著者
吉川 洋子
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1983, no.75, pp.130-149,L13, 1983-10-20 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
58

Japanese-Philippine negotiations on war reparations lasted from 1951 through 1956, often interrupted by disagreements on the terms of payment. Significantly, the diplomatic deadlocks were often broken by informal channels of communications and secret talks. A host of political and business leaders who had varying degrees of interests in each other's country participated.A most important breakthrough in deadlocked talks was made in New York and Washington in November 1954 by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and Senator Jose P. Laurel, whose secret meetings were arranged by the Premier's confidants on Philippine affairs, Nagano Mamoru and Shiohara Tamotsu. Nagano, a leading steel industrialist, had business interests in the Philippine iron mines and other resources, and had his own proposal on a variety of development projects to be financed by reparation funds. Shiohara, Executive Director of the Philippine Society of Japan, had been a personal friend of Senator Laurel since the Japanese occupation period when Laurel was President of the Republic and Shiohara served his government as an advisor on internal affairs.Nagano played several other roles during the whole process, including one as a member of the Japanese delegation for reparations talks. So did many other leaders such as former Ambassador Murata Shozo, Minister Takasaki Tatsunosuke, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro, and businessmen like Furukawa Yoshizo who had lived in the Philippines before the war and claimed to be experts about the country.Another diplomatic breakthrough was achieved in May 1955 by Ferino Neri, chief Philippine reparations negotiator, who ran a series of secret meetings in Tokyo with political and business influentials regarding the terms of payment. He finally obtained Prime Minister Hatoyama's confidential endorsement of his proposed terms. This success was made with the skillful help of Hatoyama's Deputy Cabinet Secretary Matsumoto Takizo, who apparently had many Philippine acquaintances primarily through the Free Masonry whose members pointedly included Hatoyama, Senator Camilo Osias, and most probably Senator Laurel.The long negotiations demonstrated the significant roles played by informal contact-makers on both sides. Many of them were those with official capacity seeking secret contacts, but some without official capacity also volunteered secretly to help the talks. Both Japanese and Philippine political cultures weigh personal ties, particularly, ties based on clientelism, in political dealings. The interaction of the two cultures over such difficult negotiations multiplied the effectiveness of informal contact-makers.
著者
青山 秀明 家富 洋 池田 裕一 相馬 亘 藤原 義久 吉川 洋
出版者
東京大学経済学会
雑誌
經濟學論集 (ISSN:00229768)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.78, no.2, pp.46-58, 2012-07

論文/Article
著者
吉川 洋子
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1983, no.75, pp.130-149,L13, 1983

Japanese-Philippine negotiations on war reparations lasted from 1951 through 1956, often interrupted by disagreements on the terms of payment. Significantly, the diplomatic deadlocks were often broken by informal channels of communications and secret talks. A host of political and business leaders who had varying degrees of interests in each other's country participated.<br>A most important breakthrough in deadlocked talks was made in New York and Washington in November 1954 by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and Senator Jose P. Laurel, whose secret meetings were arranged by the Premier's confidants on Philippine affairs, Nagano Mamoru and Shiohara Tamotsu. Nagano, a leading steel industrialist, had business interests in the Philippine iron mines and other resources, and had his own proposal on a variety of development projects to be financed by reparation funds. Shiohara, Executive Director of the Philippine Society of Japan, had been a personal friend of Senator Laurel since the Japanese occupation period when Laurel was President of the Republic and Shiohara served his government as an advisor on internal affairs.<br>Nagano played several other roles during the whole process, including one as a member of the Japanese delegation for reparations talks. So did many other leaders such as former Ambassador Murata Shozo, Minister Takasaki Tatsunosuke, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro, and businessmen like Furukawa Yoshizo who had lived in the Philippines before the war and claimed to be experts about the country.<br>Another diplomatic breakthrough was achieved in May 1955 by Ferino Neri, chief Philippine reparations negotiator, who ran a series of secret meetings in Tokyo with political and business influentials regarding the terms of payment. He finally obtained Prime Minister Hatoyama's confidential endorsement of his proposed terms. This success was made with the skillful help of Hatoyama's Deputy Cabinet Secretary Matsumoto Takizo, who apparently had many Philippine acquaintances primarily through the Free Masonry whose members pointedly included Hatoyama, Senator Camilo Osias, and most probably Senator Laurel.<br>The long negotiations demonstrated the significant roles played by informal contact-makers on both sides. Many of them were those with official capacity seeking secret contacts, but some without official capacity also volunteered secretly to help the talks. Both Japanese and Philippine political cultures weigh personal ties, particularly, ties based on clientelism, in political dealings. The interaction of the two cultures over such difficult negotiations multiplied the effectiveness of informal contact-makers.
著者
田原 和美 吉川 洋子 松本 亥智江 松岡 文子 平井 由佳 Kazumi TAWARA Yoko YOSHIKAWA Ichie MATSUMOTO Yuka HIRAI
出版者
島根県立大学短期大学部出雲キャンパス
雑誌
島根県立大学短期大学部出雲キャンパス研究紀要 (ISSN:18824382)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.3, pp.71-76, 2009

