著者

美濃 正

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.2, pp.43-56, 2000-11-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

9

---

In this paper I shall critically examine a rather bizarre view which Prof. Nobuhara has recently propounded concerning connectionism. The thrust of his view is this: In the Classicist-Connectionist debate, Classicists are definitely the winner, since Connectionists cannot solve the 'Systematicity of cognitive abilities' problem posed by Fodor and others.; nevertheless, our brain is a wholly connectionist cognitive system, since every cognitive activity that shows the 'Systematicity' in question (typically, thinking activity) needs symbols external to our brain and therefore is performed totally outside it. Against this view, I first point out that Prof. Nobuhara fails to give some Connectionists ('Approximationists') their due in his appraisal of the Classicist-Connectonist debate. Secondly, I argue that he can't be a Connectionist with regard to our brain, while endorsing the Classicist's solution to the 'Systematicity' problem.

著者

服部 裕幸

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.2, pp.15-28, 2000-11-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

16

---

In the dispute between classicists and connectionists, classicists assert that connectionists only claim that cognitive architecture is implemented in a certain kind of network model. They also criticize that the connectionist model cannot deal with many important cognitive competences, since they do not acknowledge the combinatorial structure of mental representations. I will argue that connectionists cannot defend themselves from the second criticism without suffering from the first criticism, and that they cannot defend themselves from the first criticism without suffering from the second criticism. Eliminativists often compare folk psychology to phlogiston theory in discussing the relation between connectionist theory and folk psychology. I will argue that the analogy does not hold.

著者

Joseph Vidal-Rosset

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.1, pp.69-80, 2000-05-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

53

---

This paper concerns Quine's classification of philosophies of mathematics as sketched in "On what there is" and offers a new reading of Quine's view. In his famous paper Quine defines three positions: Realism, Conceptualism, and Nominalism. Each of them, he says, has its modern expression, respectively, in Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism. According to Quine these foundational positions can be accepted or rejected on a clear and objective basis, according to their distinctive ontological commitments. Consistent with his own criterion for ontological commitment (buttressed by his view on impredicative definitions), Quine adopts the Realist (or the Platonist) position in mathematics. Later, it is shown that genuine Intuitionism is not definable by Quine but is easily defined in Vuillemin's classification scheme (in What Are Philosophical Systems? C. U. P., 1986).

著者

月本 洋

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.2, pp.29-41, 2000-11-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

3

---

This paper briefly describes connectionism and explains that the essence of artificial neural networks is nonlinear regression. The integration of connectionism and symbolicism is studied in order to solve their defects. This paper presents a new paradigm called Embodied AI (EAI) which is an integration of connectionism and symbolicism through imaginations. EAI insists that symbolic processings should consist of artificial neural networks trained for bodily movements. Imaginations need bodies. Robots can realize imaginations, and so can realize EAI. Current computers do not have bodies, and so cannot realize imaginations. Since the main linguistic aspects of imaginations are metaphors, EAI is realized as Metaphor Based AI (MBAI) in the current computers.

著者

水本 正晴

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.2, pp.95-110, 1999-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

11

---

In Mind and World, John McDowell tries to provide a picture in which our experiences give "rational", rather than merely causal, constraints on our thinking. This was to avoid both Myth of the Given, which can give us only exculpation rather than justification, and unconstrained coherentism, which sounds idealistic. This picture can be understood as a form of "internal realism", and I have a great sympathy with this ambitious project. But I find some tension among his several theses, which in turn brings about two interconnected problems. I will give my own solution to them, in terms of the notion of ignorance. Then I will depict some consequences, both positive and negative, of that modification.

著者

美濃 正

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.2, pp.39-51, 1999-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

12

---

The main aim of this paper is to argue for the following two theses: (1) so-called qualia are irreducibly non-physical properties of certain brain states, and (2) in spite of (1), qualia can be legitimately accommodated into a broadly physicalistic framework. On behalf of (1), what might be regarded as a variation of F. Jackson's 'knowledge-argument' is put forward and also a refutation of P. M. Churchland's objection that qualia are but physical properties (of certain brain states) as they are introspectively accessed is attempted. On behalf of thesis (2), the idea of qualia's supervening and nomologically depending upon brain states' physical properties is deployed. A radical criticism of some sceptical arguments concerning qualia is also included.

