著者
竹内 泉
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.1, pp.25-41, 2020-09-30 (Released:2020-09-30)
参考文献数
10

In analysing logic of hearsay, the inconsistency of individual notions makes difficulty. Modal logic is suitable for analysing logic of hearsay. The most previous semantics of modal logic such as using possible worlds makes the formula x = y ⊃ □x = y valid. However, in logic of hearsay, it can happen that the quoting person recognises x = y although the quoted person recognises x ≠ y. As such, the formula x = y∧¬□x = y is satisfiable in logic of hearsay. In order to deal with this, this study propose a new semantics with belief structure.
著者
木下 頌子
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.52, no.1, pp.127-141, 2019-12-30 (Released:2020-06-20)
参考文献数
24

In series of her works, Amie Thomasson has claimed that the revisionary ontology about works of arts is methodologically untenable. Interestingly, her conclusion is drawn from the reflection on the theory of reference of art kind terms. She argues that the “qua problem,” which is known as a problem for the causal theory of reference, undermine the possibility of revisionary ontology. The aim of this paper is to critically examine her argument. I argue that even if Thomassonʼs view about the reference of our art kind terms is correct, revisionary metaphysics is still possible.
著者
高谷 遼平
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.52, no.1, pp.23-46, 2019-12-30 (Released:2020-06-20)
参考文献数
23
被引用文献数
1

It is a common view in formal semantic theories that the compositional semantic values of sentences in contexts are identical to the assertoric contents expressed by these sentences. Recently, however,there have been challenges to this simple view on the basis of difficulties in theorizing various ‘shifty’ phenomena. In this paper, I argue that these difficulties can be ‘explained away’ by introducing a revised notion of compositionality which allows an expression to have different semantic values in different environments. I then claim that the proposed framework can be not only compatible with the identity but also plausible as a natural language semantics.
著者
四津 雅英
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.52, no.1, pp.93-111, 2019-12-30 (Released:2020-06-20)
参考文献数
10

Sometimes an utterance of a (logically) double negative sentence conveys the content of the corresponding positive sentence, and moreover communicates an additional content (e.g., one “weakening” or “strengthening” it) or plays an additional role. Leading accounts of such utterances-Horn's and Levinson's-have some serious problems mainly because they assume that such utterances depend on it that those of the corresponding positive sentence often convey some typical meaning. In this paper I attempt to analyze additional roles of utterances of double negative sentences without such assumption. The analysis seems more adequate than Horn's and Levinson's also in the light of a certain general feature of negative sentences.
著者
鴻 浩介
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.52, no.1, pp.113-125, 2019-12-30 (Released:2020-06-20)
参考文献数
20

In this paper, I aim to clarify and vindicate Anscombe's concept of practical knowledge by way of suggesting that some intentional actions are artifacts - i.e. artificial events. Like other artifacts, actions are ontologically dependent upon agents' intention and hence agents can know what they are intentionally doing without any evidence. However, this view comes under attack from skepticism about the reality of artifacts themselves. If artifact kinds are mind-dependent, doesn't it follow that they are nothing but nominal, arbitrary groupings? In reply, I shall argue that artifacts, including actions, are still real in the world we live in because they have characteristic built-in normativity.
著者
金杉 武司
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.51, no.1, pp.59-78, 2018-07-31 (Released:2019-05-02)
参考文献数
9
被引用文献数
1

What is “otherness”? What is “mind”? Shigeki Noya has been in pursuit of unique answers to these questions through inheriting but confronting the philosophies of Shozo Omori and Ludwig Wittgenstein. This book is positioned as an arrival point of Noya's philosophical investigations. In this paper, I examine how Noya innovatively develops his theory of “otherness” and “mind”, while referring also to the original work of Noya. In addition, introducing criticisms on Noya's previous works, I examine whether new developments in this book provide answers to those criticisms. Last of all, I examine the appropriateness of Naya's theory.
著者
松原 崇
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.50, pp.51-70, 2017-12-20 (Released:2019-05-02)
参考文献数
57

Deep learning models have already achieved significant results and surpassed other sophisticated models based on features made by experts in various tasks; image processing, sound processing, and natural language processing. They are considered to automatically learn and extract concepts such as “cat face” and “human body” from given big dataset. However, what are indeed called concepts, and how they are extracted? This manuscript provides a rough history of neural networks preceding deep learning, explanation of concepts learned by deep learning models, and then future perspective of deep learning study with (cognitive) neuroscience.