著者

松本 充豊

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_61-205_76, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

74

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This article considers the effects of China’s economic statecraft, conducting a case study of the tourism policy of sending out mainland Chinese tourists to Taiwan in China’s “Favor-Granting policies.” The Favor-Granting policies can be regarded as a particular type of economic statecraft, one which intends to change the behavior and policies of another country by providing economic benefits.Pursuing the strategic end of the “Peaceful Unification” with Taiwan, China is exerting more influence on Taiwan by economic means in recent years, following China’s emergence as an economic great power and Taiwan’s rapid deepening of economic dependence on China. A typical example of such practices is the Favor-Granting policies, which is essentially a pork barrel project. China has intended to exert its influence on the broader Taiwanese people by promoting the policies to reduce anti-China sentiment in Taiwan and to encourage the people to support or vote for the party in Taiwan that is desirable to the Chinese government, in an effort to create advantageous circumstances for future reunification. The tourism policy of sending out mainland Chinese tourists is a diplomatic means which China has been employing toward other countries also. However, in the case of Taiwan, its precise effect was limited and not successful in achieving the political ends.The literature on this topic has not completely grasped the reality of China’s influence exerted by the Favor-Granting policies. While the economic statecraft perspective elucidates the conditions with which China could exercise its influence effectively, it is not clear how the influence would exhibit its effect in Taiwan. Though political sociologists in Taiwan empirically explore the mechanisms of how China’s influence would penetrate Taiwanese society, as well as the importance of the native collaborators in Taiwan, they do not investigate the possibilities that its influence would ultimately be limited. Therefore, we need a comprehensive framework which enable us to analyze the interaction among actors involved with the Favor Granting policies.This article adopts a clientelism approach to examine the effect of the tourism policy towards Taiwan. This is because China’s influence as seen in ‘Favor Granting’ is viewed as pork barrel politics, which appears in a quasi-nation’s territory called “Liang’an” including the mainland China and Taiwan. We can know the effect of China’s influence by considering whether the clientelism across the Taiwan Strait will operate effectively.This article argues that the effective operation of the clientelism was constrained not only by a lack of the unity in the Chinese state, the market mechanism, and the existence of the de facto national border between China and Taiwan, but also by Taiwan’s democratic system. A principal-agent problem caused in the pork barrel politics undermined the effect of China’s tourism policy towards Taiwan. We argue that China’s economic statecraft is less lilely to be effective when it is applied to democratic countries.

著者

張 雲

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_77-205_93, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

116

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As the second biggest economy in the world and the leading emerging economy, how does China use its huge economic power to realize strategic goals to make influence attempts toward other nations? What implications would be for the international order? China’s economic statecraft has attracted increasing global attention in both academic and policy circles. However, the existing scholarship on China’s economic statecraft has been mainly on economic inducements particularly China’s overseas investment and finance such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The research on China’s coercive economic statecraft remains understudied and most empirical studies have derived from the cases of import restrictions on agricultural products. China’s rare earth resource diplomacy, particularly the imposition of temporary rare earth embargo on Japan, provides us a valuable case to investigate China’s coercive economic statecraft. The existing literature on China’s rare earth resource economic statecraft could be divided into three major categories. First, there is a bulk of research from the perspectives of economics and law, but the studies from international politics remain to be developed. Second, the research from international political lens mainly considers China’s behavior a diplomatic failure as Japan successfully diversified its rare earth sources in a short period. China’s international reputation is also considered to be damaged as the WTO ruled against China and the Japanese public opinion toward China has deteriorated. Third, China’s rare earth economic statecraft has been largely used as a solid supportive evidence for China’s revisionist vision against the current liberal international order. The aforementioned research has provided significant insights to understand China’s coercive economic statecraft. However, they are mainly based on the outsider’s perspective and do not address the diversified internal debate and complex internal-external dynamic linkage. This paper has two major aims. First, it aims to identify the effectiveness and mechanism of China’s rare earth temporary embargo incident toward Japan in 2010. Second, this paper aims to clarify the full logic of China’s coercive economic statecraft by focusing China’s internal debate on rare earth from the global economic crisis in 2008 to now with an internal-external nexus perspective. With this combination of zoom-in and zoom-out approach, this paper is expected to clarify the conditions, effectiveness and legitimacy of China’s coercive economic statecraft and its implications on international order.

