著者

佐藤 岳詩

出版者

北海道大学哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:02872560)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, pp.213-229, 2008-02-29

著者

廣松 渉

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1975, no.25, pp.71-85, 1975-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

渋谷 克美

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1991, no.41, pp.90-101, 1991-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

小手川 正太郎

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.65, pp.167-181, 2014-04-01 (Released:2016-06-30)

参考文献数

10

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Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) est souvent qualifié de penseur de lʼAutre, qui entend libérer «lʼabsolument autre» de la domination du Même dans la philosophie occidentale. Cette interprétation, établie par Jacques Derrida dans son article «Violence et Métaphysique. Essai sur la pensée dʼEmmanuel Levinas» (1964), est si dominante que certains partisans de Levinas la suivent à leur insu en reprochant à Levinas de ne voir lʼAutre quʼen autrui en tant que lʼhumain. Contre cette interprétation, la présente étude propose une autre lecture à lʼaide de la distinction décisive entre «autrui» et «lʼAutre» dans la philosophie de Levinas.Après avoir présenté la lecture derridienne de Levinas et en avoir montré la problématique, nous nous demanderons dʼabord si Levinas établit bien cette distinction dans Totalité et Infini (1961). Ensuite, nous montrerons que lʼordre de lʼargumentation dans la 3ème section de cet ouvrage sʼoppose diamétralement à la lecture derridienne qui va de lʼAutre à autrui. En effet, ce que Levinas nous montre,cʼest quʼon ne peut traiter de lʼAutre quʼà partir de lʼanalyse de notre rapport avec autrui. Pour Levinas, «lʼAutre» signifie, plutôt que lʼaltérité comme telle, une instance dʼautrui qui met en question le moi dʼune manière non-violente. En nous fondant sur cette lecture, nous allons tenter enfin dʼinterpréter la 1ère section de Totalité et Infini qui commence par parler de lʼAutre et qui nous semble inciter des lecteurs, tel Derrida, à comprendre Levinas comme penseur de lʼAutre.

著者

岡田 光弘

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1987, no.37, pp.210-221, 1987-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

中村 博雄

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1986, no.36, pp.152-162, 1986-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

田村 均

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.61, pp.261-276_L16, 2010 (Released:2011-01-18)

参考文献数

19

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A self-sacrificial action is not consistent with rational decision-making. If an agent decides to take the rational course of action, that is, the best action among the options, the decision is not truly self-sacrificial. The agent has sought the best option and, therefore, nothing is really sacrificed. We need, then, a scheme other than that of rational decision making to explain self-sacrifice. I propose a theory which explains a self-sacrificial action as a kind of play-acting. In a play, an actor may take a role that is undesirable in real life. In a social situation involving self-sacrifice, the agent must accept such a course of action as undesirable but inevitable for anyone in the same situation. In a sense, the agent is coerced into playing an undesirable role. We cannot but see the agent as accepting it as an actor would. In instances of sacrifice, such as the sacrificial rite of the Ainu Bear Festival (IYOMANTE) or the legend of Iphigenia at Aulis, there is a traditional, social scenario that prescribes proper action. The self-sacrificial agent accepts such action in the same way that an actor accepts an unattractive role. The agent will intentionally perform the action; however, this is only in response to the prescription of the scenario. In other words, it is not based on an authentic decision, but on a play-acting decision. In this way, we can explain an act of self-sacrifice that implies a moral split for the agent. Contemporary theories of action, such as G. E. M. Anscombe's intellectualist theory or Donald Davidson's voluntarist-like theory, take it for granted that in any situation an agent is an integrated person with no moral split in principle. Moral splits, or dilemmas, are not, however, rare in everyday life. I put forward the play-acting theory of action as an alternative to contemporary theories.

著者

野本 和幸

出版者

北海道大学哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:02872560)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, pp.1-28, 2004-07-18

