著者
小口 峰樹
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.44, no.1, pp.1_1-1_16, 2011 (Released:2011-10-13)
参考文献数
32

John McDowell proposes conceptualism of perceptual content to warrant the idea that perceptual experience rationally constrains belief. To support this idea, McDowell claims that not only belief and perception, but also the world itself has a propositional structure. This view of the “unboundedness of the conceptual” is, however, doubtful. In this paper, I shall explore how we can defend conceptualism without accepting the above view. To do this, I shall propose a mechanism that gives a propositional structure to perception before it is established as a conscious experience. In so doing, I shall employ two empirical theories: the visual index theory and the sensory classification theory. This inquiry aims at revising conceptualism and giving it an empirical basis.
著者
水本 正晴
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.41, no.1, pp.1_59-1_78, 2008 (Released:2009-07-31)
参考文献数
40

The "entailment thesis", or the principle that knowledge entails belief, is accepted by most epistemologists today. However, not everyone agrees. Some philosophers have presented at least prima facie convincing counterexamples. It seems, however, their challenges have been not so much answered as simply neglected. After examining two types of attractive, but not completely satisfying answers to such purported counterexamples, I will propose an alternative answer, which seems to be congenial to the spirit of epistemological naturalism.
著者
大畑 浩志
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.2, pp.169-189, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)
参考文献数
27

Haecceitism is the idea that each particular object has a haecceity: the property that determines its uniqueness as an object. Thus, for example, we could say that Socratesʼs haecceity is the property of being (identical with) Socrates. However, haecceitism seems to face the “Haecceitic Euthyphro Problem,” namely, that, especially in the case of fission of an amoeba, it is unclear how to set an explanatory order between the two facts: the destruction or generation of particular objects and the instantiation of their haecceities. In this paper, I distinguish between two versions of haecceitism and address this issue with the version I call “primitivist haecceitism.”
著者
小草 泰
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.44, no.1, pp.1_17-1_33, 2011 (Released:2011-10-13)
参考文献数
18

A pretty big debate has been going on in the recent philosophy of mind as to whether the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is exhausted by (or reduced to) its intentional content. On the one hand, Representationalists often argue on the ground of the so-called ‘transparency of experience’ that the phenomenal character of an experience is exhausted by its intentional content. On the other hand, qualia theorists object that there are non-intentional features of experiences (‘qualia’). But, in my view, the debate itself is wrong-headed in this respect: it presupposes that intentional contents of experiences can be explained without mentioning their phenomenal characters, but this presupposition is groundless. In this paper, I argue, by reconsidering the ‘transparency of experience’ thesis, that a more appropriate view on the relationship between intentional contents and phenomenal characters of experiences is a pretty much different one than that shared by both sides of the debate.
著者
佐藤 広大
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.1, pp.43-53, 2020-09-30 (Released:2020-09-30)
参考文献数
15
被引用文献数
1

The buck-passing accounts of values, which analyze values in terms of reasons, have lately attracted attention. There are thought to be counterexamples, such as the toxin puzzle, to the buck-passing accounts. However, it is a question whether the toxin puzzle is really a counterexample to this account. This paper shows that if two theses, namely the strong relationship between normative and motivating reasons and the guise of the good, are true, the toxin puzzle is not a counterexample to this account. It follows from this that in discussions of counterexamples to the buck-passing accounts the meanings of “reasons” and “values” need to be made explicit.
著者
山口 まり
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.2, pp.115-131, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)
参考文献数
65

The microscopes have been showing us the invisible entities since their invention. The magnified images with the optical microscope convinced us of their existence, such as blood capillary and the cell nuclei during cell divisions. And the electron microscope visualized viruses that people had doubted their existence. This paper explores the history of observations of dislocations in crystals with the microscopes from the 1940s to the 1960s to show how microscopists visualized the dislocations to verify the existence of dislocations. The visualizations of dislocations with the Transmission Electron microscope in 1956 had a critical role in the acceptance of the reality of dislocations. Also, this historical case would offer an opportunity to analyze the relationship between representations and existence.
著者
石原 孝二
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.47, no.2, pp.17-32, 2014-12-20 (Released:2015-11-08)
参考文献数
42

Throughout the history of modern psychiatry, descriptive methods and operational definitions have featured prominently in endeavors to objectively refer to and classify mental disorders. An alternative to these descriptive approaches is the argument based on the concepts of “natural kinds” and “dysfunction” such as Wakefieldʼs “harmful dysfunction” model. However, none of these approaches seem promising for understanding the nature of mental disorders. This paper proposes that we abandon the prevalent tendency to objectively classify mental disorders, revert to the original meaning of psychiatry (Psychiaterie), a term coined by J. C. Reil, as a method of therapy, and reexamine the concept of mental disorder.
著者
源河 亨
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.47, no.2, pp.87-103, 2014-12-20 (Released:2015-11-08)
参考文献数
24
被引用文献数
1

