著者

江守 正多

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.71, pp.10-20, 2020-04-01 (Released:2020-05-12)

参考文献数

7

著者

檜垣 立哉

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1992, no.42, pp.217-227, 1992-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

菅沼 聡

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.51, pp.278-288, 2000-05-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

15

被引用文献数

1

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いかなる部分的存在者でもない存在者全体は存在するか。つまり、世界全体は、その個々の部分と同じく存在するだろうか。これは、形而上学全般にとって重要であり得るにもかかわらず、十分に検討されてこなかった問題である。本稿で我々は、この問題を主として現代の英米系の哲学の流れをもとに検討する。我々はまず、存在者全体、世界全体の存在の問題を明確にし ( (1) )、その上で、その存在についての主要な疑問点を考察し ( (2) ~ (3) )、その考察から得た結論を示す ( (4) ) ことにする。

著者

菅沼 聡

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.62, pp.283-298_L17, 2011 (Released:2011-12-09)

参考文献数

24

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In this paper, reality-in-itself and the absolute whole (of everything) —two of the most radically metaphysical ideas—are critically examined from a contemporary philosophical viewpoint. The legitimacy of both ideas has long been doubted, particularly since the criticisms of Kant's thing-in-itself (by Fichte and others), and since some paradoxes of set theory (such as Cantor's paradox), respectively. In section 1 of this paper, the truth/justification conditions of the existence of something real-in-itself are presented, and examined to confirm (more explicitly than ever before) that the idea of reality-in-itself cannot be easily maintained. Likewise, in section 2, the truth/justification conditions of the existence of the absolute whole (of everything) are presented, and examined to confirm that this idea cannot easily be maintained either. In section 3, however, the concept of an absolute whole of reality-in-itself (hereafter, |R|) is introduced by combining the above two ideas. Because this concept is formulated by combining two of the most radically metaphysical ideas, |R| can/could be called the “most metaphysical” reality. In view of the results presented in sections 1 and 2, the existence of |R| might be expected to be doubly doubtful. However, the results presented in section 3 are quite the opposite. It is argued that both the truth/ justification conditions are exceptionally satisfied in |R| (hence |R| exists), and thus, both ideas can be exceptionally maintained in |R|.

著者

植村 玄輝

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.66, pp.127-142, 2015

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<p></p><p>In discussing the nature of laws of logic in the <i>Prolegomena</i> of the <i>Logical</i> <i>Investigations</i>, Husserl gives a passingly critical remark about a certain sort of <i>anti</i>-psychologism. He accuses some antipsychologists of misconceiving the laws of logic as essentially normative. This is a mistake, he claims, because logic is a system of norms of thinking or judging only in a <i>deliberative</i> sense; in its primal form, "pure" logic concerns <i>descriptive</i> laws that govern the relationship among propositions as ideal meaning-entities. Such a remark is in need of elucidation and evaluation, since it is widely and correctly acknowledged that the <i>Prolegomena</i> is devoted to the refutation of psychologism rather than anti-psychologism. In the present paper, the author argues for the following four claims: (I) Husserl's criticism of antipsychologism is an integral part of his argument for pure logic. Since his argument against psychologism in and by itself leads only to the anti-psychologism in question, he is in need of a separate argument for the primarily descriptive and deliberatively normative nature of logic. (II) Husserl succeeds in giving a coherent and fine account of how laws of logic are primarily descriptive and deliberatively normative. (III) This account is not well motivated unless it is supplemented by the phenomenological analysis of cognition. (IV) Husserl does not succeed in providing such a supplementation in the second volume of the <i>Logical</i> <i>Investigations</i>, because he there excludes intentional objects from the domain of phenomenological descriptions. With those claims, the author concludes that Husserl's so-called transcendental turn and the further development of his thought should be understood as attempts to overcome the incoherence of the Logical Investigations in order to save the largely Aristotelian conception of logic that lies behind the whole discussion.</p>

著者

一ノ瀬 正樹

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.56, pp.42-62,3, 2005-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

26

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The past is nowhere, but it is implied in our understanding of the world. We have to take into account these two fundamental characteristics of the past, i.e. absence and im-plicitness, in order to clarify historical knowledge, as history must be a part of the past highlighted by linguistic description. In this article I investigate the nature of historical knowledge by taking implicitness of the past to be causation between the past and our present state, and interpreting absence of the past as bringing about a probabilistic character of historical knowledge.After briefly examining the controversy about the reality of the past, I scrutinize the covering law model of historical causal explanation through considering its probabilistic form. In particular I mention the problem of how to apply Bayesian Conditionalisation to historical causal explanations. However, Bayesian theory is involved in serious difficulties like the problem of old evidence. This suggests that our choice of context must be ques-tioned, which calls the narrative theory of history into discussion. I argue that narrative theory will introduce backward causation from narration to past events, and that the theory will still imply a probabilistic contingent status of the past. Finally I take up the question of why we narrate our history, and I assert that a sense.of crisis causally motivates us to narrate it. As the sense of crisis itself is a sort of historical knowledge as well as the resultant narration, the probabilistic and contingent character extends throughout our historical knowledge.

