著者

水野 俊誠

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.11-19, 2007-10-18 (Released:2018-02-01)

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It is believer that the concepts of mental illness, mental disease, and mental disorders, which represent the theoretical basis of psychiatry and psychiatric medicine, are more likely to bring about problems in use than the concepts of physical illness, physical disease, and physical disorders. In this paper, I will consider two such problems : (1)the concepts of mental illness, mental disease, and mental disorders often bring about more conflicts among experts regarding the diagnosis than that of physical illness, physical disease, and physical disorders ; and (2)there are more conflicts over whether some mental illness, mental disease, and mental disorders are illnesses or disease in a relevant sense as compared to physical illnesses, physical illnesses, physical disease, and physical disorders. Szasz, Boorse, and Fulford have all responded to the question of why these problems have com about. In this paper, I will critically examine their responses and then propose my own response to this question in the following manner. First, the concepts of mental illness, mental disease, and mental disorders bring about more conflicts among experts than that of physical illness, physical disease, and physical disorders because there is no consensus on whether the painters' condition damage their natural primary goods. According to Rawls, primary goods are "things that every rational man is presumed to want." Some primary goods such as health, vigor, intelligence, and imagination are natural goods ; although their possession is influenced by the basic structure of society, they are not directly under its control. Second, there is much debate about whether particular mental disorders, such as personality disorders, are illness or disease in a relevant sense as compared to physical disorders. This is because the evidence for biological deviations corresponding to mental disorders is often more lacking than that for physical disorders.

著者

横尾 美智代 早島 理

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.121-127, 2007-10-18 (Released:2018-02-01)

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The purpose of this survey was to determine whether there are differences in the knowledge, opinions, and way of thinking about state-of-the-art health care and bioethics among students from different disciplines who attended bioethics-related classes in departments of medicine, Buddhist studies, social welfare, and dietetics. The survey was conducted with 303 students in 4 departments in 3 universities by a questionnaire completed by each person. Some differences were found among the disciplines in self-evaluation concerning knowledge of "bioethics" (p<0.01). On the other hand, there were no significant differences among the disciplines in opinions or ideas concerning bioethical topics such as "development of research" and "organ sale". Experience with study in the academic field or biology made a difference in students' self-evaluation concerning knowledge of bioethics, but did not affect answers to questions regarding opinions or ideas. This held true for a comparison between students (n=169) who took classes on bioethics and those who did not. It appeared that while self-evaluation regarding knowledge of bioethics was enhanced by study experience, opinions and ideas on bioethics were significantly correlated with study experience.

著者

後藤 雄太

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.26, pp.31-40, 2008-10-22 (Released:2018-02-01)

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This paper aims to criticize abortion and to present a vision of what our society and life should be. In Japan, abortion is technically illegal, but loopholes result in about as many as 300,000 approved pregnancy terminations a year. This paper insists that most abortions (including shady abortions) in Japan should not be approved (the paper does not dwell on abortion in cases of rape or when there is danger to the mother's life because space is limited). Broadly speaking, the main issues in the abortion debate are whether the fetus is a "person" or not, whether "rights" such as the reproductive rights of women and the fetal right to live should be recognized and whether a relationship between a pregnant woman and her fetus is formed. This paper argues against abortion from a relationalistic viewpoint; it criticizes the past relationalistic views and develops a new relationalistic view. Abortion is an act where adults unilaterally deny "the life of a child who is growing and affirming his/her own being", thereby destroying any relationship with the child. Moreover, it is an act of adults refusing a child's participation in society simply because the child was accidentally conceived by parents who did not want him/her, or simply because the child was diagnosed with a disability, etc. In brief, abortion ruins our conception of "society being a place that welcomes life hospitably". Welcoming life hospitably is to accept it unconditionally; just as it is. In order to actually solve the abortion problem, one must establish relationships where one can affirm one's own life, the opposite sex person's life, and the fetus' life, as well. This is much more important than abstractly arguing over rights, personhood, and such.

著者

鶴島 暁

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.26, pp.41-49, 2008-10-22 (Released:2018-02-01)

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In bioethics, especially in discussions of advanced technology such as genetic engineering, religious phrases like 'Playing God,' 'Creation,' and 'Image of God' are often used. In this paper, I deal with the phrase 'Playing God'. This phrase is often used as a slogan, 'You should not play God,' to oppose advanced technologies such as cloning and genetic manipulation. 'Playing God' is thus considered a human behavior that goes beyond boundaries ordained by God and involves knowing things that human beings should not know. 'You should not play God' is a sentence providing warning against this. Sometimes it is used as a basis for deriving specific conclusions. However, it is ambiguous. The implications of this phrase are unclear and depend on the interpretation of the user. As a consequence, people use the phrase frequently to mean different things without indicating exactly what 'Playing God' means, and sometimes come to different conclusions. Therefore, if the meaning of this sentence is not specified, it is of no use to consider its validity. Therefore, in this paper I analyze the phrase 'Playing God' and clarify its meaning, contents, and function in some contexts in which it is used. The following points are made. The sentence 'You should not play God' is just a warning to promote awareness of human fallibility, incompleteness, and finitude. There is some difficulty in using this phrase as a basis for reaching specific conclusions. If people wish to make this phrase function effectively, they must clarify the domain of God, offer rational and theological reasons for treating a domain as God's field, and clarify the Will of God or natural process presupposed behind the phrase 'Playing God.'

