著者

岩田 文昭

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.63-77, 2007 (Released:2020-03-24)

著者

林 永強

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.125-139, 2007 (Released:2020-03-24)

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This paper attempts to explore the meaning of “nihon” [Japan] that postulated in Nishida’s work, Nihon bunka no mondai [The Problem of Japanese Culture]. Regarding the notion, “sekai no nihon”[Japan of the world], the concept of “nihon”does not merely convey its significance towards Nishida philosophy, but also entails philosophical connotation, particularly philosophy of history in general. Borrowing the idea of “imagined communities”given by Benedict Anderson, “nihon”as a philosophical concept is neither construed by “monokataru koto”[narration] nor “kiku koto” [hearing]. Rather, it may be considered as a sōzōsuru koto [imagination].

著者

張 政遠

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.79-91, 2007 (Released:2020-03-24)

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In this paper, I shall discuss Nishida’s philosophy of acting intuition. I shall argue that acting intuition can be understood as a situated action. Situated action is not a philosophical concept, but is from the theory of situatedness in cognitive science. I shall interpret acting intuition as a third position based on the situatedness in our historical world. Like the concept of situated action, acting intuition is a philosophical position that is anti-intellectualism. The later development of Nishida’s philosophy shifts from the position of experience to a socially and historically oriented dimension. The world where we are experiencing and acting is not an imaginary world, but a world that is situated in society and history. Nishida does not use the word “situation”in his philosophy. However, we can see that Nishida has a similar word in “foothold.”Without this foothold or ground, a person will not be able to act in the concrete world. In this sense, to become the thing is an acting intuition, which is always in situ. Acting intuition is a philosophical position abridging cognitive science on one hand, and the phenomenology of action on the other.

著者

守津 隆

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.109-123, 2007 (Released:2020-03-24)

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Jun Tosaka schrieb einige Kritiken zur Nishida- Philosophie, worin er sagte, dass die Nishida- Philosophie zwar mystisch-religioese Eigenschaften aufwiese, aber diese vormodernen Eigenschaften nicht wesentlich seien. Vielmehr behaupte er, die Nishida- Philosophie sei eine hoechst moderne Philosophie : “Das Nichts ist hier ein ganz Methodisches(Mechanisches), und man darf es nicht als ein Metaphysisches ansehen. Aber dieses Nichts als logisches Werkzeug ist keineswegs ein mystische Grund(etwa ein Ungrund); sein Sein und sein Entstehen finden Statt in der Tatsache unseres Selbstbewusstseins oder Bewusstseins.”Einerseits vermag Tosaka, die Nishida- Philosophie durch diese originelle Ansicht klar und explizit zu machen. Auf der anderen Seite, bleibt Tosakas Interpretation darin aeusserlich, dass sie die sogenannten Kehre, die Nishida seit die Abhandlung “Ich und Du”vollzieht, gegenueber gleichgueltig bleibt. Diese Kehre hat jedoch die enorume Bedeutung, die bisherige Konstruktion des Selbstbewusstseins voellig zu veraendern.

著者

藤城 優子

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.93-107, 2007 (Released:2020-03-24)

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“The universal of induction”in Nishida philosophy has been considered a transitional notion between “the universal of judgment”and ”the universal of self- consciousness.”The purpose of this paper is to find a positive meaning of this notion. That is to say, it already includes three elements in late Nishida philosophy : the logic of copula, the logic of time and the prototype of “the true individual”.

著者

白井 雅人

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.141-156, 2007 (Released:2020-03-24)

