著者
萬屋 博喜
出版者
日本哲学会 ; 1952-
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
no.68, pp.231-245, 2017-04
著者
合庭 惇
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1997, no.48, pp.69-81, 1997-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

So-called “Information Society” has witnessed various discourses on the dynamic transition from the capitalist to the post-capitalist society. Although these discourses have been around the socio-economic dimensions, the urgent need is the philosophical or epistemological elaboration of the unexperienced and unpredictable aspect of the newly coming society. To clarify these issues, this article introduces Japanese Government's information policy, then discusses the changing phases of the concept of the “Information.” The The postmodernist thinking that knowledge and information is the axis principle of advanced societies, has been joined with the socio-political theory of the “Information Society, ” some theorists develop the new level of the discussion. Through the introduction of these discussions, this article tries to elucidate the theoretical meaning of the “Information Society.”
著者
滝浦 静雄
出版者
The Philosophical Association of Japan
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
no.19, pp.22-47, 1969

Cet essai a pour but de chercher un ressource pour réfuter une forme du solipsisme dont on pourrait trouver le type dans la philosophie de J.-P. Sartre. Selon lui, toute conscience d'objet est en même temps << conscience non-thétique d'elle-même >> et, par conséquent, l'expérience du << Nous >> n'est qu'un fait psychologique de chaque individu qu'il est un d' << eux >> pour un tiers. Nous essayons donc dans cet essai de démontrer que sa conception de la << conscience (de) soi >> n'a pas raison, en tenant compte du fait que la prise de conscience de soi est en règle générale très difficile pour l'enfant. Car, ce fait ne serait pas indifférent au problème de la conscience (de) soi. Et nous pensons que, pour saisir correctement l'existence d'autrui, il faut avoir la notion juste du corps humain, et nous la trouvons dans la philosophie de M. Merleau-Ponty. Il constate par l' examen de la << sensation double >> le système de coexistence de mon corps avec le corps d'autrui, c'est-à-dire l' << intercorporéité >> où l'on pourrait restituer le bon droit de l'expérience du << Nous >> sujet.
著者
西山 佑司
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2005, no.56, pp.113-129,6, 2005-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)
参考文献数
20

The present paper considers the adequacy of an essential assumption in the philosophy of language in the twentieth century, which is that linguistic meaning is to be understood in referential/logical terms and that semantics is inherently truth conditional. Frege origi-nated this assumption. He defined Sinn (sense) as the determiner of Bedeutung (reference) . In contrast, linguistic semantics developed within the framework of the generative theory of grammar has no commitment to Frege's reference determining definition of sense. It defines sense as the determiner of sense properties and relations such as ambiguity, synonymy, analyticity, and entailment. Quine's argument that these sense properties and relations cannot be made objective sense of is critically reviewed.We claim that linguistic semantics is not truth conditional. Truth conditions are to be assigned to the proposition expressed by an utterance, which is captured by the theory of utterance interpretation, i.e., inferential pragmatics.Particular attention is paid to Yamada's argument that the content of illocutionary acts such as commands, promises, and the like cannot be identified with propositions. We claim that Yamada's argument is not convincing. We also comment on his idea of a general theory of content for illocutionary acts which generalizes Austin's theory of truth.
著者
富山 豊
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2017, no.68, pp.155-168, 2017

<p>The internalism/externalism debate is one of the most important issues discussed in such areas of contemporary philosophy as philosophy of language, philosophy of mind (philosophy of thought), and epistemology. Husserl's phenomenology might also be regarded as a kind of internalism since it emphasizes its methodological reduction into the internal sphere of experiences ("phenomenological reduction"). Externalist criticisms against some naive forms of internalist prejudice, however, seem to contain some important insights concerning the concepts of meaning, knowledge, and mental content (or propositional attitudes). Therefore I would like to try to defend Husserl's basic insight concerning the concept of meaning, by adjusting it to accommodate this externalist insight. This "adjusting", however, is not a distortion of Husserl's original philosophy. I believe that it is just a precise explication of Husserl's own insight as it really is.</p><p>In order to show this, I will try to survey the early Husserl's theory of meaning first, bringing out its internalistic features. Secondly, I introduce a kind of externalist criticism relevant to the theory. Thirdly, I would like to try to reconcile them, focusing on the contextuality of experience. Then, finally, I will consider the objectivity of scientific knowledge. I will argue that Husserl can accept the contextualityof meaning from the viewpoint of the contextuality of experience, in a way which does not destroy the objectivity of scientific knowledge.</p>