著者

小林 周

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_94-205_107, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

38

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The paper analyzes Middle Eastern countries’ foreign aid and military activities in African countries through the lens of Economic Statecraft (ES), the art of employing economic means to exert influence over other countries and thereby pursue geopolitical and strategic goals. Due to changes in the strategic environment, such as the United States’ withdrawal from the Middle East and the escalation of intra-regional conflicts, Middle Eastern countries have pursued foreign and security policies that place greater emphasis on their national interests. Arab states in the Gulf and Turkey are upping their foreign aid to Africa and establishing military bases at geopolitical chokepoints to expand their spheres of influence. The economic and military expansion of Middle Eastern countries into Africa also intensifies competition among various state and non-state actors.There have been studies on foreign aid to African countries and on the establishment of military bases by Middle Eastern countries. By examining these regional dynamics from the perspective of ES, this paper seeks to decipher the complex and multi-dimensional competition, confrontation, and cooperation. Additionally, the paper investigates the effectiveness of the ES as practiced by non-major powers, which is often overlooked, the impact of ES on regional politics and security, and the linkage with international order and international security.ES is frequently discussed in the context of great power politics and strategic competition, such as the US-China rivalry. However, the same is true for regional and middle powers that use economic means to pursue their geopolitical objectives. The distinction is that great powers such as the US, China, and Russia are exceptional in the scale of their military and economic clout in international politics. Therefore, to better understand ES, it is necessary to focus on tactics being employed at the regional level and the geopolitical shifts that arise. This paper outlines the debate on ES in/towards/from the Middle East and examines the trends and background of the pursuit of geopolitical goals linked to foreign aid, which has accelerated in recent years. Then, as a case study, this paper focuses on the Middle Eastern countries’ intervention in Sudan and the Horn of Africa region, as well as the competition among the regional countries. The intervention of Middle Eastern countries in Somalia and Libya is also analyzed to demonstrate that ES involves various actors, including unrecognized states and non-state actors.

著者

杉之原 真子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_45-205_60, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

60

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This study aims to shed light on the reality of economic statecraft under the Trump administration by examining the formation of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) of 2018. For effective economic statecraft, the state as a unitary actor need to set a clear goal and pursue it in a concerted manner. Does this assumption hold in economic policymaking, where conflicting interests often collide?FIRRMA is primarily aimed to restrict China’s access to U.S. technology in order to contain the country’s rapid technological development. It is an effort to use American economic power to maintain US hegemony by limiting the operation of Chinese companies on the US soil, especially in the high-tech industries. At first glance, the bill seems to have been passed smoothly with a bipartisan support in Congress and with the full approval of the legislative branch, both of which came to take increasingly hardline stance toward China. They did so without being pushed by the public opinion or economic interests of their constituencies. This can be interpreted as a case in which policymakers came together to exercise economic statecraft in order to protect “national interest” in the face of the rising China threat, as Neorealism predicts.However, a close examination of the preferences and motives of each actor involved in the policymaking process reveals that the U.S. hardline policy toward China on inward investment was based on a combination of various motives and conditions. As there exists no firm consensus within the U.S. authority on detailed goals, it is highly likely that China’s actions or changes in the U.S. economic situation will lead to a loss of policy unity. It also shows the fundamental weakness of the foundation of economic statecraft, as economic policies usually involve a wide range of interests and preferences.In the long run, the strengthening of regulations on foreign investment could weaken the U.S. economic power, which is the base of its hegemony. Therefore, the case of regulations on inward investment also highlights such double-edged nature of economic statecraft: overuse of economic power can undermine the very source of power.

