著者

坂上 貴之

出版者

三田哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.127, pp.33-59, 2011-03

著者

佐々木 掌子

出版者

三田哲學會

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.123, pp.159-184[含 英語文要旨], 2010-03

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特集 : 教育学の射程投稿論文The purposes of this paper are to look back on arguments whether DSM (Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders) should include Gender Identity Disorder (GID) in children and adolescents or not, and to review the research outcomes on how treatments and interventions have been implemented and have produced effect. First, this paper discusses whether gender nonconforming children should be diagnosed as having a mental disorder or not and where an underlying problem of the disorder lies; in a society, a family, or child oneself. Depending upon where clinicians stand, treatments and interventions differ. Approaches to therapy can be placed into 4 categories: 1) therapy for aiming at changing cross-gender identity, 2) therapy that exhibits a nonjudgmental attitude to cross-gender identity, 3) therapy that affrmatively accepts cross-gender identity, 4) physical interventions for sex reassignment. Because no controlled comparison study has been conducted, we do not have any evidence for different outcomes by selected approaches. Finally, referring to researches in Western countries, the paper discusses support for children and adolescents with GID in Japan. For children, because of the possibility of gender identity change, we should provide a family a choice of the approaches 1), 2), or 3) as previously indicated. On the other hands, for adolescents, a family should be presented a choice of the approaches 2), 3), or 4). However, in Japan, as use of pubertal delaying hormones in GID treatment has never been discussed, we can not present the approach 4). Further discussion on physical interventions for adolescents is necessary.

著者

永井 均

出版者

The Philosophical Association of Japan

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.40, pp.19-35, 1990

著者

秋元 由裕

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.69, pp.140-154, 2018-04-01 (Released:2018-08-01)

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In den Pariser Manuskripten kritisierte Marx das kapitalistische Privateigentum als das, wodurch sich die Menschen von ihrem „Wesen“ entfremden. Innerhalb dessen erscheint die menschliche Arbeit nur als eine „Zwangsarbeit“, in der sich jeder „außer sich“ fühlen müsse. Seine Entfremdungskritik wird seit der Auslegung durch Marcuse essentialistisch verstanden und als eine normative Kritik aufgefasst; „normativ“ heißt, mit einer Konzeption des guten Lebens, die der Idee der Selbstverwirklichung des menschlichen Wesens entspricht, die entfremdete Gesellschaft zu kritisieren. Aber vom Standpunkt der Ideologiekritik aus wird oft bezweifelt, dass diese emanzipatorische Idee des guten Lebens zugleich ein Anzeichen für einen Essentialismus ist, bei dem es sich eventuell sogar um eine Art von Paternalismus handelt. Um sich mit einem solchen Ideologieverdacht auseinanderzusetzen, ist es für uns mindestens nötig, die zwei verschiedenen Verwendungsweisen des Wesensbegriffs bei Marx zu überprüfen und ihn damit in seiner ganzen Tragweite zu erkennen. Der vorliegende Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, ob und inwieweit der Begriff des menschlichen Wesens bei Marx für essentialistisch gehalten werden sollte. Erst dadurch kann die kritische Zeitdiagnose von Marx erneut verteidigt und aktualisiert werden. So gliedert sich diese Arbeit ihrer Zielsetzung gemäß in vier Teile. Zuerst wird anhand der Darstellung im Ersten Manuskript das Modell der Vergegenständlichung analysiert. Dadurch lässt sich verdeutlichen, dass der Begriff des menschlichen „Gattungswesens“ auf einer essentialistischen Vorstellung der produktiven Fähigkeiten beruht, die nur dem Menschen eigen sind. Im Gegensatz zu diesem Anschein von Essentialismus versucht Marx bei der Analyse der drei Quellen des Einkommens, die essentialistische Annahme der Arbeitswerttheorie zu kritisieren. Anschließend werden vor dem Hintergrund dieser Kritik an der Nationalökonomie Überlegungen angestellt, ob Marx in Bezug auf die menschliche Körperlichkeit eine neue Idee entwickelt hat; der Mensch ist demnach kein substantiell bestimmbares Etwas, sondern für sich ein Prozess des „Verhaltens zum Gegenstand“ und damit der „Aneignung der menschlichen Wirklichkeit“. Abschließend lässt sich aus diesem im Dritten Manuskript formulierten Gedankengang die Schlussfolgerung ziehen, dass das, was in der Begriffsform des menschlichen Wesens enthalten ist, nichts anderes ist als ein Paradox, weil der Mensch selbst ein unendlicher Aneignungsprozess seiner Wirklichkeit ist, während der Wesensbegriff eigentlich eine unveränderbare Form der Sache voraussetzt. In einer solchen paradoxen Beschaffenheit des Wesensbegriffs besteht ein Unterschied zwischen dem frühen Marx und dem Essentialismus.

