著者

入江 幸男

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.46, pp.250-258,10, 1995-10-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

---

In Geschichtsforschung und Geschichtsphilosophie ist die Form der >Erzählung< als eine Erklärungsform der Ereignisse beachtet worden. Wenn wir erklären, warum ein Ereignis geschehen ist, müssen wir die Veränderung erklären. Eine Veränderung zu erklären bedeutet, die Mitte zwischen Anfang und Ende der Veränderung zu erklären. Diese Erklärungsform hat eine Form der >Erzählung<. Eine geschichtliche Frage, warum eine Veränderung geschehen ist, muß schon die Veränderung erwähnt haben. Die Antwort gibt eine Erklärung der Veränderung an und macht eine Erzählung erst vollständig. Aber in der Frage ist schon die Hälfte von der >Erzahlung< schon enthalten. Also ist in diesem Sinne die >Erzählung< nicht nur eine Erklärungsform der Geschichte, sondern auch die Form der geschichtlichen Frage.

著者

笠木 雅史

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.63, pp.171-184_L9, 2012 (Released:2012-10-16)

参考文献数

19

---

This paper aims to elucidate various arguments for Cartesian skepticism, reveal their presuppositions, and examine their plausibility. Cartesian skepticism concerns knowledge of the external world in general. Even though there are different arguments for Cartesian skepticism, their differences are often neglected, resulting in serious confusions. By analysing the premises and presuppositions of each argument, I attempt to figure out whether and to what extent it is plausible. The paper consists of seven sections. In Section 1, I introduce the problem of Cartesian skepticism. Then, from Sections 2 to 4, I review three different forms of the argument from ignorance, which appeal to different variants of the epistemic closure principle about knowledge. Among them, the standard closure principle is more plausible than the other two; one requires that S be logically omniscient, and one entails the notorious KK thesis that first-order knowledge requires second-order knowledge. The requirements these two closure principles impose on knowledge, then, are too strong. In Section 5, I discuss how versions of infallibilism are invoked in defending the first premise of the argument, viz., that S does not know that a skeptical hypothesis is false, of the argument from ignorance. On the other hand, some claim that the argument from underdetermination does not require infallibilism, and thereby undermines even fallible knowledge. In Section 6, however, I argue that it is hard to maintain that the argument from underdetermination fares well against fallible knowledge. The underdetermination principle, to which the argument appeals, is supported by premises at odds with fallibilism. In addition, the argument from underdetermination faces another problem: it presupposes that S's total evidence is restricted to sensory evidence, if it works against fallible knowledge at all. Since this presupposition is contentious, the argument from underdetermination against fallible knowledge needs more justification for its presuppositions, in order to get off the ground. Section 7 gives a summary of the paper.

著者

高橋 克也

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.46, pp.91-100,4, 1995-10-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

被引用文献数

1

---

L'attention, chez Kant, est un acte où l'entendement et la volonté s'entrecroisent essentiellement. C'est-à-dire que d'abord, elle appartient à la faculté de la connaissance, et elle est déroulée grâce à l'effet du vouloir. Ensuite, il faut remarquer que l'attention volontaire se réalise dans divers objets dont l'existence l'entendement saisit préalablement, et que par suite l'entendement est une des conditions nécessaires de la volonté. En analysant cet entrecroisement, on peut avoir une clef pour s'approcher de la problématique de l'humanité.

著者

長谷川 三千子

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1973, no.23, pp.162-173, 1973-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

10

著者

樫 則章

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.57, pp.43-58,3, 2006-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

26

---

In this article, Peter Singer's animal liberation and criticism agaist it is discussed. Singer's animal liberation is based on the principle of equal consideration of interests. However, the basis for this principle is derived from the logical requirement of universalizability of moral judgment. Thus, on the part of people who deny any consideration of animal interests or who think animal interests weigh less than those of humans, there is a responsibility to prove the validity of their views. Though some think animal interests are not the immediate object of moral consideration, they in fact are. Those who feel that more consideration should be placed on human interests compared to animals, in order to justify this inequality, point out the relevant moral differences between the two such as rationality, autonomy, moral agency, and so on. These people must come face to face with the so called, the problem of "marginal cases" in which it is stated that the interests of people lacking these qualities or capacities need not be considered. Though many solutions have been proposed, not one has been satisfactory. Thus, Singer's view that it is an unjustifiable discrimination not to consider animal interests as strongly just because they are for animals, can be indeed labeled as "speciesism." However, there are views stating that no interests worthy of consideration exist for animals because they do not have any sense of self and not even any consciousness. This problem can not be simply solved by physiology or cognitive ethology. Since it contains philosophical aspects such as "what is consciousness"or"what is belief, " its resolution is not at all easy. Though the principle of equal consideration of interests has sufficient ground, there still is room for debate on whether animals possess any interests to be considered. Therefore, animal liberation calls for discussion as well.

