著者
望月 典子
出版者
三田哲學會
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:05632099)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.132, pp.255-280, 2014-03

特集 : 論集 美学・芸術学 : 美・芸術・感性をめぐる知のスパイラル(旋回)Nicolas Poussin, a French painter, was highly influential in the formation of French classicism in the arts. He spent most of his life in Rome, Italy, and from the 1640s, he produced works mainly aimed at amateurs in Paris. He left about 18 paintings focusing on the life of Moses as depicted in the Old Testament. Among these include The Finding of Moses, which he painted for the Parisian silk merchant Jean Pointel, and The Exposition of Moses, which he created for Jacques Stella, a French painter and old acquaintance. These works depict two episodes related to the birth of Moses as well as feature a sphinx as an attribute of the River God of the Nile. In these works, Poussin rendered two noticeably different types of sphinxes for each recipient. For Pointel, he concealed typological meanings in the Egyptian sphinx to embody prophesies from the Old Testament, whereas for Stella, he depicted the statue of a lion along with the statue of Moses in the fountain of the Acqua Felice( one of the aqueducts of Rome), in which he included syncretistic connotations while drawing on the works of Kircher. The relationship between providence of nature and fortune indicated in this particular work is a theme that Poussin dealt with through his so-called ideal landscape. Therefore, he sent this work to Stella, who understood his paintings more than anyone else, in order to receive critical appraisal.
著者
有馬 善一
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1994, no.44, pp.204-213,6, 1994-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

Dieser Aufsatz zielt darauf ab, am Leitfaden des Denken Heideggers das Problem des Begriffs der ursprünglichen Natur zu erörtern. Aus Heideggers Analyse der Welt läßt sich schließen, daß Natur dem alltäglichen oder naturwissenschaftlichen Weltentwurf nur bruckstücksweise begegnen kann und Natur »an sich« »außerhalb« der Welt bleibt. Aber das bedeutet keineswegs, daß die Realität so strukturiert ist, wie die Positivisten sie sich vorstellen, sondern, wie in seinem Denken der mittleren und späteren Phase gezeigt, daß die Erschlossenheit des einzelnen Seienden und die Verborgenheit des Seienden im ganzen miteinander verschlungen sind, und das von der Erfahrung des Nichts der Welt oder uon der»ψνσις« bei den antiken Griechen her zu verstehen ist.
著者
和泉 良久
出版者
The Philosophical Association of Japan
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
no.18, pp.36-56, 1968

In this paper we state several propositions concerning the infinite in Aristotle and some remarks relating to them.<BR>Preliminaries. (a) Usually περαç or απειρον is translated into limit or infinite respectively, but boundary or non-bounded seems more suitable. If we aim at exactness, we must define all notions such as finite, infinite, boundary and non-bounded in a set-theoretical sense. But in this paper we use these notions without such definitions. (b) The infinite is the privation of a boundary, and, according to the sense of privation, the law of the excluded middle holds between the infinite and the finite. The following propositions hold in Aristotle.<BR>Prop. 1. As the infinite exists potentially, it cannot exist actually and it cannot be a whole. So the whole of all natural numbers can-not exist.<BR>Prop. 2. As the finite exists actually and the infinite exists potentially, the former is prior to the latter. In other words, the finite and the infinite are not coordinate with respect to rank of being.<BR>Prop. 3. The continuous can be divided ad infinitum, and in this sense it contains the infinite in itself. On the other hand, the infinite surpasses the finite, and in this sense the former contains the latter in itself. Consequently, the inifinite is between the finite and the continuous.<BR>Prop. 4. The infinite can be generated in the movement, and, according to the sense of generation, the infinite is between being and non-being.<BR>Remark 1. Georg Cantor defined a set as jede Zusammenfassung M von bestimmten wohlunterschiedenen Objekten m unsrer Anschauung oder unseres Denkens welche die Elemente von M genannt werden zu einem Ganzen. If we interpret das Ganze of Cantor as a whole of Aristotle, a paradox will arise in set theory. For, while a whole must be finite or bounded, an infinite or non-bounded set, for example, a set of all natural numbers exists in set theory.<BR>Remark 2. In virtue of propositions 1 and 2, Aristotle differs from a finite standpoint, which is represented by D. Hilbert and G. Gentzenin the foundations of mathematics, and which allows the use of transfinite induction.
著者
飯塚 勝久
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1965, no.15, pp.198-206, 1965-03-31 (Released:2010-05-07)
参考文献数
30