著者

青山 瑠妙

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_99-204_108, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

3

著者

半澤 朝彦

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_149-204_152, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

村上 友章

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_136-204_145, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

18

著者

編集委員会

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_153, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

東野 篤子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_126-204_135, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

12

著者

山尾 大

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_117-204_125, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

4

著者

武内 進一

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_109-204_116, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

2

著者

高橋 力也

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_66-204_82, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

67

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This article aims to examine the process by which the project of codifying international law was initiated in the League of Nations in the 1920s, particularly focusing on the contribution made by an American international lawyer, Manley O. Hudson.The codification efforts for international law under the aegis of the League of Nations, including the Hague Codification Conference in 1930, are considered to be crucial in the history of international law. During this period, not only did the number of multilateral treaties increase dramatically, but also non-Western states began to participate in treaty negotiations through the forum of the League, and the international law-making process, which had previously been dominated by the Western powers, was transformed into a more universal one.Nevertheless, the development of international law was not necessarily promised by the establishment of the League Covenant. In the first place, the drafters of the Covenant had little interest in the enhancement of international law in general. This is evidenced by the fact that the Covenant contained only one sentence in the preamble that referred to international law. What is more, at the first Assembly of the League in 1920, a resolution proposing to embark on the project of codification was rejected.How did the League then change its course and decided to undertake the project for assembling the Hague Conference? The League’s efforts for codification were in fact not solely made for the purpose of development of international law. With the United States showing a keen interest in hosting a codification conference at that time, some League officials were concerned that the role as the bearer of the global legal order would shift from Geneva to Washington. Hudson, who was a temporary member of the Secretariat of the League, strongly shared this concern; he submitted a memorandum to the Secretary-General, Sir Eric Drummond, suggesting the League demonstrate its initiative in codification in order to preserve the League’s presence in the making of global law. With the approval of Drummond, Hudson co-drafted a resolution on the project of codification of international law which was adopted at the Fifth Session of the League’s Assembly in 1924.Hudson’s proposal became the catalyst for the League to quickly take up the initiative on the codification of international law; it paved the way for the holding of the first codification conference in The Hague. For the League, the codification was one of the means for maintaining its leadership of world order building in relation to the United States.

著者

今井 真士

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_146-204_149, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

植木(川勝) 千可子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_167, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

著者

小島 真智子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_17-204_32, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

85

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This paper deals with the continuities and changes in France’s nuclear deterrent strategy by asking the following question: has the basic notion of French strategy switched to the so-called “deterrence by denial” as opposed to “deterrence by punishment”? Some raised such question, by observing that France no longer insists on her nuclear weapons’ retaliatory capabilities, but underlines its arms’ precision as if they were to be used in counter-force operations. Such critiques do not make sense to others, because all deterrence capabilities should be or should at least look operational in order to be effective. And in a world where many countries are increasing their military invulnerabilities, the search for operational capabilities is a condition sine qua non to strengthen the deterrence.In order to answer the above question, this article first traces the French nuclear strategy thinking from 1945 on, with a focus on the strategic quarrels, in 1960s, between Pierre Gallois and Raymond Aron. Aron was against Gallois’ nuclear weapons’ “equalizer” concept which made French nuclear deterrence oriented not only against Russians but also against Americans. These quarrels were more political than strategic. In fact, the Vth republic under De Gaulle promoted the notion of national independence based on Gallois’ concept on nuclear deterrence and rejected Aron’s preferences on France-US cooperative relations. The article then analyses how France’s independent nuclear policy found its righteousness as US-USSR condominium emerged during the Cold war. France was against US coexistence with the Soviets which would undermine its Ally’s national interest. The US-USSR condominium was sacred through Arms Control measures. Even Aron criticized the condominium by calling the SALT I agreement a US-USSR “Alliance”.The second part of the article is devoted to the revision of France’s nuclear deterrence strategy in the post-Cold war era. It was especially under Jacques Chirac’s administration that France’s nuclear doctrine went through an important revision. The article uses presidential discourses, parliamentary discussions as well as ministerial internal documents such as “Horizon stratégique” in order to analyze how and why France had to review its nuclear deterrence strategy. The focus here is put on the notion of “counter-deterrence”. This notion is based on France’s recognition that France can no longer be on the side to deter but will be deterred by an emerging country in the post Cold war era. And it happens that these emerging countries are non-democratic countries marking the decline of the Occident.This article concludes that continuities in France’s nuclear deterrent strategy remains essential whereas the changes are only apparent. The changes are nonetheless important because they confirm that today’s nuclear world order as two-folds (or disconnected between): global order between Russians and Americans; regional order among emerging nuclear countries including nuclear-capable Iran.

