著者

永井 均

出版者

三田哲學會

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

no.69, pp.p23-42, 1979-03

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La plupart de la presente etude s'occupe de commenter la critique de Husserl par J. Derrida selon son livre La Voix et Le Phenomene qui porte sur Logische Untersuchungen. J'y suis a peu pres d'accord avec lui, cependant, il me semble que, au sens contraire de Husserl, son point de vue est aussi transcendantal, et que, en effet, la voix qui est une de ses figures critiques eventuellement passe par le monde, comme chez Merleau-Ponty. Je ne serai pas d'accord avec lui aux dernieres pages de cette etude parce que je pense que l'ego transcendantal a ete mort avant de se faire tuer par la signification; celui-ci ne me semble pas constituer le sens et la validite du monde, mais il en est la matiere ou la substance. La conception du sujet constituant chez Husserl, qui a pris modele sur le sujet mondain, est par essence metaphorique. Si l'on voulait faire une distinction entre l'ego mondain et le trancendantal, il faudrait considerer celui-ci comme ce qui n'est pas vivant; alors, on pourait dire: je suis mort done je suis.

著者

宮崎 裕助

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.57, pp.240-253, 2006-04

著者

酒井 健太朗

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.70, pp.205-219, 2019-04-01 (Released:2019-04-18)

参考文献数

11

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Aristotle’s APo. claims that scientific knowledge requires a cause serving as the middle term in the demonstration. APo. II 11 considers how the well-known “four causes” should be understood in the theory of demonstration. What is key is the relation of the final cause to the other three causes. This paper discusses how the theory of demonstration handles these causes by considering their status and interrelation. Aristotle examines the four causes from the perspective of the major and minor terms in a demonstration. The grounding cause states the essence of the minor term, and the essential and efficient causes state the essence of the major term. However, there are difficulties in considering the final cause. For, in the example of being healthy, illustrating the final cause involves two demonstrations. In the first demonstration, the middle term (food not staying on the surface) explains the essence of the major term (being healthy). In the second demonstration, however, the middle term (being healthy) does not explain the essence of the major term (food not staying on the surface) or the minor term (walking after dinner). In order to answer this problem, we have to mention two points: First, the final cause appears last in generation but arises first as the initial point of the explanation; secondly, the final cause explains the processes to the end as for the end. By considering these facts, I show that the second demonstration explains the major term and the minor term by the middle term from the viewpoint of temporal order that the first demonstration establishes. This paper argues that APo. II 11 divides the four causes into the final cause and the other three causes and claims that the second demonstration includes “hypothetical necessity”. Consequently, this paper shows that Aristotle aims to exclude chance from a demonstration having the final cause as the middle term by introducing hypothetical necessity.

著者

Gergely Mohacsi 森田 敦郎

出版者

三田哲學會

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.125, pp.263-284, 2011-03

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特集 : 人間科学投稿論文科学技術が日常生活にますます浸透しつつある現代世界において, 多様な見方を同時に生きることは, 当たり前だといえる. その結果民族学の基本的な手法とされてきた. 「比較」は, 客観性を思考する人類学者が俯瞰的に対象を眺める視点に属するのではなく, 移動し, 差異を認め, そこから知識を生み出そうとする人々が行う実践の中の一要素となってきた. 本稿が焦点を当てるのは, こうしたグローバル化する科学技術に従う比較の氾濫である. 一方, 日常的に生きられる比較のあり方を, 多様な事例研究を踏まえて描き出すことで, いわゆるポストプルーラルの世界を把握しようとする. さらにこれを, エンジニアリングと医療という「日々の通約」の二つの事例をとおして, 人類学者のフィ ルドワークにおける比較と併置し 存在論的な展開を図るための方法論を提案する. Anthropologists, in the field, work to recognize differences through continuously contrasting their findings with the cultural and other kinds of knowledge they bring from home or elsewhere. They keep comparing in order to make sense of the links between the particular and the general. On the other hand and this has been studied less thoroughly so far , such comparative work is also part and parcel of the very practices under study in anthropology. It is this implicit interplay between different scales of comparison that we want to reflect upon in this article. Through two short case studies of engineering in Thai and medical technologies in general we argue that the increasing mobility of scientific ideas and technological innovations is generated by practices that accumulate comparisons and contrasts on many levels. This will lead us to challenge ethnographic methodology from the vantage point of a post-plural understanding of the world.