The “Body” has been mainly discussed as a problem of its relation to soul. In Descartes' dualism it was entirely identified with the physical thing and was opposed to soul. For this reason the problem of connection of those two entities was succeeded by the hypothesis of psychophysical parallelism. Bergson, however, pointed out that the hypothesis was derived from the principles of the mechanical view of nature. He severely criticized Cartesianism from his own standpoint and introduced the idea of “pure perception” into his treatise concerning the connection of mind with matter, but could not necessarily shake himself free from the cognitive viewpoint. It is existentialism that dealt with body in the pre-reflective dimension of being. In fact, it argued body not as an object of epistemology, but as our existence itself. And thus, the conclusion of this paper is this : existentialism has made an epoch in the history of the problem of body.
著者
西川 耕平
出版者
三田哲學會
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:05632099)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.133, pp.57-80, 2014-03

投稿論文Dans cet article, nous examinons les dénonciations et les démystifications chez Deleuze. En étudiant Lucrèce, Spinoza et Nietzsche, Deleuze dénonce le trouble de l'âme, la tristesse, le ressentiment et la mauvaise conscience qui nous séparent de ce que nous pouvons. Bien plus, ces concepts sont toujours rapportés aux mystifications etillusions; selon lui, la tâche pratique de la philosophie consiste donc à démystifier. Dans son étude de Lucrèce, il montre comment les simulacres entraînent les phantasmes et les mythes qui sont la source du malheur de l'homme; dans celle de Spinoza, il dénonce la superstition derivée du signe moral et tente de libérer l'homme de la servitude; dans celle de Nietzsche, il analyse la fiction et la mystification qui font triompher les forces réactives, rendant possible la formation d'hommes vraiment libres. Nous pouvons alors entrevoir la raison pour laquelle Deleuze introduit une distinction entre l'éthique et la morale, ainsi que le but qu'il vise: aller jusqu'au bout de ce que nous pouvons.
著者
関口 浩喜
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1996, no.47, pp.256-265, 1996-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

Although Wittgenstein insists on the importance of the notion of a perspicuous representation (übersichtliche Darstellung) in his Philosophical Investigations (section 122), this notion has scarecely been clarified by Wittgenstein scholars. The aim of my paper is to throw light on this notion. A clue is found in the sections 90-92 of Philosophical Investigations, where Wittgenstein explains the aim of his invesitigations by contrasting them with the investigations which aim at exact representaions of the use of our words. Another clue is found in his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, where Wittgenstein says that changing notation of a proof-pattern that is not perspicuous into one that is perspicuous changes our way of looking at it. From these clues I try to show that the opening sections of Investigations (i. e. a famous example of five-red-apples and a primitive language-game of section 2) should be seen as a typical place where Wittgenstein uses a perspicuous representation as the method of his philosophy.
著者
田村 圭一
出版者
北海道大学哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:02872560)
巻号頁・発行日
no.39, pp.1-18, 2003
著者
安彦 一恵
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1999, no.50, pp.61-73, 1999-05-01 (Released:2010-05-07)

或る〈状況〉にあるとき人は何をなすべきか。この問いに答えて行為するのが「道徳」であるとして、それは、その〈状況〉の《価値》的様相に応じて行為するという現象であるとも、あるいは、その〈状況〉に関する《規範》に従って行為するという現象であるとも敷衍できる。しかし、そこでさらに、「道徳」の現象に反省的に、そうした行為はそのまま妥当なものかと問うなら、一つの方向として、そこに《合理性》があるなら妥当であると次には言うことができる。「道徳哲学」-ないしは「倫理学」-とは、一つの、しかし最も基本的なかたちとして、「道徳」の合理性を問うものであるとも言える。そこには、「道徳」の正当化として、自ら合理性の証示を行なうものに加えて、そうした合理性の証示は不可能だと論証するものも含まれる。こうした作業は、それとして重要だと考えるが、しかしながら我々はここでは、言われるところの「合理性」が果たして一義的な概念であるのかとの疑問のもとで、基本的に異なる二つの「合理性」観念が「道徳哲学」において支配しているということを、その背景をなすものから明らかにしたい。そしてそれは、実はこの〈合理性〉観念の相違こそが、相互対立を含んで様々な「道徳哲学」を展開させているのだと我々はみているからである。
著者
浅野 光紀
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2006, no.57, pp.113-124,6, 2006-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

Practical reasoning is deliberation about what to do. In order to figure out the best thing for her to do, the agent weighs both the reasons for and against a particular course of action and finally forms the judgment: "All things considered, I should do x". In cases of akrasia, however, the agent curiously fails to abide by this best judgment. She freely and intentionally does something that she knows well, at the time of action, to be worse than the best alternative. What is the meaning of this irrational, self-destructive action? How can it be even possible?The chief aim of this paper is to explain how we can act freely against our best judgment, but this task will also lead us to see the significance of akrasia for the contemporary philosophy of action. The significance of akrasia, I shall argue, lies in the fact that it reveals the other crucial determinants of our actions than practical reasoning, the importance of which has not yet been fully recognized and emphasized in the philosophy of action.
著者
相澤 康隆
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2009, no.60, pp.121-135_L8, 2009 (Released:2010-11-09)
参考文献数
19