著者

坂本 邦暢

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.60, pp.185-200_L11, 2009 (Released:2010-11-09)

参考文献数

97

---

The Flemish humanist Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) is well-known for his restoration of Stoicism in early modern Europe. His main works, Introduction to Stoic Philosophy and Natural Philosophy of the Stoics, both published in Antwerp in 1604, prompted the reception of Stoicism in the seventeenth century and laid the foundation for its modern reconstruction.Lipsius tried to reconcile Stoic philosophy with Christian theology. Although the importance of his Christianized interpretation was recognized, scholars have paid little attention to the real motivation that led him to write the Introduction and Natural Philosophy. The preface to Introduction shows clearly that his primary aim was the exposition of Seneca's philosophy. Indeed, Lipsius's heavy reliance on the Roman philosopher and other Latin authors has been criticized since the publication of his works. According to this criticism, Lipsius ignored so many Greek sources that his reconstruction of Stoicism is invalid from a philological point of view. However, can his partial selection of sources not be viewed from different angles? Is it not his reading of Seneca's work that enabled him to harmonize Stoicism with Christian doctrines?To answer these questions I shall focus on Lipsius's theory of evil and the cosmic cycle, expounded in Natural Philosophy. My analysis will show that Seneca's eclecticism played an important role in the Lipsian reconstruction of Stoicism.

著者

坂本 百大

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1985, no.35, pp.1-18, 1985-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

李 明哲

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.73, pp.391-407, 2022-04-01 (Released:2022-07-21)

参考文献数

17

著者

金山 弥平

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.54, pp.71-91,239, 2003-04-01 (Released:2009-12-09)

---

Ancient and modern skepticism are said to be different in that (1) ancient skeptics attacked beliefs, while modern skeptics are challenging knowledge (justified true belief); (2) ancient skeptics considered it possible to live without beliefs, following 'appearances', while modern philosophers consider it impossible, as is typically represented by Hume's judgement; (3) ancient skeptics took skepticism to be the best way to attain happiness, while such a demand may be incredible to philosophers today. But are these differences really substantial? As to (1), the state of mind to which justified true belief corresponds in Greek philosophy is doxa (belief) rather than episteme (knowledge); modern skeptics may be regarded by ancient skeptics as challenging belief rather than knowledge. As to (2), when e.g. a car rushes toward them, Pyrrhonists and Humeans will both evade the car, with the processes in their minds being almost the same, and different only in names ('appearances' and 'beliefs'). However, there is at least one substantial difference: if ancient skeptics' claim in (3) is true, Pyrrhonists can lead a better life than Humeans, by following appearances of moral virtues and also suspending judgement about the sufferings their moral activities may cause to them. To Humeans, who hold that reason is the slave of the passions, Pyrrhonists' claim to achieve happiness by rationally suspending judgement may appear to be the result of neglecting observation. But the reason's power that enables men to lead a good life, in which ancient skeptics believed, was what Socrates actually observed in his own mind and handed down to posterity.

著者

青山 拓央

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.65, pp.9-24_L3, 2014-04-01 (Released:2016-06-30)

参考文献数

26

---

The titular question can be interpreted as follows: Does future possibility precede logical possibility ─ which provides simultaneous alternatives? In this paper, I defend a philosophical intuition that future possibility is more fundamental than logical possibility, even though the former seems conceptually more complex than the latter. My attempt can be regarded as retreating from Duns Scotusʼs modal semantics to Aristotleʼs (cf. Yagi 2009, Knuuttila 2013). Moreover, I attempt to reconstruct my previous arguments (Aoyama 2008, 2011) on the assumption that the above intuition is correct, and seek to connect Kripkeʼs famous argument about de re modality (Kripke 1980) with Wittgensteinʼs argument on certainty regarding de re beliefs (Wittgenstein 1969). In the appendix, I note that the background of this paper is related to Nietzscheʼs peculiar fatalism (I call a world in which this kind of fatalism is true not an ʻunfree worldʼ but an ʻafree worldʼ; everything in such a world involves no contrast between being free and being unfree that can be found in the determiningdetermined relation).

著者

田村 歩

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2023, no.74, pp.189-202, 2023-04-01 (Released:2023-06-28)

著者

川島 彬

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.70, pp.191-204, 2019-04-01 (Released:2019-04-18)

参考文献数

19

---

In this paper, I provide an interpretation of ‘the Form of the Good’ and ‘the unhypothesized principle’ in Plato’s Republic, VI-VII. Regarding the ‘Form of the Good,’ I first consider what is meant by the fact that Plato speaks of ‘the Good,’ on the one hand, usually as one Form among others and, on the other hand, at Republic, 509b7-9 as a special ‘Form’ that transcends the other Forms. I argue that these two ways of speaking of the Good should not represent two different items (pace Fujisawa) but rather two aspects of the same item. The Form of the Good is the cause of good things being good, just as the Form X is the cause of x things being x. And, for Plato, for something to be good is for its components to be unified. Now, the totality of Forms is something good, and this is made good by the Good, which unifies the system of Forms (this unification is what the Good does as the special, transcending ‘Form’). ‘The unhypothesized principle’, which the dialectician grasps at the end of ‘the upward path’, is, in my view, the system of Forms (and not, as many suppose, the Good itself). In the upward path, the dialectician subsumes a given Form under a more general Form and then subsumes this under an even more general Form, so that the whole system of Forms is both the endpoint of this procedure and the starting point (archē) for the downward path. This system is an especially good thing, showing, I suggest, the highest unity; grasping this system helps one to understand how unification in general comes about, which understanding, in turn, promotes the understanding of the Good.