1 0 0 0 OA 意識と存在

著者
田中 晃
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1975, no.25, pp.108-119, 1975-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)
著者
伊藤 邦武
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2003, no.54, pp.55-70,240, 2003-04-01 (Released:2009-12-08)

Naturalistic epistemology is generally considered to be a strong antidote to the traditional foundational epistemology, and it is believed to be able to evade the sceptical challenge to the traditional foundational project. This belief, however, should be thought again. Naturalistic epietemology and philosophical scepticism can coexist and mutually sustain each other. This is at least the case in the arguments of Hume's Treatise, which is widely recognized as a precursor of current naturalistic epistemology. According to Hume, sceptical argument against reason suggests the validity of naturalism in the theory of knowledge, but naturalism, in turn, encourages the adoption of further sceptical stance to the claim of reason. We can see the novelty of Hume's argument against classical scepticism in this complex combination of scepticism and naturalism.
著者
藤井 千佳世
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2013, no.64, pp.173-190_L12, 2013 (Released:2014-07-10)
参考文献数
19

Chez Spinoza, la norme est immanente à l'activité de la vie. De même pour Canguilhem, elle est, primordialement, instituée et constituée par le vivant lui-même. Dans cet article, par la comparaison du concept spinoziste de conatus en tant que développement pratique (de la théorie de la vérité à celle de la vie) de sa notion de norma avec l'idée de normativité chez Canguilhem, nous tâchons d'éclairer le rôle de la norme immanente selon eux, ainsi que sa portée éthique.Pour ce faire, nous analysons, d'abord, les points communs entre la théorie de la norme de la vie sur la base de laquelle Canguilhem définit la santé et la maladie, et celle du conatus à partir duquel Spinoza explique deux modes de la vie : la vie affective et la vie menée sous la conduite de la raison.En outre, pour passer du problème de la norme de la vie à celui de l'éthique, nous examinons la valeur de la négativité pour l'un et l'autre (la position de la pathologie ou de la maladie chez Canguilhem et le problème du mal chez Spinoza).Enfin, nous éclairons l'importance du concept d' exemplar de la nature humaine qui se trouve au noyau de l'éthique spinoziste. Celle-ci nous permet de délimiter la continuité et la rupture des deux modes de la vie et d'y trouver des divergences de perspective éthique entre Spinoza et Canguilhem, qui, tous deux, attachent de l'importance à la norme immanente à l'activité de la vie.Ces analyses proposent une interprétation du problème du projet ou de la possibilité de l'éthique de Spinoza et, par la lecture de Canguilhem, explicitent un certain contexte intellectuel qui prépare la réinterprétation de Spinoza au 20e siècle.
著者
大石 敏広
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1996, no.47, pp.266-275, 1996-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

The thesis of the indeterminacy of translation is that manuals for translation can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another. On the other hand the thesis of the underdetermination of empirical theory means that empirical theories can be at odds with each other and yet compatible with all possible data. According to Quine, there is a parallel between these two theses, but the parallel fails in certain respects. However, the reasons Quine gives for the parallel-failing are not valid, because they presuppose the problematical doctrine of physicalistic ontology. Although these reasons may be invalid, I still believe that the thesis of indeterminacy plays a singular role in justifying a refusal of the hypostatization of meaning. It is in this respect that the thesis of indeterminacy ultimately differs from the thesis of underdetermination.
著者
勝 道興
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2007, no.58, pp.147-162,22, 2007-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

