著者

島村 修平

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.2, pp.29-46, 2012

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It is commonly assumed that a personʼs avowal of her own mind is privileged. But quite a few researchers doubt this first-person privilege, finding it difficult to give it a secure place within their theories of the mind. This paper aims to show that a psychological subject must have first-person privilege. Some philosophers claim that psychological subjects must be rational agents, and a special subclass of them (like us) must have first-person privilege. Accepting this basic idea, I attempt to give substance to it by offering an indisputable interpretation of rational agency and a non-trivial argument to derive first-person privilege from it.

著者

小川 芳範

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.1-13, 2002

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In this paper, I consider a philosophical interpretation of Hilbert's program put forward by Paul Bernays. The paper consists, roughly, of two parts. In the first part, I briefly describe Bernays's polemic against "immanence philosophy" over the question concerning the epistemological status of theoretical sciences and its relation to the foundational controversy in mathematics in the 1920s. In the second part, I briefly discuss the theory of cognition contained in the transcendental philosophy of Jakob Friedrich Fries and his twentieth century evangelist, Leonard<BR>Nelson, and consider Bernays's view against the background of this intellectual tradition. I conclude the paper by arguing for the importance of attending to Friesian influence in order to achieve a deeper understanding of Bernays's (and Hilbert's) philosophy of mathematics.

著者

村上 祐子

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.1, pp.69-76, 2012

著者

宮坂 和男

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.27, pp.111-123, 1994-11-18 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

松原 仁

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, pp.45-56, 1991-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

19

著者

太田 紘史 谷辺 哲史

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.2, pp.3-26, 2022-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

63

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There is an emerging experimental trend in bioethics and neuroethics. We briefly review several topics in this trend and discuss how the existing and future studies can have normative implications related to bioethical/neuroethical issues. Particularly, we consider three major ways to draw such implications; (1) contributing to conceptual analysis and philosophical (counter-)evidence, (2) figuring out the unreliability of moral thinking and thereby providing a debunking argument, and (3) estimating the feasibility of ethical norms and policies.

著者

石原 孝二

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.2, pp.17-32, 2014

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Throughout the history of modern psychiatry, descriptive methods and operational definitions have featured prominently in endeavors to objectively refer to and classify mental disorders. An alternative to these descriptive approaches is the argument based on the concepts of "natural kinds" and "dysfunction" such as Wakefieldʼs "harmful dysfunction" model. However, none of these approaches seem promising for understanding the nature of mental disorders. This paper proposes that we abandon the prevalent tendency to objectively classify mental disorders, revert to the original meaning of psychiatry (Psychiaterie), a term coined by J. C. Reil, as a method of therapy, and reexamine the concept of mental disorder.

著者

野村 尚新

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.1, pp.1-16, 2015-07-31 (Released:2015-11-08)

参考文献数

20

被引用文献数

2

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Does Pegasus fly? We believe most of you would answer “yes”without thinking it actually exists in this world. On the other hand,W. V. Quine argued that if we let some existential formula be true,we have to commit the existence of the object which is essential to let the formula be true. So that it can be said that there is a gap between Quine’s ontological argument and ontology in our daily life. Our goal in this paper is to fill the gap and expand Quine’s argument by relying on Meinongian philosophy, especially G. Priest’s neo-Meinongianism called Noneism, which admits different types of existence.

著者

網谷 祐一

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.317-320, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

著者

佐藤 俊治

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.2, pp.113-127, 2002-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

44

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This paper is an introductory survey of the modal interpretation of quantum mechanics. We review in this paper especially elementary kinematics of the Vermaas-Dieks and Bub modal interpretations: frameworks of their theories and justificatory arguments for their choices of possessed properties of quantal systems. We conclude this paper with a remark about relationship of their proposals to scientific realism.

著者

立花 希一

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.31, no.1, pp.85-99, 1998-05-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

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This paper deals with the problem whether Popper's falsificationism has been refuted by the Duhem-Quine thesis. According to the Duhem-Quine thesis it is not an isolated hypothesis but a theory as a whole that is subjected to an experimental test. And it is claimed that by adding an ad hoc hypothesis or by changing a minor auxiliary hypothesis any falsifications of a theory as a whole can be evaded or at least main hypotheses can be saved from falsifications. Against this I claim that it is not always possible to evade the falsifications. Thus Popper's falsificationism has not been refuted by the Duhem-Quine thesis.

著者

小草 泰

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.1, pp.1_29-1_49, 2009 (Released:2009-09-30)

参考文献数

16

被引用文献数

2

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Intentionalism and disjunctivism are two main views in the current debate about perceptual experience. In this paper, I will focus on a couple of (supposed) basic properties of perceptual experience, put forward by disjunctivists, which they claim will motivate disjunctivism as opposed to intentionalism. One is the epistemologically special status of perceptual experience as (providing) knowledge; the other is the phenomenological property that this or that particular object seems to be given to us in perceptual experience. By examining these properties, I will show that, in spite of disjunctivists' claim, they do not exclude intentionalism, and that they can be appropriately accommodated into intentionalsits' view.

