著者

藤井 千佳世

出版者

The Philosophical Association of Japan

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.64, pp.173-190_L12, 2013

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Chez Spinoza, la norme est immanente à l'activité de la vie. De même pour Canguilhem, elle est, primordialement, instituée et constituée par le vivant lui-même. Dans cet article, par la comparaison du concept spinoziste de <i>conatus</i> en tant que développement pratique (de la théorie de la vérité à celle de la vie) de sa notion de <i>norma</i> avec l'idée de normativité chez Canguilhem, nous tâchons d'éclairer le rôle de la norme immanente selon eux, ainsi que sa portée éthique.<br>Pour ce faire, nous analysons, d'abord, les points communs entre la théorie de la norme de la vie sur la base de laquelle Canguilhem définit la santé et la maladie, et celle du <i>conatus</i> à partir duquel Spinoza explique deux modes de la vie : la vie affective et la vie menée sous la conduite de la raison.<br>En outre, pour passer du problème de la norme de la vie à celui de l'éthique, nous examinons la valeur de la négativité pour l'un et l'autre (la position de la pathologie ou de la maladie chez Canguilhem et le problème du mal chez Spinoza).<br>Enfin, nous éclairons l'importance du concept d' <i>exemplar</i> de la nature humaine qui se trouve au noyau de l'éthique spinoziste. Celle-ci nous permet de délimiter la continuité et la rupture des deux modes de la vie et d'y trouver des divergences de perspective éthique entre Spinoza et Canguilhem, qui, tous deux, attachent de l'importance à la norme immanente à l'activité de la vie.<br>Ces analyses proposent une interprétation du problème du projet ou de la possibilité de l'éthique de Spinoza et, par la lecture de Canguilhem, explicitent un certain contexte intellectuel qui prépare la réinterprétation de Spinoza au 20^e siècle.

著者

秋保 亘

出版者

日本哲学会 ; 1952-

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.67, pp.138-152, 2016-04

著者

シュスターマン リチャード 大石 昌史

出版者

三田哲學會

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.131, pp.323-348, 2013-03

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講演この発表は, 私の哲学的研究を導いてきた, また, 身体感性論somaesthetics の中心をなす理論と実践の統合を強調するところの, 越境的で経験的な探究inquiry のプラグマティックなモデルを検証するものである. 基本的な考え方は, 探究は, その過程で獲得される経験, すなわち, 継続中の探究がそのエネルギーを将来の方向へ向け, また, その結果を回顧的な確認へと向かわせるところの力動的な経験を通じて, 探究それ自体として, 新たな方向, 形式, 方法, 基準を発展させ得るということである. (このようなモデルは, 探究には, 独立に基礎づけられ, 探究の過程に先立つ, 探究と評価を支配する外的な基準となるところの方法の確定や妥当性の論理的な基準が必要だとする, よく知られた考え方とは対照的である. )私は, このような探究の経験的モデルを, 私の美学的研究における例証を通じて, すなわち, どのようにプラグマティズムの美学における探究が身体感性論の試みへと, そして現代アートの研究, および芸術的パフォーマンスを通じた探究という考えへと至ったかを跡づけることによって, 検証する. なお, この発表は, 『プラグマティズムの美学(生き生きとした芸術)Pragmatist Aesthetics (L'art à l'état vif)』の(フランス語版と英語版の)出版20周年を記念したソルボンヌ大学での国際会議と連動して, (2012年5月24日から6月6日まで)パリで私が企画した最近の芸術展示に依存している.

著者

早川 正祐

出版者

The Philosophical Association of Japan

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.59, pp.261-276,L20, 2008

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Until now, mainstream philosophers of action have never taken seriously the fundamental fact that human agents are beings who care. Most philosophers have attempted to clarify the features of human agency mainly by analyzing intending, planning, and policy-making. In this paper, however, by introducing and analyzing the concept of care, I have tried to analyze human agency in the light of caring. Recognizing that the meanings of care are manifold, I focus first on one of the most central meanings of caring about/for X; if we care about/for X, we are continuously interested in X, and we consider X as important and significant to ourselves over an extended period of time. I then elucidate the distinctive features of caring by considering what kinds of patterns caring is embedded in, and explaining how these patterns are distinguished from the patterns that characterize future-directed intention, and particularly policy.<br>The common aspect between care and policy is that both involve a commitment to the repetition of various kinds of activities that concern their intentional object. However, there are important differences between care and policy. One of the essential aspects of policy is to fix the understanding of the object of policy, and to control beforehand the activities that concern the object. In contrast, one of the essential aspects of care is to deepen the understanding of the object by trial and error, and to change our activities flexibly, according to our developing understanding of the object. These features of caring enable us to recognize and understand the <i>receptive</i> modes of human agency, which mainstream philosophers of action have disregarded. We will obtain a more well-balanced conception of human agency if we analyze these receptive modes, as well as the regulative modes which most philosophers of action have concentrated on.