Diese Abhandlung unternimmt Nietzsches Gedanke von der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen zu prufen, vermittels der Unterscheidung seines Entstehungsprozesses in die drei Momente aufgrund der Geschichte von Zarathustra in Ecce homo.Erstens last der Werdenbegriff Heraklits sich zwar in der Philosophic im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen abheben, aber es ist unmoglich, ein Quelle-moment fur die Wiederkunftslehre einem periodischen Kreislauf gemaß in semen Fragmenten abzulesen. So ist es vielmehr moglich, eine Vorausform fur die Wiederkunftslehre bei der kritischen Historie in Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historic fur das Leben zu finden. Zweitens last das Beweisfuhrung-moment der Wiederkehr zwar in den Nachgelassenen Fragmenten von Friihjahr-Herbst 1881 hinter, aber an seiner erkenntnistheoretischen Grenze spielt es eine Rolle des Steuern nach dem Auswahl-moment in der Frohlichen Wissenschaft und Zarathustra. Das entscheidende Einverleiben mit Grauen und Gelachter im letzteren Buch zeigt einen Modus der Wiederkehr als rhythmische Bewegung. Durchs Bestrahlen aus der Untersuchung von der griechischen Rhythmik in Baslerzeit Nietztsches konnen wir entdecken, class er am Leitfaden des Leibes den Rhythmus fur Formel der Individuation oder Figuration des Werdens halt. Eine Szene von einem spielenden Kind am Meer in Zarathustra (quellend aus etwas Heraklitischem) gestaltet die Wiederkehr als selbe, das Gleiche wiederholende, rhythmische Wellenbewegung.
著者
縣 由衣子
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2016, no.67, pp.123-137, 2016

<p>Le but du présent article est de mettre en lumière la notion de ‹corps mêlés› introduite par Michel Serres dans <i>Les Cinq Sens</i> au moment de la description de la notion de peau. Il s'agit ici de situer la place et la portée de cette notion dans l'ensemble de la pensée philosophique de l'académicien français.</p><p>Les premiers ouvrages de Michel Serres, à savoir ceux des années 1960 jusqu'aux années 1980, l'ont fait connaître dans le domaine de l'épistémologie. En revanche, le fait qu'il ait entrepris dans le même temps l'analyse du concept de sensation est beaucoup moins connu, comme le prouve le nombre insuffisant d'études académiques consacrées à cette problématique, les liens reliant celle-ci avec les autres préoccupations de l'oeuvre de Michel Serres restant par conséquent ignorés.</p><p>L'intérêt du présent article se situe précisément dans la découverte de ces liens à travers l'analyse de la notion de ‹corps mêlés› dont Michel Serres se sert pour décrire la notion de peau. De cette façon, la peau apparaît comme le lieu des ‹corps mêlés› par lesquels le sujet et l'objet se mélangent. Mais que veut signifier Michel Serres en recourant à cette notion méconnue et a priori difficile d'accès ? Pour éclairer cela, nous nous concentrons ici sur la notion, primordiale dans l'oeuvre de Michel Serres, de ‹quasi-objet› notamment traitée dans <i>Le Parasite</i> et qui, en soulignant l'état potentiel du sujet, dépasse en définitive la dichotomie de la philosophie traditionnelle entre le sujet et l'objet.</p><p>Finalement, le présent article montre ainsi que le lieu des ‹corps mêlés› constitue l'état potentiel du sujet, mis en exergue par Michel Serres à travers la notion de ‹quasi-objet›, intervenant au niveau de la sensation.</p>

1 0 0 0 OA 模倣の存在論

著者
柴田 健志
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.65, pp.197-211_L14, 2014-04-01 (Released:2016-06-30)
参考文献数
11

Recent scientific breakthroughs in the study of imitation at multiple levels evoke further problems such as “Why should we imitate each other?” and “Why should we recognize another person as a model of ourselves?” which we can call ontological. Sartreʼs Being and Nothingness ought to be very helpful to an in-depth exploration of these. Although Sartreʼs book does not deal with imitation, it provides insights into important but overlooked aspects of this intriguing phenomenon. Following through with Sartreʼs arguments concerning being for-itself and being for-others in this book would offer a fundamental understanding of the imitative nature of human beings.In this paper, three explanations are presented, which are intended to illuminate the ontological aspects of imitation. First, the fact that our consciousness has the special feature of not being identical with itself (this is called for-itself), explains why we spontaneously imitate others. Second, the fact that being looked at by others can provide us with recognition of the dimension of ourselves as object (this dimension is called for-others), explains why we recognize others as models. Finally, that the gaze of others is a hole through which my world drains from my grasp, explains what aspect of the world we are focusing on in the act of imitating.I believe we can offer a firmer grounding for theoretical exploration of imitation than current experimental studies do in that we can provide arguments based on the specific features of consciousness, which are not available in these studies.
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1984, no.34, pp.87-106, 1984-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)
著者
大谷 弘
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.65, pp.135-150_L10, 2014

