著者

高山 真

出版者

三田哲學會

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.138, pp.41-59, 2017-03

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特集 : アートベース社会学へ#寄稿論文1. Personal life history2. Life story3. Autoethnography4. Life story and Autoethnography

著者

小泉 義之

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1986, no.36, pp.118-128, 1986

著者

鴻 浩介

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.68, pp.169-184, 2017

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<p>According to G. E. M. Anscombe's proposal, agents have a special way of knowing about their own intentional actions - they have the capacity to know what they are intentionally doing without relying on any evidence from observation, inference and so on. Anscombe dubbed this special knowledge "practical knowledge" and took it to be an essential mark of agency. This article attempts an explanation and vindication of this Anscombean approach to agency.</p><p>The discussion falls into four sections. In the first section, I clarify the nature of Anscombe's practical knowledge and argue that the principal task for us is to spell out how one can be justified in believing not just what one intends, but what one is intentionally doing without any evidence. In Section II, I discuss what is generally considered to be the most promising way of dealing with this task: the reliabilism strategy. On this view, practical knowledge is justified because there is a reliable efficient-causal link between an agent's intention to φ and his/her actually doing φ. I am willing to accept the reliabilism strategy as being basically on the right track. However, in Section III, I argue that the reliabilism strategy overlooks an important element of Anscombe's discussion, namely that practical knowledge is the "formal cause" of what it understands, i.e., intentional actions. With this observation in place, we can give an even more comprehensive account of the nature of practical knowledge. In Section IV, I close with a suggestion that the structure of practical knowledge so understood is surprisingly similar to the structure of the knowledge that makers of artifacts are said to have, and this similarity can support the claim that practical knowledge is knowledge about an objective, public world.</p><p></p>

著者

星名 雪子

出版者

北海道大学哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:02872560)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, pp.1-19, 1999-07-18

著者

石黒 ひで

出版者

三田哲學會

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

no.91, pp.p125-141, 1990-12

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1. 序2. 一般命題と単称命題3. 単称命題とレアリズム4. 対応と指示5. 因果関係と指示文学部創設百周年記念論文集ITreatise

著者

宮地 たか

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1966, no.16, pp.158-170, 1966-03-31 (Released:2010-01-20)

参考文献数

18

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Dieser Versuch wünscht eine Antwort darüber zu sein, ob die Fähigkeit der Erkenntnis mit der Wesensanschauung als der neuartigen Funktion, die Wesenserkenntnis zu begründen, a priori versehen sei oder nicht. Ich finde den Anfang dieses Versuches in dem Analyse der Wesenserkenntnis. Nach Husserl hat die Wesenserkenntnis zwei gründliche Seiten : das Urteil über “Was” des Individuums und das “rein eidetisches Urteil”. Als einen passenden Typus des letzteren Urteils ziehe ich die Geometorie in Betracht. Dann finde ich zwei Bestimmungen der Wesensanschauung in den Husserls Erörterungen : 1.der mit der Wahrnehmung gemeinsame Charakter, das Wesen originär erfassen zu können. 2. der Charakter, durch die “Blickwendung” auf ein Individuelles dadurch, “die Bildung des exemplarischen BewuBtseins” vorauszusetzen, eine Ideation zu vollziehen. Nun, es wird klar, daß für die Ideation von “, Was” des Individuums die zweite Bestimmung der Anschauung wichtig ist, und die Ideation inadäquat ist, wenn diese Voraussetzung unsicher sei.Nun, Husserl meint, die geometorische Erkenntnis könne nur auf der Wesensanschauung, die “Eidos überhaupt” originäl erfaßt, beruhen, und diese könne die schlechthin unbedingte Allgemeinheit für die Form des Raums, das Wesen des Dinges, begründen. So stelle ich auf dem heutigen Zeitpunkt, wo die nichteuklidischen Geometorien bestehen, zwei folgende Fragen. 1. die Frage auf die schlechthin unbedingte Allgemeinheit der geometorischen Erkenntnis fur den realen Raum. 2. die Frage auf die Figur überhaupt, den sogenannten Gegenstand des geometorischen Universalurteils, d. h. des Lehrsatzes. In Beziehung auf die erste Frage : solange ich den Grund der Bestehung jeder Geometorie betrachte, schließt sich theoretisch, daß die Geometorie nicht eine Wissenschaft, die dem realen Raum entspricht, sondern eine Wissenschaft über einen imaginären Gegenstand ist, der gemüß den das System konstruierenden Axiomen besteht, und jedes System bezeichnet sich also als eine Wissenschaft, deren Sätzen verbürgt sind, nur in demselben System die Allgemeingültigkeit zu haben. In diesem Punkte findet dieser Versuch eine wichtige Verschiedenheit gegen Husserls Meinung.In Bezug auf die zweite Frage : nach dem praktischen und theoretischen Versuch, wie die Lehrsätze aus Axiomen bestehen, kann ich klar feststellen, daß das Universalurteil der Lehrsätze nicht, wie Husserl behauptet, auf die Wesensanschauung, die “Eidos überhaupt” originär erfaßt, sondern auf die Verallgemeinerung vom individuellen Urteile über individuelle Figuren zum Universalurteile besteht.Nach obengedachtem Versuch kann ich folgendes beschließen, in der Tat besteht die geometorische Erkenntnis, ohne auf der Wesensanschauung nach Husserls erster Bestimmung zu beruhen, sogar solche Anschauung nicht sein können. Aber, die Anschauung nach der zweiten Bestimmung kann in dem bedingten Sinne sein. Jedoch ist der durch solche Anschauung erfaßte Inhalt nicht das Wesen des natürlichen Dinges, sondern nur das imaginare Wesen, gemäß den vorausgesetzten Bedingungen konstruiert.