著者

笠木 雅史

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.63, pp.171-184_L9, 2012 (Released:2012-10-16)

参考文献数

19

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This paper aims to elucidate various arguments for Cartesian skepticism, reveal their presuppositions, and examine their plausibility. Cartesian skepticism concerns knowledge of the external world in general. Even though there are different arguments for Cartesian skepticism, their differences are often neglected, resulting in serious confusions. By analysing the premises and presuppositions of each argument, I attempt to figure out whether and to what extent it is plausible. The paper consists of seven sections. In Section 1, I introduce the problem of Cartesian skepticism. Then, from Sections 2 to 4, I review three different forms of the argument from ignorance, which appeal to different variants of the epistemic closure principle about knowledge. Among them, the standard closure principle is more plausible than the other two; one requires that S be logically omniscient, and one entails the notorious KK thesis that first-order knowledge requires second-order knowledge. The requirements these two closure principles impose on knowledge, then, are too strong. In Section 5, I discuss how versions of infallibilism are invoked in defending the first premise of the argument, viz., that S does not know that a skeptical hypothesis is false, of the argument from ignorance. On the other hand, some claim that the argument from underdetermination does not require infallibilism, and thereby undermines even fallible knowledge. In Section 6, however, I argue that it is hard to maintain that the argument from underdetermination fares well against fallible knowledge. The underdetermination principle, to which the argument appeals, is supported by premises at odds with fallibilism. In addition, the argument from underdetermination faces another problem: it presupposes that S's total evidence is restricted to sensory evidence, if it works against fallible knowledge at all. Since this presupposition is contentious, the argument from underdetermination against fallible knowledge needs more justification for its presuppositions, in order to get off the ground. Section 7 gives a summary of the paper.

著者

高橋 克也

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.46, pp.91-100,4, 1995-10-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

被引用文献数

1

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L'attention, chez Kant, est un acte où l'entendement et la volonté s'entrecroisent essentiellement. C'est-à-dire que d'abord, elle appartient à la faculté de la connaissance, et elle est déroulée grâce à l'effet du vouloir. Ensuite, il faut remarquer que l'attention volontaire se réalise dans divers objets dont l'existence l'entendement saisit préalablement, et que par suite l'entendement est une des conditions nécessaires de la volonté. En analysant cet entrecroisement, on peut avoir une clef pour s'approcher de la problématique de l'humanité.

著者

宮野 晃一郎

出版者

北海道大学哲学会 = The Philosophical Society of Hokkaido University

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:02872560)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, pp.57-71, 2004-07-18

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Le texte de ses dernières années,nommé "Qu'est-ce que les Lumiéres?," nous montre que l'attitude critique et philosophique de M. Foucault était traversée par les idées des 'l'êthos philosophique' et 'l'ontologie historique de nous-memes' depuis l'archéologie et la généalogie. Nos positions sont qu'il est à la fois la reprise mêmede ses travaux et la charnièrede la theme du savoir, celle du pouvoir et celle de l'éthique,y trouvent-elles leur charnière, et donc qu'il est également au point de départ de envisager son éthique.

