belief operator B. Proper formulation of such differences will in turn clarify the interconnection between consciousness and certainty qua prop-erties of belief, and assure us that we do not have to take special care of these properties when we are concerned with formal theories of belief and knowledge.

著者

Joseph Johnson

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.1, pp.57-77, 2003-07-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

22

---

Chomsky claims that linguistics will become part of biology and that truths about language can be given in terms of facts about the brain. While allowing that psycholinguistic structures may be objects of science, I argue that any account of language must involve more than descriptions of the states of individuals. This implies that many linguistic truths cannot be reduced to neurobiological facts, or even captured on the psychological level within Chomsky's framework. Chomsky's rebuttals to arguments of this sort are examined, but found wanting. This leads to anomalous monism and doubts about whether propositionally construed entities will find analogues in brain science.

著者

Joseph Vidal-Rosset

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.1, pp.69-80, 2000-05-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

53

---

This paper concerns Quine's classification of philosophies of mathematics as sketched in "On what there is" and offers a new reading of Quine's view. In his famous paper Quine defines three positions: Realism, Conceptualism, and Nominalism. Each of them, he says, has its modern expression, respectively, in Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism. According to Quine these foundational positions can be accepted or rejected on a clear and objective basis, according to their distinctive ontological commitments. Consistent with his own criterion for ontological commitment (buttressed by his view on impredicative definitions), Quine adopts the Realist (or the Platonist) position in mathematics. Later, it is shown that genuine Intuitionism is not definable by Quine but is easily defined in Vuillemin's classification scheme (in What Are Philosophical Systems? C. U. P., 1986).

著者

Kenichi Fukui

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.2, pp.65-80, 1999-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

---

According to J. R. Searle's account of perception developed in his book Intentionality, perception is "causally self-referential, " in the sense that the representative content of a perceptual experience involves reference to that very experience. This claim is untenable, and it derives from a failure to draw a sharp distinction between the representative contents of Intentional states and their conditions of satisfaction. An account of Intentional states can accommodate the alleged self-referentiality of perception without commitment to Searle's treatment of it, and given a proper treatment, it can be shown that the representative contents of perceptual experiences are not self-referential in the properly semantical sense.