著者

小手川 正太郎

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.65, pp.167-181, 2014-04-01 (Released:2016-06-30)

参考文献数

10

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Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) est souvent qualifié de penseur de lʼAutre, qui entend libérer «lʼabsolument autre» de la domination du Même dans la philosophie occidentale. Cette interprétation, établie par Jacques Derrida dans son article «Violence et Métaphysique. Essai sur la pensée dʼEmmanuel Levinas» (1964), est si dominante que certains partisans de Levinas la suivent à leur insu en reprochant à Levinas de ne voir lʼAutre quʼen autrui en tant que lʼhumain. Contre cette interprétation, la présente étude propose une autre lecture à lʼaide de la distinction décisive entre «autrui» et «lʼAutre» dans la philosophie de Levinas.Après avoir présenté la lecture derridienne de Levinas et en avoir montré la problématique, nous nous demanderons dʼabord si Levinas établit bien cette distinction dans Totalité et Infini (1961). Ensuite, nous montrerons que lʼordre de lʼargumentation dans la 3ème section de cet ouvrage sʼoppose diamétralement à la lecture derridienne qui va de lʼAutre à autrui. En effet, ce que Levinas nous montre,cʼest quʼon ne peut traiter de lʼAutre quʼà partir de lʼanalyse de notre rapport avec autrui. Pour Levinas, «lʼAutre» signifie, plutôt que lʼaltérité comme telle, une instance dʼautrui qui met en question le moi dʼune manière non-violente. En nous fondant sur cette lecture, nous allons tenter enfin dʼinterpréter la 1ère section de Totalité et Infini qui commence par parler de lʼAutre et qui nous semble inciter des lecteurs, tel Derrida, à comprendre Levinas comme penseur de lʼAutre.

著者

岡田 光弘

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1987, no.37, pp.210-221, 1987-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

中村 博雄

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1986, no.36, pp.152-162, 1986-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

田村 均

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.61, pp.261-276_L16, 2010 (Released:2011-01-18)

参考文献数

19

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A self-sacrificial action is not consistent with rational decision-making. If an agent decides to take the rational course of action, that is, the best action among the options, the decision is not truly self-sacrificial. The agent has sought the best option and, therefore, nothing is really sacrificed. We need, then, a scheme other than that of rational decision making to explain self-sacrifice. I propose a theory which explains a self-sacrificial action as a kind of play-acting. In a play, an actor may take a role that is undesirable in real life. In a social situation involving self-sacrifice, the agent must accept such a course of action as undesirable but inevitable for anyone in the same situation. In a sense, the agent is coerced into playing an undesirable role. We cannot but see the agent as accepting it as an actor would. In instances of sacrifice, such as the sacrificial rite of the Ainu Bear Festival (IYOMANTE) or the legend of Iphigenia at Aulis, there is a traditional, social scenario that prescribes proper action. The self-sacrificial agent accepts such action in the same way that an actor accepts an unattractive role. The agent will intentionally perform the action; however, this is only in response to the prescription of the scenario. In other words, it is not based on an authentic decision, but on a play-acting decision. In this way, we can explain an act of self-sacrifice that implies a moral split for the agent. Contemporary theories of action, such as G. E. M. Anscombe's intellectualist theory or Donald Davidson's voluntarist-like theory, take it for granted that in any situation an agent is an integrated person with no moral split in principle. Moral splits, or dilemmas, are not, however, rare in everyday life. I put forward the play-acting theory of action as an alternative to contemporary theories.

著者

西脇 与作

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1988, no.38, pp.24-43, 1988-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

川瀬 和也

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.68, pp.109-123, 2017-04-01 (Released:2017-06-14)

参考文献数

6

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The “Idea” is, according to Hegel, the unity of the subject and object. However, as often in Hegel, his explanation of the role of the “Idea” is extraordinarily dense, and it is hard to understand what he means. In this paper, I will attempt to reveal the meaning of Hegel’s “absolute Idea” by focusing on his notion of dialectic and his favorite analogy of the circle.Robert B. Pippin argues that Hegel’s logic is the completion of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, and therefore, a kind of epistemology in itself. James Kreines, however, criticized this view in his recent book. Hegel, says Kreines, criticizes any attempt to start with the assessment of our epistemic faculties; so according to him, Pippin’s interpretation cannot be valid. I take Kreines’ critique seriously. Hegel cannot begin his philosophical system with an epistemological argument.However, it is also incorrect to start with a metaphysical argument. If we read Hegel’s argument on dialectic carefully, we can see that it is impossible for him to start with either epistemology or metaphysics. Rather, we must not fixate on where to start.Prohibiting this fixation, in Hegel’s view, shows us how to solve the problem of the gap between subject and object. And it is because of this insight, I believe, that Hegel emphasizes the analogy of the circle when he argues for a genuine method of philosophy.