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Im folgenden Traktat ist die Problematik der “Ethik im SpätwerkKitarōNishidas”anhandseinerSchrift“Ich und Du”zu untersuchen. Im Grunde des Lebens liegt die Begegnung von “Ich und du”, und auch die Wirkung des Absoluten, die das Verhältnis “Ich und du”erschließt. Durch eine derartige Wirkung im Grunde des Lebens wird das Problem der Ethik fundiert. “Ich und du”bedeutet nämlich : das Verhältnis “Ich und du”besteht vor dem Entstehen eines Subjekts als “Ich”. Das Entstehen vom “Ich”basiert auf der Begegnung des “Ich und du”. Nicht das “Ich”als Substanz, sondern das als Wirkendes kommt zum Gewahrnis. Was das “Ich”als Substanz vernichtet und dem Anderen öffnet, ist der über das Ich Hinauswachsende. Wirkung der Negativität. Gerade in dieser negativen Wirkung geht das “Ich”ins Verhältnis zum Anderen hinein, und damit gestaltet sich eine Welt. Aufgrund einer derartigen Vermittlung der Negativität sind wir zur ständigen Gestaltung unsrers Selbst und unserer Welt bestimmt. Um das eigentliche Selbst zu〈sein〉, müssen wir stets vermittels der Wirkung der Negativität eine solche Gestaltung durchsetzen. Insoweit erweist sich diese Welt als eine schöpferische, aber zugleich als eine Welt des Sollens. Die Negativität der Welt stellt sich als Aufgabe dar. Als das Paradigma des Verhältnisses zwischen “Ich”und Welt, welches zur Aufgabe sich bestimmt, fungiert das Verhältnis zwischen “Ich”und Spezies. Die Spezies stellt sich als die uns bestimmende, aber zugleich von uns zu negierende heraus. Soweit unser Selbst aus dem Verhältnis “Ich und du” besteht, wirkt es auf das Andere ein, und realisiert sich als im Sollen Entstandenes, welches in der Wirklichkeit seine Aufgabe freilegt.

著者

大西 光弘

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.117-131, 2006 (Released:2021-01-16)

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Diese Abhandlung behandelt als Thema die Beziehung zwischen der Nishida-Philosophie und den Prinzipien der Ph註nomenologie.Sie stellt vorwiegend zwei Punkte dar: erstens Nishidas Gedanke der Transzendierung durch den Boden von dem naturalistischen Allgemeinen uber das selbstbewu13te Allgemeine nach dem intelligiblen Allgemeinen tut das Gleiche mit der phanomenologischen Reduktion. Zweitens das Fundament der Nishida-Philosophie jikaku (Selbstbewu13tsein), d.h. das Selbst sieht in dem Selbst das Selbst, entspricht der Konstitution des Noemas durch die Noesis der Phanomenologie. Wenn man diese zwei Punkte versteht, wurde man erkennen, dass Nishidas schwierigen Redewendungen, die der beriihmte Kritiker Hideo Kobayashi das weder durch Japanisch noch durch Fremdsprache geschriebene groteske System genannt hat, eine auf seine Weise folgerichtige Logik haben.

著者

島本 英明

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.133-150, 2006 (Released:2021-01-16)

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the essence of Alberto Giacometti's sculpture of human body in the light of the philosophy of Kitaro Nishida. Alberto Giacometti's motif was to express the world just as it is seen. This experience can be considered as one mode of the pure experience, a basic philosophical conception of Nishida. Driven by this motif, the Swiss sculptor in the 20th century left a lot of sculptures in the form of a standing woman or a walking man. Usually one sees in them two typical forms which can easily be confirmed : The one is thin and the other is uneven in her surface. This paper tries to interpret these characters by understanding the artistic experience of Giacometti as one mode of the pure experience of Nishida. That is : These characters as not to be regarded as merely visual, but a clue to look into the invisible dimension of the work. Nishida's thought of the self-developing pure experience and the dynamism of the selfa wareness helps us to understand this invisible dimension of the work of Giacometti. The pure experience of Nishida and the artistic experience of Giacometti are essentially narrow to each other, but not the same with each other. Art can not be absorbed into philosophy, and the latter not into the former. But the philosophy of Nishida sheds a light on the work of Giacometti because of the analogy of the both.

著者

熊谷 征一郎

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.103-116, 2006 (Released:2021-01-16)

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It is well-known that Nishida Kitaro asserted the motive of philosophy must be the grief of life. In early literature, the grief of life has been often dealt with in terms of the Nishida's life. It is true that his life was not a little unhappy and grief was his motive of philosophy. However, the grief of life is important not only in his life, but also in the system of his philosophy. Even when the grief of life was dealt with in terms of the system of philosophy in early literature, it was treated in the context of emotion. But it is more essential in the context of selfrealization. In short, he thinks that self is realized as place of nothingness and as the unique person in the grief of life. He finds a sort of contradiction in selfrealization. Or rather, he thinks of self as the contradiction itself. He finds two aspects in the contradiction. One is that self is intuited when it gets lost and subsumes objects .. That means the fundamental acquisition of the body and the self-realization as subsuming place of nothingness. The other aspect of the contradiction is the coincidence of the realization of the eternal death and that of the uniqueness of self. In both aspects, the negation of the grief plays essential roles.

