著者

菅崎 香乃

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.2, pp.159-162, 2022-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

石田 知子

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.2, pp.163-166, 2022-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

4

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.2, pp.167-170, 2022-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

山下 智弘

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.2, pp.71-91, 2022-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

21

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This paper aims to defend McDowellʼs disjunctivism about perception from misunderstanding, to explain it in more detail, and to point out his own error. In section 1, I summarize disjunctivism and show that the common objection to it is based on a misunderstanding. Section 2 describes ideas that are useful in avoiding misunderstandings and then provides an argument for disjunctivism based on these ideas that are applicable not only to perceptual knowledge but to knowledge in general. In section 3, I explain how the content of section 2 is incompatible with McDowellʼs conception, and that McDowell misunderstands the nature of perception and thought. My conclusion is that perception is thinking.

著者

車田 研一

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.2, pp.113-118, 2022-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

4

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Those engaged in natural science have strong subliminal tendency to regard imaginary representations appearing in scientific descriptions as real objects, although they are not aware that such a spontaneous and tacit background toward the recognition of real objects could be induced by confusion in the use of lexica for theoretical conception and macroscopic observation. This short communication is to present an example where a typical imaginary representation is unknowingly transformed into a concrete scientific belief of a real object since its definitional expression involves the imaginary representation for the relevant theory.

著者

横路 佳幸

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.2, pp.119-138, 2022-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

20

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In this paper, I will present a way to reorganize constitutionalism,one of the major metaphysical positions on cases of spatially coincident things such as a bronze statue and the lump of bronze from which it is formed. After an overview of constitutionalism and its problems, I will construct a hylomorphist theory to revise the relation of constitution from two independent perspective of the metaphysical grounding concerning forms and matters and the mutual parthood of coincidents. It is only a sketch of basic ideas, but it would contribute to a new basis not only for a full explanation of the mechanism of constitution and but also for an ontology of bodies and persons.

著者

千葉 将希

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.2, pp.139, 2022-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

飯塚 理恵

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.2, pp.143-146, 2022-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

2

著者

植原 亮

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.1, pp.105-1, 2021-09-30 (Released:2021-09-30)

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.1, pp.108-1, 2021-09-30 (Released:2021-09-30)

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.1, pp.111-1, 2021-09-30 (Released:2021-09-30)

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.2, pp.2-1, 2022-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.336-340, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

著者

大石 敏広

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.1, pp.51-1, 2021-09-30 (Released:2021-09-30)

参考文献数

22

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The following statements represent an example of external world skepticism: (1) I know that I have hands only if I know that I am not a brain in a vat. (2) I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat. (3) Therefore, I do not know that I have hands. The first premise implies the closure principle. So, anti-skeptics argue that external world skepticism is false, as there are several counterexamples of the closure principle. This study aims to examine these counterexamples, contend their invalidity, and argue that external world skepticism is an attempt to transcend the everyday world, showing that its statements are not necessarily nonsense or false in terms of analogy and metaphor.

著者

竹内 泉

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.1, pp.73-1, 2021-09-30 (Released:2021-09-30)

参考文献数

7

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This study discusses the usages of independent and dependent variables. Independent variables are used in two ways: to denote the input to a function and to define a function. Correspondingly, dependent variables are used to hold the output of a function and to describe the relationship between the inputs and outputs of a function. When translating independent variables and dependent variables of mathematics into predicate logic, mathematical variables are mapped onto both variables and function symbols of predicate logic.

著者

古谷 公彦

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.239-257, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

参考文献数

29

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The world of perception has the structural feature which we name the foreground influence. The influence clarifies the relation between the damages of brains and the conditions of the patients. Furthermore, the foreground influence explains the relation between the condition of the non-damaged brain and the looks of the world of perception. The foreground influence, which is not causal relation, makes landscape appear directly without representation. The information processing in brain operates as the foreground influence like many kinds of glasses. We will be able to realize the naturalization of mind only after we can clarify the physical nature of information and the virtual dimension which information processing produces.

著者

秋葉 剛史

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.295-316, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

参考文献数

13

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This is a review essay on Daisuke Kachi's Agents: Contemporary Substance Ontology (sic. Shunjusha, 2018). The book develops and partially defends an ontology that takes the category of substance as the most fundamental one. The author provides in it a new perspective on substance, which consists in characterizing substances as bearers of what he calls “substance modalities” (of which there are four kinds, that stem from the factors of essence, power, past persistence, and future persistence respectively). The first part of this review essay gives an extended overview of Kachi's book while the second discusses some problems it may face.

著者

峯島 宏次

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.321-323, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

著者

谷川 卓

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.328-330, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

著者

伊藤 遼

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.25-44, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

参考文献数

27

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A standard interpretation of Bertrand Russell’s early work on logic revolves around the doctrine of the unrestricted variable—the idea that the genuine variable of logic must range over all the objects in the universe. Those who endorse this interpretation view the doctrine as ‘the centerpiece’ of The Principles of Mathematics. My aim in this essay is to examine some of the given and possible grounds for this view. I attempt to show that Russell in that book does not endorse the doctrine as it stands but the idea that there are no objects that cannot, in principle, be fully described—the idea that there is no logical bar to making simply true judgments about objects.