著者

有安 和人

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.51, pp.190-199, 2000-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

13

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Plusieurs philosophes naturels du dix-septième siècle ont souligné l'importance des mathématiques pour la méthode.Ils se sont opposés au contenu de la physique aristotélicienne, mais avaient les activités scientifiques dans le même cadre que l'aristotélicien, c'est-à-dire la même conception de la science.Mon propos est d'analyser cette philosophie naturelle sous le rapport de la conception de la science.

著者

神崎 繁

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.60, pp.51-66_L5, 2009 (Released:2010-11-09)

参考文献数

27

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The theme of our discussion ‘Reality and Virtual Reality’ seems, if we take it in antagonistic sense, somewhat awkward at this day. For in many occasions of everyday life such as playing with interactive game soft, testing by simulations for driving skills check, or using MRI images for medical diagnoses, ‘Virtual Reality’ is already partially built in our ‘Reality’. But the dark side of this kind of thing is also becoming conspicuous. An animation TV program named ‘Pokemon’ made children be in panic and paralyzed by rapid movements and too much strong stimulations of their images. But we are eventually caught by a suspicion that Reality does not partially consists of Virtual Reality but amounts to Virtual Reality itself. Such an empty feeling of Reality from which we are distanced has a philosophical background.I spell this out by scrutinizing three points or, shall I say, pitfalls (1) an active power of human mind which works on the dead nature, (2) mechanization of human body as a part of such nature, (3) internality of human thought which is insulated from environmental world and only by representations can keep contact with it.And in trying to show a way out from these pitfalls, I also explore some traces of prisoners of the cave in Plato's Republic in Descartes' body-machines as well as in cybernauts put on head-mounted-display.

著者

納富 信留

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.58, pp.25-43,17, 2007-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

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When Nishi Amane introduced Western civilisation into Japan in the mid 19th century, he observed that its essence lies in "philosophy", especially in its Greek origin. I examine therefore the original meaning of "philosophia" in ancient Greece in order to reconsider the possibility of philosophy in modern Japan.First, "philosaphos" as form of a human life is contrasted with the modern concept of "philosophy" as an academic discipline. Asking what a philosopher is inevitably raises a serious question about one's own life, whereas modern philosophy ignores this ethical dimension of "philosophy". Second, Greek thinkers experimented a variety of styles-prose, verse, aphorism, dialogue, speech, and treatise-through which a possibility of doing philosophy was pursued. The conflict between these styles developed philosophical thinking and eventually established universality. Third, Greek philosophy laid the basis for sciences by systematizing the entire area of knowledge. It also founded academic institutions-Academy and Lyceum-to pursue shared research in philosophy and sciences in a free intellectual space. This started the tradition of Western philosophy.Considering these aspects, I suggest that philosophy be reconsidered in our modern society as realisation of a human life. In particular, the concepts of "wisdom" (sophia), "universality", and "soul" (psyche) should be examined in light of Greek philosophy, to which we need to return as a mirror that sheds a new light on our own philosophy.

著者

石田 柊

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.73, pp.119-133, 2022-04-01 (Released:2022-07-21)

参考文献数

31

著者

板橋 勇仁

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.73, pp.52-65, 2022-04-01 (Released:2022-07-21)

参考文献数

8

著者

児玉 聡

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2023, no.74, pp.22-30, 2023-04-01 (Released:2023-06-28)

著者

富山 豊

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.68, pp.155-168, 2017-04-01 (Released:2017-06-14)

参考文献数

8

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The internalism/externalism debate is one of the most important issues discussed in such areas of contemporary philosophy as philosophy of language, philosophy of mind (philosophy of thought), and epistemology. Husserl’s phenomenology might also be regarded as a kind of internalism since it emphasizes its methodological reduction into the internal sphere of experiences (“phenomenological reduction”). Externalist criticisms against some naive forms of internalist prejudice, however, seem to contain some important insights concerning the concepts of meaning, knowledge, and mental content (or propositional attitudes). Therefore I would like to try to defend Husserl’s basic insight concerning the concept of meaning, by adjusting it to accommodate this externalist insight. This “adjusting”, however, is not a distortion of Husserl’s original philosophy. I believe that it is just a precise explication of Husserl’s own insight as it really is.In order to show this, I will try to survey the early Husserl’s theory of meaning first, bringing out its internalistic features. Secondly, I introduce a kind of externalist criticism relevant to the theory. Thirdly, I would like to try to reconcile them, focusing on the contextuality of experience. Then, finally, I will consider the objectivity of scientific knowledge. I will argue that Husserl can accept the contextualityof meaning from the viewpoint of the contextuality of experience, in a way which does not destroy the objectivity of scientific knowledge.

著者

永井 均

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1983, no.33, pp.213-223, 1983-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

松田 克進

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.46, pp.60-69,3, 1995-10-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

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Many contemporary philosophers disagree to Cartesian Dualism (CD) saying that it results in solipsism, but the author shows that this is not the case. Their argument against CD is based on the belief that we could not know another person has a mind if we accepted CD, and one of the essential reasons for this belief is the view that the connection between mental workings and corporeal behaviors is at best contingent. However, Descartes himself denies this view when he proposes the 'argument from language', which says that the impossibility of mechanical explanation of speech behavior enables us to attribute minds to others.

