著者

三船 恵美

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_180-206_189, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

16

著者

三百苅 拓志

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_117-206_132, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

91

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As a part of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) is situated at the top of the hierarchical channel for security talks. The SCC played a major role in the management of the Japan-U.S. Alliance during the post-Cold War era as it was reorganized into a “2+2” meeting structure in which two foreign ministers and two defense ministers participate. However, there have been no studies that have tracked the historical changes in the talks system or the talks process.This paper aims to track the historical transformations in the processes relating to how agreements are reached and to clarify the qualitative changes in these processes until the enactment of the “2+2” system. We will chronologically follow the historical transformations in the Japan-U.S. talks by focusing on the following two points: centered on the “2+2” meetings, how the consulted channels such as the Security Sub-Committee (SSC), the Mini-SSC, and the Sub-Committee on Defense Cooperation (SDC) were utilized in the process of strengthening the alliance; and how actors such as the politicians and the bureaucratic organizations in Japan and the United States spearheaded the agreement. The following became clear as a result of doing this.In the 1990s, the “2+2” meetings became increasingly important as a type of ceremony that demonstrated the strengthening of an alliance. They also transitioned to being a forum in which each of the channels of consultation was converted into a group of processes. The “2+2” meetings then came to play the role of controlling the deadlines for the targets to be met in each of the consultation channels and the channels themselves. In addition, the meetings were positioned as a part of a “comprehensive mechanism” through which Japan and the United States formulated operational plans during emergencies and critical situations in the areas surrounding Japan.In the 2000s, there was a change on the Japanese side, whereby the agreement process changed from being led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to being led by the Prime Minister’s Office. This strengthened the initiative of the cabinet ministers and expanded the role of the Ministry of Defense, in particular the uniformed members of the armed forces. As a result, the negotiations with the United States were held in the form of a joint team for foreign affairs and defense under the Prime Minister’s Office, allowing them to deal with the political issues that were difficult to coordinate. In addition, the uniformed personnel group within the Self-Defense Force (SDF) made use of it expertise to realign the bases as well as the units of the SDF and U.S. forces in Japan, thereby strengthening the military cooperation.In the 2010’s, the Japanese side proposed a revision of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation along with the consideration and coordination of the expansion of the Japan-U.S. roles, including the partial acceptance of the right to have a collective self-defense.It became clear that the qualitative changes in the “2+2” system as described above had gradually strengthened the framework of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. While “2+2” did not fully function right from the beginning, nevertheless, through the changes in the situation in East Asia post the end of Cold War and other factors, the two countries accumulated an experience of more than 20 years and qualitatively shifted towards more politically, militarily, and pragmatically important engagements.

著者

佐竹 知彦

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_133-206_148, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

73

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Since the end of the Cold War, the US allies in Asia such as Japan and Australia have enhanced their bilateral and trilateral security cooperation including the United States. Does it mean that, as some suggest, the US-led “hub and spokes” system—a bilateral alliance network centered on the US “hub” and regional allies as “spokes”—has transformed to a more “networked” alliance structure based on horizontal relations between the United States and regional allies?To answer this question, the paper first focuses on the asymmetric nature of the “hub and spokes” alliance system. Previous studies suggest that an asymmetric structure of the US alliance system in Asia—in a sense that regional allies do not assume defense obligations or burden which are equivalent to those of the United States—has prevented the emergence of the collective defense mechanism such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe. In particular, the US regional allies did not wish to establish a collective defense mechanism in Asia, so long as the United States continuously committed to regional allies’ defense bilaterally.This in turn suggests that, should the US security commitment become less credible, regional allies have greater incentives to enhance their mutual defense cooperation in order to prepare for the loss of security provided by the United States. Indeed, Japan and Australia began to enhance their security cooperation immediately after the Cold War, out of fear that the US military presence in the region would become weaken. In order to maintain the strong US military presence in the region, these two allies began to assume greater burden-sharing with the United States.Such cooperation continued after the 2000s, at which the rise of China became more prominent. In order to maintain the US strategic primacy in Asia, Japan and Australia actively contributed to the US-led global “war on terror”. Both countries also increased their roles in regional peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance and disaster reliefs activities. As a result, the trilateral security cooperation became institutionalized in the late 2000s. As such, trilateral security cooperation between Japan, the US and Australia have enhanced as Japan and Australia assumed greater burden and responsibilities in both regional and global security.This ostensibly suggests the transformation of the US alliance network from an asymmetrical “hub and spokes” system to a more symmetrical alliance network. In reality, however, these regional allies enhanced their security cooperation in order to maintain the US strategic primacy, so that they can continuously enjoy the US security commitment to them through bilateral alliance relations. This means that, quite ironically, the so-called “spokes to spokes” cooperation could help to endure, rather than transform, the existing hub and spokes system by maintaining its asymmetric alliance structure.