著者

長谷川 三千子

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1973, no.23, pp.162-173, 1973-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

10

著者

樫 則章

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.57, pp.43-58,3, 2006-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

26

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In this article, Peter Singer's animal liberation and criticism agaist it is discussed. Singer's animal liberation is based on the principle of equal consideration of interests. However, the basis for this principle is derived from the logical requirement of universalizability of moral judgment. Thus, on the part of people who deny any consideration of animal interests or who think animal interests weigh less than those of humans, there is a responsibility to prove the validity of their views. Though some think animal interests are not the immediate object of moral consideration, they in fact are. Those who feel that more consideration should be placed on human interests compared to animals, in order to justify this inequality, point out the relevant moral differences between the two such as rationality, autonomy, moral agency, and so on. These people must come face to face with the so called, the problem of "marginal cases" in which it is stated that the interests of people lacking these qualities or capacities need not be considered. Though many solutions have been proposed, not one has been satisfactory. Thus, Singer's view that it is an unjustifiable discrimination not to consider animal interests as strongly just because they are for animals, can be indeed labeled as "speciesism." However, there are views stating that no interests worthy of consideration exist for animals because they do not have any sense of self and not even any consciousness. This problem can not be simply solved by physiology or cognitive ethology. Since it contains philosophical aspects such as "what is consciousness"or"what is belief, " its resolution is not at all easy. Though the principle of equal consideration of interests has sufficient ground, there still is room for debate on whether animals possess any interests to be considered. Therefore, animal liberation calls for discussion as well.

著者

坂本 邦暢

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.60, pp.185-200_L11, 2009 (Released:2010-11-09)

参考文献数

97

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The Flemish humanist Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) is well-known for his restoration of Stoicism in early modern Europe. His main works, Introduction to Stoic Philosophy and Natural Philosophy of the Stoics, both published in Antwerp in 1604, prompted the reception of Stoicism in the seventeenth century and laid the foundation for its modern reconstruction.Lipsius tried to reconcile Stoic philosophy with Christian theology. Although the importance of his Christianized interpretation was recognized, scholars have paid little attention to the real motivation that led him to write the Introduction and Natural Philosophy. The preface to Introduction shows clearly that his primary aim was the exposition of Seneca's philosophy. Indeed, Lipsius's heavy reliance on the Roman philosopher and other Latin authors has been criticized since the publication of his works. According to this criticism, Lipsius ignored so many Greek sources that his reconstruction of Stoicism is invalid from a philological point of view. However, can his partial selection of sources not be viewed from different angles? Is it not his reading of Seneca's work that enabled him to harmonize Stoicism with Christian doctrines?To answer these questions I shall focus on Lipsius's theory of evil and the cosmic cycle, expounded in Natural Philosophy. My analysis will show that Seneca's eclecticism played an important role in the Lipsian reconstruction of Stoicism.

著者

都築 貴博

出版者

北海道大学哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:02872560)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, pp.101-118, 2008-02-29

著者

高田 純

出版者

北海道大学哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:02872560)

巻号頁・発行日

no.39, pp.89-96, 2003

著者

大出 晃

出版者

三田哲學會

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

no.43, 1963-10

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Il s'est dit traditionellement qu'il n'existe pas la quatrieme figure dans le classement aristotelicien des syllogismes assertoriques. Ce qui ne signifie pas, comme il est bien connu, qu'Aristote ne reconnaisse les syllogismes de la quatrieme figure pour valides. Le philosophe examine tous les syllogismes de la quatrieme figure et les admet pour valides, mais il ne les classe pas dans une figure particuliere qui est nommee au cours de temps la figure galenique. Pourquoi donc n'existe-t-il pas la quatrieme figure dans son classement ? Les explications donnees par des commentateurs, me semble-t-il, n'eclaircissent pas beaucoup ce probleme. Au congres de l'association japonaise pour philosophie des sciences tenu au mois de mai 1959, j'ai propose une explication qui le concerne. Mon argument en est suivant Le classement ordinaire des syllogismes aristoteliciens suppose qu'Aristote lui-meme le fasse selon la meme methode que celle-ci: [table] Mais a mon avis cette supposition ne trouve aucune justification dans l'interpretation fidele du texte d'Analytica Priora. La methode de classement authentiquement aristotelicien est plutot suivante: [table] En bref, elle est lineaire et de ce point de vue la non-existence de la quatrieme figure est bien naturelle, Les phrases d'Analytica Priora, surtout 25b 32-37, 26b 34-39, 28a 10-15, justifient entierement cette explication. Recemment M. Kneale a propose la mene explication dans son excellent ouvrage "The Development of Logic". J'ai developpe dans cet article l'argument plus detaile qui est favorable a la nouvelle explication.