On the standard interpretation of the later Wittgenstein, it is supposed that he accepts the view that language is governed by rules. Many interpreters, explicitly or implicitly, think that Wittgenstein is committed to the view that the correct uses of words are determined by their rules.In my paper, I argue that the standard interpretation is incorrect as an interpretation of Wittgensteinʼs later thought on language and rules. First, in my view,Wittgensteinʼs position is that we explain the meaning of a word by rules, when it is necessary. However, when it is not necessary, we do not operate according to rules.Second, the standard interpretation ascribes to Wittgenstein a dogmatic philosophical method, which he in fact tries to avoid. On the standard interpretation, a rule for a word is supposed to be the source of normativity, so that, by citing the rules that Wittgenstein or Wittgensteinians identify, we can reject some philosophical assertions as nonsense. To think that only Wittgenstein or Wittgensteinians can identify the right rules in philosophical discussions is dogmatic, however, and by carefully surveying the text of Philosophical Investigations we can see that he avoids such dogmatism.In section 1 of my paper, I explain the standard interpretation. In section 2, I review the general points of Wittgensteinʼs discussion of rule-following and argue that the standard interpretation has a problem here. In section 3, I show that the Wittgensteinʼs texts cited by Glock, a prominent supporter of the standard interpretation, as the evidence for his interpretation do not support it. In section 4, by carefully investigating the remarks that concern rule-following in Philosophical Investigations, I argue that the standard interpretation misunderstands the method and aim of Wittgensteinʼs argument. Finally, in section 5, I argue that the standard interpretation has serious flaws as an interpretation of Wittgensteinʼs view of rules.
著者
柴田 健志
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.65, pp.197-211_L14, 2014

Recent scientific breakthroughs in the study of imitation at multiple levels evoke further problems such as "Why should we imitate each other?" and "Why should we recognize another person as a model of ourselves?" which we can call ontological. Sartreʼs Being and Nothingness ought to be very helpful to an in-depth exploration of these. Although Sartreʼs book does not deal with imitation, it provides insights into important but overlooked aspects of this intriguing phenomenon. Following through with Sartreʼs arguments concerning being for-itself and being for-others in this book would offer a fundamental understanding of the imitative nature of human beings.In this paper, three explanations are presented, which are intended to illuminate the ontological aspects of imitation. First, the fact that our consciousness has the special feature of not being identical with itself (this is called for-itself), explains why we spontaneously imitate others. Second, the fact that being looked at by others can provide us with recognition of the dimension of ourselves as object (this dimension is called for-others), explains why we recognize others as models. Finally, that the gaze of others is a hole through which my world drains from my grasp, explains what aspect of the world we are focusing on in the act of imitating.I believe we can offer a firmer grounding for theoretical exploration of imitation than current experimental studies do in that we can provide arguments based on the specific features of consciousness, which are not available in these studies.
著者
中村 香住
出版者
三田哲學會
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:05632099)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.138, pp.193-215, 2017-03

特集 : アートベース社会学へ#寄稿論文1. Introduction : The distance between feminist sociology and feminist art2. Affinity of arts-based research (ABR) for feminism 2.1. Two characters of ABR : Art as a medium, overlapping of the three phases of bodies 2.2. Feminist ethnography and its problems 2.3. Feminist ABR as the alternative of feminist ethnography3. Practices of feminist ABR 3.1. Proposition of feminist ABR and its trends in late years 3.2. Review of feminist ABR 3.2.1. Case 1 : ABR novel Low-Fat Love (Leavy 2011) 3.2.2. Case 2 : ABR project with homeless women in Victoria (Clover 2011)4. Potential of feminist ABR in Japan5. Conclusion