著者

神島 裕子

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.69, pp.21-31, 2018-04-01 (Released:2018-08-01)

参考文献数

8

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This paper examines the problem of harassments in higher education from the perspective of Iris Marion Young’s social connection model of responsibility and suggests the problem as results of structural injustice. The first section reviews Young’s model of responsibility and sheds light on three features: (1) it imposes responsibility on all actors involved in structure that produces unjust outcome, (2) it sees responsibility as forward-looking and imposes this responsibility on all actors as shared responsibility, and (3) all actors are demanded to engage in collective actions to make unjust structures less unjust. The second section applies Young’s model of responsibility to sexual harassments in higher education institutions. A hypothetical character of a female university lecturer is employed to show how in a gendered sexist society sexual harassments could occur in university setting where no single actor can be blamed for the unjust result. The third section points out one problematic feature of Young’s model of responsibility. Young’s idea of shared responsibility is useful to set the problem of sexual harassments as our collective problem, but it gives insufficient attention to capabilities of victims of unjust structures. The forth section discusses the question of capability to responsibility. Although Young suggests that victims share responsibility at least to criticize unjust structure, they generally lack capabilities to do so due to the gendered sexist society. On the other hand, Young denies the idea of blaming non-victims, even when they have capabilities to reproduce such structures, for the sake of cooperative motivations. This paper argues that Young’s model should take capabilities of victims into account so that it does not allow a counter-argument that “no voices raised, no harassment done”, while admitting that in certain cases we cannot practically blame non-victims of unjust structure. The fifth section suggests a sort of “self-investigating research project” as part of taking shared responsibility where individual actors take turns to reflect upon one’s own positions and actions and then present one’s report to others in meetings. This project seems fit into the university setting as a way for sharing responsibility for achieving justice.

著者

高橋 晃一

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.71, pp.96-106, 2020-04-01 (Released:2020-05-12)

参考文献数

11

著者

納富 信留

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.68, pp.45-62, 2017-04-01 (Released:2017-06-14)

参考文献数

1

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In the first part of this paper, in order to reconsider the significance of the history of philosophy, I examine its relationship with philosophy in three respects. First, the history of philosophy aims to examine the beginning (archē) of philosophy. By revealing its beginnings (not only in ancient Greece), we can start to engage in a new philosophy. Second, the history provides us with philosophical texts that encourage our thinking. We find there rich resources of reasoning and ideas on philosophical issues. Third, this history shows us our own position in two ways. It presents a set of philosophical concepts, problems and frameworks that we inherit from past philosophers. Also, an examination of this heritage reveals our own position within philosophy.In the second part, I critically survey the various candidates for “first philosopher” in ancient Greece. Each thinker, from Thales to Plato, has supporters and good justification for being considered the first. Then, in the third part, I propose a new perspective, “compound eye history”, in which we investigate plural lines of thinking. Each distinct line started from a new problem raised by a philosopher and developed through critical or positive responses by his contemporaries or later thinkers. I envisage 10 “plots” or lines of ancient philosophy by which we can conceptualise that whole intellectual activity of human life and wisdom.

著者

関谷 直也

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.73, pp.37-47, 2022-04-01 (Released:2022-07-21)

参考文献数

21

著者

鴻 浩介

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.68, pp.169-184, 2017-04-01 (Released:2017-06-14)

参考文献数

16

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According to G. E. M. Anscombe’s proposal, agents have a special way of knowing about their own intentional actions - they have the capacity to know what they are intentionally doing without relying on any evidence from observation, inference and so on. Anscombe dubbed this special knowledge “practical knowledge” and took it to be an essential mark of agency. This article attempts an explanation and vindication of this Anscombean approach to agency.The discussion falls into four sections. In the first section, I clarify the nature of Anscombe’s practical knowledge and argue that the principal task for us is to spell out how one can be justified in believing not just what one intends, but what one is intentionally doing without any evidence. In Section II, I discuss what is generally considered to be the most promising way of dealing with this task: the reliabilism strategy. On this view, practical knowledge is justified because there is a reliable efficient-causal link between an agent’s intention to φ and his/her actually doing φ. I am willing to accept the reliabilism strategy as being basically on the right track. However, in Section III, I argue that the reliabilism strategy overlooks an important element of Anscombe’s discussion, namely that practical knowledge is the “formal cause” of what it understands, i.e., intentional actions. With this observation in place, we can give an even more comprehensive account of the nature of practical knowledge. In Section IV, I close with a suggestion that the structure of practical knowledge so understood is surprisingly similar to the structure of the knowledge that makers of artifacts are said to have, and this similarity can support the claim that practical knowledge is knowledge about an objective, public world.