著者

川村 陶子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_149-206_164, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

52

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In today’s world, cross-border movement of people, goods, and information causes instability of sovereign nation-state system and distrust in fundamental values. To attain security and creative development of international society, it is necessary to develop a policy which contributes to co-existence and -creation among people with different cultural backgrounds. Conventional research on cultural and public diplomacy suffers from multiplicity of terminology and difficulty in policy evaluation. A new conceptual framework is necessary, which allows comparative study across time and space, and enables analysis of broader policy process.This paper suggests two new concepts to meet the current needs: (1) management of international cultural relations (ICR-management), and (2) cultural relations policy (CRP). The first concept, ICR-management, refers to cultural resources management for the purpose of constructing better intercultural relations. The second concept, CRP, refers to commitment of a state to ICR-management.The paper consists of three parts. Part One sketches out the theoretical background of ICR-management, drawing on different approaches of IR-scholars (and also of practitioners) to cultural dimension of international relations. There are three main approaches: analytical, administrative, and combined. The combined approach explicitly pursues better cross-cultural relations by exploiting cultural resources. Researchers in other disciplines also take interest in ICR-management; recent works of Cultural Policy Research have especially a lot to offer.Part Two introduces the concept of CRP, i.e., a state’s policy which directly or indirectly promotes ICR-management. CRP consists of cultural policies in a broad sense with four interrelated dimensions: external (traditional cultural or public diplomacy), outward (nation branding and information), inbound (attraction of foreigners), and inland (intercultural education and diversity management). Planning and administration of CRP requires consultation and collaboration among many different actors – both public and private, domestic and foreign. Adopting the concept of CRP would make it possible to consider various “cultural policies,” which have conventionally been handled in different administrative sectors, within a single framework. The concept also enlarges the scope of policymaking in international cultural relations, thus facilitates a broader perspective in the analysis and evaluation of a cultural program.Part Three briefly examines the practices of CRP in Germany and Japan. Scope and content of a country’s CRP vary, according to the nation’s constitution and its history of cultural relations with internal and external “others”. While the CRPs of Germany and Japan contrast in their concepts and structures, the two countries share their historical principle of nation-building and the current issue of accepting migrant workers as a complement to aging society. For Japan, it is instructive that many German organizations with longtime experience in “external” cultural policy currently apply their know-how of ICR-management to new “inbound” and “inland” programs.

著者

毛利 聡子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_165-206_179, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