著者

安田 将

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.71, pp.232-242, 2020-04-01 (Released:2020-05-12)

著者

川端 繁之

出版者

北海道大学哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:02872560)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, pp.103-120, 2005-07-17

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It is common knowledge among philosophical researchers that modern philosophy began with Descartes's "cogito". And there might be no objection to calling modern philisophy "philosophy of self-consciousness". H.Bergson found his philosophical starting-point in immediate self-knowledge, "durée pure". As such we can say that his philosophy belongs to the ancestry of self consciousness philosophy. If so, a problem will arise. :What is his own contribution to philosophy? I found an answer by interpreting and extending the concept of "schéme moteur" which is found in his second main book, "Matter and Memory". The answer is a tri-structure which is composed of three moments, "actual", "virtual", and "medium". I propose to regard this structure as the archetype of signification, moreover, to extend it to the ontological principle. And I call this the "semiotic process". My intention is to give some logical form to Bergson's idea which some people often criticize as just being a metaphor. In this sense I think it can be said that "semiotic process" is another name for "élan vital". The making Bergson's "hidden logic" clearer by finding out the "semitic process" is the main theme of this paper.

著者

麻生 尚志

出版者

北海道大学哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:02872560)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, pp.17-31, 2010-03-21

著者

菅沼 聡

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.55, pp.179-192,28, 2004-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

39

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Being a highly traditional question of metaphysics, the so-called “Ultimate Why-Question” still interests some contemporary philosophers. To ask this question amounts to asking where, if anywhere, “why-chains” can stop.Whereas the most traditional approach to the Ultimate Why-Question has been to try to answer it by “God”, i. e., “Necessary Existence/Being”; the most usual ap-proach in contemporary analytical philosophy has been to dismiss it as a nonsense pseudo-problem because it is “logically unanswerable”. I call the former tradition as a whole the “old tradition” and the latter the “new tradition”.In this article, I propose a “third alternative”, by suggesting that the Ultimate Why-Question is not necessarily unanswerable but can be answered by a kind of “Necessary Existence/Being”, which cannot be anything in particular at all (in-cluding even “God”) but only the “Absolute Totality of Reality”.The following three procedures would be required to make the above sugges-tions assertions:(1) to show whether the “Absolute Totality of Reality” exists at all, (2) to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be the “Nec-essary Existence/Being” that would stop all possible why-chains, (3) to decide whether only the “Absolute Totality of Reality” satisfies the above conditions.

