著者
日下 渉
出版者
京都大学東南アジア研究所
雑誌
東南アジア研究 (ISSN:05638682)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.46, no.3, pp.420-441, 2008

This paper analyzes moral conflicts between the middle class and the poor in Philippine politics through a discursive construction of the "we/they" consciousness. These moral conflicts have not been explored in earlier studies, which either regard the middle class and civil society as democratic factors or examine class conflicts solely in terms of interest distribution. This paper provides an analytical framework that explains the construction of a "we/they" consciousness in a class-divided "dual public sphere." I analyze these discourses in relation to several political issues and conclude by arguing that the moral conflicts between the collective consciousnesses of "we/they" relations have undermined popular support for democracy. The middle class generally associates "we" with "citizen," and regards itself as a purveyor and defender of democracy. It views the "poor" ("them") as lacking the appropriate morals and education to make similar claims. In fact, for the middle class, the poor are often responsible for undermining democracy. On the other hand, the poor associate "we" with "the masses," who despite their upright morality, have been marginalized, despised or ignored by the selfish and cold-hearted "rich" ("them"). For the poor, the culprits behind democratic deterioration are the rich. This moral conflict denies the legitimacy of others and is undermining popular trust in democracy, which inherently demands the acceptance of "them" as legitimate adversaries.
著者
片岡 樹
出版者
京都大学東南アジア地域研究研究所
雑誌
東南アジア研究 (ISSN:05638682)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.42, no.2, pp.188-207, 2004-09-30 (Released:2017-10-31)

This paper examines the formation of a modern state with demarcated borders in Thailand. The case taken into account is the presence of KMT (Kuomintang) Chinese troops in the northwestern borderlands, the Thai government's attempts to control them, and the hill tribes' adaptation to these circumstances from the 1950s through the 1980s. The analysis demonstrates that not addressing the occupation of its frontier by foreign armed groups in favor of anti-communist considerations, the Thai government's Cold War policy delayed the nation's official goal—the completion of a modern territorial state. It further shows the dual nature, or “official” and “unofficial” mechanisms, of modern state formation in Southeast Asia. The hill tribes in the anti-communist camp have exploited the “unofficial” side of this process as front-line soldiers against the communists inside and outside the nation. This dualism began to disappear only after the 1980s, when the government declared victory over the communist challenge.
著者
中村 孝志
出版者
京都大学
雑誌
東南アジア研究 (ISSN:05638682)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.18, no.3, pp.422-445, 1980-12

この論文は国立情報学研究所の学術雑誌公開支援事業により電子化されました。The inhabitants of Formosa, which became a Japanese colony as a result of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), were allowed to become Japanese nationals on 8 May 1897. But, for some ten years the Government-General of Formosa was too occupied with pacification of this new territory to take an accurate census. This enabled non-Formosan Chinese in Fukien to obtain illegally Japanese nationality, which gave them exterritorial rights and a means to elude the likin. Around 1910,the majority of those registered as Formosan by the Japanese consulates at Amoy and Fuchou was actually non-Formosan Chinese. At the end of 1911 the consulates in Fukien, the Government-General, and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided that the consulates at Amoy, Fuchou, and Swatow should register those Formosans who wanted Japanese nationality and exclude the undesirable elements even if they had been registered in Formosa as Formosans of Japanese nationality. When the southern expansion policy of the Government-General was stimulated and activated by World War I, Formosan fortune seekers, criminals, and anti-Japanese rebels crossed over to Fukien without passports and entered the underworld there. Some of them even became leaders of the underworld and were called Formosan bandits. The Japanese consulates in Fukien could not control them and asked for aid from the Government-General. Police officers of the consulates in Amoy, Fuchou, Swatow, and Canton were increased at the expense of the Government-General. In 1916 conferences were held between the Government-General and the consulates at Amoy and Fuchou to discuss the problems of South China as well as the problems of the Formosans there. Through these conferences the Government-General revealed its southern expansion plan, including such programs as the education of the Formosans to convert them into loyal Japanese subjects and propaganda and intelligence activities through hospitals and the press. The 1916 conferences were significant in that they foreshadowed the next phase of the southern expansion program of the Government-General of Formosa.
著者
金 悠進
出版者
京都大学東南アジア地域研究研究所
雑誌
東南アジア研究 (ISSN:05638682)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.55, no.1, pp.71-102, 2017