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Firstly I sketch Frege's personal history, his academic career and his publications briefly, and secondly I try to give a general outline of the structural and methodological characteristics of his investigations as a whole. One can divide Frege's logico-philosophical investigations into the three parts as follows: (A) The invention of contemporary logic, its axiomatic systematization and the development of the logicist philosophy of arithmetic. (B) Philosophy of logic. (C) Controversies with his contemporary distinguished scholars concerning psychologism, empiricism, physicalism, formalism, etc., though I do not take them up this time. Concerning (A), firstly I try to explain why Frege must constitute the higher order logic through formulating his formal language (Begriffsschrift) for the accomplishment of his logicist project. Secondly I take note of his theory of judgment/ assertion and inference, and point out its two distinctive features, i.e., (1) his priority thesis of judgment, and (2) his epistemological characterization of judgment and inference. For Frege, a judgment is the recognition of the truth (als wahr anerkennen) of the thought-content and assertion is the manifestation of a judgment with assertoric force,while an inference is the justification (Berechtigung) of the correctness of the conclusion based on its true premises. Thirdly, Frege's claim of the primacy of the sentence or the context principle, and the composition principle are Frege's methodological guiding principles of his syntactic and semantic considerations as a whole. Concerning (B): his philosophy of logic, (1) Frege will neither approve the justifiability of primitive logical laws nor definability of primitive logical terms within his Begriffsschrift. (2) In fact, Frege does not introduce distinctive model theoretic ideas such as variant domains or quantification along with domain fixing. However, Frege explicitly provides lots of semantical 'explanations (Erklärung/Darlegung)' in his ‘explanatory language (Darlegungssprache)' as metalanguage distinguished from his object language (Begriffsschrift as ‘Hilfssprache'). For example, in his main work: GGA, Frege tries to give the proofs of the meaningfulness of his primitive logical symbols, truthfulness of axioms, and the truth-preserving nature of inference-rules. (3) Frege gives further metalinguistic explanations as propedeutic concerning the basic ‘logical forms' such as‘fall-under (subsumption)' and his logical categories: objects versus concepts/functions, and his semantic distinction of sense (Sinn) and Meaning (Bedeutung). In such explanations there might be a certain anticipation of Wittgensteinian idea of ‘saying' and ‘showing'. Furthermore Frege provides meta-meta-linguistic elucidations or suggestions resorting to vivid metaphors concerning his fundamental categories of proper names versus function-signs/concept-words,o r objects versus functions/concepts, the distinction of Begriffsschrft from ordinary language, and the relationship of representation, sense and Meaning, etc. Really Frege is not only the most revolutionary logician since Aristotle, but also a distinguished man of metaphor.

著者

小沢 明也

出版者

北海道大学哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:02872560)

巻号頁・発行日

no.38, pp.149-154, 2002

著者

西脇 与作

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1988, no.38, pp.24-43, 1988-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

川瀬 和也

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.68, pp.109-123, 2017-04-01 (Released:2017-06-14)

参考文献数

6

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The “Idea” is, according to Hegel, the unity of the subject and object. However, as often in Hegel, his explanation of the role of the “Idea” is extraordinarily dense, and it is hard to understand what he means. In this paper, I will attempt to reveal the meaning of Hegel’s “absolute Idea” by focusing on his notion of dialectic and his favorite analogy of the circle.Robert B. Pippin argues that Hegel’s logic is the completion of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, and therefore, a kind of epistemology in itself. James Kreines, however, criticized this view in his recent book. Hegel, says Kreines, criticizes any attempt to start with the assessment of our epistemic faculties; so according to him, Pippin’s interpretation cannot be valid. I take Kreines’ critique seriously. Hegel cannot begin his philosophical system with an epistemological argument.However, it is also incorrect to start with a metaphysical argument. If we read Hegel’s argument on dialectic carefully, we can see that it is impossible for him to start with either epistemology or metaphysics. Rather, we must not fixate on where to start.Prohibiting this fixation, in Hegel’s view, shows us how to solve the problem of the gap between subject and object. And it is because of this insight, I believe, that Hegel emphasizes the analogy of the circle when he argues for a genuine method of philosophy.

著者

水野 浩二

出版者

北海道大学哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:02872560)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, pp.1-17, 2002-07-21