著者

勝守 真

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.2, pp.53-63, 1999-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

---

Shozo Omori's theory of the past, developed during his later years, is examined critically with a focus on its central thesis that the past is that which is recalled. The analysis shows that Omori's argument designed to support the above thesis contains ideas which run counter to that very thesis. Specifically, it turns out that, when contrasting recall and perception as two heterogeneous modes of experience, he tacitly supposes past perception as something other than the recalled, and that this inconsistency threatens the validity of his basic views.

著者

Kenichi Fukui

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.2, pp.65-80, 1999-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

---

According to J. R. Searle's account of perception developed in his book Intentionality, perception is "causally self-referential, " in the sense that the representative content of a perceptual experience involves reference to that very experience. This claim is untenable, and it derives from a failure to draw a sharp distinction between the representative contents of Intentional states and their conditions of satisfaction. An account of Intentional states can accommodate the alleged self-referentiality of perception without commitment to Searle's treatment of it, and given a proper treatment, it can be shown that the representative contents of perceptual experiences are not self-referential in the properly semantical sense.

著者

Takeshi Ohba

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.1, pp.1-16, 2000-05-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

12

---

According to a prevailing view, a self is reflective solely by virtue of the self-referential nature of a human mind. Relationship with fellow beings, according to this view, concerns merely a contingent matter of psychological developments, and has conceptually nothing to do with the self-reflectivity. This view, however, seems to me totally wrong. To be sure, both 'self-locating' information processing and 'other-oriented' information processing may be necessary and sufficient for purposeful movements and social transactions. But selfhood requires an ability to entertain an "I"-thought. To have this ability is manifested by being able to identify an image in a mirror as one's own image though no one can see one's own face. This sort of self-identification requires in turn the mastery of the concept of 'being seen by' fellow beings.

著者

中村 正利

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.1, pp.31-42, 2000-05-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

---

This paper deals with the question: what does Carnap's conventionalism consist in? As Quine points out, logic is needed for inferring logic from conventions. In the same way, in order to show that mathematics is true by convention, or to provide a justification for mathematics by convention, the very mathematics must be presupposed, as Godel puts it. So, the conventionalist claim that logic and mathematics are true or justified by convention must fail. Is this predicament not a problem for Carnap's conventionalism? I shall argue it is not, for his conventionalism does not aim at justification of logic and mathematics. It is what Carnap later called "explication" that he tries to undertake with his conventionalism.

出版者

日本地図

巻号頁・発行日

1956

著者

近藤 貴明

出版者

法政大学大原社会問題研究所

雑誌

大原社会問題研究所雑誌 = The journal of Ohara Institute for Social Research (ISSN:09129421)

巻号頁・発行日

no.733, pp.63-80, 2019-11

著者

佐藤 純一

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.2, pp.25-37, 1999-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

---

本稿で論じた論点において,論者のコミットしたい「医療の哲学」は,医学の方法・概念を対象化し,医療が社会的文化的行為(現象)であることを確認し,人々(患者・layman)の視点・realityを包摂するようなものとして構築される「医療の哲学」である.そのような「医療の哲学」の構築には,医学や哲学だけではなく,社会学・人類学などの様々な領域・方法の共同作業が必要であることは,ここまでの議論で明白であろう.とくに「科学哲学」の参加への要望・期待は非常に大きいものである.なぜなら,医療・医学の分析においての科学哲学のもつ方法の可能性と同時に,本稿で論じた「医療の哲学が検討せねばならない諸問題」は,科学哲学が検討して行かねばならない「問題」と通底していると思われるからでもある.感応する議論が出てくるのを期待したい.

著者

大林 雅之

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.2, pp.15-23, 1999-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

被引用文献数

1

---

以上の議論から,小論における一応の結論を以下のように示すことができよう.「医学の哲学」は従来から議論されていたが,1960年代から起こったバイオエシックスの議論が,従来の「医学の哲学」を,患者(「非専門家」)の役割を考慮することにより,医療のリアリティーに迫るものに変えた.医療者と患者により成立する「医療」についての哲学こそ「医学の哲学」すなわち「医療の哲学」なのである.