著者

斉藤 健

出版者

北海道大学哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:02872560)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, pp.45-63, 2004-07-18

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The aim of this paper is to examine Shapiro's structuralism in philosophy of mathematics and to show several difficulties in his structuralism. He adopts ante rem structuralism which is based upon his realism. After delineating his arguments I will point out some advantages of his structuralism, which become apparent when it is compared especially with a traditional type of mathematical Platonism. Then I will show, by using examples taken from mathematics, that there are some ambiguities in his uses of the basic notions, such as structure, system, exemplification and place. Finally I criticize his axiomatic theory of structure mainly because it relies upon too many undefined terms, and show that in his ontological views there is an underlying discrepancy between his ante rem structuralism and his set-theoretic approach to structures.

著者

鈴木 万希枝

出版者

三田哲學會

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.128, pp.179-206, 2012-03

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特集 : 社会学 社会心理学 文化人類学投稿論文In recent years, news access in multiple formats on multiple platforms emerged. By taking diary records of graduate students' news exposure in this media environment, this study investigated (1) the pattern of using platforms to acquire news and (2) content preference on news exposure. Results indicated that young generation uses internet (PC) more than TV to acquire news. News diary of the participants showed that they acquire news on various platforms, such as web portal, an online newspaper, RSS, mixi news, and Twitter/Facebook. Some patterns of platforms' usage are recorded. It is suggested that the pattern of news diffusion could change because SNS such as mixi, Twitter and Facebook is the main news source for many cases.The results showed that most youth were exposed only to soft news except for the news about the earthquake. Meanwhile, only a small number of participants acquired hard news such as business or political news. Most hard news readers used RSS.

著者

坂本 百大

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1985, no.35, pp.1-18, 1985-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

李 明哲

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.73, pp.391-407, 2022-04-01 (Released:2022-07-21)

参考文献数

17

著者

金山 弥平

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.54, pp.71-91,239, 2003-04-01 (Released:2009-12-09)

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Ancient and modern skepticism are said to be different in that (1) ancient skeptics attacked beliefs, while modern skeptics are challenging knowledge (justified true belief); (2) ancient skeptics considered it possible to live without beliefs, following 'appearances', while modern philosophers consider it impossible, as is typically represented by Hume's judgement; (3) ancient skeptics took skepticism to be the best way to attain happiness, while such a demand may be incredible to philosophers today. But are these differences really substantial? As to (1), the state of mind to which justified true belief corresponds in Greek philosophy is doxa (belief) rather than episteme (knowledge); modern skeptics may be regarded by ancient skeptics as challenging belief rather than knowledge. As to (2), when e.g. a car rushes toward them, Pyrrhonists and Humeans will both evade the car, with the processes in their minds being almost the same, and different only in names ('appearances' and 'beliefs'). However, there is at least one substantial difference: if ancient skeptics' claim in (3) is true, Pyrrhonists can lead a better life than Humeans, by following appearances of moral virtues and also suspending judgement about the sufferings their moral activities may cause to them. To Humeans, who hold that reason is the slave of the passions, Pyrrhonists' claim to achieve happiness by rationally suspending judgement may appear to be the result of neglecting observation. But the reason's power that enables men to lead a good life, in which ancient skeptics believed, was what Socrates actually observed in his own mind and handed down to posterity.

著者

青山 拓央

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.65, pp.9-24_L3, 2014-04-01 (Released:2016-06-30)

参考文献数

26

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The titular question can be interpreted as follows: Does future possibility precede logical possibility ─ which provides simultaneous alternatives? In this paper, I defend a philosophical intuition that future possibility is more fundamental than logical possibility, even though the former seems conceptually more complex than the latter. My attempt can be regarded as retreating from Duns Scotusʼs modal semantics to Aristotleʼs (cf. Yagi 2009, Knuuttila 2013). Moreover, I attempt to reconstruct my previous arguments (Aoyama 2008, 2011) on the assumption that the above intuition is correct, and seek to connect Kripkeʼs famous argument about de re modality (Kripke 1980) with Wittgensteinʼs argument on certainty regarding de re beliefs (Wittgenstein 1969). In the appendix, I note that the background of this paper is related to Nietzscheʼs peculiar fatalism (I call a world in which this kind of fatalism is true not an ʻunfree worldʼ but an ʻafree worldʼ; everything in such a world involves no contrast between being free and being unfree that can be found in the determiningdetermined relation).

著者

田村 歩

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2023, no.74, pp.189-202, 2023-04-01 (Released:2023-06-28)