著者

中畑 正志

出版者

The Philosophical Association of Japan

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.47, pp.55-73, 1996

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Recently some philosophers have cast doubt on the causal relevancy of the mental. In particular, they complain that functionalism and anomalous monism fail to make the mental causally efficient. However, both the critics and the defenders of these views share a common picture of causation that generates the problem of mental causation : they sharply contrast causation with normativity or rationality and take it to be prior to and independent of our explanatory practice. Rejecting this assumption, this paper argues that there is a deep connection between psychological explanation and the attribution of causal powers of the mental.

著者

宮崎 裕助

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.57, pp.240-253,14, 2006-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

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What new possibilities of communication are contained in Derridean deconstruction, which so severely dismisses the theory of communication as we have known it, especially from Habermas and Apel? Is there really any "serious" approach to the notion of communication for such a thought that radically calls into question the idealization and theorization of communication? The aim of this study is to examine and recast Derrida's critique of the theory of communication by incorporating the following insights: (1) Derrida's argument is based upon his own discovery of the necessity of what could be called "telecommunication"; (2) it is constitutive of an immanent criticism in that it disputes the idealizing assumptions of communication (the ideas of univocality, transparency, publicity, etc.) not from an empiricist standpoint (which clings to a diversity of everyday realities in communication) but from the very logic which makes possible the idealization of communication; (3) these arguments set out the precondition for communication to take place as event in a strict sense, and it is from this point of departure that one can search for the "minimal consensus." By taking these steps, this study attempts to characterize Derrida's thought of language as the "logic of telecommunication."

著者

中村 信隆

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.69, pp.215-229, 2018-04-01 (Released:2018-08-01)

参考文献数

19

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Many philosophers suspect that the emotion of shame cannot play a significant role in morality because shame is the reaction to others’ contempt and therefore, a heteronomous emotion. This paper aims to defend the view that shame is a morally significant emotion by focusing on one form of reproach —“shame on you.” We employ this reproach, for example, with a President who establishes discriminatory policies or a scientist who falsifies data in his academic paper and in these cases, we assume this reproach is morally important. Therefore, what does “shame on you” imply? How can it be morally justified? Moreover, what are its characteristics? In this paper, I answer these questions by clarifying the notions of shame and self-respect. The paper proceeds as follows. First, I resolve the issue of autonomy and heteronomy in the emotion of shame based on Gabriele Taylor’s observation that shame contains two elements — a self-directed adverse judgment and a notion of an audience. I argue that the adverse judgment is always rendered autonomously, but the audience can be either autonomous or heteronomous; essentially, agents feel shame either in their own eyes or in the eyes of others. Second, I explain the meaning of “shame on you” and demonstrate the moral validity of this reproach by referring to the nature and classification of self-respect. Finally, I examine the distinctive significance of “shame on you.” Examining the different characteristics of shame and guilt, I argue that this form of reproach involves more a comprehensive assessment of the agent than other forms of reproach that concern, for example, the violations of moral rules.

