著者
森元 良太
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.42, no.1, pp.1_83-1_96, 2009 (Released:2009-09-30)
参考文献数
22

Probability concepts are an integral part of modern evolutionary theory. This raises a philosophical question. Which interpretation of probability is appropriate for evolutionary theory? Alex Rosenberg argues from the Laplacian worldview that the probabilities used in evolutionary theory shouldn't be interpreted realistically because they only reflect our ignorance of details. This paper gives a critical appraisal of his arguments. I show that the probabilities reflect not merely our ignorance but some aspects of reality. I also show that in evolutionary theory we may update the probabilities rationally depending on what we know. Then I suggest an alternative interpretation, which is the Bayesian interpretation.
著者
森元 拓
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2005, pp.165-175,194, 2006-10-30 (Released:2010-02-15)
参考文献数
13

This paper will consider the legal validity of Georg Jellinek's legal theory. Jellinek's theory on legal order is as follows: in his theory, legal validity stems from “the legal belief” of the members of the legal community. “Legal belief” consists of two elements, one is the “normalizing function of facts, ” and the other “the factual function of norms.” The former element originates from extracting norms from facts, and the latter element originates from normative consciousness that transforms into a ‹normative› fact. These two elements are in a competitive relationship, which results in legal order always encompassing an opportunity to progress and continuously develop and evolve. However, this kind of theory on legal order contains two problems. First, there is a danger that this kind of theory on legal order to fall into a limitless relativism. This problem can be solved if and when the legal judgment of the legal community is based and rely on the unchanging and unique historical and cultural value of the community. Second, there is fear that this theory of legal order continuously enforce only the element of “normalizing function of facts, ” and that such a situation will result in a conservative society. To solve this problem, Jellinek emphasizes the element of “normalizing function of facts, ” while weakening the element of the other, thus, the concept of injustice (in German “unrecht”) and legal struggle becomes crucial in Jellinek's theory. Injustice (unrecht) is an illegal act committed on purpose, while legal struggle is a struggle to gain justice from the members of the legal community. Jellinek thought that the act of injustice (unrecht) and legal struggle will assure that the two elements will work competitively; therefore, insuring the progressiveness and continuous development of legal order.
著者
森村 進
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2004, pp.1-4,206, 2005-09-30 (Released:2008-11-17)

The Annual Meeting of Legal Philosophy 2004 was held in Hiroshima on November 13-14, 2004, under the auspice of the Japan Association of Legal Philosophy (JALP). Its general theme was “Libertarianism and Legal Theory”. The concept of liberty or freedom has been discussed in philosophy of law in many different ways, but JALP had not yet devoted an annual meeting to this topic. In order to fill this gap, libertarianism both in theory and practice was focused on in this meeting, because libertarianism can be considered to be a purified version of classical liberalism as contrary to contemporary welfare liberalism. 7 speakers and 2 commentators were asked to make clear evaluations of libertarianism.
著者
森村 進
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2004, pp.5-17,206, 2005-09-30 (Released:2008-11-17)
参考文献数
21

It is often assumed that libertarianism presupposes rational, autonomous, strong individuals and is committed to “rugged individualism”. Not only critics of libertarianism, but also some libertarians themselves believe this is so. However, I disagree. In this paper, I argue that libertarians should not advance any particular controversial conception of human nature. Rather, they should acknowledge the great diversity amongst humankind as an undeniable fact and be wary of presenting some ideal form of human life. With respect to human nature as it is, it is partly because real people vary in so many respects such as their beliefs, ideals, values, talents, capacities, inclinations, tastes, temperament, knowledge and so on that everyone is to be allowed the liberty-right to pursue their own individual happiness at will and governments should abstain from imposing any particular ideal on their citizens and inhabitants. As for the ideal of human life, libertarianism must remain neutral among competing conceptions of the good life. It is true and only natural that libertarians, like others, should have their own views regarding human happiness and excellence, which are likely to differ from those of communitarians, welfare liberals and conservatives. However, libertarians do not hold such views qua libertarians, for a libertarian may voluntarily lead a life in a collectivist community or a disciplined monastery without any self-contradiction. Libertarianism is a doctrine of justice, not of human well-being or happiness. Nevertheless, atthe very least libertarianism makes one assumption concerning human nature, and that is that bar some exceptions all adults share minimal rationality and autonomy. Hencecomes the right of self-determination. While communitarians, left or conservative, exaggerate cultural diversity across nations and ethnic groups and make little of the diversity between individuals in a group, libertarians recognize basic universal humanity all over the world on the one hand and emphasize the differences between individuals on the other.
著者
森村 進
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2002, pp.110-114, 2003-10-20 (Released:2008-11-17)
参考文献数
1
著者
森際 康友
出版者
日本法哲学会
雑誌
法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1990, pp.55-70, 1991-10-30 (Released:2008-11-17)
参考文献数
3