49

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At the 21st Conference of Parties (COP21) in Paris in 2015, Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change (UNFCCC) reached an agreement to combat climate change and set goal of holding temperature rises no more than 2°C. The Paris Agreement entered into force in 2016, and the ratified countries were expected to submit their intended nationally determined contributions. However, climate talks at COP 25 in 2019 ended with limited progress on emissions targets. The long-term climate talks among governments continue to fail to deliver commitment to cut greenhouse gases and to limit dangerous climate impacts.On the other hand, the global financers and investors have accelerated to shift their funds from fossil fuel industry to realize the de-carbonized economy. In practice large institutional investors and companies start to divest from the fossil fuel industry and re-invest renewable energy industry. According to the environmental NGO “Fossil Free”, over 1110 institutions have committed to policies black-listing coal, oil and gas, and assets committed to divestment have leapt from $52 billion in 2014 to more than $11 trillion in 2019. Why do the number of investors express commitment to divest their funds without international legal binding? It can be assumed that institutional investors have re-examined their thoughts through interactions with civil society actors. In order to answer to these questions, this article examines how and to what extent NGOs’proposals and strategies influence on decisions made by institutional investors in three aspects.First, this article explores how the small thinktank called Carbon Tracker’s Report Unburnable Carbon (especially the concept of ‘stranded assets’) could reframe the debate on climate change into financial term. Second, how do strategies taken by fossil fuel divestment movement campaigns impact and effect on finance and public discourse. A closer look is taken at the changing notions of ‘reputation risk’ and ‘fiduciary duty’ which have significant impacts on investors and companies. Third, this article analyzes how the information disclosure system, which is essential for investors to decide investment choice, has been constructed with a particular focus on the CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project).In so doing, the article explores the process of non-state actors, particularly NGOs and institutional investors, contributing to create information-based private governance. In addition, the article addresses the conditions and lessons that empower private governance sustainable and democratic.

著者

福島 啓之

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_67-206_83, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

86

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This article explains historical transition of the U.S.-Japan Alliance by applying theoretical frameworks which combine the distribution of power in the world and the degree of threat. The explanation reveals the evolution of Japan’s alliance policy as a minor ally. It suggests that the minor ally’s adaptable behavior in order to respond to the threat and unite with the major ally contributes to the maintenance of the asymmetric alliance. This argument provides an implication to answer why the U.S.-Japan alliance has been maintained although it had unfair or unequal relationship for each ally.Theoretical frameworks to examine the asymmetric alliance rearrange four basic forms of the minor ally’s alliance policy. They are reflex balancing, buck-passing, hedging, and complementary cooperation. Reflex balancing is to counter a threat and to rely on a major ally. Buck-passing is to make a major ally accept the burden of an alliance. Hedging is to approach a target country while cooperation with a major ally is maintained. Complementary cooperation is to counter a threat and to assist a major ally.I argue that the combination of the distribution of power and the degree of threat affects the minor ally’s alliance policy as the member of the asymmetric alliance. Their causal relationships have following four patterns. First, if the distribution of power is decentralized and the degree of threat is high, a minor ally chooses reflex balancing. Second, if the distribution of power is decentralized and the degree of threat is low, a minor ally chooses buck-passing. Third, if the distribution of power is concentrated and the degree of threat is low, a minor ally chooses hedging. Fourth, if the distribution of power is concentrated and the degree of threat is high, a minor ally chooses complementary cooperation.Applying theoretical frameworks of balance of power and threat, I explain four basic forms of Japan’s alliance policy which were adopted by succesive administrations except for three short-lived ones. When war and confrontation were observed in the Cold War period, Japan relied on the U.S. and balanced against the Communist camp’s threat. When leaders’ talks and tension reduction were observed in the Cold War period, Japan depended on the U.S. When the sole superpower U.S. pursued unilateralism and exhausted in the Post-Cold War period, Japan cooperated with the U.S. as the ally while it approached China and Russia. When Senkaku islands problem fell into a territorial dispute in the Post-Cold War period, Japan decided to start collective self-defense with the U.S. Therefore, the implication of this article suggests that the adaptable nature of Japan’s alliance policy to the changes of international environment sustained the U.S.-Japan alliance.

