著者
長友 謙治
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.43, pp.135-152, 2014 (Released:2016-09-09)
参考文献数
30

The USSR was one of the main grain importing countries, because their grain production was insufficient for domestic consumption, including livestock feeding. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia’s agricultural production was dramatically curtailed through the 1990s, but in the 2000s, Russia returned to the international grain market as an emerging and one of the main wheat exporting countries. The primary reason for Russia’s transformation from a grain importing to a grain exporting country was its dramatic decrease in feed grain consumption in the 1990s, which was caused by reduced livestock production and the recovery of grain production in the 2000s. Russia’s livestock production recovered substantially in the latter half of the 2000s, but the increase in Russia’s feed grain consumption has been relatively small. It seems meaningful to analyze this phenomenon and to anticipate, to what extent further recovery of Russia’s livestock production will influence its feed grain consumption and grain exporting capacity. This paper attempts this analysis by examining concentrate feed consumption (mostly of grain) in Russian agricultural enterprises by types of livestock products (beef, pork, milk, etc.) and the contribution of two factors (“quantity of livestock production” and “concentrated feed conversion ratio”) to changes in concentrate feed consumption. The results of this analysis reveal two main reasons for the relatively small increase in feed grain consumption after Russia’s livestock production recovery. First, continued stagnating production prevented significant increase in feed consumption in the bovine sector (beef and milk production). Second, the declining concentrated feed conversion ratio curbed the increase of concentrated feed consumption in the poultry and pig sectors. Increasing livestock production in Russia would cause increased feed grain consumption and contribute to a decline in grain export capacity to some extent. However, considering the above-mentioned changes in Russia’s livestock industry, Russia’s reversion to a grain importing country seems unrealistic.
著者
山脇 大
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.43, pp.89-104, 2014 (Released:2016-09-09)
参考文献数
24

Regulations on the flaring and utilisation of associated petroleum gas (APG) have been in place since the early 1980s. Their purpose is environmental conservation and the effective use of limited natural resources. The formation on international frameworks, such as the World Bank’s Global Gas Flaring Reduction, which was launched in the 2000s, and the raising of environmental awareness in emerging and developing countries have also decreased the amount of APG flaring around the world. In Russia, however, the situation on APG utilization and flaring is entirely different. Here, the utilisation of APG has not improved since the 1990s. Even now, Russia remains the world’s largest APG-flaring country. This means that it is now explicitly confronted with problems on APG flaring and utilisation, while it struggles to adapt to global environmental protection trends and to modernise its economy. President Putin regards this problem as one of Russia’s most urgent tasks. On the 26 April 2007, at the Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, he ordered his government to design solutions to achieve a more than 95% effective APG-usage level (less than 5 % flaring). In addition, the 7th government decision was selected, a policy that can enforce a fine for flaring over 5% of all APG and also for the use of infrastructure in oil fields that does not meet standards of approval. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of this fine policy remains limited. This situation suggests that the APG-flaring-and-utilisation problem in Russia has its own specificity and that it should not only be analysed from the current situation, but from the perspective of the continuity or incoherence of the Soviet Union actors, policies and institutions surrounding it, during this country’s transition to a market economy. As mentioned above, the APG utilisation and flaring in Russia is one of the most urgent environmental and economic problems among this country’s hydrocarbon industries. This study attempts to give some explanation on this situation. First, it analyses long-term APG-utilisation trends in Russia. Then, actors, policies and institutions involved in Russia’s APG utilization and flaring are traced. Finally, through the above-mentioned analysis, this paper tries to explain the situation and factors of Russia currently being the largest flaring country. JEL classification codes: L71, P28, Q35, Q40
著者
堀江 典生
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2013, no.42, pp.32-44, 2013 (Released:2015-05-28)
参考文献数
39

This paper investigates “Chinese diaspora,” the term used by the Russian media and in Russian scholarly articles to describe the Chinese residing and working in Russia either permanently or temporarily. Although Russia’s perceived threat of Chinese migration to Russia has calmed as compared to the 1990s, Russian citizens are still intolerant of Chinese inclusion into Russian society and the apparent unwillingness of the Chinese to adapt. Hostility against the Chinese can be avoided by understanding their activity in Russia, as well as the roots of Russian society’s stereotyping of the Chinese. This paper focuses on the term Chinese diaspora because it has not previously been theoretically considered. In addition, whether this Chinese presence in Russia qualifies as actual diaspora has not been thoroughly examined, despite its wide use to describe the Chinese currently residing and working in Russia. The aim of this paper is to examine how the term Chinese diaspora as a metaphor operates in Russian society, as well as how the boundary between Russian citizens and the Chinese has been maintained not by diasporic motivation, but by Russian motivation to perpetuate it. This paper first examines how the term Chinese diaspora is used by the Russian media and in Russian scholarly articles, and then describes how this usage differs from the definition of diaspora in the theoretical sense and from how the Oversea Chinese worldwide define themselves as diaspora. This paper also examines the diasporic ties between Chinese migrants and their home countries and diasporic practices from a historical perspective. Chinese diaspora should be analyzed by the diasporic stances, projects, claims, idioms, practices, and so on, that are motivated from the diaspora side, even if they passively accept or adapt their diasporic stances. This analysis finds that there is no diasporic cohesion between new and old Chinese immigrants to Russia in term of their origins, and no consistent and well-organized diasporic practice. This paper’s investigation makes it clear that the Chinese diaspora in Russia does not presently exist from the perspective of diasporic theory and social practices. The term Chinese diaspora is a metaphor designed by Russia to maintain the boundary between Russian society and Chinese migrants. The grouping of Russia’s Chinese population into this putative diaspora keeps them arbitrarily bounded by the host society. With this grouping, biased views against Chinese immigrants remains as a device to instigate new threats against them or inflate existing threats, even if those who speak about the Chinese immigrants welcome them or not. The term Chinese diaspora in the Russian context should be used carefully. Its use hinders the Chinese by stereotyping them as a putative diaspora, provoking an inexplicable disquiet among the host citizens that keeps them intolerant of Chinese immigrants.