著者
野矢 茂樹
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.37, no.2, pp.47-58, 2004-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

Fatalism or logical determinism says that the future is determined on a very logical ground. In this paper, examining the fatalist argument critically, I am going to show how we can avoid the fatalist thesis. Aristotle discussed this problem and came to the conclusion that some statements about the future are neither true nor false. Following his suggestion, I farther claim that the future does not exist. That is the reason why any proper name included in a statement about the future has no referent. Therefore, as Aristotle said, statements about the future have no truth value. In the latter half of this paper, I will consider some problems with my claim what does a statement about the future mean and how is the past related to the present?
著者
林 晃紀
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.1, pp.55-75, 2020-09-30 (Released:2020-09-30)

When we read Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, we often feel baffled because it is difficult to draw out a systematic theory from the text. Given this exegetical problem, it is often said that Wittgenstein never intends to propound any theory; rather his aim of philosophy is therapeutic.     The problem of rule-following has been most often argued among the topics in the Investigations. Most of approaches to the problem, however, are not therapeutic but constructive. The purpose of this paper is to examine the problem of rule-following from a perspective of therapeutic philosophy.
著者
網谷 祐一
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.41, no.1, pp.1_79-1_94, 2008 (Released:2009-07-31)
参考文献数
32

Gerd Gigerenzer's views on probabilistic reasoning in humans have come under close scrutiny. Very little attention, however, has been paid to the evolutionary component of his argument. According to Gigerenzer, reasoning about probabilities as frequencies is so common today because it was favored by natural selection in the past. This paper presents a critical examination of this argument. It will show first, that, pace Gigerenzer, there are some reasons to believe that using the frequency format was not more adaptive than using the standard (percentage) format and, second, that Gigerenzer's evolutionary argument and his other arguments such as his historical description of the notion of probability are in tension with each other.
著者
佐金 武
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.42, no.1, pp.1_15-1_28, 2009 (Released:2009-09-30)
参考文献数
12

The central thesis to presentism is that only the present exists; what is past no longer exists and future does not exist yet. One problem with this position is how to explicate the asymmetry of time. In ordinary talk, we say that the past is fixed whereas the future is still open. How can we cash out such metaphors? The answer, however, will not automatically follow from presentism itself because past and future are said to be ontologically on par, both being nonexistent. In this essay, I first introduce a theory of presentism, which I call Tensed-Property Presentism, and show how it can explicate the asymmetry of time.
著者
佐藤 暁
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.45, no.1, pp.1-16, 2012-07-30 (Released:2013-06-05)
参考文献数
6

Dummett argued that practical ability is knowledge if and only if having an ability is described as knowing some propositions. He asserts that the ability to speak a language is knowledge itself, because we cannot attempt to speak a language unless we can speak the language. However, it is not clear why such an ability is knowledge itself. In this study, we reinforce his argument by defining knowledge of how to do things as knowledge based on learning experience. We cannot speak a language without learning experience. Moreover, if one gains an ability through learning experience, this means that he at least knows some propositions.
著者
照井 一成
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.36, no.2, pp.49-64, 2003-12-30 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
13

It is observed by Grishin that inconsistency of naive set theory can be avoided by restricting the logical law of contraction, as it is contraction that enables us to derive logical inconsistency from set-theoretic paradoxes such as Russell's paradox.In this paper, we examine Grishin's contraction-free naive set theory to better understand Russell's paradox and the naive comprehension principle from a purely formal standpoint. We study both static-propositional and dynamic-procedural aspects of naive comprehension and argue that it could lead to an ideal formalization of (part of) mathematics, where both propositional knowledge (theorems) and procedural knowledge (algorithms) reside in harmony.
著者
鈴木 貴之
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.35, no.2, pp.83-94, 2002-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
18
被引用文献数
3 1

We have the ability to predict and understand behavior of ourselves and others by attributing various mental states. How can this ability, so-called the theory of mind, be explained? At present, we have two explanations, theory-theory and simulation-theory, and cannot decide which is better. However, if we appreciate that the underlying problem is how to describe the psychological mechanism which generates the phenomena describable as the use of theoretical knowledge, we can see that there remains an important alternative explanation which explains the ability as a kind of pattern recognition.
著者
鈴木 雄大
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.1, pp.1-17, 2016-07-31 (Released:2016-11-10)
参考文献数
9
被引用文献数
2