著者

浜 由樹子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_180-205_183, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

ロメロ イサミ

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_177-205_180, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

矢口 啓朗

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_17-206_33, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

113

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The Quadruple Alliance, which was signed by Russia, Great Britain, Austria and Prussia on November 20, 1815, established the foundation of the Congress System. However, the main object of this Alliance was the prevention of another instance of French aggression. In the 1830s, the international order was threatened by the French July Monarchy, which wanted to influence neighboring countries through ideas of liberalism. The autocrat of Russia, Tsar Nicholas I, who was afraid of these ideas, tried to prevent the spread of French influence. Many previous studies have emphasized that he strengthened relationships with the Holly Alliance. However, this study focuses on Russia’s relationship with Great Britain and reveals the Russo-British partnerships in the Quadruple Alliance for the defense of the Vienna System when Britain was governed by the liberal Whig Party during most of the 1830s.Although there was a liberal ideological identity, in both Great Britain and France in the 1830s, the two countries had many conflicts of interest in Europe and the Near East. The Whig government never permitted France to expand its influence over Belgium and Syria. For example, when a son of the King of France was recommended as the new Belgian king in January 1831, the British Foreign Secretary Palmerston rejected this idea, because Britain could not agree to the practical annexation of Belgium by France. In addition, since Britain showed negative attitudes to France in 1831, Russia could be sure of Britain’s commitment to the Continent through the Quadruple Alliance. Although in 1832 the ideological differences between Russia and Britain appeared with the passing of the Reform Act in Britain and by means of Belgian independence, Russia relied on Britain to deflect French aggression to neighboring countries. However, after the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, which was signed by Russia and the Ottoman Empire on July 8, 1833, Britain approached France because they did not agree with the expansion of Russia’s influence in the Near East.Nevertheless, during the Second Syrian Crisis, when the divergent and conflicting of Anglo-French interests in the Near East resurfaced, Russia approached Britain and took the initiative to develop the First Straits Convention, signed without France on July 15, 1840. Since “disgraced” France was threatening its neighboring countries into signing another convention, Russia demanded Britain’s commitment to defend Europe. Britain agreed to deflect the French invasion, although it did not want to sign a formal agreement. Russia used the Quadruple Alliance as a tool for involving liberal Britain in consistent defense against France in the 1830s. This Alliance contributed to the preservation of the Vienna System even after the collapse of the Congress System through the continued solidarity of the Four Powers against France.

著者

安富 淳

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_184-205_187, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

鈴木 一人

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_188, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

前川 一郎

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_157-205_166, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

24

著者

高原 秀介

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_167-205_176, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

5

著者

青野 利彦

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_1-206_16, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

44

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This special issue is an attempt to reexamine the dynamics of alliance politics from historical and theoretical perspectives. The subsequent essay serves as an introduction to the current issue and is divided in two parts. The first half provides a short overview of the theoretical and historical literature concerning alliance politics, with special attention to important topics, such as: alliance formation, alliance security dilemma, alliance functions, alliance institutionalization, and the dynamics of asymmetrical alliances.The second half of this piece contends that the scholarly contribution of the eight articles in this volume are significant to the study of alliance politics. With evidence from neglected archival sources, YAGUCHI Hiroaki and TAJIMA Nobuo reinterpret the nature of such well-studied alliances as the Quadruple Alliance in the nineteenth century and the alliance among the Axis powers in the 1930s. FUJII Atsushi’s article on French-Belgian relations and NAKASHIMA Takuma’s article on the US-Japan alliance respectively examine the alliance politics in Europe and Asia with emphasis on the wider historical contexts – decolonization in the 1950s and the development of nuclear weapons technology in the 1960s. International Relations (IR) theorist IZUMIKAWA Yasuhiro offers a new “dynamic” theory of alliance politics concerned with the interplay between allied countries and their adversary, while FUKUSHIMA Hiroyuki seeks to reassess the transformation of the post-war US-Japanese alliance by means of his new analytical model. Articles by SANBYAKUGARI Hiroshi and SATAKE Tomohiko shed new light on the post-Cold War US-Japanese alliance. The former meticulously scrutinizes the development of the Two-Plus-Two system between the allies after 1990, while the latter analyzes the implications of the increasing Australian-Japanese security cooperation for the “hub and spoke” alliance system in post-war Asia. All in all, this special issue makes significant contributions to the historical and theoretical literature on alliance politics.