著者

石田 京子

出版者

三田哲學會

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.134, pp.149-170, 2015-03

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特集 : 西脇与作君・樽井正義君退職記念寄稿論文Diese Abhandlung betrachtet Kants Unterscheidung zwischen Moral und Recht vom Standpunkt der zwei fundamentalen Begriffe der Kantischen praktischen Philosophie, i.e., der Gesetzgebung und der Freiheit, aus, um das Verhältnis des Rechts zum kategorischen Imperativ zu erläutern. Grundsätzlich stimme ich dem Gedanken zu, es gebe einen negativen und einen positiven Begriff der äußeren(rechtlichen)Freiheit. Ein negativer Begriff der äußeren Freiheit kann als die Unabhängigkeit von der Nötigung durch andere Personen verstanden werden, während ein positiver als die Freiheit der rechtlichen Vernunft aufgefasst wird. Um diesen Gedanken zu bestätigen, weise ich zuerst darauf hin, dass die Selbstgesetzgebung der praktischen Vernunft in der Grundlegung nicht als identisch mit der ethischen Gesetzgebung in der Tugendlehre betrachtet werden kann. Die Selbstgesetzgebung in der Grundlegung ist die Selbstgesetzgebung überhaupt, welche sowohl der rechtlichen als auch der ethischen Gesetzgebung zugrunde liegt. Dann erwäge ich, was ein positiver Begriff der äußeren Freiheit ist und wie die Selbstgesetzgebung in Bezug auf das Recht möglich ist. Nach der Einleitung in die Tugendlehre kann man das höchste Prinzip der Rechtslehre für den kategorischen Imparativ an sich halten, welcher die Verallgemeinerbarkeit der Maximen fordert. Aber das höchste Prinzip der Rechtslehre bezieht sich lediglich auf die Maximen der äußeren Freiheit, die anderen Personen eine Handlung vorschreibt. In diesem Aspekt kann man in Kants Rechtslehre seine Idee der Autonomie finden. Dieser Gedanke hat mit dem Dilemma von Gemeinschaft und Freiheit zu tun. Zwar können wir keine Gemeinschaft mit anderen Personen bilden, wenn wir nicht unser gegenseitigen Verhältnis bestimmen. Aber wenn andere Personen bestimmen, was ich tun soll, wird mir die Freiheit entzogen. Kants Entwurf ist das einzige Konzept, das die Kompatibilität von Gemeinschaft und Freiheit möglich macht.

著者

新田 孝彦

出版者

北海道大学哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:02872560)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, pp.155-162, 2002-07-21

著者

有安 和人

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.51, pp.190-199, 2000-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

13

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Plusieurs philosophes naturels du dix-septième siècle ont souligné l'importance des mathématiques pour la méthode.Ils se sont opposés au contenu de la physique aristotélicienne, mais avaient les activités scientifiques dans le même cadre que l'aristotélicien, c'est-à-dire la même conception de la science.Mon propos est d'analyser cette philosophie naturelle sous le rapport de la conception de la science.

著者

神崎 繁

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.60, pp.51-66_L5, 2009 (Released:2010-11-09)

参考文献数

27

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The theme of our discussion ‘Reality and Virtual Reality’ seems, if we take it in antagonistic sense, somewhat awkward at this day. For in many occasions of everyday life such as playing with interactive game soft, testing by simulations for driving skills check, or using MRI images for medical diagnoses, ‘Virtual Reality’ is already partially built in our ‘Reality’. But the dark side of this kind of thing is also becoming conspicuous. An animation TV program named ‘Pokemon’ made children be in panic and paralyzed by rapid movements and too much strong stimulations of their images. But we are eventually caught by a suspicion that Reality does not partially consists of Virtual Reality but amounts to Virtual Reality itself. Such an empty feeling of Reality from which we are distanced has a philosophical background.I spell this out by scrutinizing three points or, shall I say, pitfalls (1) an active power of human mind which works on the dead nature, (2) mechanization of human body as a part of such nature, (3) internality of human thought which is insulated from environmental world and only by representations can keep contact with it.And in trying to show a way out from these pitfalls, I also explore some traces of prisoners of the cave in Plato's Republic in Descartes' body-machines as well as in cybernauts put on head-mounted-display.

著者

納富 信留

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.58, pp.25-43,17, 2007-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

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When Nishi Amane introduced Western civilisation into Japan in the mid 19th century, he observed that its essence lies in "philosophy", especially in its Greek origin. I examine therefore the original meaning of "philosophia" in ancient Greece in order to reconsider the possibility of philosophy in modern Japan.First, "philosaphos" as form of a human life is contrasted with the modern concept of "philosophy" as an academic discipline. Asking what a philosopher is inevitably raises a serious question about one's own life, whereas modern philosophy ignores this ethical dimension of "philosophy". Second, Greek thinkers experimented a variety of styles-prose, verse, aphorism, dialogue, speech, and treatise-through which a possibility of doing philosophy was pursued. The conflict between these styles developed philosophical thinking and eventually established universality. Third, Greek philosophy laid the basis for sciences by systematizing the entire area of knowledge. It also founded academic institutions-Academy and Lyceum-to pursue shared research in philosophy and sciences in a free intellectual space. This started the tradition of Western philosophy.Considering these aspects, I suggest that philosophy be reconsidered in our modern society as realisation of a human life. In particular, the concepts of "wisdom" (sophia), "universality", and "soul" (psyche) should be examined in light of Greek philosophy, to which we need to return as a mirror that sheds a new light on our own philosophy.

著者

石田 柊

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.73, pp.119-133, 2022-04-01 (Released:2022-07-21)

参考文献数

31

著者

板橋 勇仁

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.73, pp.52-65, 2022-04-01 (Released:2022-07-21)

参考文献数

8

著者

児玉 聡

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2023, no.74, pp.22-30, 2023-04-01 (Released:2023-06-28)