著者

西村 高宏

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.153-156, 2007-10-18 (Released:2018-02-01)

著者

宮坂 道夫

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.137-141, 2007-10-18 (Released:2018-02-01)

著者

天田 城介

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.131-136, 2007-10-18 (Released:2018-02-01)

著者

宮越 一穂 霜田 求

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.129-130, 2007-10-18 (Released:2018-02-01)

著者

山中 恵利子

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.110-120, 2007-10-18 (Released:2018-02-01)

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We can objectively observe the speech and behavior of others but are not privy to their thinking. Even in face-to-face conversation I cannot understand everything you experience. This is the problem of intersubjectivity, which is achieved through agreement and negotiation between different, mutually independent perspectives. This paper seeks to understand the perspectives of others using A. Schutz's concept of relevance as a means of unraveling the problem of intersubjectivity. Based on records of conversations between nurses and a mother who gave birth to a disabled child and letters written by that mother, this paper explores the mother's narrative and presents it as an example of understanding others. The paper also indicates how analysis of the mother's perspective at different times using the concept of relevance is linked to ascertaining the mother's stream of consciousness.

著者

田村 恵子

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.142-145, 2007-10-18 (Released:2018-02-01)

著者

浅井 篤

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.146-151, 2007-10-18 (Released:2018-02-01)

著者

新山 喜嗣

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.99-109, 2007-10-18 (Released:2018-02-01)

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Patients with Capgras syndrome complain that real persons close to them have been replaced by identically looking imposters. This syndrome is interpreted as the total replacement of the "haecceity" that is distinct from one's attributes. Capgras syndrome suggests that possible worlds around a person come in two different series: one of possible worlds in which the attributes of the real person change in a variety of forms with his "haecceity" unchanged, and the other of possible worlds in which the "haecceity" of the real person is replaced by something else with his attributes unchanged. Possible worlds involving these two series could develop without limitations, and hence impart unlimited diversity to the variants of myself living in possible worlds. Thus, the variants in possible worlds must include some who possess both haecceity and attributes that are identical to those of others in the real world. It can thus be speculated that others in the real world are nothing but variants of myself who have turned up in the real world from possible worlds they originally inhabited. In this context, it may be assumed that I am keeping in touch with my own variants every day here in this real world. In the real world, I myself always create a singular point characterized as "I," "now," and "here". In a certain possible world, however, another person generates this singular point. As a result, I myself become the other to him. Such worlds where I turn up as the other probably include ones whose contents are exactly the same as those of the real world. Because these worlds are perfect mirror images of the real world, we mistakenly assume that they are the same one world. Because of this confusion, we see many generators of the singular points coexisting in the real world.

著者

上野 哲

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.91-98, 2007-10-18 (Released:2018-02-01)

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The main envisioned contribution of professional ethics education for nurses has been that it offers a clear and concrete antithesis to the previous professional ethics education methodology, according to which it was supposed that nurses would be able to make correct ethical judgments if a set of given standards were applied to clinical problems. It was assumed that students who became medical professionals would be able to make ethical judgments in the clinical workplace if the general principles of these standards were clarified. On this basis, students were taught the principles of these standards as part of their training. The antithesis by professional ethics education for nurses was to spotlight caring which had been ignored because a change to a clear knowledge of science had been impossible. Specifically, case studies were adopted as a method of education, and emphasized the following four points: (1) stimulating moral imagination, (2) recognizing ethical issues, (3) developing analytical skills, and (4) tolerating disagreements and ambiguities. However, in practice, professional ethics education for nurses based on case studies supplies the training of proof, rather than the training of creativity and flexibility. In this paper, I propose the possibility of use of case methods in place of case studies. Case methods offer the possibility of going beyond the limitations of case studies, since they require training in unfettered judgment unrelated to occupational evaluations.

著者

遠矢 和希

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.51-60, 2007-10-18 (Released:2018-02-01)

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In Japan, the Council for the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare recognized the right of children born by DI (Donor Insemination) to knowledge of their blood relationships, in the final report in 2003. This right will become a significant issue, because the report admitted the legality of reproduction by an egg donor. It goes without saying that the right to knowledge of blood relationships is important, since genetic knowledge has medical, psychological, and social effects. In the Japanese adoption system, the family registers makes it possible for adopted children to determine their blood relationships when they get older. But DI children can not know the information, so there is an imbalance in family register system between DI resulted children and adopted children. How do we solve this imbalance and retain the rights of donor offspring? In this paper, I consider the current situation in Japan and cases of other foreign countries as reference.