著者

田嶋 信雄

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_34-206_50, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

62

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This study will analyze the political realities of the Japanese–German Anti-Comintern Pact, the Tripartite Pact, and the Japan–Germany–Italy wartime alliance. Particular attention will be paid to the following: (1) introducing a new perspective on Axis relations from the viewpoint of Japan’s policy toward India, Afghanistan, and Iran; (2) providing new historical knowledge on Axis relations while unearthing new materials; (3) demonstrating that the trend of international politics, the development of Axis relations, and the change in the “virtual enemy” of the alliance factored in changing Japan’s Axis Alliance policy. It will also analyze the political transformation of Japan’s Axis policy, which, metaphorically speaking, drastically changed from “a policy to combat Russia and defend against Communism” to “a policy to work with Russia and accommodate Communism.”Conventionally, studies have underscored the continuity in the relationship between Germany, Italy, and Japan, categorized as the “Axis,” from the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936 to the collapse of the Japanese–German wartime alliance in 1945. The Axis Pact has been regarded as a “hollow alliance,” as Johanna Menzel Meskill (1966) put it more than half-a-century ago. In addition, the Anti-Comintern Pact has been thought of not as an ideological anti-Soviet alliance but as a power-political anti-British alliance from the beginning, which had a commonality and continuity with the Tripartite Pact, in other words, the anti-British and anti-American alliance. Moreover, scholars have situated the origin of the Tripartite Pact in the “Axis Diplomacy” of the 1930s. They have also emphasized the continuity between the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Tripartite Pact.This study will compare the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Tripartite Pact, and the Japan–Germany–Italy wartime alliance, with a focus on the policies toward India, Afghanistan, and Iran, to demonstrate that the Axis relationship was not “hollow” but a real one and that the Tripartite Pact and the wartime alliance were not based on the continuity of the Anti-Comintern Pact but rather on its negation.

著者

増永 真

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_141-205_156, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

47

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In international relations theory, balancing can be defined as provision of protection against a threat to a weaker state (junior partner) by a stronger ally (senior partner). Though there are several related works on this, the following question remains unanswered.If the senior partner suddenly stops engaging balancing, what would the junior partner’s policy choice and its related consequences be?This paper aims to provide an answer to this question by presenting two patterns of behaviors of the North Korea (DPRK) and Taiwan (ROC) as cases.The DPRK found itself in a state of confusion when its two senior partners—the Soviet Union and China—established diplomatic ties with South Korea, while the ROC found itself in a difficult spot when the U.S. officially recognized the Mainland.These changes have led to the following internal balancing strategies having contrasting patterns: the DPRK has chosen nuclear weapons as a means to protect itself from U.S.’ threat, whereas the ROC has decided to continue to depend on the U.S. to balance against China.Asymmetric patterns can also be observed when we compare the two nations’ international economic policies. The DPRK’s level of economic interdependence with other nations, barring senior partners, has been low because of its closed and self-reliant economy. This has resulted high vulnerability to the change in the economic relations with their senior partners and the low sensitivity to the turbulence in the international economy. The situation in the ROC, on the other hand, is completely opposite as it has always been open to the global economy with diversified economic interdependence with other nations.The DPRK’s continued nuclearization has resulted in the international society imposing economic sanctions on it, but effects of consecutive sanctions have been hedged by their closed and self-relied economy with dependence on the economic relations with China. The strategy that the DPRK employed—holding summits with the U.S.—can be described as bandwagon; this has, however, been unsuccessful due to the DPRK’s continued internal balancing strategy armed by nuclear weapons.The ROC, on the other hand, has succeeded in establishing economic relations with its two former Cold War rivals—Russia and Vietnam; the ROC’s domestic market and investments by its private companies have attracted the two nations. The ROC’s approaches to these two were part of its hedging strategy to avoid vulnerability to economic interdependence with a limited number of nations, as well as isolation in the international society.

