著者

Sho KANAMARU Kazushi KAWAMURA Shu TANAKA Yoshinori TOMITA Nozomu TOGAWA

出版者

The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers

雑誌

IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information and Systems (ISSN:09168532)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.E104-D, no.2, pp.226-236, 2021-02-01

被引用文献数

4

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Ising machines have attracted attention, which is expected to obtain better solutions of various combinatorial optimization problems at high speed by mapping the problems to natural phenomena. A slot-placement problem is one of the combinatorial optimization problems, regarded as a quadratic assignment problem, which relates to the optimal logic-block placement in a digital circuit as well as optimal delivery planning. Here, we propose a mapping to the Ising model for solving a slot-placement problem with additional constraints, called a constrained slot-placement problem, where several item pairs must be placed within a given distance. Since the behavior of Ising machines is stochastic and we map the problem to the Ising model which uses the penalty method, the obtained solution does not always satisfy the slot-placement constraint, which is different from the conventional methods such as the conventional simulated annealing. To resolve the problem, we propose an interpretation method in which a feasible solution is generated by post-processing procedures. We measured the execution time of an Ising machine and compared the execution time of the simulated annealing in which solutions with almost the same accuracy are obtained. As a result, we found that the Ising machine is faster than the simulated annealing that we implemented.

著者

長谷川 信

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, no.1, pp.1-27, 1986-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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This paper analyzes the entrepreneurial activities relating to market and product developments and the plant and equipment investments, and their contribution to the development of Yasukawa Electric Co. Yasukawa Electric Co. was established in 1915 as a part of the Yasukawa family's business diversification, initially producing generators, motors, and transformers. The company did not fare well in the 1920s, due to the slow product development and the formation of sales organizations.From the late 1920s, the product development focusing on motors became active. During the Great Depression, the production became organized around electric motors and the sales network expanded. Thus the company grew rapidly in the 1930s.The establishment of the mass production system stemmed from the active plant and equipment investments beginning in 1933. These developments were made possible by the increasing influence of salaried managers. The advent of salaried managers and their supporting staff necessitated an adjustment of interests in the Yasukawa family's businesses, and changed the process of decision making in the Yasukawa family as well.

著者

佐々木 聡

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, no.1, pp.28-47, 1986-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, no.1, pp.48-57, 1986-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

米川 伸一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, no.2, pp.1-31, 1986-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The Royton group was widely known as one of the best-performing company groups among the Oldham limiteds in the interwar period. The purpose of this article is to clarify the origin and process of the group from its formative years, and to analyze its major strategies. Analysis is based on the company records stocked at Shiloh Spinners Ltd., company files in the Public Record Office and Company Registration Office of London, and the Oldham local newspapers. The major conclusions are the following.(1) The group originated in the Royton and Star Spinning Company which was founded in the midst of the phenomenal 1873-75 boom in the flotation of cotton spinning companies. M.B. Tattersall was a principal entrepreneur in forming the group.(2) G.E. Gartside, a “student” of the M.B. Tattersall school, spun off from the Tattersall group by establishing the Holly Mills in 1890. He was, however, closely aligned with Tattersall's group, so that it is reasonable to regard the companies as part of a single group.(3) The group's strategies were not notably different from those of most well-performing cotton spinning companies, but among the Oldham limiteds they were not common, and therefore worthy of appreciation.(4) How was it possible to keep up the good performance among the group?, One of the answers is found in the internal labour market of the group. Mill officials were usually recruited and moved within the group, so management strategies could be settled in each company.

著者

伊藤 孝

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, no.2, pp.32-60, 1986-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) -the present name is Exxon Corporation-has been the biggest company in the world petroleum industry since the late 19th century. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the characteristics of business activities of the Company during World War II.The main characteristics were as follows : (1) The Company maintained and shored up the fundamental structure of operations which had been established during the 1920s and 1930s : the crude oil production department played a most important part in dominating other companies; the cartel continued to be effective in crude oil production, especially in the U.S.A.; the range of operations was worldwide in wartime as well as before the war.(2) The Company manufactured strategic munitions, that is, aviation gasoline (100-octane), butadiene and synthetic toluene. I think this was an important beginning for petroleum chemical operations by the Company. But it was small in scale in contrast to other operations. I estimate that it didn't provide profits of any importance.(3) The Company made use of government finances, which were essential. But it used them chiefly for operations which had little validity in peacetime. The main operations, for instance, crude oil production, were carried out using the company's own capital.

著者

ブラックフォード マンセル G

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, no.2, pp.61-70, 1986-07-30 (Released:2010-05-07)

著者

田村 祐一郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, no.3, pp.1-26, 1986-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1

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This article deals with some important problems in the life insurance business in the late Nineteenth Century America, as follows;1. Fundamental structure of life insurance business.2. Expansive character of the American life insurance business, tipified by Henry B. Hyde, the Equitable Life. His aim was, first of all, to satisfy his own entrepreneurial wants, higher ranked than life insurance purpose.3. Tontine Policy, introduced by Hyde, was not only an ideal solution of the problem with which he was confronted, but also gave him a weapon to push his Equitable to the top of the industry.4. Manegement of Jacob Greene, the Connecticut Mutual, was in a marked contrast to that of Hyde. Being an early advocate of “Humane Life Value Theory”, and stubborn opponent of the Tontine, he had a distinct idea of life insurance business. His management, true to his principle, was inferior to Hyde, in quality. that is, growth of business, but much more superior in quality, both cost and returns to policyowners.