著者

シナン レヴェント

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_33-204_48, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

62

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This manuscript analyzes the nationalism seen in Japan’s Middle East diplomacy after the World War II, focusing on Takeyo Nakatani, the president of Japan Arab Society. Nakatani’s activities, thoughts about the Middle East, and his network with Japanese politicians will be investigated. Specifically, it examines Nakatani’s relationship with conservative politicians such as Nobusuke Kishi, Yasuhiro Nakasone, Takeo Miki etc. in his approach to the Arabian countries, as well as how Nakatani’s Pan-Asiatic notion left over from the pre-war period effected his ‘public diplomacy’ to the Middle East.Concretely, the manuscript first examines Nakatani’s role in Japan’s involvement of the Egyptian Aswan High Dam construction project. Then, it inquires the process of establishing the Japan Arab Society in Tokyo and Nakatani’s ‘public diplomacy’ with Egypt and other Arab countries. Finally, Nakatani’s postwar Asianism is discussed in the example of the Middle East issues, especially the Palestinian Question.Consequently, Nakatani was a Japanese nationalist, keenly advocating that the Japanese Imperial regime and so the institution of Tennō should be preserved in post-war time. Tennō, Japanese Emperor was a holy existence which took his roots from a two-thousand year history and was placed at the center of Japanese nation and people. His ideological background deeply related to the Greater Asianism, Pan-Asianism in other word, did not leave him in post-war period either.Since Japan’s technological and economical superiority to other Asian countries, he consistently advocated that Japan was still the leader nation of all Asia even in post-war time. He believed that most of Arabian countries in the Middle East obtained their independence via Japanese defeat in the World War II, that Nakatani explained it as ‘Japanese sacrifice for Asian nations’ in the war.‘Asia’, which was Tōyō in Nakatani’s word, was centered on Japan and Japanese Emperor was the core of this concept. Nakatani’s way of thinking is none other than ‘the post-war Asianism’. He thought that Japan’s diplomacy towards the Middle East as a demilitarized country should be based on peaceful system, and the economic and technical aspects should be mainstream of the politics to countries in the region.Briefly, Nakatani as a non-state actor played crucial roles in Japan’s Middle East diplomacy in post-war period. And Asianism, nationalist ideology in Japan before and during the war was still effective in his actions, remarks on the Middle East issues and even network in the relations with both Japanese politicians and leaders of Arab countries.