著者

佐野 之人

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.72, pp.127-139, 2021-04-01 (Released:2021-05-20)

著者

中村 徳仁

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.72, pp.141-151, 2021-04-01 (Released:2021-05-20)

参考文献数

16

著者

加藤 之敬

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.69, pp.170-184, 2018-04-01 (Released:2018-08-01)

---

This paper intends to clarify Nietzsche’s concept of “contest.” This is because “contest” is an important concept in properly understanding Nietzsche’s view of our relation to others. In many cases, Nietzsche regards relation to others as a struggle, which may lead readers to think that Nietzsche considers relation to others negatively because struggle is associated with denying, suppressing, and destroying others. However, this interpretation is a misunderstanding. For Nietzsche, struggle is not only negative but also positive - if it is a form of relation in which people recognize others and which is associated with productive activity. This is clear from his early text, “Homer’s Contest.” In this text, he divides struggle into two forms: a positive and productive struggle, namely “contest,” on the one hand, and a negative and destructive struggle, namely “annihilative struggle,” on the other. Moreover, he postulates that “contest” was the foundation of progress in ancient Greek culture. Thus, in “Homer’s Contest,” Nietzsche considers “contest” to be the ideal relation to others. Furthermore, in discussing “contest,” Nietzsche often compares ancient and modern cultures, criticizing modern culture’s inability to create the conditions for forming an ideal relation to others. Nietzsche’s concept of “contest” has three fundamental elements: first, affirmation of envy and ambition, which are regarded as negative in the modern age; second, the necessity of equal or more powerful rivals and the availability of people who are capable of estimating correctly; and third, the necessity of maintaining pluralism. In this paper, these elements are explained in detail in order to clarify Nietzsche’s opinion on the ideal relation to others, namely “contest,” and emphasize his critical attitude toward modern culture apparent in “Homer’s Contest.

著者

渡邉 京一郎

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2023, no.74, pp.240-255, 2023-04-01 (Released:2023-06-28)

著者

縣 由衣子

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.67, pp.123-137, 2016-04-01 (Released:2017-06-13)

参考文献数

2

---

Le but du présent article est de mettre en lumière la notion de ‹corps mêlés› introduite par Michel Serres dans Les Cinq Sens au moment de la description de la notion de peau. Il s’agit ici de situer la place et la portée de cette notion dans l’ensemble de la pensée philosophique de l’académicien français.Les premiers ouvrages de Michel Serres, à savoir ceux des années 1960 jusqu’aux années 1980, l’ont fait connaître dans le domaine de l’épistémologie. En revanche, le fait qu’il ait entrepris dans le même temps l’analyse du concept de sensation est beaucoup moins connu, comme le prouve le nombre insuffisant d’études académiques consacrées à cette problématique, les liens reliant celle-ci avec les autres préoccupations de l’oeuvre de Michel Serres restant par conséquent ignorés.L'intérêt du présent article se situe précisément dans la découverte de ces liens à travers l'analyse de la notion de ‹corps mêlés› dont Michel Serres se sert pour décrire la notion de peau. De cette façon, la peau apparaît comme le lieu des ‹corps mêlés› par lesquels le sujet et l’objet se mélangent. Mais que veut signifier Michel Serres en recourant à cette notion méconnue et a priori difficile d'accès ? Pour éclairer cela, nous nous concentrons ici sur la notion, primordiale dans l’oeuvre de Michel Serres, de ‹quasi-objet› notamment traitée dans Le Parasite et qui, en soulignant l’état potentiel du sujet, dépasse en définitive la dichotomie de la philosophie traditionnelle entre le sujet et l’objet.Finalement, le présent article montre ainsi que le lieu des ‹corps mêlés› constitue l’état potentiel du sujet, mis en exergue par Michel Serres à travers la notion de ‹quasi-objet›, intervenant au niveau de la sensation.

著者

高木 駿

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.71, pp.172-183, 2020-04-01 (Released:2020-05-12)

参考文献数

11

著者

嘉指 信雄

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1997, no.48, pp.82-96, 1997-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

---

It was in James' philosophy of pure experience that Nishida Kitaro and Natsume Soseki as well found a theoretical starting-point for their seminal works in the fields of philosophy and literature respectively. This paper proposes to set up a “co-ordinate space for comparative studies” with James' phenomenological notion of “fringes” at its origin, where we can place the works of Nishida and Soseki. It is expected that, thus brought together side by side, the characteristics of their works as two independent metamorphoses of the Jamesian phenomenology of “fringes” will be brought into relief in contrast to each other ; especially, Nishida's notion of “field” will be called into question as failing to do full justice to the pluralistic implications James drew from his consideration of the phenomenon of “fringes.”

著者

古田 光

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1967, no.17, pp.201-210, 1967-03-31 (Released:2009-07-23)