著者

速川 治郎

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.119-131, 1968-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

竹崎 鼎輔

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.147-161, 1968-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

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Every science must be based on anthropology, not on philosophy. This is because every science is created by man; and philosophy forms part of anthropology-an anthropology of the inner sense.To explain the essence of mathematics from the viewpoint of anthropology, especially of anthropology of the inner sense, I have classified knowledge in general into five categories to define what kind of knowledge mathematics is: (1) natural knowledge and artificial knowledge; (2) knowledge of the outer sense and knowledge of the inner sense ; (3) knowledge as reality and knowledge as memory; (4) knowledge as image and knowledge as language; (5) inductive knowledge and deductive knowledge.To apply this classification to mathematical knowledge, we must clarify what mathematical entity is. The physiological transformation of images, an a priori cerebral function which plays a main role in the formation of recognition, serves as a clue to the understanding of the essence of mathematical knowledge.If one recognizes this function by the inner sense, one can grasp the inner relation of quantity as, natural knowledge by the inner sense. Artificial beings realized by this philosophical knowledge is natural mathematical entity. Elementary mathematics, therefore, is a natural science, the object of which is such entity.The basis of the validity of inductive mathematical knowledge lies in entity itself and agrees with the provabitity of mathematical knowledge by means of deduction from axiom (the principle of cre-ation). Mathematics is, in this sense, an ideal model of natural science.

著者

Max Bense

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.183-197, 1968-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

5

著者

石本 新 藤川 吉美

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.9-22, 1968-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

12

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This paper concerns the construction of a modal sentential calculus, which constitutes a subsystem of Lewis' S 1 and a decision method of the proposed calculus. The method represents a generalization of that rendered by McKinsey for Lewis' S 2 as well as for S 4 and is characterized by the construction of all the finite regular matrices containing not more than a certain number of elements specified by the given formula.

著者

斎藤 晢朗

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.23-29, 1968-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

高松 鶴吉

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.31-44, 1968-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

4

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At the root of two-valued logic we use there is the assumption, which is usually not formulated explicitly, but is a basic one, and which is called the principle of two-values. This principle in twovalued logic corresponds to the principle of contradiction and the principle of the excluded middle. However, the principle of the syllogism in the usual (conjunctively transitive) formulation, and the principle of contradiction, of the excluded middle are only "possible" in three-valued logic. From this, three-valued logic are connected with a modal functor such as 'M' to be called "possible" (möglich). Furthermore, some laws of two-valued logic are false in three-valued logic, among others the law (a=a') = 0. From this fact results the absence of antinomies in three-valued logic.Thus any of many-valued logic from three-valued to infinitely many-valued is a proper part or a proper sublogic of two-valued logic, and the latter is a superlogic of the former.

著者

江藤 肇

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.45-54, 1968-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

6

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Some important parts of economics are formally stated in a finite manner in the sense that their syntax is given and that their theorems are proved without resorting to the compactness just under the assumptions the rational numbers and their arithmetical rules are finitely given. Firstly the syntax introduces the linear space spanned over the rational field which is shown to meet the so-called axioms of the linear space. The simplex algorithm of linear programming provides a finite tool to develop the linear algebra and its. geometric representation which, on the contrary, usually in nonfinite systems deduce it. The basic parts of the game theory and non-linear programming are shown to be expressible in a finite manner as well. Economic behaviors besides games are also seen to be expressed by finite mathematics. Lastly it is remarked that the integer programming algorithms as the most powerful tool for finite systems are finite.

著者

金田 明子

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.2, pp.43-55, 2006

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In his book, The Concept of Logical Consequence, Etchemendy claims that the currently standard model-theoretic account of logical consequence is "the interpretational semantics" and does not capture logicality. The purpose of this paper is to defend the model-theoretic account from Etchemendy's criticisms. Through comparison with Sher's "Tarskian logic" and her model-theoretic definition of logical constants, I aim to demonstrate that the basis of Etchemendy's arguments are mistaken. I then explain that the model-theoretic account of logical consequence guarantees its logicality by the semantic functions of logical constants.