著者

藤田 将史

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_49-204_65, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

58

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Since the liberalization of capital accounts, huge international financial crises have resulted repeatedly and caused serious damage. This experience clearly demonstrates that the international lender of last resort is essential for the stable development of the global economy.Intriguingly, the U.S. that bore the responsibility of the international lender of last resort after World War II ceased bilateral balance of payment (BOP) support recently and commenced its delegation to the IMF (International Monetary Fund). Prior to the second half of the 1990s, the U.S. gave huge amounts of bilateral BOP support to economically or politically important countries because it is easier to reflect U.S. national interests in bilateral support than multilateral ones. However, since the second half of the 1990s, the U.S. has provided limited bilateral support however important a crisis country is, and increased contribution to the IMF instead. Why has the U.S. ceased to provide support by itself and delegated the role of the international lender of last resort to the IMF?Previous studies explained the U.S. utilization of the IMF mainly by two international factors: change in the nature of BOP support from economic stabilization to structural adjustment and a decline in the U.S. financial capacity. However, these international factors dissipated post the second half of the 1990s with no precise explanations for the U.S. delegation to the IMF during that period.Therefore, this paper focuses on the U.S. domestic decision-making process that previous studies almost ignored and presents a hypothesis that the Congress has delegated the BOP support to the IMF for the purpose of blame avoidance. That is, while integration of the U.S. economy into the global financial system increased the necessity of BOP support for the American political elites, enlarging inequality also increased discontent in the U.S. voters with the support. Consequently, members of Congress that faced a serious dilemma have delegated the support to the IMF for reconciliation between implementation of necessary BOP support and maintenance of political support from voters. This paper verifies that hypothesis both by statistical analysis and by supplementary case analysis.This paper has three main contributions to the existing literature. First, it demonstrates that the IMF has a politically important function to the U.S. that enables implementation of large BOP support through domestic blame avoidance. Second, it confirms the significant role and preferences of the Congress in deciding the means of the U.S. BOP support. Third, it hints at the general theory of international institutions that multilateral organizations can be utilized for blame avoidance because they can lower the visibility of operations controversial in domestic politics.

著者

倉科 一希

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_1-204_16, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

55

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How do alliance partners treat the problem of credibility of extended deterrence when they understand seriousness of security threats differently? Do they continue negotiations on the measures to confirm credibility? If so, why? To study this problem, this paper examines US policies toward nuclear sharing when France challenged NATO and shook US-European relations since World War II.France withdrew from the military organization of NATO when nuclear sharing and the stationing costs of the US/British troops on the European continent also troubled the alliance. The administration of Lyndon B. Johnson treated them as parts of a large problem. Washington also tried to solve these related problems through closer cooperation of the United States, the British, and the West Germans. This tripartitism (or trilateralism) was the basic framework through which the Johnson administration considered the ways to deal with individual problems in NATO.Nuclear sharing was not only a part of tripartitism but also a means to promote it. At least by the end of 1964, the respective US governments regarded nuclear sharing as the major way to secure credibility of extended deterrence and, as a result, to hold the alliance together. This attitude changed, however, by the beginning of 1966 when the Johnson administration seriously studied the France-NATO problem and the troop stationing costs. By constructing a nuclear consultation mechanism based on US-UK-FRG cooperation, Washington expected to introduce tripartitism into NATO.The problem of the US/British troop stationing costs grew tense in the middle of the same year. The Johnson administration tried to persuade Bonn to bear more costs of these costs, and this burden-sharing was expected to be a part of tripartitism. Washington tried to introduce a burden-sharing mechanism into NATO in face of the French challenge. President Johnson particularly considered a deal with Bonn over nuclear sharing and the troop costs problem, and this became clear in unofficial US-Soviet talks over the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Johnson insisted on sustaining the possibility of a common strategic nuclear force despite Soviet rejection of any common strategic nuclear force with FRG participation. Here Johnson expected to open this option of a common nuclear force to encourage Bonn’s acceptance of larger burden to support US/British forces.This paper shows that a nuclear sharing measure played a role in inter-allies’ negotiations even though its prime purpose, securing credibility of US extended deterrence, grew less relevant. This perspective could enhance our understanding of nuclear issues under a less tense international situation.

