著者
村田 全
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.31, no.2, pp.89-104, 1998-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

This is a complement of 'Cantor's set theory and his philosophy', compiled in my collected papers, Borderland between Mathematics and Philosophy (1998, in Japanese). Cantor (1845-1918) was a mathematician with a strong tendency to philosophy, which tendency appeared as early as 1867 (Dissertation), and finally exerted latent influences upon the formation of transfinite set theory. For a purely mathematical purpose, this theory as well as its formation process can be explained without any reflection on his philosophical writings. However, in this case, we shall miss the complete figure of his conception. In fact, he expressed an opinion on Time and Space, opposed to Kant, on the basis of his Continuum, and gave an interpretation of-Spinoza's 'Deus' (in Ethica) through his transfinite ordinals (1883). He attempted, too, to establish a sort of Pythagorean Natural Philosophy, but in vain, in which was applied the Continuum Hypothesis (1885). This Natural Philosophy, fantastic as it was, can be traced back via several marks in his papers up to 1867. On the other hand, to speak frankly, Cantor's philosophical reasonings are far from systematic, and sometimes remain casual remarks.
著者
西脇 与作
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.31, no.2, pp.1-16, 1998-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
19

Let's think first the following argument: if (1) classical mechanics implies Laplacian determinism, and (2) biology is reducible in principle to classical mechanics, then Laplacian determinism holds in biology and therefore, probability used in biology is only the result of classical ignorance. This claim seems to represent the so-called classical attitude toward the probability concept, but still there are many advocates of this position. I will show that this position is wrong by investigating the argument of Laplace's demon. It is shown that probability model can't be reduced to mechanical model, because of having different points of view. We will see the concrete differences between two types of models. From the construction of each model, I will claim that the difference between two types of models is due to the point of view of thinking of the world. Models include many points of view and among them the elements of agents are implicitly included in (genetic) probability models, whereas there are fewer elements in mechanical models than probability models.
著者
真船 えり
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.31, no.1, pp.53-68, 1998-05-10 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
17

The subject of this paper is Hume's concept of mind, especially the arguments concerning the mind-body problem, in A Treatise of Human Nature, I, iv, 5. I will try to clarify the aspect of Hume's naturalism by showing that it aims to explain the human cognitive processes in terms of human nature. Hume's arguments on the cause of thought show that the relation between mind and body may be regarded as causal one, since the constant conjunction between objects constitutes the essence of their causal relations. It will be found through the examinations of the arguments that Hume's sceptical arguments are to introduce the naturalistic programmes.
著者
Robert T. Pennock
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.31, no.1, pp.101-119, 1998-05-10 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
23
被引用文献数
1

Goodman's Grue Paradox may be intransigent as a version of the problem of induction, but may be resolved within the more limited context of confirmation theory in which the task is to explicate the basic notion of evidential relevance. Although the green and grue hypotheses are equivalently confirmed if we follow Goodman's use of the Hempelian instance confirmation relation, there are asymmetries than can be exploited if we adopt an "ontic" confirmation theory that uses a causal notion of evidential relevance. I sort out a variety of interpretive confusions about the intended content of the definition of grue and show how the causal approach resolves each in a way that is not paradoxical.
著者
竹尾 治一郎
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.31, no.1, pp.1-15, 1998-05-10 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
9

The model of language presupposed by the verificationist theory of meaning and the two holistic models of language such as W. V. Quine's are of marked difference. But in theoretical details, they have interesting points of contact. The paper considers the verification condition of meaningas formulated by Prawitz, on the basis of which the verificationist and non-verificationist aspects of Quine's theories are discussed. The contrast is also related to that of classical and intuitionistic logic. And Quine's view on the "obvious" in the translation of logical connectives is criti-cally examined along with the dogmatic presupposition of the grasp of meaning by the intuitionists.

1 0 0 0 OA adjunction小考

著者
清水 義夫
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.31, no.1, pp.17-33, 1998-05-10 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
5

The following relation between operations F and G is called an adjoint situation or adjunction, and such a relation occurs almost everywhere in logic and mathematics; F(C)→B ⇔ C→G(B). The relation between A∧ and A⊃ which are primitive connectives in logic is a well-known example. So to understand the primitiveness of these connectives, it is necessary to clarify the essence of adjointness. For this purpose the author thinks tentatively that two operations G and F in an adjunction ultimately correspond to two mental functions (i.e. projection and reflexion) which are always found in a primitive state of our consciousness.

1 0 0 0 OA Qualiaの不在

著者
入不二 基義
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.30, pp.77-92, 1997-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

In this paper I show an aporia which both a subjectivist view and a functionalist view of qualia have in common, and try to change the view of qualia in order to solve the aporia. The aporia of the qualia problem is this: as long as we take a subjectivist view or a functionalist view, qualia must shift either into something other than qualia, or just into nothing. A solution of the aporia which I try to present is: qualia is neither something nor nothing, but an uncom-pleted absence.
著者
田村 均
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.30, pp.29-42, 1997-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
24

The aim of this paper is to propound a view that philosophical epistemology has failed to comprehend the essence of experimental natural science ever since the late seven-teenth century. The first indication of the failure is given in Edward Stillingfleet's misunderstanding of John Locke. In his Essay concerning Human Understanding, Locke tries to establish the distinction between the particular matters of fact and the universal theories of nature. Stillingfleet mistakenly counts him, however, among cartesians and regards his distinction as that of the objects in the mind and those in the external world. This misreading of Locke, which is common to later historians of philosophy, entails total misunderstanding of the essential trait of experimental science. The Lockean way of ideas is, if correctly un-derstood, a successful vindication of the experiments based on sense perception and has nothing to do with the cartesian skepticism towards the senses.
著者
岡庭 宏之
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.29, pp.183-193, 1996-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