著者

鈴木 一人

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_1-205_13, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

18

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Globalization connects the economic activities of the world even though the world is becoming more contested and confrontational. The rivalry between the US and China increases the political frictions while they are deeply connected through global supply chain. Both the US and China are weaponizing trade relations as if they are at war without shooting a single bullet. The concept of “Economic Statecraft” emerged in such circumstances.A quick definition of the “Economic Statecraft (hereafter, ES)” is “achieving diplomatic and strategic goals of the state by using economic means”. Under this definition, the article examines the measures used in ES such as sanctions, export control, trade restrictions and aid. These measures have different effects on delivering political message to the target state, but they are taken in accordance with the aim and objective of the ES exercising state.The aim and objectives of the states are threefold. First, the ES is used to change the behavior and action of target state. For example, ES can be used for improving human rights conditions or halting nuclear programs by adding economic pressure. Second, ES is effective for announcing the malign activities and setting up norms of behavior. It is a message to add not only economic pressure but social pressure as well. Third, ES may have an effect to improve international and national solidarity and claim its legitimacy for implementing market distorting measures. If a state exercise ES, it may have negative effect on the economy of its own by cutting trade and investment or not licensing the export from its territory.The condition for the success of ES does not depend on the size of economy but the monopoly position in the global supply chain. If other countries have no option but to depend on the product from particular state, that state will have the power to use such a product as a leverage. Also the size of the market may create dependence. States in proximity of a large economy tend to fall into this category. Also state which controls the international currency can use such a position as a leverage.The article also examines the difference between the concepts of “economic security” and ES. The difference is that “economic security” focuses on the defense from economic coercion by improving national autonomy, while ES is an offensive tool for imposing political will on other states.

著者

久保田 裕次

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_108-205_123, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

83

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This article reconsiders Japanese diplomacy towards China during the period of the initial establishment of the Hara Takashi cabinet, concentrating on the problem of having industrial loans included in the formation of the “New Four-Power Consortium”.Previous research has concentrated on the transition from “Old Diplomacy” to “New Diplomacy”, and has stated that the Hara cabinet altered the policy of the previous Terauchi Masatake cabinet. Compared with the old consortium, the new consortium is characterised by the inclusion of industrial loans in its scope of business. However, this has only been pointed out by a few researchers, who have clarified the relationship between this problem and “New Diplomacy”. My research concentrates on the domestic preparation for participating in the new consortium, and the changes it brought to Anglo-Japanese relations.In October 1918, the Hara cabinet decided not to supply loans that would pose an obstacle to North-South peace in China, such as the “Nishihara Loans”. This decision was certainly ground-breaking, but the Army Ministry demanded certain exceptions.The US government tried to restrain Japanese economic influence on the Chinese government and proposed forming a new consortium. The US State Department insisted that the new consortium should include not only administrative loans, but industrial loans. The British government and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation had been opposed to including industrial loans when the Six-Power Consortium was formed in 1912. The Japanese government expected that the British government and bankers would be opposed to including industrial loans this time as well. However, the British government pledged “exclusive support” to the British syndicate to unify British banks connected to China. Therefore, the Japanese government could not expect the British party to state its opposition.J. J. Abbott, an American banker who had visited Japan, had held talks with Prime Minister Hara and Deputy Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro. Abbott and the State Department were optimistic that Japan would want to include industrial loans. T. W. Lamont, representing the American syndicate, suggested in the inter-group conference in Paris that the new consortium should include not only administrative loans but industrial loans. Yokohama Specie Bank, representing the Japanese syndicate, agreed to his proposal. However, the bank’s stance did not represent all Japanese banks closely related to China. These banks could not fully agree to his proposal because the Hara cabinet had not yet made preparations to organize a syndicate formed of multiple banks. It was only after the Paris conference that the Hara cabinet assembled eighteen banks in Tokyo and Osaka to let them participate in the new consortium.In conclusion, it was not difficult for the Hara cabinet to agree to include industrial loans in the process of forming the new consortium. However, the Hara cabinet had not been able to organize the Japanese syndicate. The argument is also advanced that the Japanese syndicate formed by the Hara cabinet had its origins in the syndicate under the Terauchi cabinet.