著者

太田 昌克

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_142-203_158, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

60

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Since the Crimea crisis in 2014, the international nuclear order bed-rocked on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has become severely distressed due to lack of cooperation among nuclear stakeholders. Especially, stalling disarmament dialogue between the United States and Russia amplifies such a negative atmosphere. To be worse, the competitive nuclear-weapon powers have been beefing up their nuclear capability and sharpening their nuclear doctrines in recent years.The demise of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002 and the expiration of the Intermediate-Range Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 have undermined the “strategic stability” which was established and maintained by the US and the Soviet Union, later Russia, through a series of nuclear arms-control negotiations during the Cold War.Behind these destabilizing scenes played by the former super-powers, China, another nuclear rising power, has steadily increased her strategic capability through deployment of new nuclear missiles and hypersonic weapons for the past decade. North Korea is another big nuclear challenge against regional stakeholders like Japan, South Korea and the U.S. that promises to provide strategic deterrence in East Asia.Giving a rough overview of the recent nuclear landscape shaped by these strategic trends, this paper mainly analyzes evolutions of the U.S.-Japan alliance influenced by U.S. nuclear policy, especially represented by each administrations’ Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), and deteriorating security situation in East Asia.For example, the Trump administration announced its own NPR in 2018 and broadened nuclear retaliation option against “non-nuclear strategic attack” which may include adversary’s cyber-attack on the U.S. nuclear command and control system. At almost the same timing of an announcement of Trump NPR, the Japanese Abe administration expressed a high evaluation of the NPR, because Japan strongly desired to strengthen the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence against the backdrop of on-going military crisis provoked by North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests.Based on exclusive interviews with current and former officials of the U.S. and Japan, the paper focuses on diplomatic process of the two allies for solidifying the nature of “nuclear alliance” through the Extended Deterrence Dialogue that started under the Obama administration in 2010. Differently from NATO, the U.S.-Japan alliance has not ever formalized any mechanism to share and operate U.S. nuclear weapons at the time of contingency. However, the paper sheds a light on how the U.S. and Japan have evolved their nuclear bond particularly for the past decade.

著者

荒井 誉史

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_126-203_141, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

58

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This paper explores why the Sato Eisaku administration (from 1964 to 1972) feared the development of nuclear weapons by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The existing literature argues that the Sato administration worried about the possibility of a nuclear attack by the PRC because this administration considered the political leaders of PRC as very aggressive and irrational. In contrast, by using newly declassified documents, this paper shows that the Sato administration feared the possibility of a political disturbance in Japan resulting from a nuclear blackmail by the PRC.During this period, the Japanese government recognized that it was not likely for the PRC and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to invade Japanese soil, including by a nuclear attack, because they realized that the US had military supremacy in Asia in terms of naval, air, and nuclear force. On the other hand, the Japanese government feared nuclear blackmail by the PRC or the USSR because it could lead to a large political movement against the US-Japan Security Treaty. In this period, the Japanese political leaders felt uneasiness about the duration of the US-Japan Security Treaty because this treaty would expire in 1970, and the number of supporters of this treaty was as much as that of the non-alignment policy. Therefore, the Japanese government suspected that if the PRC or the USSR inflamed public anxiety for Japanese security by nuclear blackmail, Japanese people would be attracted by a non-alignment policy in order to inhibit nuclear attacks. To avoid such a situation, the Japanese government asked the US to assure their defense commitment to Japan to eradicate public anxiety that the US government would not fulfill the commitment to defend Japan when the PRC or the USSR attacked Japanese soil by nuclear weapons. Therefore, this paper concludes that the Sato administration feared political disturbance against the US-Japan Security Treaty caused by nuclear blackmail of the PRC or the USSR.This paper may contribute to a rethinking of the role of extended nuclear deterrence. Generally, nuclear weapons are known to be deterrent to a nuclear attack by other states, and few researchers have paid attention to nuclear blackmail and domestic politics. However, this paper illustrates that extended deterrence has also played an important role in preventing domestic disturbance caused by nuclear blackmail. This paper discovers new aspects of extended nuclear deterrence.