著者

伊勢田 哲治

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.64, pp.9-24_L3, 2013 (Released:2014-07-10)

参考文献数

16

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This paper explores how analytic social epistemology has incorporated social aspects of inquiring activities into epistemological research, and how non-epistemic values can be related to it. Since the 19th century, science as a kind of inquiring activity has been socialized in many senses. Scientific community is institutionalized and the research itself is often conducted collectively; outside influence became also visible through national funding system and increase of so-called ‘mode 2’ knowledge production. Given such socialization of science, analytic social epistemology, such as Goldman's veritism and social falsificationism of several authors, has expanded epistemology to include institutional and collective aspects as objects of epistemic appraisal. Non-epistemic values are also included as parts of such social aspects. However, the standards of epistemic appraisal, such as truth conductivity and objectivity through mutual checking, remain epistemic. Some authors, such as Stephen Stich and Steve Fuller, criticize such epistemological conservatism and advocate non-epistemic evaluation of cognitive processes and scientific institutions. Even though they both make good points, the role of analytic social epistemology as a part of total assessment of an inquiring activity should not be denied. What epistemologists need is the awareness that their enterprise is an indispensable part of such a larger project.

著者

柏原 勤

出版者

三田哲學會

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.128, pp.207-234, 2012-03

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特集 : 社会学 社会心理学 文化人類学投稿論文The purpose of this investigation is to regard "2 -channel thread editing blog" as a new form of news communication, to identify the characteristics and processes of the news communication, and to present the possibility that these blogs can be examined from the perspective of several mass communication theories. "2-channel thread editing blog" is a famous blog genre for many Japanese Internet users. It contains articles whose recourses are selected from threads on "2-channel", the most popular anonymous bulletin board in Japan.This study classifies these blogs and its articles into two groups, "news" and "non-news", and considers the former a new form of news communication. This type of blogs functions as a news media by mediating news articles reported by traditional media, or reporting social events particularly occurring on the Internet.As a novel type of news media, "2-channel thread editing blog" presents some potentialities to be studied from the point of and by methods of mass communication theories or news communication researches, such as double geetkeeping, media effect theories, and so on.

著者

植村 玄輝

出版者

日本哲学会 ; 1952-

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.66, pp.127-142, 2015-04

著者

佐藤 和夫

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1976, no.26, pp.163-172, 1976-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

大小田 重夫

出版者

北海道大学哲学会 = The Philosophical Society of Hokkaido University

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:02872560)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, pp.67-80, 2008-02-29

著者

江守 正多

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.71, pp.10-20, 2020-04-01 (Released:2020-05-12)

参考文献数

7

著者

檜垣 立哉

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1992, no.42, pp.217-227, 1992-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

菅沼 聡

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.51, pp.278-288, 2000-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

15

被引用文献数

1

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いかなる部分的存在者でもない存在者全体は存在するか。つまり、世界全体は、その個々の部分と同じく存在するだろうか。これは、形而上学全般にとって重要であり得るにもかかわらず、十分に検討されてこなかった問題である。本稿で我々は、この問題を主として現代の英米系の哲学の流れをもとに検討する。我々はまず、存在者全体、世界全体の存在の問題を明確にし ( (1) )、その上で、その存在についての主要な疑問点を考察し ( (2) ~ (3) )、その考察から得た結論を示す ( (4) ) ことにする。

著者

菅沼 聡

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.62, pp.283-298_L17, 2011 (Released:2011-12-09)

参考文献数

24

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In this paper, reality-in-itself and the absolute whole (of everything) —two of the most radically metaphysical ideas—are critically examined from a contemporary philosophical viewpoint. The legitimacy of both ideas has long been doubted, particularly since the criticisms of Kant's thing-in-itself (by Fichte and others), and since some paradoxes of set theory (such as Cantor's paradox), respectively. In section 1 of this paper, the truth/justification conditions of the existence of something real-in-itself are presented, and examined to confirm (more explicitly than ever before) that the idea of reality-in-itself cannot be easily maintained. Likewise, in section 2, the truth/justification conditions of the existence of the absolute whole (of everything) are presented, and examined to confirm that this idea cannot easily be maintained either. In section 3, however, the concept of an absolute whole of reality-in-itself (hereafter, |R|) is introduced by combining the above two ideas. Because this concept is formulated by combining two of the most radically metaphysical ideas, |R| can/could be called the “most metaphysical” reality. In view of the results presented in sections 1 and 2, the existence of |R| might be expected to be doubly doubtful. However, the results presented in section 3 are quite the opposite. It is argued that both the truth/ justification conditions are exceptionally satisfied in |R| (hence |R| exists), and thus, both ideas can be exceptionally maintained in |R|.