著者

久保田 雅則

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_124-205_140, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

62

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The nuclear non-proliferation norm, or the limitation on the number of nuclear weapon states, has been institutionalized in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) centered regime. It is notable that the 25 years term limitation of the treaty was extended indefinitely and the International Atomic Energy Agency inspection system strengthened in spite of the unfairness of the treaty. Why then, was the non-proliferation norm institutionalized in such a strong regime beyond the merely ideological norm?Existing research points to the Great Powers preference and/or civil society movements as the factors behind the norm institutionalization. In contrast, this paper focuses on the norm violations and presents a hypothesis that the norm violations prompted the institutionalization of the nuclear non-proliferation norm. Specifically, the norm violations, that is, possession of nuclear weapons, gave policy makers accurate information about the costs and effects of nuclear weapons. Subsequently, many states who renounced nuclear weapon possession created the strong regime in order to bind other potential norm violators.The theoretical kernel of this argument is the uncertainty of the costs and effects of nuclear weapons. Many policy makers were not well-informed about the effects and costs after the first atomic bomb was introduced. This discouraged policy makers from planning nuclear weapon policies, then dampened their resolve to establish the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Against this background, nuclear non-proliferation norm violations, that is, new nuclear weapon possessors emerged, which reduced the uncertainty around the nuclear weapons and decisively influenced the institutionalization of the nuclear non-proliferation norm.This paper derived the hypothesis from theoretical consideration. Policy makers faced a range of uncertainties regarding nuclear weapons, including deterrent effect, costs, international relations, and normative behavior of other states. These played a role in their decisions regarding compliance with the norm. The uncertainties of nuclear weapons are reduced and the policy makers clearly recognize the costs and effects of nuclear weapons when the nuclear non-proliferation norm violations occurred. Almost all policy makers renounce possession of nuclear weapons because of their relatively high costs. They then want to bind others to abandon the aspiration for nuclear weapons. Hence it follows that a strict institution is created.The sections which follow the theoretical consideration empirically verify the above hypothesis. The third section posits that no violations led a weak institution, that is to say the 1968 NPT. The fourth section shows that the policy makers who became informed about the costs and effects of nuclear weapons by norm violations, renounced possession of nuclear weapons and strengthened the nuclear non-proliferation regime to bind other states.

著者

長谷川 将規

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_29-205_44, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

90

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This article examines the practices and studies of economic statecraft (ESC), which refers to economic means for strategic purposes. The aim is to acquire a broad view of ESC to deepen our understanding of ESC and provide useful suggestions for ESC in the 21st century. ESC has been practiced since ancient times, and many states used it in the 20th century. China’s ESC, based on its massive economic power, is now attracting international attention. However, although various countries have used ESC in various times, comprehensive research of ESC is unexpectedly few. Without grasping the whole picture of ESC, it is difficult for us to understand the true value, usefulness, and implications of each ESC practice or study, and to understand the big picture of ESC, we have to explore the history of ESC.This article begins by examining past ESC practices. It surveys the diverse techniques, cases, and objectives of ESC and its changing legitimacy. Next, based on the above research, I focus on how previous studies discussed ESC. Third, the article confirms the problems with the ESC (economic engagement) that the West has used toward China for the past twenty years, discussing more useful and appropriate alternatives toward rising China in the 21st century. Finally, the article confirms the pitfalls of ESC studies, summarizing the theoretical and practical implications of its discussion.Today’s liberal democracies need an alternative and more systematic ESC toward China because the failure of economic engagement is now obvious. It must be the ESC focused on economic order—the gauze curtain, which is different from the iron curtain of the Cold War period and is based on a high-level multilateral free trade agreement, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).In today’s global era, the high cost of military means is widely recognized, ESC techniques are expanding thanks to economic globalization, the two major powers—the United States and China—are both outstanding ESC users, and the West wants a new ESC toward China to replace economic engagement. Therefore, ESC bears significant meaning for both practice and research. Traditionally, both policymakers and researchers have considered national security and geopolitics exclusively from the perspective of military means. In the 21st century, however, without the perspective of ESC, they would not be able to fully understand national security and geopolitics.