This paper will show that one of the decisive factors in the rise of Ridwan Kamil as the mayor of Bandung is the sociocultural context of the city. The daily cultural practices of urban apolitical "ordinary" young people have been historically developed into or conceptualized as "creative" (kreatif). The term "kreatif" itself is ambiguous and could include anything new and different. Ridwan Kamil, as a political outsider with no strong political base, has shrewdly and successfully exploited the ambiguous concept of kreatif to increase his popularity among the urban citizens in Bandung. Bandung has been described as a thriving cosmopolitan city during the colonial period. Urban young people in the city were depoliticized but able to enjoy Western popular culture under the Suharto regime. Especially since 1990, they have built independent music and clothing labels to develop the local indie scene. Ridwan Kamil, as an architect, has supported creative industries, including fashion and music. He has successfully changed the mindset of citizens to become the mayor of Bandung through creative festivals.
著者
茅根 由佳
出版者
京都大学東南アジア研究所
雑誌
東南アジア研究 (ISSN:05638682)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.51, no.1, pp.139-161, 2013

This paper analyzes the water privatization process in Jakarta, Indonesia, focusing on the changes in policy after the fall of Suharto in 1998, to show the strategic adaptation of domestic business elites to survive after the drastic transition period. During the Suharto era, business elites were able to accumulate capital by drawing patronage from former President Suharto. However, the democratization of the country led to Suharto's ouster and disordered the former interest structure, which was deeply entrenched in the Indonesian political economy. Today concessions in water privatization are no longer sustained by merely relying on the political authority. In Jakarta, the center of Indonesia's politics and economy, agreements with Suharto guaranteed private corporate interests with lucrative business relating to city development. Recently, however, private businesses, especially those managing public infrastructure, have become increasingly vulnerable to aggres sive public backlash and supervision by the regulatory bodies of the provincial government. Despite this increasing vulnerability, domestic business elites have succeeded in regaining their lucrative concessions by seizing opportunities and cooperating with the capitals of foreign countries. These business elites have successfully adapted to the changing democratic nvironment with sophisticated strategies and shrewd risk management.
著者
山下 晋司
出版者
京都大学東南アジア研究センター
雑誌
東南アジア研究 (ISSN:05638682)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.23, no.4, pp.419-438, 1986-03

この論文は国立情報学研究所の学術雑誌公開支援事業により電子化されました。

1 0 0 0 OA 未完の党=国家

著者
中西 嘉宏
出版者
京都大学東南アジア地域研究研究所
雑誌
東南アジア研究 (ISSN:05638682)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.41, no.3, pp.330-360, 2003-12-31 (Released:2017-10-31)

This article examines Ne Win’s attempt to construct a party-state in Burma. Previous studies have argued that Ne Win built the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) in 1962 as a political organization to camouflage his dictatorship and military rule. In this article I suggest that Ne Win tried to construct a partystate in the 1970s by changing the rules governing appointment to top state positions, but failed. From 1962 to 1970, the Revolutionary Council consisted of military officers favored by Ne Win, directors of the Ministry of Defense, and regional commanders of the Army. It began to change in 1971, when Ne Win formed the Central Executive Committee (CEC) within the BSPP for top decisionmaking. In 1972, he compelled most CEC members to retire from the military and did so himself. Many CEC members who concurrently held ministerial posts resigned in 1973, effectively separating the CEC from the military and the government. At the third Party Conference in February 1977, Ne Win began to change the type of people appointed to the CEC. Five new members of the third CEC were retired officers who had transferred from the military to the party in the 1960s and rose in the party. They were not former directors of the Ministry of Defense or former regional commanders, but party leaders. This means Ne Win began to shift his power base from the military to the BSPP. But in an attempt that came to light later, some party leaders tried to unseat Ne Win in the election of the Central Committee at the third Party Conference. Ne Win then purged 113 party members including new CEC members and appointed the fourth Central Committee in November 1977. Ne Win never again appointed people to the CEC who had risen through the party. Subsequently, until 1988, the BSPP functioned primarily to camouflage his military dictatorship.
著者
岩井 美佐紀
出版者
京都大学
雑誌
東南アジア研究 (ISSN:05638682)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.39, no.1, pp.120-136, 2001-06
被引用文献数
1