著者

山本 史華

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.31-39, 2007-10-18 (Released:2018-02-01)

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Few of the current guidelines on clinical research mention ex post issues. For example, the Declaration of Helsinki includes as such an issue only its 30th Article and note. As for concrete ethical requirements, that is, Informed Consent, Assessment of Risks and Benefits and Selection of Subjects, the chief aim covers all aspects of applying the regulations to the preconditions. Emphasis was for a long time focused on how ethical principles regulate ex ante issues. In recent years, based on reflection on this situation, the need for ex post ethics has gradually become clear. Patricia A. King notes, in Belmont Revisited, that fairness requires specific compensatory justice and procedural justice, both of which were ignored in the Belmont Report. This paper aims to construct the idea of ex post ethics, which we call aftercare ethics, through examination of the principles of biomedical ethics. Chapter 1 confirms the fact that compensation and free medical treatment for accidental injury or damage are extremely rare in guidelines for clinical research. In Chapter 2, we address the problems of the emotions of the injured and the compensation. The reason why they were absent from clinical research is examined. In Chapter 3, it is shown that if we reinterpret the principles of respect for persons and of justice, we can see that the ethical necessity referred to in the preceding chapter can be derived from the said principles. Finally, in Chapter 4, we present the basic idea of aftercare ethics.

著者

田代 志門

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.21-29, 2007-10-18 (Released:2018-02-01)

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the logical construction of Robert J. Levine's model for the distinction between research and therapy. Levine's model has been adopted in well-known ethical guidelines such as the Belmont Report (1979) and the CIOMS guidelines (1993). Levine introduced into research ethics two theoretical models, the intent-based model and the approval-based model, for the distinction between research and therapy. He also recommended that physician-investigators deal with "innovative therapy" as research, which should be reviewed by IRBs. Levine criticized two assumptions which were largely shared in the medical community in the 1960's. Some physician-investigators thought that it was impossible to distinguish research from therapy because all medical practice was in a sense experimental. Others thought we should distinguish therapeutic research from non-therapeutic research and that the former can be conducted according to relatively relaxed standards. This was also the standpoint of the Declaration of Helsinki in 1964. These assumptions interfered with effective regulation of clinical research. Levine's model introduced a new perspective into research ethics and became a foundation of the contemporary regulation of clinical research. The purpose of this paper is not only to reconstruct past discussion and share its heritage but also to obtain suggestions for the regulation of clinical research in Japan.

著者

日笠 晴香

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.41-50, 2007-10-18 (Released:2018-02-01)

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Advance directives are statements made beforehand by a person who was competent at the time about the care he/she wishes to receive if he/she were to become incompetent in the future. They are thus means of determining the patient's will when surrogate decision-making is needed. However, difficult problems may arise if advance directives conflict with the interests of the patient as judged by the people around him/her. This paper will explore this issue, focusing on advance directives of dementia patients. Theorists have varying opinions on the advance directives provided by dementia patients when they were competent. R. Dworkin argues that if someone has made a prior expression that "I will refuse any medical treatment at the terminal stage of dementia", we should not give the person any treatment at all. In contrast, R. Dresser asserts that "a dementia patient is a 'different person' from the person who made the advance directive", so that advance directives should be overridden if the current benefits of treatment the dementia patient may obtain are greater than the burden resulting from it. M. Quante asserts that advance directives should be respected as long as they do not cause actual pain or harm to dementia patients. The differences between these assertions are, in my view, based on differing views regarding the "personality" of incompetent dementia patients. Dementia patients have lost their personalities, according to Dworkin and Quante, while they have a "different personality" according to Dresser. However, a dementia patient and the person he/she used to be cannot be completely severed, for he/she is a being who lives one human life. Therefore, in order to make decisions on behalf of the patient, I suggest the need to distinguish him/her from the person who he/she used to be while at the same time regarding him/her as a person who lives one human life.

著者

田辺 英

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.1-10, 2007-10-18 (Released:2018-02-01)

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In the history of medicine as well as in the modern clinical setting, conflicts between two contrastive models of explanation have been observed, the "pathogenic model" and the "recovery model". The pathogenic model focuses on how the pathological process is generated, and has its theoretical background based on the modern mechanistic view of nature. The recovery model focuses on how the recovery process occurs, and has its origin in the ancient Hippocratic school and teleological standpoint. In the context of modern science, the recovery model has always been criticized as a vitalistic and non-rational way of thinking. Some clinicians, however, have reported beneficial effects of certain symptoms. For instance, clinicians may use two different descriptions in the treatment of a fever: 1) the fever should be brought down because it is harmful to the body, or 2) the fever has a beneficial effect on the course of disease. Much research suggests that fever both benefits and harms the body. Therefore, clinical judgments will be based on assessments of these two aspects. Antagonism of the two models is one of the most fundamental themes in the history of medical theory. Hippocrates often referred to the "vis medicatrix naturae" and insisted upon the benefit of symptoms. On the other hand, scientists of the 17th century denied the existence of a "vis medicatrix naturae". To solve this conflict and obtain a basic theory of a model of recovery, we examined the concept of the norm with reference to the philosophy of G. Canguilhem.

著者

佐藤 労

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, pp.111-115, 2006-10-24 (Released:2018-02-01)

著者

森下 直貴

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, pp.134, 2006-10-24 (Released:2018-02-01)