著者

谷川 卓

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.1, pp.37-51, 2014

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David Lewis argues that the thesis of Humility follows from two metaphysical principles; combinatorial principle and quidditism. The thesis has received attention of philosophers because of its skeptical implication, but only by focusing on that point one may underestimate the significance of Humility. Another implication drawn from the thesis pertains to the methodological issue, that is, justification of metaphysical principles. A key for the justification of two metaphysical principles in question is correspondence between our thought and the world, and it is required to develop modal epistemology in the way to oppose to Saul Kripkes view.

著者

稲岡 大志

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.1, pp.67-82, 2014

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In this paper, we would present an overview of the recent studies on the role of diagram in mathematics. Traditionally, mathematicians and philosophers had thought that diagram should not be used in mathematical proofs, because relying on diagram would cause to various types of fallacies. But recently, some logicians and philosophers try to show that diagram has a legitimate place in proving mathematical theorems. We would review such trends of studies and provide some perspective from viewpoint of philosophy of mathematics.

著者

糸川 昌成

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.2, pp.53-68, 2014

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Schizophrenia is severe mental disorder. A genetic study is thought to be effective to reveal pathophysiology of schizophrenia since genetic factors are involved in developing the disease. Molecular biology has been performed to detect etiology of the mental illness. However, genetic studies have not found a causative mutation from patients with schizophrenia because the psychotic illness is large heterogeneous syndrome, not homogeueous disease. Mind is depending upon central nervous systems but is not equal to the brain. We need to study on not only the brain but also the mind.

著者

大塚 淳

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.1, pp.29-41, 2007

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Much of the controversy of function revolves around two concepts, namely selected effect (SE) function and causal role (CR) function. Each of these proposals and its reciprocal critiques are examined, and it is shown that each concept embodies two different research strategies in biology, one the search for adaptation (SE function) and the other the reduction of biological phenomena (CR function). But this conceptual difference does not entail a separation in scientific practice. The proper attribution of SE function to a trait requires careful analysis of CR function in its developmental origin -- this is the idea of developmental modularity. It turns out that the ideal condition for developmental CR function analysis (i.e. near decomposability) also facilitates the mosaic evolution of -- and thus the attribution of SE function to -- organismal characters.

著者

福井 謙一

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.2, pp.133-146, 2000

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Whereas Jaegwon Kim's metaphysical theory of events(events as property exenlpl fications)is compatible withDonald Davidson's theory of the nature of events(events asparticulars), the sernantical accounts of event sentences associated with these theories are incompatible with each other. Moreover, no natural modification of Kim's semantics is capable of explaining certain entailment relations between eventsentences in the manner open to the Davidsonian account. thus, given the plausibility of the latter account, it is reasonable to conclude that there is no simple correspondence, of thesort required by Kim's semantics, that obtains between verbphrases of event sentences and the constitutive properties of the events describeci by them.

著者

中村 正利

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.1, pp.31-42, 2000

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This paper deals with the question: what does Carnap's conventionalism consist in? As Quine points out, logic is needed for inferring logic from conventions. In the same way, in order to show that mathematics is true by convention, or to provide a justification for mathematics by convention, the very mathematics must be presupposed, as Godel puts it. So, the conventionalist claim that logic and mathematics are true or justified by convention must fail. Is this predicament not a problem for Carnap's conventionalism? I shall argue it is not, for his conventionalism does not aim at justification of logic and mathematics. It is what Carnap later called "explication" that he tries to undertake with his conventionalism.

著者

佐藤 俊治

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.1, pp.75-87, 2001

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In this paper, I examine van Fraassen's original version of modal interpretations, which have the increasing significance in the foundational research concerning elementary quantum mechanics. I argue that although van Fraassen's modal interpretation has a salient advantage over the standard Dirac-von Neumann interpretation with the projection postulate, it is confronted with two kinds of interpretive difficulties stemmed from one and the same fact of experience, repeatability of the first kind measurement.

著者

鈴木 生郎

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.1, pp.15-28, 2008

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The paradox of coincidence, a paradox about the relation between a material object and its stuff, has been paid a great attention to in recent metaphysics. In this paper, I compare two influential approaches to this paradox; sortalism and fourdimensional worm theory, and defend sortalism. I give the following two arguments. (1) Worm theory, like sortalism, must introduce sortal concepts to resolve the paradox. So both approaches owe the (almost) same theoretical burden to explain how sortal concepts work. (2) Worm theory, unlike sortalism, introduces sortal concepts in a very problematic way.