著者

松本 俊吉

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.55, pp.90-112,23, 2004-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

14

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The objective of this article is to clarify the nature of the methodological position called adaptationism in evolutionary biology (that is, a position holding natural selection to be ubiquitous and the most powerful as a mechanism of the evolution of life) and to discuss the problems that relate to it. To this end, I will first set forth the controversy having been waged on the legitimacy of adaptationism, originally initiated by Gould and Lewontin in 1978 and having been joined by mainstream neo-Darwinists ever since. Then I will put forward some framework for evaluating this controversy, namely, the idea of taking adaptationism to be a research program in Lakatos' sense. In the second section, I will review, somewhat critically, how adaptationistic thinking is exemplified in the sociobiological research program advocated by E. O. Wilson and his followers. In the third section, I will give some considerations on the possibility of the model of cultural evolution (memetics) as a complement to the one-sidedness of the genetically-biased sociobiological explanation of human culture.

著者

中村 征樹

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.67, pp.61-79, 2016-04-01 (Released:2017-06-13)

参考文献数

4

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After a series of serious misconduct cases uncovered in the previous years, the situation surrounding research misconduct in Japan is changing dramatically. The government stipulated new guidelines for research misconduct in 2014. As such, the research institutions are now required to implement measures to prevent misconduct, including research integrity education. In the face of this rapidly changing situation, it seems imperative to clarify what the research misconduct issues are and to closely examine countermeasures. Research misconduct is principally defined as fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism. But what is wrong with these types of behavior? In the case of plagiarism, it is considered unforgivable not because it poses any real harm or breaches the law, but because it violates the moral norms of the scientific community and damages the ecosystem of scientific research. “Responsible” conduct, which is emphasized in the discourse on research integrity, could be properly understood by considering this intrinsic dimension of research misconduct. Examining the “responsible” authorship issues makes it possible to illuminate another feature of research integrity. While the biomedical community has been elaborating on the criteria for “responsible” authorship, the high energy physics community formulated an alternative model of authorship: collective authorship. This difference stems from a constellation of internal and external factors of a given scientific community. This shows that research integrity is deeply embedded in the economy of scientific research.

著者

小柳 美代子

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1991, no.41, pp.166-176, 1991-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

阪井 裕一郎

出版者

三田哲學會

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.125, pp.105-141, 2011-03

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特集 : 人間科学投稿論文The purpose of this paper is to clarity the axis of confrontation regarding the freedom of marital surname choice and to seek for the standpoint for justifying the freedom. From analyzing the discourses on the discussion of allowing marital couples to choose separate surnames (Fuufu-bessei) and my interview research for couples with separate surnames, I attempt to show the axis of confrontation and to examine the validity of legislation of this right.We can largely identify the different and opposite positions as four types: (A) those who insist that marital couples should have the same surnames, (B) those who support the legislation of the right for choosing separate marital surnames, (C) those who criticize the present family register (koseki) and support an ideal society based on the individuals, and (D) those who criticize the family resister but also require the legislation of the right for marital surname choice.With this classification, this study suggests the follows. Firstly, we can not take history or tradition as the grounds for the argument. Secondly, we should not regard the freedom for choosing separate surnames in the same light as requirement for equality of sexes, feminist ideals or individualism. In effect, some feminists or individualists continue to criticize the legislation of the right for choosing separate surnames.This study also suggests that the freedom of marital surname choice should be required in terms of not individualism but 'individual freedom'.