In Book 7 of his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle explains how a man can do what he knows to be wrong. Traditionally, Aristotle's account of akrasia is interpreted in this way: when someone acts from weakness of will, he doesn't know that what he does is wrong and that he should not do it. For example, when a diabetic eats something sweet because of his appetite, he doesn't know that he should not eat it.However, some objections have been made against this traditional interpretation. First, Aristotle seems to think that some akratic people know they should not do such and such (1150b19-22). If he thinks this, the traditional interpretation contradicts his text because on that interpretation an akratic person doesn't know he should not do such and such. Second, on the traditional interpretation there can be no conflict of motives. If an akratic person doesn't know he should not do such and such, he has no conflict between reason and appetite. However, it is quite clear to us that when we act from weakness of will, we have a conflict of motives.These objections can be answered by making few modifications to the traditional interpretation. It is true that an akratic person doesn't know at the time of his act that he should not do such and such. However, he knows it before he acts. If the traditional interpretation is modified in this way, the above objections can be answered. First, in 1150b19-22 Aristotle thinks some akratic people know before they act that they should not do such and such. Second, an akratic person does have a conflict of motives before he acts. He does have a conflict between reason and appetite before he acts, though at the time of his act he no longer has it.Making these modifications to the traditional interpretation, we can interpret Aristotle's account of akrasia consistently.
著者
金杉 武司
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2012, no.63, pp.201-216_L11, 2012 (Released:2012-10-16)
参考文献数
9

It is generally thought that the motivation for an action can be explained in terms of a desire (or evaluative judgment) and a belief. It is not clear, however, what kind of explanation is the explanation of the motivation for an action. This paper takes up and considers the validity of two answers to this question from different perspectives: the causal theory of action and the anti-causal theory of action. Construing practical reasoning as a simple practical syllogism, Donald Davidson argues that the motivation for an action can not be fully explained by the rationality of practical reasoning and needs to be explained by the causal relation between a beliefdesire pair and an action (the causal theory of action). Practical reasoning, however, can not be construed as a simple practical syllogism. An agent should be construed to start with a prima facie judgment about the desirability of an action and to work to reach an all-things-considered (ATC) judgment before reaching a conclusion in practical reasoning. Under such a construal, Davidson's argument that the rationality of practical reasoning can not fully explain the motivation for an action loses its validity (the anti-causal theory of action). It appears prima facie, however, that the causal theory of action is required for explaining the motivation for an akratic action. An akratic action is a free action that is contrary to an ATC judgment about the most desirable action reached at the time of performing it, and it is thus generally considered that the motivation for an akratic action is not determined by practical rationality. Rather, it is more plausibly determined by causal powers of individual desires (or evaluative judgments). Under the causal theory of action, however, an akratic action can not be construed as a free action since, under the theory, an akratic agent is a passive being who is at the mercy of the causal power of desires and hence does not have autonomy in the sense of a capacity to determine his/her motivation voluntarily, which is required for a free action. In order for an akratic action to qualify as a free action, it must be an action that is contrary to a comprehensive ATC judgment and, at the same time, arises because of a cognitive-condition-bound ATC judgment in favour of it. Furthermore, the motivation of an action, in general, must be explained by a practical rationality that includes cognitive-condition-bound ATC judgments (the anti-causal theory of action).
著者
宮坂 清
出版者
三田哲學會
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:05632099)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.128, pp.285-312, 2012-03

特集 : 社会学 社会心理学 文化人類学投稿論文This paper deals with the relationship between tourism and agriculture by case studies of migrants to Minami-Izu. In Anthropology of tourism, there has been less studies of domestic migration from urban to country area in Japan though there are many cases.Minami-Izu, Shizuoka prefecture have been known as a major tourist site from 1960s which is represented as warm and rich nature by the mass media and tourist agencies. The local farmers who had been almost self-suffcient in food also entered into tourism by running direct sales shop or pick-your-own farm shop. Though they are declining these days, it is remarkable that the local community encourages migration from urban areas and engagement in agriculture. The Community attracts people by ways such as creating youth employment, researching development of organic farming and networking farmers, or mediating urban market and local farmers.There are migrant farmers in Minami-Izu, who share value of sustainable farming which is characterlized by organic without agricultural chemicals and rooted in local nature and community. They seem to enjoy life there despite many adverse conditions as they see the value worthwhile. To locate domestic migration from urban to country area in the study of tourism, the dualistic frame of urban and country should be treated as more fluid and interactive by mediaters of locals and migrants.