この論文は国立情報学研究所の学術雑誌公開支援事業により電子化されました。Khanh Hau commune was a typical rural community in the Mekong Delta which still mainifested clear social stratification by land holding when Hickey, an American anthropologist, did fieldwork in the late 1950s and early 1960s. But the social structure of Khanh Hau commune changed sharply in the ensuing 40 years due to a series of institutional agricultural reforms, agricultural collectivization, and the rapid growth of population. According to our questionnaire of 96 households in 1996,we found only small land holders and a large number of landless households existing because of the fractionization of land. Almost all households are engaged in farming and nonfarming wage labor. The greatest number are agricultural laborers, women engaged mainly in transplanting and harvest. Among the various types of informal wage labor available, agricultural labor is regarded as providing relatively stable income. Most laborers are managed by agents (trum) who live in Khanh Hau. Big agents, those who hire some 100 laborers, are prestigious because they provide stable work and payment in advance, which helps laborers guarantee their daily income.
著者
小田 なら
出版者
京都大学
雑誌
東南アジア研究 (ISSN:05638682)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.2, pp.217-243, 2016-01-29

This paper aims to examine to what extent and how the government of South Vietnam (1954-75) institutionalized "Eastern medicine (Dong Y)" that is, traditional medicine, in its medical system. It also analyzes the social background of the significant Chinese influence, which prevented South Vietnam from institutionalizing Vietnamese traditional medicine as was the case of the North. Today, Vietnamese traditional medicine, which consists of Thuoc Nam (medicine of the south) and Thuoc Bac (medicine of the north), is institutionalized in the medical system. This has been attributed to the North Vietnamese policy to improve Vietnamese medicine, whereas South Vietnam purportedly did not take the initiative to make the most of Vietnamese traditional medicine. This paper reveals that South Vietnam did try to promote traditional medicine and to integrate it into the public health care system. However, due to the large population and influence of the Chinese, Eastern medicine in South Vietnam was not represented by traditional Vietnamese medicine but by its Chinese counterpart. In order to incorporate more of Vietnamese traditional medicine, the government had to restrict Eastern medicine practices to the Vietnamese. South Vietnam also attempted to institutionalize traditional medicine. However, it was premised on a more complex principle than the North's.
著者
渡辺 弘之 阿部 健一 星川 智之 Prachaiyo Buared Sahunalu Pongsak Khemnark Choob
出版者
京都大学
雑誌
東南アジア研究 (ISSN:05638682)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.28, no.1, pp.45-54, 1990-06
被引用文献数
1

この論文は国立情報学研究所の学術雑誌公開支援事業により電子化されました。
著者
田中 則雄
出版者
京都大学
雑誌
東南アジア研究 (ISSN:05638682)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.10, no.3, pp.409-421, 1972-12

この論文は国立情報学研究所の学術雑誌公開支援事業により電子化されました。
著者
Zainal Andi' Abidin
出版者
京都大学東南アジア研究センター
雑誌
東南アジア研究 (ISSN:05638682)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.20, no.4, pp.455-491, 1983-03

この論文は国立情報学研究所の学術雑誌公開支援事業により電子化されました。
著者
原 洋之介
出版者
京都大学東南アジア研究所
雑誌
東南アジア研究 (ISSN:05638682)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.54, no.1, pp.93-116, 2016-07-31

Shinichi Ichimura. Japan and Asia: Economic Development and Nation Building. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company, 2015, xxv+438p.
著者
Arai Kenichiro
出版者
京都大学東南アジア研究センター
雑誌
東南アジア研究 (ISSN:05638682)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.38, no.4, pp.481-511, 2001-03

この論文は国立情報学研究所の学術雑誌公開支援事業により電子化されました。
著者
ARAI Kenichiro
出版者
京都大学東南アジア研究所
雑誌
東南アジア研究 (ISSN:05638682)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.2, pp.161-191, 2011-09-30

This paper examines the impact of industrial estates on surrounding villages in Karawang Regency, West Java, Indonesia. A few large industrial estates have been in operation since the latter part of the 1990s, with hundreds of tenants, mainly auto manufacturers and related component suppliers. The rapid inflow of industry and decrease of agriculture-related jobs have prompted villagers to look for jobs in the industrial estates. However, there is a significant mismatch between the average educational and skill levels of the villagers and those required by companies in the estates. Competition with a growing number of immigrants with higher educational or skill levels has made it difficult for local villagers to obtain jobs in industry, while newcomers with a more secure job status are forming a new socioeconomic order outside the existing village settlements. The study also found that recruitment of regular staff had decreased rapidly since the introduction of a new labor law in 2003. Widespread use of fixed-term contracts and temporary agency workers has made jobs in industrial estates fragile and short-term. This gives companies flexibility of employment but at the same time is producing a growing pool of disenchanted and frustrated village youths in the surrounding environment. Further assistance to the villagers is desirable—not only for their sake but also for local government and industry if they hope for a long-term peaceful and conducive business environment.