著者

末木 文美士

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.68, pp.81-97, 2017-04-01 (Released:2017-06-14)

参考文献数

18

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After the theological turn in phenomenology, the relation between philosophy and theology has become very close. Jean-Luc Marion’s God without Being (1982) was the epoch-making work which showed the way from philosophy to theology.The subject of philosophy is not limited to manifest phenomena: the invisible is also important for our life and has to become the subject of philosophy. In this respect, it will be difficult to divide theology and philosophy.Turning to Buddhism, Imamura Hitoshi presented the idea of Buddhology in contrast to theology in Christianity. In my opinion, it will be possible to deal with the invisible in philosophy without this new field of Buddhology. Tanabe Hajime has already presented a ‘philosophy of death’, in which he discussed the existential cooperation of the living and the invisible dead. I would like to present a ‘philosophy of the manifest (ken) and the hidden (myō).’ The field of the hidden includes the dead, kami, Buddhas and other invisible aspects. Buddhism teaches the relation between the manifest and the hidden, but does not teach a transcendent God. Instead, Buddhist ideas of the dharma body, suchness and so on reveal the depth of the world of the manifest/ hidden, reminding us of the khôra of Plato and ‘place’ in Nishida Kitarō.

著者

湯浅 泰雄

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1969, no.19, pp.108-146, 1969-03-31 (Released:2010-01-20)

参考文献数

37

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It seems that the modern philosophers in Japan, Nishida, Tanabe, Watsuji and Miki, are not so interested in Confusiasm in proportion to Buddhism. They have been bred in Confusiastic education in their boyhood, and in their youth they were strongly influenced by modern European philosophy which made them critical to the feudal Confu-siastic moral in their beyhood. I think, however, the framework of their philosophical thought are based upon the Confusiastic tradition unconsciously. Unfamiliarity with the Western thought, which grew by degrees, led them back to the Eastern tradition and Buddhism. Confusiastic education in their boyhood had survived here uncon-scionsly. For, the orthodox Confusiastic school in Tokugawa Era (Sogaku) had been established from the first under the strong influ-ence of the medieval Cninese Buddhism, Zen and Kegon sect, so buddhistic and confusiastic ways of thinking are inseparable in their philosophies.They seek the unified or undivided horizont of theoretical and practical philosophies. In the tradition of western philosophy, the unity between “theoria” and “praxis” may be a metaphysical ideal that can be never possible in our dayly experiences in this world. They insist, on the contrary, that this unity is the most immediate experience in human life. For instance, Nishida's “Pure Experience” means the fundamental unity of Good and Reality. This way of thinking, I think, has its origin in “Kakubutsu-Chichi” (Intuition through things) in modern Confusiasm (Sogaku).Then, they divided two kinds or directions in practice: introverted and extroverted. Extroverted practice means social and ethical activities, and the introverted practice means the religious and metaphysical “inner way”, through which man can ascend to the height of “hierophany”. This “inner way” to the great religious awakening, which has its origin in the fundamental spirit of Mahayana Buddhism, Sunya, bring the true human personality to its perfect realization and also make possible the unity of theoretical and extroverted practical human activities in this world.By the way, their ways of thinking have been influenced not only by Buddhism but also by the traditional culture in Japan. For, the Chinese culture does not like the mystical “inner way”, so the Zen and Kegon sects in medieval China attach more importance to the moral custom in the dayly-life in this world, compared with the same sects in Japan. In the tradition of Japanese culture, I think it is possible to find the powerful tendencies to seek the dialectical unity between the “inner way” and the daily ethics, for instance as in Kukai's Mystical-esoteric Buddhism.

著者

小林 登

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1963, no.13, pp.16-30, 1963-03-31 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

屋良 朝彦

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1996, no.47, pp.276-285, 1996-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

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Merleau-Ponty qualifiait la réversibilité de «vérité ultime». «La réversibilité» exprime la fonction ontologique d'alterner les deux termes <le voyant-le visible>, <le touchant-le touché>, tout en les faisant demeurer dans la même chair. Et plus il soulignait l'importance d' «une réversibilité toujours imminente et jamais réalisée en fait». Je ne parviens jamais à me toucher touchant. Il y a quelque chose qui déborde cette réversibilité. Le but de cette essai est rechercher le sens de l'imminence de la réversibilité. Est-ce la latence de l'Être ? ou la transcendance de l'Être ? ou la transcendance même au-delà de l'Être ? La possibilité de déchirer l'ontologie de la chair serait montrée, qui est «l'impensé» dans la dernière philosophie de Merleau-Ponty.

著者

村上 陽一郎

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1977, no.27, pp.1-9, 1977-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)