著者

清水 将吾

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.58, pp.191-202,24, 2007-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

9

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The body is a subject in the sense that it is that which perceives. But, at the same time, it is also an object. In this paper, I hope to take a step towards understanding this peculiar twofold character of the body.The question I will consider is : are bodily sensations able to locate the body in space? I take up this question because arguments have already been advanced for an affirmative answer. If they are found persuasive, that would seem to support the claim that bodily sensations afford an objective aspect to the subjective body.Such arguments, however, are not at the level relevant to my interest, since they appear to deal not with the intrinsic or indipendent affect of such sensations.The first aim of this paper is to therefore secure the relevant level through making critical examination of the existing arguments. The second aim is to answer the question articulated at that level. The answer I give will be a negative one.

著者

大越 愛子

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1992, no.42, pp.228-239, 1992-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

宮崎 裕助

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

no.57, pp.240-253, 2006-04

著者

酒井 健太朗

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.70, pp.205-219, 2019-04-01 (Released:2019-04-18)

参考文献数

11

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Aristotle’s APo. claims that scientific knowledge requires a cause serving as the middle term in the demonstration. APo. II 11 considers how the well-known “four causes” should be understood in the theory of demonstration. What is key is the relation of the final cause to the other three causes. This paper discusses how the theory of demonstration handles these causes by considering their status and interrelation. Aristotle examines the four causes from the perspective of the major and minor terms in a demonstration. The grounding cause states the essence of the minor term, and the essential and efficient causes state the essence of the major term. However, there are difficulties in considering the final cause. For, in the example of being healthy, illustrating the final cause involves two demonstrations. In the first demonstration, the middle term (food not staying on the surface) explains the essence of the major term (being healthy). In the second demonstration, however, the middle term (being healthy) does not explain the essence of the major term (food not staying on the surface) or the minor term (walking after dinner). In order to answer this problem, we have to mention two points: First, the final cause appears last in generation but arises first as the initial point of the explanation; secondly, the final cause explains the processes to the end as for the end. By considering these facts, I show that the second demonstration explains the major term and the minor term by the middle term from the viewpoint of temporal order that the first demonstration establishes. This paper argues that APo. II 11 divides the four causes into the final cause and the other three causes and claims that the second demonstration includes “hypothetical necessity”. Consequently, this paper shows that Aristotle aims to exclude chance from a demonstration having the final cause as the middle term by introducing hypothetical necessity.

著者

神島 裕子

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.69, pp.21-31, 2018-04-01 (Released:2018-08-01)

参考文献数

8

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This paper examines the problem of harassments in higher education from the perspective of Iris Marion Young’s social connection model of responsibility and suggests the problem as results of structural injustice. The first section reviews Young’s model of responsibility and sheds light on three features: (1) it imposes responsibility on all actors involved in structure that produces unjust outcome, (2) it sees responsibility as forward-looking and imposes this responsibility on all actors as shared responsibility, and (3) all actors are demanded to engage in collective actions to make unjust structures less unjust. The second section applies Young’s model of responsibility to sexual harassments in higher education institutions. A hypothetical character of a female university lecturer is employed to show how in a gendered sexist society sexual harassments could occur in university setting where no single actor can be blamed for the unjust result. The third section points out one problematic feature of Young’s model of responsibility. Young’s idea of shared responsibility is useful to set the problem of sexual harassments as our collective problem, but it gives insufficient attention to capabilities of victims of unjust structures. The forth section discusses the question of capability to responsibility. Although Young suggests that victims share responsibility at least to criticize unjust structure, they generally lack capabilities to do so due to the gendered sexist society. On the other hand, Young denies the idea of blaming non-victims, even when they have capabilities to reproduce such structures, for the sake of cooperative motivations. This paper argues that Young’s model should take capabilities of victims into account so that it does not allow a counter-argument that “no voices raised, no harassment done”, while admitting that in certain cases we cannot practically blame non-victims of unjust structure. The fifth section suggests a sort of “self-investigating research project” as part of taking shared responsibility where individual actors take turns to reflect upon one’s own positions and actions and then present one’s report to others in meetings. This project seems fit into the university setting as a way for sharing responsibility for achieving justice.

