著者
萬屋 博喜
出版者
広島工業大学
雑誌
広島工業大学紀要. 研究編 (ISSN:13469975)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, pp.223-228, 2019-02

In this paper, I examine the problem of the absent agent which is a kind of challenge to the causal theory of action. First, I explain the causal theory of action and the problem of the absent agent. Then, I examine two strategies capable of solving that problem, and draw some morals from the debate between Michael Smith and Jennifer Hornsby. Finally, I suggest that we need to understand the nature of causation and the ownership of agency to evaluate the causal theory of action.
著者
萬屋 博喜
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2012, no.63, pp.297-311_L16, 2012 (Released:2012-10-16)
参考文献数
20

In this paper I examine Hume's theory of meaning and abstraction. Although his doctrine of abstraction relies on his theory of meaning, his own conception of meaning is not necessarily the so-called “idea theory of meaning”, which supports the possibility of private language. On the contrary, he tries to defend a sort of use theory of meaning: the meaning of abstract terms must consist in our custom or disposition to use them in society and conversation. This idea is derived from his concept of ability, which depends on his conception of the resemblance and the uniformity of nature. The aim of this paper is to show that we can interpret Hume's view of meaning as a use theory of meaning. To begin with, I criticize the traditional interpretation of Hume's theory of abstraction, which faces a substantial difficulty concerning the possibility of communication. Then, I clarify that he proposes in his Treatise the following two doctrines of abstraction: (1) two sorts of resemblance and (2) the principle of the uniformity of nature. These enable us to understand language by appealing to the ability to generalize the use of our abstract terms. Finally, I show that his theory of meaning does not only offer us a criterion for the correct use of abstract terms, but also a defensible foundation of communication.
著者
木村 正人 野矢 茂樹 早川 正祐 竹内 聖一 吉川 孝 古田 徹也 池田 喬 河島 一郎 星川 道人 島村 修平 筒井 晴香 八重樫 徹 萬屋 博喜
出版者
高千穂大学
雑誌
基盤研究(C)
巻号頁・発行日
2009

分析哲学者を中心に昨今注目を集めている共同行為論の諸理論について紹介・検討し、さらに現象学、社会学理論等による知見を加えて、共同行為の構成要件、共同行為特有の意図性の諸原理、還元主義アプローチの当否、共同行為論における因果的解釈の射程などについて明らかにした。若手研究者を中心として組織された「行為論研究会」は学問分野を越える各学会等で注目を集め、一般公開の研究大会において報告されたその成果は、雑誌『行為論研究』にまとめられた。
著者
早川 正祐 竹内 聖一 古田 徹也 吉川 孝 八重樫 徹 木村 正人 川瀬 和也 池田 喬 筒井 晴香 萬屋 博喜 島村 修平 鈴木 雄大
出版者
東京大学
雑誌
基盤研究(C)
巻号頁・発行日
2015-04-01

本研究は、従来の行為者理論において見落とされてきた、人間の「脆弱性」(vulnerability)に着目することにより、自発的な制御を基調とする主流の行為者 概念を、より相互依存的・状況依存的なものとして捉え直すことを目的としてきた。その際、行為論・倫理学・現象学・社会学の研究者が、各分野の特性を活か しつつ領域を横断した対話を行った。この学際的研究により、個別領域にとどまらない理論的な知見を深め、行為者概念について多層的かつ多角的な解明を進めることができた。

1 0 0 0 OA 証言と徳

著者
萬屋 博喜
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2017, no.68, pp.231-245, 2017-04-01 (Released:2017-06-28)
参考文献数
15

Among contemporary epistemologists of testimony, David Hume is typically taken to be a reductionist, that is, one who asserts that the justification of one’s testimonial beliefs must depend on non-testimonial evidence. In his first Enquiry (“Of Miracles”), according to the standard interpretation of Hume on testimony, he expresses the view that testimony, unlike perception or memory, is not a fundamental source of epistemic justification. Recently, however, this interpretation has been challenged by many scholars who argue that Hume, as a reductionist, would not even attempt to justify testimonial beliefs by appealing to the evidence of ordinary empirical beliefs. But, in his Treatise and first Enquiry, Hume suggests that, in spite of the reductionism, we can still use our evidence of human nature to justify our testimonial beliefs. This leads us to another interpretation of Hume’s reductionism on testimony.The purpose of this paper is to show that, we can construe Hume, consistently with reductionism, as a sort of virtue epistemologist, and that the standard interpretation of Hume on testimony is inaccurate. To begin with, I examine C. A. J. Coady’s interpretation which formulates Hume’s reductionist thesis and provides some objections to Hume. Then, I discuss the virtue-epistemological interpretation, by S. Wright, of Hume on testimony. In responding to Coady’s objections, she attempts to show that Hume scholars can learn much from the insights of virtue epistemology. According to her, our interactions with others, combined with the evidence of human nature, give us an insight into the testifier’s virtues. Although her interpretation seems to be attractive, there is still a problem of the hearer which needs to be solved. Finally, I conclude that, taking into account both the testifier’s and the hearer’s virtues, we can adequately defend the virtue-epistemological interpretation of Hume on testimony.