著者

小林 傳司

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.1, pp.15-27, 1999-05-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

被引用文献数

2

---

The development of science and technology has posed again the problem of the "legitimacy" of science and technology. Philosophy of science in the nineteenth century had such concern but recently it has lost the sensitivity to such a problematique. This article claims the recovery of this sensitivity in the sense of Social Epistemology advocated by Steve Fuller and argues that scientific research should be analyzed as a collective activity of knowledge production at face value. Then it is argued that justification of scientific knowledge is intrinsically social activity, and the identity of the content of scientific knowledge is not to be presumed but to be explained.

著者

Neven Sesardic

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.31, no.2, pp.41-48, 1998-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

8

---

This paper raises the question about the malleability of heritable psychological differences. Put differently, if some differences in behavioral dispositions are the product of genetic variation can these differences be eliminated, or at least can they be eliminated in the same way as the environmentally caused differences? I criticize three arguments purporting to prove the complete symmetry between environmental and genetic causality.

著者

伊藤 邦武

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.31, no.2, pp.75-87, 1998-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

12

---

As a methodologist of science, John Maynard Keynes scrutinised the classical induction theory of Bernoulli and Laplace and proposed a new set of principles of induction in A Treatise on Probability (1921). He took up the same subject, after the publication of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), in his debate with Jan Tinbergen on econometrics. Keynes's criticism of econometrics is generally considered to be done on the ground of the principles of induction which he formulated in the former book. However, this standard interpretation seems odd, because those principles depended heavily on his theory of probability and he radically changed this analysis of probability in his mature economic theory. If he kept the theory of induction intact in his criticism of econometrics, then he was curiously absent-minded. I do not think that Keynes was such an inconsistent thinker, and I believe that his later theory of induction should be understood from the perspective of a much modern type of theory, i.e., something like a Kuhnian paradigm-bound view of science, or one of its more sophisticated variants. It is founded on the concept of inter-personal probability or 'expectation', and it is also constructed to be amenable to the interplay of 'theory and practice'.

著者

川野 洋

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.1, pp.1-14, 1999-05-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

---

In what follows, I would like to point out some basic aspects of the message in communication. First, a holistic agency as "the society of mind" (Minsky) emerges from interactions among its individual agents. Second, the messages which are sent out or received by the agents consist of two different constituents: "citation" and "commentaire" (Sperber), where the former is the invariant part of their meaning conditioned by semantic rules, and the latter is the variant one showing the agent's intention to perform the speech act. Third, what is expressed in the message of communication is a speaker's intention, making use of the "quoted" propositional meaning only as Stoff for its performance.

著者

坂本 百大

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.31, no.2, pp.49-59, 1998-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

---

In this paper, I will propose a new foundation of the possible post-modern "Philosophy of Biology" by introducing the new idea of "Artificial Evolution" revising the meaning of classical Darwinian concepts of "fitness" and "natural selection", replacing by the term of contemporary biotechnology.Then, clarifying essential distinction between "Genetic Identity" and "Personal Identity", I will sketch a newly emerging "Communitarian Bioethics" which is based on the revised interpretation of value-oriented "Personhood" which might destroy the classic idea of "humanism" and therefore, the theory of "fundamental human right".

著者

西脇 与作

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.31, no.2, pp.61-74, 1998-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

12

---

We are now living together with the enormous progress of many biological innovations. In this situation, do these innovations change evolutionary biology? Or can evolutionary biology control these various innovations? There is the strong opinion that we have to change present biology to include the new situation where we can make an artificial selection to change organisms genetically in order to satisfy our desires. I defend evolutionary theory, which should not change itself to treat the new situation, even though it needs a minor change. Within the synthetic theory, we can answer negatively to these two questions. Evolutionary biology took a progress recently and this new population biology claims something positive about the new situation. With new evolutionary ideas we can give partially affirmative answers to these questions. We see why the answers are affirmative by considering evolutionary egoism and altruism. And then we will show that at the bottom of these answers there are many philosophically unsolved problems.