著者

高橋 晃一

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.71, pp.96-106, 2020-04-01 (Released:2020-05-12)

参考文献数

11

著者

納富 信留

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.68, pp.45-62, 2017-04-01 (Released:2017-06-14)

参考文献数

1

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In the first part of this paper, in order to reconsider the significance of the history of philosophy, I examine its relationship with philosophy in three respects. First, the history of philosophy aims to examine the beginning (archē) of philosophy. By revealing its beginnings (not only in ancient Greece), we can start to engage in a new philosophy. Second, the history provides us with philosophical texts that encourage our thinking. We find there rich resources of reasoning and ideas on philosophical issues. Third, this history shows us our own position in two ways. It presents a set of philosophical concepts, problems and frameworks that we inherit from past philosophers. Also, an examination of this heritage reveals our own position within philosophy.In the second part, I critically survey the various candidates for “first philosopher” in ancient Greece. Each thinker, from Thales to Plato, has supporters and good justification for being considered the first. Then, in the third part, I propose a new perspective, “compound eye history”, in which we investigate plural lines of thinking. Each distinct line started from a new problem raised by a philosopher and developed through critical or positive responses by his contemporaries or later thinkers. I envisage 10 “plots” or lines of ancient philosophy by which we can conceptualise that whole intellectual activity of human life and wisdom.

著者

関谷 直也

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.73, pp.37-47, 2022-04-01 (Released:2022-07-21)

参考文献数

21

著者

鴻 浩介

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.68, pp.169-184, 2017-04-01 (Released:2017-06-14)

参考文献数

16

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According to G. E. M. Anscombe’s proposal, agents have a special way of knowing about their own intentional actions - they have the capacity to know what they are intentionally doing without relying on any evidence from observation, inference and so on. Anscombe dubbed this special knowledge “practical knowledge” and took it to be an essential mark of agency. This article attempts an explanation and vindication of this Anscombean approach to agency.The discussion falls into four sections. In the first section, I clarify the nature of Anscombe’s practical knowledge and argue that the principal task for us is to spell out how one can be justified in believing not just what one intends, but what one is intentionally doing without any evidence. In Section II, I discuss what is generally considered to be the most promising way of dealing with this task: the reliabilism strategy. On this view, practical knowledge is justified because there is a reliable efficient-causal link between an agent’s intention to φ and his/her actually doing φ. I am willing to accept the reliabilism strategy as being basically on the right track. However, in Section III, I argue that the reliabilism strategy overlooks an important element of Anscombe’s discussion, namely that practical knowledge is the “formal cause” of what it understands, i.e., intentional actions. With this observation in place, we can give an even more comprehensive account of the nature of practical knowledge. In Section IV, I close with a suggestion that the structure of practical knowledge so understood is surprisingly similar to the structure of the knowledge that makers of artifacts are said to have, and this similarity can support the claim that practical knowledge is knowledge about an objective, public world.

著者

松本 俊吉

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.55, pp.90-112,23, 2004-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

参考文献数

14

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The objective of this article is to clarify the nature of the methodological position called adaptationism in evolutionary biology (that is, a position holding natural selection to be ubiquitous and the most powerful as a mechanism of the evolution of life) and to discuss the problems that relate to it. To this end, I will first set forth the controversy having been waged on the legitimacy of adaptationism, originally initiated by Gould and Lewontin in 1978 and having been joined by mainstream neo-Darwinists ever since. Then I will put forward some framework for evaluating this controversy, namely, the idea of taking adaptationism to be a research program in Lakatos' sense. In the second section, I will review, somewhat critically, how adaptationistic thinking is exemplified in the sociobiological research program advocated by E. O. Wilson and his followers. In the third section, I will give some considerations on the possibility of the model of cultural evolution (memetics) as a complement to the one-sidedness of the genetically-biased sociobiological explanation of human culture.

著者

中村 征樹

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.67, pp.61-79, 2016-04-01 (Released:2017-06-13)

参考文献数

4

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After a series of serious misconduct cases uncovered in the previous years, the situation surrounding research misconduct in Japan is changing dramatically. The government stipulated new guidelines for research misconduct in 2014. As such, the research institutions are now required to implement measures to prevent misconduct, including research integrity education. In the face of this rapidly changing situation, it seems imperative to clarify what the research misconduct issues are and to closely examine countermeasures. Research misconduct is principally defined as fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism. But what is wrong with these types of behavior? In the case of plagiarism, it is considered unforgivable not because it poses any real harm or breaches the law, but because it violates the moral norms of the scientific community and damages the ecosystem of scientific research. “Responsible” conduct, which is emphasized in the discourse on research integrity, could be properly understood by considering this intrinsic dimension of research misconduct. Examining the “responsible” authorship issues makes it possible to illuminate another feature of research integrity. While the biomedical community has been elaborating on the criteria for “responsible” authorship, the high energy physics community formulated an alternative model of authorship: collective authorship. This difference stems from a constellation of internal and external factors of a given scientific community. This shows that research integrity is deeply embedded in the economy of scientific research.