The causal theory of action, which has been the standard theory of action, presupposes that reasons for action are an agentʼs mental attitudes (e.g. beliefs and desires) and claims that they are the cause of the action. However, in this paper I argue that reasons for action are not the agentʼs mental attitudes but their object (e.g. facts, states of affairs, or propositions), inspired by the idea that reasons must be capable of justifying the action as well as explaining it, and that what has this normative force is not mental items, but something objective. I also solve a problem that derives from cases in which the agent believes things falsely.
著者
野中 哲士
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.52, no.2, pp.21-40, 2020-03-30 (Released:2020-07-03)
参考文献数
31

I present an approach to the problems of perception that explicitly considers the material basis of the perceptual information picked up by active agents. Taking into account the reservoir of information external to the perceiver makes it possible to study activity before sensory signals have been aroused by stimuli, an activity that orients the organs of perception and explores for the external information. Drawing on J. J. Gibsonʼs ecological approach and the recent discussions on reservoir computing, I illustrate how the consideration of the material basis of potentially informative patterns could fundamentally change the traditional theories on perception.
著者
鈴木 生郎
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.41, no.1, pp.1_15-1_28, 2008 (Released:2009-07-31)
参考文献数
21

The paradox of coincidence, a paradox about the relation between a material object and its stuff, has been paid a great attention to in recent metaphysics. In this paper, I compare two influential approaches to this paradox; sortalism and fourdimensional worm theory, and defend sortalism. I give the following two arguments. (1) Worm theory, like sortalism, must introduce sortal concepts to resolve the paradox. So both approaches owe the (almost) same theoretical burden to explain how sortal concepts work. (2) Worm theory, unlike sortalism, introduces sortal concepts in a very problematic way.
著者
石田 正人
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.41, no.1, pp.1_29-1_44, 2008 (Released:2009-07-31)
参考文献数
23
被引用文献数
1 1

This paper focuses on C. S. Peirce's philosophy of logic and mathematics pertinent to the so-called model-theoretic tradition in formal logic. While it is common to trace the development of model-theoretic logic back to Peirce, closer textual study tends to reveal that there is a gap between the work of Peirce and what was later achieved by, among others, Löwenheim and Skolem. As Peirce's nonstandard model of the theory of reals suggests, however, Peirce does belong to the model-theoretic tradition at least in a broad sense. This paper thus makes efforts to better situate Peirce in the model-theoretic movement by considering Cantor's influence on Peirce, which most probably motivated Peirce to develop his nonstandard model of the reals. The paper also endeavors to shed light on Peirce's highly original ideas regarding the logic of mathematics seen in this particular context.
著者
石原 哉
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.40, no.2, pp.1-12, 2007-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
24

We survey Brouwer's intuitionistic mathematics and Markov's constructive recursive mathematics by examining axioms assumed in each school and mathematical theorems derived from the axioms. It is known that Bishop's constructive mathematics is a core of the varieties of mathematics in the sense that it can be extended not only to intuitionistic mathematics and constructive recursive mathematics, but also classical mathematics. We compare a new trend of constructive mathematics, called a minimalist foundation, with Bishop's constructive mathematics.
著者
山口 裕之
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.34, no.2, pp.89-100, 2001-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

These days, "biological determinism" is getting popular, corresponding to the pubulic interest in biology. Such determinism is a false opinion, which is ethically destructive. But, not only popular determinists, but "real" biologists also try to explain human characters by genes, which are segmented by the researchers' arbitrariness or social bias. On this point, there's no difference between popular determinists and real biologists. Human mind should not be understood as determined by genes, but as an "emergence" from life system which consists in the interaction between genes and proteins. From this point of view, we can make scientific researches on the human freedom.
著者
網谷 祐一
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.48, no.1, pp.35-48, 2015

In <i>Realism and Naturalizing Knowledge</i> (Keisho Shobo, 2013), Ryo Uehara carefully formulates the homeostatic property cluster theory of natural kinds and expands it by applying this framework to artifacts and knowledge and thereby drawing them in the naturalistic picture of the world. This is a substantial addition to the development of naturalistic philosophy in Japan. In this essay I shall make general comments on his account of natural kinds in the following respects: Ueharas distinction between real and nominal kinds, his objection to the species-as-individual thesis, the relative lack of attention to the distinction between the realism of natural kinds and the scientific realism, and finally, races as possible natural kinds.