著者

岡田 勝明

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.51-70, 2006 (Released:2021-01-16)

著者

片柳 榮一

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.71-85, 2006 (Released:2021-01-16)

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Nishida quoted several times the sentences of British philosopher, B. Bosanquet in the middle period of the formation of his own philosophical thought. The sentences express the assertion that the true logical subject is always reality and the logical predicate is always the meaning of an idea and the judgment always appears as a revelation of something which is in reality. This assertion inspired Nishida to the build up his own unique understanding of the judgement. Bosanquet's thesis expresses that the judgment is not the connection of two abstract concepts but that the subject in judgment indicates always the reality of the actual world. Nishida's endeavor consists in the further elucidation of the structure of judgment. The reality that Bosanquet saw behind the logical subject is understood by Nishida as the concrete universal. Nishida defines the concrete universal as the universal that embraces in itself what can be subject without being ever predicate. According to Nishida mathematics can define their concrete universal, but the experience of facts can not define its own concrete universal. The concrete universal in the world of experience suffers the split between the subject-sphere and the predicate-sphere of the concrete universal. What is perceived by the intuition is the subject-sphere which has in itself infinite depth. Nishida owes this understanding to Bosanquet. Nishida's uniqueness consists in elucidating the predicatesphere. The infinitely deep subject-sphere is embracedby the infinitely wide universal which is the predicate-sphere.These two spheres do not coincide with each other in the knowledge of experience. But Nishida finds what bridges this split. That is the concept o f what I experience. Nishida's unique term transcendent predicate-sphere which is Nishida's definition of ego originates from this insight.

著者

大橋 容一郎

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.35-50, 2006 (Released:2021-01-16)

著者

小林 信之

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, pp.60-83, 2005 (Released:2021-01-16)

著者

熊谷 征一郎

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, pp.128-142, 2005 (Released:2021-01-16)

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The Turn in Nishida's Philosophy of Others Nishida's philosophy of others has been often criticized for identifying self with others. Especially, his paper I and You has been. However, exactly in the paper, Nishida's philosophy of others takes a 180 degree turn. It is, as it were, the turn from sympathetic identification to response relations with others. Therefore, concerning after the paper, the criticisms are beside the point, even though they are right to the point before the paper. In this thesis, I make clear the substance and tracks of the turn. But, the criticisms seem to have the grounds even in the paper. In fact, the paper has a lot of words which suggest that he identifies self with others. However, if you examine the true meaning of those words faithfully, you find that they mean diverse sides of response relations. In short, he finds immediate encounter with others not in the direction of sympathy or empathy, but in the direction of birth of Itself. It is well-known that Nishida uses the concept of he. I prove that Nishida thinks the response relations between self and others can be realized only where they are open to him (a third party)

著者

杉本 耕一

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, pp.158-172, 2005 (Released:2021-01-16)

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Although absolute contradictory self-identity is one of the most fundamental notions in the philosophy of Nishida, it is also notorious for its ambivalence. Actually, because Nishida uses this term in different senses and in various applications, it appears that it cannot avoid the charge of ambivalence. However, this essay considers the possibility that this very ambivalence can be taken as favorable. That is, this essay suggests that fields which have tended to be thought of as separate, actually overlap each other. This essay draws special attention to the fact that, among the various aspects of absolute contradictory self-identity which he formulates, Nishida develops formulations in both the religious world and the historical world. In general, it is often assumed that the religious world and the historical world are two completely different worlds; the former is assumed to be completely transcendent from the latter. But Nishida's notion of absolute contradictory self-identity can put this assumption into question. This essay claims that if one examines this notion carefully, then one will find that its very ambivalence demonstrate that these two worlds are intimately related and overlapping.