According to the Sibleyan account, descriptive aesthetic judgments are warranted by aesthetic perception. I defend this account by using a philosophical theory of perceptual experience, that is, Fregean intentionalism. I will then suggest an anti-realistic account of aesthetic properties, which claims that perceivable aesthetic properties are not realistic properties supervening on sets of non-aesthetic sensible properties (e.g. color, shape, etc.) of objects, but some kind of “modes of presentation” of such properties. Proving this argument, I demonstrate how the philosophy of perception can be useful for considering problems in aesthetics.
著者
村井 忠康
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.45, no.2, pp.99-114, 2012 (Released:2016-01-15)
参考文献数
24

According to the standard form of conceptualism, which comes from McDowell (1994), the conceptual content of experience is propositional. But this is at variance with naive realism, which conceptualism craves for. Given that, we should seek non-propositionalist forms of conceptualism, which make room for naive realism. In this paper I propose such a conceptualism, exploiting Sellarsʼs idea of visual experience as “thinking in color”, although he himself has never been conceptualist. Elaborating the idea will lead to the conception of visual experience as analogous, in a unique way, to drawing a picture. I argue that this enables conceptualism to take seriously the particularity and concreteness of perception, which are emphasized by naive realism.
著者
佐金 武
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.44, no.1, pp.1_59-1_74, 2011 (Released:2011-10-13)
参考文献数
18

In his book Metaphysics of Temporal Modality, Prof. Isashiki takes a very unique and intriguing approach to philosophy of time. He begins with raising the following three questions. (i) What does it mean to say that the past is determinate or fixed whereas the future is open? (ii) Why is it impossible to see temporal transition from the present to the past? (iii) Does the present have no duration? Answering to those questions, he declares that he does not assume any linear representation of time. In this review, I shall examine to what extent the attempt succeeds and in what respects it fails.
著者
源河 亨
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.47, no.2, pp.87-103, 2014

According to the Sibleyan account, descriptive aesthetic judgments are warranted by aesthetic perception. I defend this account by using a philosophical theory of perceptual experience, that is, Fregean intentionalism. I will then suggest an anti-realistic account of aesthetic properties, which claims that perceivable aesthetic properties are not realistic properties supervening on sets of non-aesthetic sensible properties (e.g. color, shape, etc.) of objects, but some kind of "modes of presentation" of such properties. Proving this argument, I demonstrate how the philosophy of perception can be useful for considering problems in aesthetics.
著者
村中 達矢
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.42, no.1, pp.1_97-1_106, 2009 (Released:2009-09-30)
参考文献数
6

Yuji Yonemori published a book titled Abduction in 2007. In this book, he argues mainly in support of C. S. Peirce's theory of abductive reasoning. Peirce said that abductive reasoning is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis, that the reasoning is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea, and that the reasoning differs from either deduction or induction. Yonemori agrees with Peirce on all of these points in his book. In this review, I shall critically comment on the book.
著者
佐金 武
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.55, no.2, pp.3-18, 2023-03-30 (Released:2023-03-31)
参考文献数
34

The contemporary debate on time which was opened up by J. E. M McTaggart tends to focus on metaphysical issues framed in the dispute between tensed theories and tenseless theories. In the history of the philosophy of time, on the other hand, the subject matter looks strikingly different, and the focus is more wideranging. At least three main categories should be considered: idealism, realism, and relationism. This paper aims to offer an insight into contemporary and classical philosophy of time from a systematic perspective and thereby to suggest a research program worth exploring.
著者
古田 智久
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.51, no.2, pp.47-64, 2018-12-30 (Released:2019-11-27)
参考文献数
33

Today philosophy of science and analytic philosophy are regarded as different areas or methods of philosophy. But although Philosophy of Science Society, Japan bears name of ʻPhilosophy of Scienceʼ, many analytic philosophers belong to it. In this paper, from the historical point of view I consider the reason why the journal of this society accepts papers of analytic philosophy and annual meeting of this society accepts talks of analytic philosophy. First, I explain how analytic philosophy is different from philosophy of science. Next, I explore the historical situation in which analytic philosophy became intertwined with philosophy of science. As result of these considerations, an answer to the above question, ʻWhy does this society accept the study of analytic philosophy?ʼ is given.
著者
鈴木 雄大
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.2, pp.5-25, 2016-12-20 (Released:2017-09-29)
参考文献数
19
被引用文献数
1

The aim of this paper is to argue for the anti-causal theory of action by associating separate ideas of action with one another: the logical connection argument, the anti-psychologism of reason, teleology, the disjunctivism of intention and the disjunctivism of bodily movement. I will also defend the anti-causal theory from the famous objection called “Davidsonʼs challenge” and reveal that the fundamental idea of the anti-causal theory is that an intention to act and the action itself do not exist independently of each other.
著者
北村 直彰
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.47, no.1, pp.1-17, 2014-07-30 (Released:2015-07-24)
参考文献数
9

This paper aims to precisely characterize the theoretical significance of the notion of truthmakers. First, the closeness of the alleged principle of truthmaker theory and the realistic intuition on which it rests is assessed, thereby determining to what extent a certain kind of general objection against truthmaker theory carries weight. Second, the principle of truthmaker theory is reformulated on the basis of this assessment, and truthmaker theory is argued to offer a methodological role for identifying fundamental entities that ground metaphysically nonfundamental truths. The discussion suggests a sophisticated nonQuinean criterion of ontological commitment.