This paper is an examination of Jerry Fodor's internalist position in his controversy with externalists. His internalism is not to be taken as the contention that the whole of mental content is independent of the surrounding world. Rather his point is that the scientific explanation of behavior requires that the relevant mental content should be causally efficacious and therefore supervene on brain states. If we have to give the content of a propositional attitude a semantic value, we can interpret "narrow contents" as functions from both their contexts and mental states to "wide contents".
著者
松王 政浩
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.30, pp.43-58, 1997-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

Scientific methodologies in 17-18th centuries are very important when we think of the relation of philosophy and science in this period. Particularly interesting among them is that of Leibniz's philosophy. His method of finding laws of natural sciences was a so-called hypotheticodeductive method. What is quite remarkable in his methodology is that he not only shows empirically valid criteria for finding laws, in spite of his extreme rationalistic tendencies on one hand, but also delves into the grounds for the hypothetico-deductive method in terms of God's perfection. In this latter point, we can recognize one of the proper roles of philosophy, very clearly distinguished from but united very organistically with those of science.
著者
渡辺 博
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.30, pp.59-76, 1997-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

I attempt in this paper to survey the classical features which lie in the concept and methodology of the Newtonian science. To this end I summarize the concept of science in the Aristotelian philosophy, and utilize several recent results in the Newtonian scholarship.
著者
石本 新
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.29, pp.107-125, 1996-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
23

Lukasiewicz-type completeness proof of classical propositional logic is presented coupled with the axiomatic rejection for the logic. This is to the effect of much simplifying the completeness proof. On the basis of the consistency of the logic the cut-elimination theorem in the sense of Gentzen is also demonstrated of the logic making use of the axiomatic rejection.
著者
松阪 陽一
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.29, pp.155-167, 1996-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

In this note I examine the criticism of Quine's "Two Dogmas" given by Crispin Wright in his "Inventing Logical Necessity". Wright claims, in opposition to Quine, that certain metalogical statements are indeed immune to revision. Without committing myself to Quine's position, I show that Wright's argument is flawed since (1) he overlooks the indispensable role of intuitive reasoning in metalogic, and (2) even if the acceptance of a metalogical statement is presupposed in the test of a certain theory, it does not follow that the very same metalogical statement must be presupposed whenever we put a theory into empirical test.
著者
金井 範夫 石本 新
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.29, pp.127-137, 1996-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
13

Axiomatic rejection for Aristotle's syllogistic is not fully arranged as a formal system because one of its rejection rules contains a meta-concept. In this paper, we restrict our discussion to the classical propositional logic and reconstruct the rejection system as a formal system with assumptions. Furthermore, we give the axiomatization of satisfiability through a similar way of the reconstruction of the rejection system.
著者
奥山 眞紀子
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.29, pp.95-105, 1996-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
12

Cybernetics first introduced by Norbert Wiener in 1940's has been inter- or meta-disciplinary science and this has been one of the most attractive and fruitful aspects of the cybernetics community. In this kind of community many new ideas have been emerged. Here two major conceptual developments of cybernetics would be pointed and discussed. One is the line from self-regulation to self-organization, autopoiesis, and self-reference, and the other is the line from first-order cybernetics to second-order cybernetics. Finally the potentiality of cybernetics to open the door to the new era in the area of medicine and psychotherapy would be discussed with a few brief examples.
著者
安孫子 信
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.29, pp.15-30, 1996-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

This paper proposes to provide a general view of Duhem's epistemological thought, which is now well-known perhaps only for so called Duhem-Quine thesis.This holistic idea on the 'structure' of the scientific activities is, in Duhem's real work, accompanied by the representationistic idea on the 'aim' of the same activities, and forms with it a total rejection of two dogmatisms, that is, physical realism and empiricism. But although destructive with regard to these dogmatisms, neither holism nor representationism succumbs to skeptic relinquishment. It is the cogency of the scientific history that saves them from stranding in skeptic despair, as well as reinvigorating themselves in dogmatic ambition.
著者
横山 輝雄
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.29, pp.31-43, 1996-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

Duhem-Quine thesis that a single theory can never be tested and decisively refuted by experience is well known among philosophers of science. But Duhem himself did not argue for that thesis. His argument was restricted within physical theories.Duhem has been interpreted as an instrumentalist or conventionalist. But he did not deny the existence of a reality behind the theory. Duhem's realism is very different from contemporary scientific realism. To understand his philosophy of science, it is important to note that he was a Pascalian and argued for intuition as well as logic. His philospophy of science is similar to that of M. Polanyi.
著者
内井 惣七
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.28, pp.17-29, 1995-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
16

The philosophical implications of "chaos" cannot be grasped without clear understanding of such concepts as "determinism", "non-linearity", and "predictability". Beginning with Laplace's classical statement of determinism and predictability, I will sketch Maxwell's and Poincaré's modifications of the statement and their awareness of the significance of nonlinearity. Then I will briefly touch upon what may be suggested by the study of chaos for clarification of the notion of complexity; and, finally, contend that the computation for the study of chaos can be regarded as a kind of inductive basis, which provides the affinity of mathematics and natural sciences, on the one hand, and the continuity of traditional sciences and studies on chaotic systems, on the other.