著者

大橋 良介

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.1-14, 2006 (Released:2021-01-16)

著者

佐々木 慎吾

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, pp.143-157, 2005 (Released:2021-01-16)

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Scince Nishida's thought is greatly affected by his practice of Zen Buddism, some people often regerd him as a speculative metaphysician. This way of looking contains some truth, but it fails the very important point to see. In this article insist that the essential intention of Nisida's philosophycal work is oriented toward the concrete reality of the world. By Nishida, the world of concrete reality is the historical-social world, in which we act, live and die. That's why the idea of life is frequently mentioned in his late works. Life represents the concretness of the world. Nishida argues that real social facts such as folks or nations must be treated as life. On the analogy of J. S. Haldane's physiology, Nishida insists that the species should be considered as self of the maintaining subject in the historical-social world. Being inspired by Haldane's holistic conception of life, Nishida conceptualizes the historical-social species, whose ideal form (paradeigma) is embodied in social acts. But there is a serious misunderstanding in Nishida's argument. Biologically, self-maintaining function cannot be found in species, but in a concrete, individual organism. My conclusion is that Nishida contradicts himself because of this inappropriate interpretation of Haldane's concept of life.

著者

リーゼンフーバー クラウス

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, pp.84-104, 2005 (Released:2021-01-16)

著者

浅倉 祐一郎

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, pp.110-127, 2005 (Released:2021-01-16)

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Throughout his life the philosopher Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945) made references to art in his writings. On occasion the references were quite slight and on other occasions more profound. I think we can infer from this that art had a certain importance in the formation of his philosophy. It is helpful to divide the development of Nishida's philosophy into four periods. The First Stage, J unsui-keiken (pure experience) refers to the immediate or intuitive apprehension of the world about us. In the Second Stage, Jikaku (self-awareness) Nishida deals with self-awareness in the apprehended world, here Nishida was considerably influenced by the famous scholar of aesthetics K. Fiedler (1841 -95). Turning logically from this comes the Third Stage, Basho (place) here Nishida concludes that true selfawareness occurs when one sees oneself as one really is, as a place (Basho) existing in the greater or deeper'place'of the apprehended surrounding world. The Fourth Stage flows naturally from this as the Bensyohoteki-sekai or dialectical world which is the world questioned and examined in relation to these first three principles, that is pure immediate experience, to which is added self-awareness refined to Basho in the philosopher, which eventually leads to a new viewpoint on the actual world. It is when we come to the Fourth Stage that we find the principal influence on Nishida changes, partially leaving behind the theories of K. Fiedler and becoming increasing influenced by the work of J. Harrison (185 0| 1928) whose theories on reality and the historical world may have caused this change in emphasis. Nevertheless the theories of K. Fiedler remained important in relation to Art Theory. I believe that the third Basho stage is the most important in understanding the development of his idea s. Historically scholars have also believed that. However they have so far tended to neglect the r elation between Nishida's thought and art on this Third Stage, attaching far more importance to the second and fourth periods. But for me the Third Stage re , mains probably significant, revealing as it does a process of fundamental change between thought and art.

著者

村田 康常

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, pp.173-191, 2005 (Released:2021-01-16)

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The Summary presented paper deals with three subjects. The first point to be made is that Nishida Kitaro and A. N. Whitehead share the same origin, called the fact of pure experience or immediate experience, in spite of no direct academic exchange between them. They regard the pure experience as the sole starting-point of any thought in which the reality discloses itself as a non-dualistic unity. The problem they face there is whether they can describe the insight gained in that experience. They solve it by reaching at the same idea that the reality expresses itself and its self-expression takes form of a sort of logic. The second point is to show that their conclusions are different from each other. At the beginning, both philosophers regard the fact of pure experience as a flux. And then, they formulate it into the idea of process. Nevertheless, because the pure experience refuses any seat to the substantial self, which is still held in the idea of process, Nishida abandons this idea and searches for a deeper logic. It is a sort of topology that implies a paradoxical content. He finds our own selves in their vanishing point, in which our relative selves encounter with the absolute. In contrast, Whitehead searches for the emerging point of our own selves in his immediate experience. His conclusion puts no emphasis on the idea of nothingness but evidently on that of process. The third point suggests the possibility to construe Whitehead's philosophy not only as a process philosophy but also as a topological philosophy comparable to Nishida's. As Nishida watches the vanishing point of our own selves in order to reveal the depth of reality, Whitehead describes the perishing of actual entities in order to discover the principle of universal relativity of the universe. To perish is to be objectified, and to be objectified is to be present in another, and the presence in another is the main subject of topology. In conclusion, we can say that Nishida's approach to the reality and that of Whitehead are complement to each other.