著者

植村 玄輝

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.66, pp.127-142, 2015

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<p></p><p>In discussing the nature of laws of logic in the <i>Prolegomena</i> of the <i>Logical</i> <i>Investigations</i>, Husserl gives a passingly critical remark about a certain sort of <i>anti</i>-psychologism. He accuses some antipsychologists of misconceiving the laws of logic as essentially normative. This is a mistake, he claims, because logic is a system of norms of thinking or judging only in a <i>deliberative</i> sense; in its primal form, "pure" logic concerns <i>descriptive</i> laws that govern the relationship among propositions as ideal meaning-entities. Such a remark is in need of elucidation and evaluation, since it is widely and correctly acknowledged that the <i>Prolegomena</i> is devoted to the refutation of psychologism rather than anti-psychologism. In the present paper, the author argues for the following four claims: (I) Husserl's criticism of antipsychologism is an integral part of his argument for pure logic. Since his argument against psychologism in and by itself leads only to the anti-psychologism in question, he is in need of a separate argument for the primarily descriptive and deliberatively normative nature of logic. (II) Husserl succeeds in giving a coherent and fine account of how laws of logic are primarily descriptive and deliberatively normative. (III) This account is not well motivated unless it is supplemented by the phenomenological analysis of cognition. (IV) Husserl does not succeed in providing such a supplementation in the second volume of the <i>Logical</i> <i>Investigations</i>, because he there excludes intentional objects from the domain of phenomenological descriptions. With those claims, the author concludes that Husserl's so-called transcendental turn and the further development of his thought should be understood as attempts to overcome the incoherence of the Logical Investigations in order to save the largely Aristotelian conception of logic that lies behind the whole discussion.</p>

著者

一ノ瀬 正樹

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.56, pp.42-62,3, 2005-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

26

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The past is nowhere, but it is implied in our understanding of the world. We have to take into account these two fundamental characteristics of the past, i.e. absence and im-plicitness, in order to clarify historical knowledge, as history must be a part of the past highlighted by linguistic description. In this article I investigate the nature of historical knowledge by taking implicitness of the past to be causation between the past and our present state, and interpreting absence of the past as bringing about a probabilistic character of historical knowledge.After briefly examining the controversy about the reality of the past, I scrutinize the covering law model of historical causal explanation through considering its probabilistic form. In particular I mention the problem of how to apply Bayesian Conditionalisation to historical causal explanations. However, Bayesian theory is involved in serious difficulties like the problem of old evidence. This suggests that our choice of context must be ques-tioned, which calls the narrative theory of history into discussion. I argue that narrative theory will introduce backward causation from narration to past events, and that the theory will still imply a probabilistic contingent status of the past. Finally I take up the question of why we narrate our history, and I assert that a sense.of crisis causally motivates us to narrate it. As the sense of crisis itself is a sort of historical knowledge as well as the resultant narration, the probabilistic and contingent character extends throughout our historical knowledge.

著者

清水 将吾

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.58, pp.191-202,24, 2007-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

9

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The body is a subject in the sense that it is that which perceives. But, at the same time, it is also an object. In this paper, I hope to take a step towards understanding this peculiar twofold character of the body.The question I will consider is : are bodily sensations able to locate the body in space? I take up this question because arguments have already been advanced for an affirmative answer. If they are found persuasive, that would seem to support the claim that bodily sensations afford an objective aspect to the subjective body.Such arguments, however, are not at the level relevant to my interest, since they appear to deal not with the intrinsic or indipendent affect of such sensations.The first aim of this paper is to therefore secure the relevant level through making critical examination of the existing arguments. The second aim is to answer the question articulated at that level. The answer I give will be a negative one.

著者

大越 愛子

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1992, no.42, pp.228-239, 1992-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)