著者
長坂 源一郎
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2, pp.99-109, 1969-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

The recent discussions concerning the validity of the hypotheticodeductive model of scientific explanation are examined. The existence of conflicting theories would be a vital blow to the model. However, the failure on the part of Feyerabend in recognizing that the rival theories have their own domains of application has led to the erroneous denial of correspondence rules. The apparent paradox is the result of unlegitimate ontology introduced in the argument.
著者
杉原 丈夫
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.3, pp.15-26, 1970-11-25 (Released:2009-05-29)
被引用文献数
1 1

All temporal truth-functions are expressed in the form of ordinary truth-function by the use of sequential variables.The temporal truth-functions are classified in three categories : (1) Simple temporal truth-function, (2) Happening function and (3) Sequential f unction.Some fundamental temporal truth-functions are as follows : After-happening function, Hp. (After the happening of p) Delay function, Dp. (Delaying p for an interval) Jumping function, Jp. (Jumping over a positive interval of p) Temporal conjunction, K(p, q). (p and q, but p before q.)Hp≡sDp≡-p∧HpJp≡p∧-S1K(p, q)≡(p∧q)∧S(p)
著者
永井 成男 大窪 徳行
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.3, pp.27-43, 1970-11-25 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
21

In a current paper we constructed the system SNk, which is an extended and generalized system of Carnap's inductive logic. In the present paper we shall show that the new system L'Nπ equivalent to SNk can be constructed within predicate logic of first order with some meaning postulates.Some remarks have been made by Carnap concerning the use of meaning postulates for inductive logic. However, our aim of the use of meaning postulates is altogether different from and ought not to be confused with Carnap's.

1 0 0 0 OA 哲学的論理学

著者
速川 治郎
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.3, pp.45-58, 1970-11-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

Man bedarf der Kunstausdrucke, die ganz bestimmte and feste Bedeutungen haben, weil die natürliche Sprache unexakt ist. Aber wenn man so strenge Logiken erfindet, beruhen sie loch auf einzelnes Denken and Ich (Selbst), die sich mit ihnen beschäftigen. Man muβ darüber reflektieren.Nun werden logische Gedankenkonstruktionen mit Hilfe des abstrahierten calculus ratiocinator mitteilbar. Aber Hegel setzt sich solcher Denkweise entgegen. Denn er sucht neben einer gegenstandlichen Logik eine subjektive, das Selbst enthaltende and reflektierende Logik unter. Im Denken, das sich auf these gründet, bin "Ich" frei, weil der objektive Gegenstand in ungetrennter Einheit mein Selbstsein ist. Aber doch darf man keine mathematische (formale) Logik ignorieren, well die logische Vernunft, die es mit einem Inhalt zu tun hat, nur durch die vernunftige Form verniinftig sein kann.Das Denken in der philosophischen Logik ist total and streng. Das Totale ist dynamisches Element, das Strenge festes, and die Dynamik zwischen beiden ist die philosophische Logik.
著者
石本 新 藤川 吉美
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2, pp.5-17, 1969-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
7

In this paper some bi-modal systems involving two kinds of modal operators are constructed in Gentzen-type formulations with the proof of the " Hauptsatz " for some of these systems.
著者
大窪 徳行
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2, pp.19-36, 1969-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
12

Together with Professor Shigeo Nagai, my teacher, I engage myself in studying the extension and generalization of the theory of inductive probability and the theory of semantic information. To state only a result of my part in our reseaches, therefore, is the aim of this monograph.The mathematical field of the theory of semantic information belongs to the theory of inductive probability, and the philosophical field of it to semantics. So, by extending and generalizing the theory of inductive probability, most of the extension and generalization of the theory of semantic information can be done syntactically; and the extended language system can be the semantical one.In the last I extended the theory of inductive probability. Here I will state, therefore, the theory of inductive probability, or the theory of semantic information, based on the SKN language system, as compared with that based on the LSπSNN language system of R. Carnap and Bar-Hillel.
著者
江藤 肇
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2, pp.37-48, 1969-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
14

Following the definitions of concepts of the linear algebra in a finite manner, two natural decision-making behaviours are constructively represented in a formal axiomatic system assuming the existence of the rational numbers and their arithmetics. Their capabilities of the optimal planning for the global organizations under the decentralized administrations are shown to be provable in the formal system. I. e., the optimal planning is shown to be computable on the Turing machine. In model 1 each branch is rather independent and the headquarters control the branches through the appropriate information flow. Model 2 has no headquarters and the natural bargaining process between the branches yields the optimal plan for the global organization.