著者

小柳 美代子

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1991, no.41, pp.166-176, 1991-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

著者

阿部 里加

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.70, pp.129-144, 2019-04-01 (Released:2019-04-18)

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Im Liebesbegriff bei Augustin, in dem Arendt die Struktur der Nächstenliebe im Christentum philosophisch analysiert, unterscheidet sie zwischen amor mundi und dilectio mundi (beide „die Liebe zur Welt“). Darüberhinaus versucht Arendt zu zeigen, dass der Mensch wie ein Fremder existiert, während er in dieser Welt ist, gleichzeitig jedoch auch nicht existent ist. Dieser Widerspruch wird durch den Begriff der Isoliertheit, im Zusammenhang mit denen der sibi sufficere (Autarkie), der dilectio (Liebe) und des uti (Gebrauchs), expliziert. Der Begriff der Isolierung impliziert sowohl die Unabhängigkeit von der Welt als auch von Gott und findet seinen Ursprung im griechischen sibi sufficere (αυτάρκει) sowie in den Begriffen ordinata dilectio (geordnete Liebe) und uti. Das sibi sufficere lässt den Menschen die irdische Welt vermeiden, weil es die absolute Abwesenheit von Bedürftigkeit und die völlige Freiheit von anderen bedeutet. Auf der Grundlage der ordo amor (Liebesordnung) hat ordinata dilectio ihren Ursprung in Gott und im „eigenen Ich-selbst“ und führt bei der diligere invicem (gegenseitigen Liebe) unter den Christen zur Indirektheit. Diese Indirektheit hebt die gegenseitige Angewiesenheit der Menschen radikal auf: Die Beziehung zwischen dem Menschen und der Welt zum uti. Folglich liebt der Mensch sowohl seinen Nächsten als auch andere als ein Objekt des uti. Weiterhin führt die ordinata dilectio auch zwischen dem Menschen und zwischen Gott zur Indirektheit. Nach Arendts Interpretation ist es möglich, dass der Mensch bei Augustinus räumlich „Vor Gott“ (coram Deo) und durch die Objektivität außerhalb der Welt steht. Im Hinblick auf die Konzepte ordinata dilectio und uti nach Augustinus bedeutet somit die Isolierung eine Weltentfremdung und deutet auf eine Vorbedingung der christlichen Nächstenliebe hin. Außerdem verweist die Isolierung nicht auf die Versöhnung mit der Welt, sondern eher auf die Ablehnung und die Entfremdung von der Welt. Deshalb erklärt Arendt: „Aus der Weltentfremdung an sich entsteht neben der alten societas auch ein ihr gegensätzliches neues Miteinander und Füreinander“. Ohne eine Isolierung von der Welt kann der Mensch keine wahre Verbindung mit seinen Mitmenschen sowie kein neues vita socialis (soziales Leben) aufbauen.

著者

村山 達也

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.60, pp.279-293_L17, 2009 (Released:2010-11-09)

参考文献数

17

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Le but de cet article est de dégager de l'Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience de Bergson, non pas son ontologie et son épistémologie à l'état d'achèvement, mais sa vision plus primitive sur la réalité et la connaissance. Bien que la vision qui s'y trouve soit en quelque sorte rudimentaire, ce livre constitue néanmoins un cas privilégié en ce qu'il est le premier livre majeur de Bergson où celui-ci n'expose pas encore sa propre théorie de l'intuition, qui est présentée dans l'Introduction à la métaphysique et travaille parfois comme un écran qui nous cache le bergsonisme.Nous procédons par l'analyse de l'attitude bergsonienne face aux problèmes philosophiques. La position et la résolution des problèmes philosophiques révèleraient non seulement les idées que celui qui le pose et résout a de l'objet questionné, mais aussi les thèses générales qu'il se fait sur la réalité, la connaissance et leur rapport. Au début, nous extrayons de l'Avant-propos de ce livre le paradoxe de la solution du problème mal posé, analogue à celui de Ménon. Ensuite nous interprétons successivement les antinomies qu'a formulées Bergson et les contradictiones in adjecto, ou les«grossières images», qui ont engendré ces antinomies. Nous mettrons ainsi au jour les travaux à faire pour faire s'évanouir les antinomies et créer une solution unique. Nommément, la critique du postulat commun et l'invention, à travers la dialectique aristotélicienne, des images nouvelles qui sont naturellement précises.À la fin de cet article, nous tirerons des analyses ci-dessus plusieurs thèses sur la tendance rationaliste, la valeur de l'immédiat et le statut de la réalité dans le bergsonisme.