著者

村上 勝三

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1978, no.28, pp.116-126, 1978-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

古賀 万由里

出版者

三田哲學會

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.107, pp.261-275, 2002-01

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1. はじめに2. ヴァヤナードゥ県部族の状況3. アーユルヴェーダ4. 民俗医療 (1) クルマ族のVヴァイディヤン (2) カートゥナーイカ族のKヴァイディヤン (3) 衰退する蛇毒治療 (4) 州政府の奨励したAヴァイディヤン (5) 妊娠儀礼,ガッディガ(gaddika)5. 民俗医療の特徴と展望特集文化人類学の現代的課題研究ノート

著者

池上 健一郎

出版者

三田哲學會

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.132, pp.309-341, 2014-03

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特集 : 論集 美学・芸術学 : 美・芸術・感性をめぐる知のスパイラル(旋回)The symphonies of Anton Bruckner (1824‒1896) were evaluated both during his lifetime and subsequent to his death in terms of two opposing criteria : "absolute music" and "program music", terms that actually reflect aesthetic polemics. Especially since the 1980s, Bruckner scholarship has connected this dichotomy to methodological discussions of autonomic analysis and semantic interpretation. However, the methodological purism being undeniably at stake in both positions comes with the risk of misconceiving the multiple layers of Bruckner's symphonies.Hence my paper aims at demonstrating that both dimensions—the "purely musical" and the semantic—make up an inseparable unit in Bruckner's music. The third movement of his Ninth Symphony seems particularly suitable for this purpose, since Bruckner himself commented on its "content" on various occasions.By means of analysis, I seek to demonstrate how thematic ideas being integrated into a broader motivic network throughout the symphony are interlinked semantically. Remarkably, such "semantic networks" are strengthened through thematisch-motivische Arbeit, the technique which is commonly regarded as the "autonomous" principle. Along those lines, the culmination of the movement (mm.187ff.) gains a multidimensional character. In order to understand the related nature of Bruckner's "Doppeldasein"(Korte), the methodological purism ought to be overcome.

著者

野上 志学

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.71, pp.185-196, 2020

著者

綿内 真由美

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.69, pp.58-75, 2018-04-01 (Released:2018-08-01)

著者

荒畑 靖宏

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.57, pp.126-138,7, 2006-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

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Diese Abhandlung zielt darauf ab, die neuerdings in den anglosach-sischen Ländern immer häufiger anzufindende "pragmatische" Lesart von Heideggers Weltlichkeitsanalyse einer Kritik zu unterziehen. Diese Kritik bezieht sich auf die Diskussion Heideggers selbst, auf der eine solche Lesart vor allem beruht, und die mit einem Begriff unverträglich ist, der nicht nur in der Weltlichkeitsanalyse, sondern auch im ganzen Sein und Zeit eine zentrale Rolle spielt. Diese Inkonsequenz besteht zwischen dem Gedanken der quasitranszendentalen Konstitution der Umwelt durch die Praxis des Daseins (Entwurf) and der Struktur der Welt, die Heidegger von der »Welt« als der Gesamtmenge der innterweltlich Seienden unterscheidet, der "Bedeutsamkeit" also. Mein Diskussionsbeitrag geht so vor; i) Heideggers "Be-deuten" ist keineswegs ins "Verweisen" zur uckzuholen, das nach Heidegger die Zeugzusammenhänge ausmacht; ii) Heideggers Analyse der Funktion des Zeichens als "Zeuges" ist merkwüirdig verstellt, was aber in der Tat darin liegt, dass er den Verweisungszusammenhang des "Zeuges" implizite nach dem Modell der Kontextualität und der Bezeichnungsfunktion des Zeichens analysiert; iii) wenn die holistisch-systematische Phanomenalität der "Welt", die Heidegger als die dritte Instanz neben dem Subjekt und Objekt zum ersten Mal zur Geltung gebracht hat, mit der "Bedeutsamkeit" zu erklaren wäre, und wenn wir sie genau in der Weise verstehen möchten, in der er sie auch gemeint hat, dann müßten wir zu der Schlussfolgerung, dass die Welt symbolisch struktuiert ist, oder, genauer gesagt, auf jene Weise konstituiert ist, welche für die sprachliche Bedeutsamkeit charakteristisch ist.