1 0 0 0 OA 哲学的論理学

著者
速川 治郎
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2, pp.49-62, 1969-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

Zuerst behandle ich Freges Aufsatze, , , Der Gedanke", , , Die Verneinung". Tempus Praesens, das er im ersten darlegt, könne mit, , Jetzt" Hegels vergleicht werden. Hegels, Wissenschaft der Logik" ist auch philosophische Logik, aber seine Denkweise ist niemals mangelfrei. Denn er hat z.B. gegen mathematischen Formalismus eine starke, kindische Abneigung. In, , Die Verneinung" ist eine Einheit der Pole, Urteilen and Verneinen gedacht. Das beziehe sich auf, , das Spiel der beiden Krafte" Hegels. Aber die Verneinung ist Frege das Sekundäre, insofern kann die negative Logik nicht zustande kommen. Es handelt sich ihm um das Wahrsein. Dieses vergleiche ich kritisierend mit Wahrheit Hegels, and zeletzt gebe ich als eine drei stufige, wertige Logik die ausgezeichnete Reflexionslogik G. Giinthers an.
著者
今田 竹千代
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2, pp.63-76, 1969-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

1. Die verschiedenen Arten der Logik.2. Die verschiedenen Arten der Erkenntnistheorien.3. Die symbolische Erkenntnistheorie als Formale Wissenschaft.
著者
中本 昌年
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2, pp.77-89, 1969-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

Die Wahrheitsdefinition ;, P' ist eine wahre Aussage dann and nur dann, wenn P, enthält einige Frage. In dieser Abhandlung werden durch die Betrachtung von Ansichten der marxistischen Philosophen folgende drei Probleme ; erstens die Frage, ob das Prädikat, , wahr" der Aussage oder derv Aussagesatz zukommt, zweitens das Problem um Wahrheitsantinomie, endlich das Problem um die objektive Wahrheit. Es wird klar, daB das Wahrheitsproblem auf der Grundlage der Wider-spiegelungstheorie noch nicht vollkornmen formuliert wird. Diese Abhandlung ist eine vorläufige Arbeit für die einheitliche Auffassung der alistotelischen Wahrheitskonzeption and der hegelischen.
著者
永井 成男
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1, pp.55-70, 1968-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
7

In this paper I shall define the concept logical information distinguished from a customary concept (semantic) information, which is called "factual information" in the paper. In accordance with the contemporary theory of semantic information, if i is an analytic sentence, then i conveys no information. It means thatinf (i) = -log m (i) = 0where i is an analytic sentence and inf is the measure of information. According to our intuition, however, it seems that most analytic sentences convey much more information than "A is A", which is a trivial analytic sentence or tautology. I shall give only one example here.1. Man is man. (S1)2. Man is a rational animal. (S2)Let us suppose that the both sentences Si and S2 are analytic. Then S2 has the same intention, and hence conveys the same amounts of factual information, as S1, whereas S2 has the more complicated intensional structure, and hence conveys much larger amounts of logical information, than S1.
著者
川野 洋
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1, pp.71-82, 1968-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)
被引用文献数
1

In the world of signs surrounding us, there are two sorts of information which look contradictory with one another, (1) abstract information as "negentropy" being the measure of order by Wiener's formulation, and (2) concrete information as "entropy" being the measure of disorder by Shannon's formulation. The former, possessed by the logical composition of virtual message, informs about another one and the later, generated in the actual performance of this composition by coded signals, informs about oneself. But properly the sign can inform oneself as well as another one, and the composition and performance are two necessary stages of communication. Accordingly these two informations can be coexistent with one another in the world of signs, sounding under a sonorous counterpoint.

1 0 0 0 OA 経験論再検討

著者
大畑 甚一
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1, pp.97-104, 1968-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

Empiricism, traditionally, has analyzed 'the foundation' of empirical knowledge in terms of 'the Given' as an epistemological category. What is 'the foundation'? What meaning does it have?. Following W. Sellars, two requirements are postulated, i. e., (1) there is a structure of particular matter of fact that is non-inferentially known. (2) non-inferential knowledge about the structure is ultimate. In this direction, a consistent picture of empiricism is drawn. In this process, 'the Given' must be construed as immanent 'awareness', on which the edifice of empirical knowledge rests. Indeed, 'the Given' as its foundation is the Myth, but this assertion does not imply the rejection of the inner, non-verbal episodes of 'observing', 'impression' or 'idea'. A new epistemology is in future.
著者
瀬在 良男
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1, pp.105-117, 1968-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

This paper is an introductory study for the behavioristic approach to value.I think, as the fundamental method of such an approach, it must be possible to understand the theory of value as follows ;(a) the theory of the preferential system of action.(b) the theory of the social system of action.The former (a) characterizes as the "selectiv-rejective behavior" the human behavior, and examines the value approach connected with the function of purpose and cognition in the human behavior from the standpoint of psycho-biological analysis of the value phenomenon.The latter (b) characterizes as the "role-taking behavior" the human behavior, and examines the value approach connected with the function of socialization in the human behavior from the standpoint of psycho-sociological analysis of the value phenomenon.In this paper, I treated as the subject of this paper a case of the latter (b).And, I verified, in this examination, the reason which is understood as the value is the social, the functional, and the normative from the following problems ;(1) the problem of selfhood and role-taking behavior(2) the problem of value-situation and process of "socialization" in the human behavior And, in the last of this paper, I found the following conclusion from this verification. Value theory is the theory of scientific inquiry of the "attitude".