著者

阿部 里加

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.70, pp.129-144, 2019-04-01 (Released:2019-04-18)

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Im Liebesbegriff bei Augustin, in dem Arendt die Struktur der Nächstenliebe im Christentum philosophisch analysiert, unterscheidet sie zwischen amor mundi und dilectio mundi (beide „die Liebe zur Welt“). Darüberhinaus versucht Arendt zu zeigen, dass der Mensch wie ein Fremder existiert, während er in dieser Welt ist, gleichzeitig jedoch auch nicht existent ist. Dieser Widerspruch wird durch den Begriff der Isoliertheit, im Zusammenhang mit denen der sibi sufficere (Autarkie), der dilectio (Liebe) und des uti (Gebrauchs), expliziert. Der Begriff der Isolierung impliziert sowohl die Unabhängigkeit von der Welt als auch von Gott und findet seinen Ursprung im griechischen sibi sufficere (αυτάρκει) sowie in den Begriffen ordinata dilectio (geordnete Liebe) und uti. Das sibi sufficere lässt den Menschen die irdische Welt vermeiden, weil es die absolute Abwesenheit von Bedürftigkeit und die völlige Freiheit von anderen bedeutet. Auf der Grundlage der ordo amor (Liebesordnung) hat ordinata dilectio ihren Ursprung in Gott und im „eigenen Ich-selbst“ und führt bei der diligere invicem (gegenseitigen Liebe) unter den Christen zur Indirektheit. Diese Indirektheit hebt die gegenseitige Angewiesenheit der Menschen radikal auf: Die Beziehung zwischen dem Menschen und der Welt zum uti. Folglich liebt der Mensch sowohl seinen Nächsten als auch andere als ein Objekt des uti. Weiterhin führt die ordinata dilectio auch zwischen dem Menschen und zwischen Gott zur Indirektheit. Nach Arendts Interpretation ist es möglich, dass der Mensch bei Augustinus räumlich „Vor Gott“ (coram Deo) und durch die Objektivität außerhalb der Welt steht. Im Hinblick auf die Konzepte ordinata dilectio und uti nach Augustinus bedeutet somit die Isolierung eine Weltentfremdung und deutet auf eine Vorbedingung der christlichen Nächstenliebe hin. Außerdem verweist die Isolierung nicht auf die Versöhnung mit der Welt, sondern eher auf die Ablehnung und die Entfremdung von der Welt. Deshalb erklärt Arendt: „Aus der Weltentfremdung an sich entsteht neben der alten societas auch ein ihr gegensätzliches neues Miteinander und Füreinander“. Ohne eine Isolierung von der Welt kann der Mensch keine wahre Verbindung mit seinen Mitmenschen sowie kein neues vita socialis (soziales Leben) aufbauen.

著者

村山 達也

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.60, pp.279-293_L17, 2009 (Released:2010-11-09)

参考文献数

17

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Le but de cet article est de dégager de l'Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience de Bergson, non pas son ontologie et son épistémologie à l'état d'achèvement, mais sa vision plus primitive sur la réalité et la connaissance. Bien que la vision qui s'y trouve soit en quelque sorte rudimentaire, ce livre constitue néanmoins un cas privilégié en ce qu'il est le premier livre majeur de Bergson où celui-ci n'expose pas encore sa propre théorie de l'intuition, qui est présentée dans l'Introduction à la métaphysique et travaille parfois comme un écran qui nous cache le bergsonisme.Nous procédons par l'analyse de l'attitude bergsonienne face aux problèmes philosophiques. La position et la résolution des problèmes philosophiques révèleraient non seulement les idées que celui qui le pose et résout a de l'objet questionné, mais aussi les thèses générales qu'il se fait sur la réalité, la connaissance et leur rapport. Au début, nous extrayons de l'Avant-propos de ce livre le paradoxe de la solution du problème mal posé, analogue à celui de Ménon. Ensuite nous interprétons successivement les antinomies qu'a formulées Bergson et les contradictiones in adjecto, ou les«grossières images», qui ont engendré ces antinomies. Nous mettrons ainsi au jour les travaux à faire pour faire s'évanouir les antinomies et créer une solution unique. Nommément, la critique du postulat commun et l'invention, à travers la dialectique aristotélicienne, des images nouvelles qui sont naturellement précises.À la fin de cet article, nous tirerons des analyses ci-dessus plusieurs thèses sur la tendance rationaliste, la valeur de l'immédiat et le statut de la réalité dans le bergsonisme.