10年前と比較して看護学生の社会的スキルや自尊感情について変化があるのか、1999年度1年次生と2008年度1年次生の2群で、和田(1992)のソーシャルスキル尺度改訂版とジャニスとフィールドの自尊感情尺度(SE測定尺度)日本語版に改定を加えた遠藤ら(1974)の尺度を用い比較した。それぞれの尺度の合計得点、下位尺度ごとの比較において有意差はみられず、今回の比較では1999年度と2008年度の看護学生の社会的スキルと自尊感情に変化はなかった。その理由として、青年期の特性の影響、看護を学ぶ学生の特性、用いた尺度による影響が考えられた。
著者
清水 善久 根岸 七洋 吉川 洋一 小金丸 健一
出版者
地域安全学会
雑誌
地域安全学会論文報告集
巻号頁・発行日
no.6, pp.91-95, 1996-11

都市ガス事業者は、地震発災後に、二次災害を防止するためのガス供給停止について、迅速かつ速切な判断を下す必要がある。東京ガスのSIGNAL(地震時導管網警報システム)はその判断を支援することを目的に開発され、331ヶのSIセンサー、20ヶの液状化センサー、5ヶの基盤地震計の情報を地震発災直後に高信頼性の無線網により収集する地震動モニタリングシステムの展開、また地盤条件、埋設管、建物、液状化危険度、地震時埋設管被官事等の豊富なデータベースの構築、及び被害推定システムの整備を実施し、1994年6月より実稼働している。また、別途開発した復旧基本計画策定システムと連動させ、地震発災直後に復旧に関する手立てが即時実行可能となったため、結果的に早期復旧が図れることとなる。さらに、1996年9月より、震度3相当以上の大きさの地震が発生した際は、SIGNALの331ヶ所の最大SI値及び最大加速度について、インターネットの東京ガスホームページを通じて一般公開を始めた。このデータの公開により、地震情報・データベースの共有化の促進と、それらの地震防災などの研究への活用が期待される。
著者
吉川 洋
出版者
物性研究刊行会
雑誌
物性研究 (ISSN:07272997)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.86, no.4, pp.503-505, 2006-07-20

この論文は国立情報学研究所の電子図書館事業により電子化されました。
著者
吉川 洋子 飯塚 雄一 長崎 雅子
出版者
島根県立看護短期大学
雑誌
島根県立看護短期大学紀要 (ISSN:13419420)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.6, pp.97-103, 2001-03-31

女子学生の社会的スキルについて,ソーシャルスキル尺度,ノンバーバルスキル尺度を用いて看護学科1年次,2年次生,教育学部1年次生,保育学科1年次生の4グループを比較した。各グループ間に有意差は認めなかった。全体について,社会的スキルと自尊感情とセルフモニタリングの関連をみた。その結果,自尊感情およびセルフモニタリング得点が高い群は低い群よりソーシャルスキル得点は有意に高かった。しかしノンバーバルスキルに関しては,有意な差はなかった。対人関係技能・能力を向上させる教育を考えていく上で,社会的スキルを高めていくだけでなく,自尊感情やセルフモニタリングも高める必要があることが示唆された。