著者

野家 啓一

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, pp.45-60, 1996-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

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Prof. Kobayashi criticized the Duhem-Quine thesis from an original point of view in his recent book Philosophy of Sience. His point is that there is "a difference of degree concerning theoreticity" which means the vulnerability to a theoretical revision in the whole system of physical theory. But, in my view, scientists cannot uniquely determine which is the object of revision between main hypotheses and auxiliary hypotheses. While in the "normal science" period auxiliary hypotheses are revised by falsificational experiments, only in the "scientific revolution" period main hypotheses are falsified. Therefore the so-called crucial experiment is no other than an honorary title which is awarded by historical consideration in a later period.

著者

将積 茂

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.59-72, 1970-11-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

20

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In his paper "What is dialectic?" K. Popper tried to point out many limitations in the modern dialectic, from the angle of method of trial and error. His criticism on dialectic is very radical and suggestive. This paper intends to make some of his arguments clear, and set forth dialectician's explanations of them.

著者

山田 友幸

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.2, pp.1-16, 2013-12-20 (Released:2014-06-28)

参考文献数

10

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John Searleʼs discussion of the gaps in rational action raises serious problems for the commonsense view that an explanation of an agentʼs action in terms of her reason for doing what she did is a species of causal explanation. The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of the problems Searle's discussion raises and examine the relation between the experienced gaps and the neurobiological processes in the brain.

著者

小口 峰樹

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.1, pp.1_1-1_16, 2011 (Released:2011-10-13)

参考文献数

32

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John McDowell proposes conceptualism of perceptual content to warrant the idea that perceptual experience rationally constrains belief. To support this idea, McDowell claims that not only belief and perception, but also the world itself has a propositional structure. This view of the “unboundedness of the conceptual” is, however, doubtful. In this paper, I shall explore how we can defend conceptualism without accepting the above view. To do this, I shall propose a mechanism that gives a propositional structure to perception before it is established as a conscious experience. In so doing, I shall employ two empirical theories: the visual index theory and the sensory classification theory. This inquiry aims at revising conceptualism and giving it an empirical basis.

著者

水本 正晴

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.1, pp.1_59-1_78, 2008 (Released:2009-07-31)

参考文献数

40

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The "entailment thesis", or the principle that knowledge entails belief, is accepted by most epistemologists today. However, not everyone agrees. Some philosophers have presented at least prima facie convincing counterexamples. It seems, however, their challenges have been not so much answered as simply neglected. After examining two types of attractive, but not completely satisfying answers to such purported counterexamples, I will propose an alternative answer, which seems to be congenial to the spirit of epistemological naturalism.

著者

森田 邦久

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.2, pp.119-131, 2004-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

8

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The main purpose of this essay is an analysis of the methodology in physical research using the semantic concept of scientific theories (SC). The structure of this paper is as follows. First, the antecedent analyses of scientific research by T. S. Kuhn, I. Lakatos and L. Laudan are surveyed. Secondly, I try to define what SC is. According to SC, theory is applied not to real world directly but to model. And next, the methodology of physical research is analyzed by using SC according to the following three steps: 1. improving the approximation between model and the real world, 2. introducing unknown objects (or interactions), 3. alternating basic theory. Finally, the development of physics is discussed. I insist that a criterion to judge which theory is better when theory is modified is the ability to solve empirical problems not conceptual.

著者

竹内 泉

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.2, pp.135-150, 2003-12-30 (Released:2009-05-29)

被引用文献数

1

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This work proposes a new semantics named "context semantics", which interprets predicate modal logic in which the modality symbols means logical validity. Although the possible world semantics is the most well-known method for semantics of modal logic, it is not so useful or so essential in studying the predicate modal logic. Especially, the transworld identification always makes serious problem. In order to avoid the problem, we propose the new semantics. Our semantics interprets a formula with finite information. This point is the most essential difference between our semantics and possible world semantics.

著者

戸田山 和久

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, no.1, pp.29-43, 1999-05-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

14

被引用文献数

1 1

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To naturalize philosophy of science radically and thoroughly, we must re-examine the ontological character (not ontological commitment) of theories and ask how theories are realized in this physical world. Paul M. Churchland dare to answer to this question and claims that a theory is a partition across activation space which is realized by a specific pattern of synaptic weights in a brain. He also tries to justify some Feyerabendian strategies for doing science well in terms of neurocomputational functions of our brains. In this paper, Churchland's project to naturalize philosophy of science is defended against some criticisms. Then, a minor deficiency of his theory is pointed out and a way-out is suggested.