著者

鈴木 俊洋

出版者

北海道大学哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:02872560)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, pp.105-110, 2019-01-04

著者

秋間 実

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1964, no.14, pp.59-80, 1964-03-31 (Released:2009-07-23)

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Unter Determinismus versteht man oft Praedeterminismus, eine Lehre, nach welcher soziale und Naturerscheinungen durch Gott oder Gesetze vorherbestim mt waeren. Man nimmt an, dass historischer Materialismus in diesem Sinne von der Herrschaft historischer Gesetze bzw. historischer Notwendigkeit predigt, die keinen Raum fuer freie menschliche Handlungen offen laesst.Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung stellt jedoch keinen Praedeterminismus dar. Sie behauptet zwar die Determiniertheit der Grundrichtung der Geschichte, aber diese bedeutet keineswegs Vorherbestimmtheit der Ereignisse durch sog. historische Gesetze. In der Geschichte herrscht keine solche geheimnisvolle Macht, die sich mit eherner Notwendigkeit durchsetzte. Historischer Materialismus betont, dass es eben Menschen sind, die Geschichte schaffen, weist aber zugleich darauf hin, dass sie es nicht willkuerlich tun koennen, sondern nur auf Grund der objektiv gegebenen materiellen Bedingungen. Die Richtung der Entwicklung einer Gesellschaftsformation wird naemlich in letzter Instanz durch die Entwicklung ihrer Produktionsweise selbst bestimmt. Die Menschen duerfen zwar alles versuchen, um diese zu beeinflussen, sie mit der sog. Sozialtechnik einzelner Probleme ganz abstoppen koennen sie jedoch nicht. Der sich vorbereitende Wechsel der oekonomischen Gesellschaftsformation wird frueher oder spaeter durch unzaehlige Zufaelle hindurch, also mit statistischer Notwendigkeit, verwirklicht. Hiermit hat sich dos Gesetz der Geschichte erst durchgesetzt.Der Verfasser versucht diesen Gesetzesbegriff wissenschaftstheoretisch zu begruenden.

著者

乘立 雄輝

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2023, no.74, pp.50-63, 2023-04-01 (Released:2023-06-28)

著者

宮原 克典

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.68, pp.200-214, 2017-04-01 (Released:2017-06-14)

参考文献数

21

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This paper proposes an enactive account of thing-perception by integrating a descriptive, phenomenological analysis of thing-perception with the American philosopher John Haugeland’s account of “objective perception.” Enactive views of perception hold that perception is a form of embodied action. They apply well to the kind of perception that directly guides embodied action, but so far there is no convincing account as to how they might accommodate “thing-perception,” or the kind of perception that merely presents physical objects as things as such. Phenomenologically speaking, thing-perception is a temporally extended process of transforming an inarticulate appearance of a physical object into an articulate one. Furthermore, such transformation is shaped by embodied action guided by a normative sensitivity to the environment. Accordingly, phenomenological description suggests that ordinary thing-perception depends on the operation of bodily skills or bodily habits of certain kinds. On the other hand, Haugeland submits that our perceptual experience has the structure of objectivity by virtue of our antecedent commitment to certain constitutive standards. In particular, thing-perception is essentially dependent on our commitment to the constitutive standard for thinghood: We experience things as perceptual objects because of our preparedness to maintain in our experience a pattern of phenomena in accord with this constitutive standard. I claim that it is one and the same thing to have a commitment to the constitutive standard for thinghood and to have a bodily habit of seeing physical objects as things as such. Furthermore, I argue by thus integrating the two accounts described so far that thing-perception is essentially dependent on a form of embodied action. To have a bodily habit of seeing something as such is to have a commitment to the constitutive standard for thinghood, and the latter commitment is necessary for thing-perception to take place. Therefore, thing-perception is essentially a form of embodied action.

著者

犬竹 正幸

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1996, no.47, pp.217-226, 1996-05-01 (Released:2010-01-20)

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本稿の意図は、カントにおける「実在性」 (Realität) 概念の検討を通じて、カントの超越論的観念論を解釈するための一つの視角を呈示することにある。その際、単なる「実在性」と「客観的実在性」 (objektive Realität) とを区別して論じる必要がある。そこで、まずカントが実在性について語る場合に念頭においていたはずの、実在性概念の伝統的な意味を明らかにし、次いで、カントにおける客観的実在性の概念を検討する。その後、再び実在性概念にもどり、その批判哲学的な意味を明らかにしたい。その際、カントが実在性を「力」として捉えていることから、カントにおける力概念の内実、および経験の構成におけるその役割を検討することを通じて、「実在性としての力」を主題的に論じることが本稿の中心的論点となる。