著者

松井 貴英

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.55, pp.243-255,32, 2004-04-01 (Released:2009-12-09)

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In Plato's Phaedo 74b2-3, at one stage of the argument for the theory of recollection, Socrates and Simmias agree that they have knowledge of equality itself. The aim of this paper is to answer the following two questions concerning this agree-ment : (1) What is equality itself, which they claim to know, the Platonic Form of Equality or some mathematical object different from Platonic Forms?(2) Is recollection a form of ordinary learning accessible to ordinary people or some kind of higher learning?In our approach to question (1), we deal first with 76b10-12. This passage suggests that only Socrates is capable of giving an account of Forms, including the Form of Equality, and this can be taken to imply that Simmias does not know this Form. The knowledge he has attained so far concerns only mathematical objects. This conclusion may be supported by 74c1-3, where the equality itself which Sim-mias is said to know is represented in the plural.As to question (2), Socrates says that whenever we recollect something through something like it, we necessarily recognize that the latter is defective in its similarity to the former (74a5-7), and this statement suggests that recollection is not simple concept formation, but rather a kind of higher learning, which requires reflective thought.Now in this process of recollection, where does Simmias, who doesn't have knowledge of Forms, stand? The 'Divided Line' in the Republic and the comparison with the slave boy in the Meno help us to answer this question : his state of mind corresponds to 'dianoia' in the 'Divided Line', but is nearer to 'noesis' than the slave boy in the Meno, who is supposed to have just begun his attempt to reach 'dianoia' starting from 'pistis'. Recollection is supposed to be a long and arduous process of learning in the journey toward 'dianoia' and 'noesis', starting from 'pistis'.

著者

田村 圭一

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.55, pp.206-217,30, 2004-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

10

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Cognitivism in ethics can be divided into two branches. One is naturalism and the other is intuitionism. Intuitionism is cognitivist internalism, that is, the claim that cognitive states, i. e., beliefs, can motivate an agent to action without the assistance of desires. But cognitivist internalism faces two kinds of problems, i. e., weakness of will and accidie. In order to clear cognitivist internalism of these difficulties, we have to revise Humean motivational theory. Humeanism is the claim that beliefs cannot motivate an agent without the assistance of relevant desires. Only desires can motivate in their own right and their motivation is necessary. T. Nagel's cognitiv-ist internalism and J. McDowell's are partially committed to Humeanism, because they tacitly admit that cognitive states should necessarily motivate. J. Dancy tries to revise Humeanism. According to him, cognitive states can motivate in their own right, but their motivation is contingent.Dancy's cognitivist internalism accepts particularism, which adopts a holistic un-derstanding of the behaviour of moral reasons.Particularists reject the generalist as-sumption that a cognitive state which behaves in a given case in favour of an action should behave similarly in every case. Cognitivist internalists, therefore, can escape their traditional difficulties when they adopt particularism.

著者

土谷 志帆

出版者

北海道大学哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:02872560)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, pp.1-19, 2009-03-21

著者

横路 佳幸

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.69, pp.259-273, 2018-04-01 (Released:2018-08-01)

参考文献数

26

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The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (hereafter the PII) states that if any individuals exactly resemble each other, then they are necessarily identical. Intuitively, the PII seems valid, but Max Black attempted to refute it by introducing the possibility of a symmetry universe in which two iron spheres c and p can resemble each other exactly. This counterexample (hereafter BU) seems easy to rule out using a weak discernibility strategy (hereafter WD) according to which c, being spatially separate from p and not from c itself, is not indiscernible from p. WD, however, leads to ‘the presupposition problem’, because obtaining c as spatially separate from p presupposes the distinctness of c and p. In this discussion, I will give an outline of a defense of the validity of the PII that evades the presupposition problem through the elucidation of some aspects of ‘identity’. In my view, ‘identity’ has two aspects: one is simply self-identity as a universal monadic property (hereafter identity-1), and the other is identity as an equivalence relation entailing indiscernibility (hereafter identity-2). The basis or ground for identity-1 obtaining with regard to an individual x can be called the individuator for x, but it is no wonder that the individuation and articulation of c and p are prior to or ground for obtaining c as spatially separate from p. So far as the PII is concerned with identity-1, it may not be valid. However, we can characterize identity-2, following David Wiggins’s lead, in terms of what is called the sortal dependency of identity-2 and the extended Locke’s Principle (hereafter ELP), according to which, for any sortal concept F, x falling under F is identical with y falling under F if and only if x is the same F as y, and x is the same F as y if and only if a) x and y share F and b) x is not spatially separate from y. If ELP is valid, we can regard BU as merely a general case to which WD is applied. And if the Wigginsian idea of the sortal dependency of identity-2 is also right, there is no longer a presupposition problem. I hence conclude that the PII is valid to the extent that it is concerned with identity-2.