著者

小林 惟司

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.3, pp.38-64, 1985-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

鈴木 恒夫

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.4, pp.1-28, 1986-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

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The purpose of this paper is examine the circumstances under which Mitsui Mining Co. had established Miike Chisso Industries and Toyo Koatsu Industries, in three respects; (1) the relations of the dyestuff industry which Mitsui Mining Co. had developed, to the synthetic ammonia industry, (2) the reasons why it had established two companies of the same type, and (3) the meanings of the merger of Daiichi Chisso Kogyo Co.Mitsui Mining Co. started to produce in Taisho Era various dyestuffs using tar collected from coke ovens. In late 1920's, as the production of alizarin and sulphuric dyestuffs had increaced, the demand of the nitric acid, which is necessary for producing dyestuffs, also increased. So, it caused lack of nitric acid. This condition was critical to Mitsui Mining Co., because it had decided to start producing Indigo. Then, it had to make for itself the nitric acid from the synthetic ammonia.On the other hand, having established Miike Chisso Industries, Mitsui Mining Co. set up Toyo Koatsu Industries in order to introduce a new method of the synthetic ammonia, to produce the ammonium-sulphate which were then insufficient in Japan, and to supply Miike Senryo Kogyosho (Miike Dyestuff Works), which belonged to Mitsui Mining Co., with the ammonia to produce the nitric acid. The true reason why it didn't enlarge Miike Chisso Industries but established Toyo Koatsu Industries was to intend tax exemption. So, after the expiration of the special privilege, they were amalgamated.The most difficult and also important problems to produce the synthetic ammonia were to select the technology they shoud adopt and to obtain related skilled engineers, in those days. Mitsui Mining Co. solved these problems by merging Daiichi Chisso Kogyo.

著者

麻島 昭一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.2, pp.50-66, 1985-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

渡 哲郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.4, pp.29-54, 1986-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

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Nippon Electric Power Co. Ltd. (Nippon Denryoku) was founded after World War 1 as a subsidiary of Ujigawa Electric Power Co. Ltd. (Ujigawa Denryoku), with the intention that its main business would be the supply of wholesale electricity to Ujigawa.However, Ujigawa decided to go into partnership with, and to buy electricity from, Great Consolidated Electric Power Co. Ltd. (Daido Denryoku), which had completed electric power transmission facilities to Osaka before Nippon Electric, and so Nippon Electric lost its largest customer. It was forced to seek other purchasers for its electricity to replace Ujigawa and, undertaking a positive sales drive, found customers in Osaka, Hyogo, Kyoto, Aichi and Toyama Prefectures.As a result of this Nippon Electric was able to break away from its parent company and become independent. The main reasons for its growth were the low price of the electricity it supplied and the rapid expansion of the power supply market in the 1920s caused by the electrification of industry.However, in the process of becoming independent Nippon Electric practiced unrealistic financial management, letting for example its depreciation reserve become insufficient, and consequently in the Showa depression which followed, the company found itself in a serious crisis.

著者

チェックランド S

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.3, pp.65-76, 1985-10-30 (Released:2010-05-07)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.1, pp.66-80, 1985-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

橘川 武郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, no.4, pp.66-77, 1985-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

由井 常彦

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.1, pp.1-35,i, 1985-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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It is well known that Yasuda Zenjiro, founder of the Yasuda Zaibatsu, obtained a large amount of money from the Yasuda Shoten (Yasuda & Co.) during the early Meiji period, and this served as a first step in the formation of the fourth largest zaibatsu business combine. Neverthless, the business activities of the early Yasudas' enterprise as well as the process of capital accumulation have not been studied by any economic or business historians. Such a common assertion as “Yasuda built up a great fortune by speculation in Dajokan bills” does not seem to be verifiable.Based on the analysis of original records of the Yasuda Shoten, including accounting books, the main parts of this paper will clarify the nature of a wide variety of the business activities of Yasuda, such as real estate, retail selling of dry goods and banking, and examine the process of capital accumulation in the Yasuda businesses in detail.

著者

鈴木 良隆

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.2, pp.1-21,i, 1985-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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To mention subcontract has been an answer to the question how the factories were operated in nineteenth century Britain. First, this article examines whether or to what extent this system was prevalent, and second, whether it played the same managerial functions in various industry branches. Finally, in place of subcontract, a different framework in interpretating the nineteenth century employment is proposed. Whether the subcontract system was prevalent or not can be measured by investigating the forms of wages paid to the foremen or skilled workers who were in charge of a group of workers. Some were paid by piece, but they were mostly paid by time. In the latter case, these workers were not subcontractors. More important still was the attitude of skilled workers to subcontract or 'piece-masters', and further to the forms of payment, which differed from industry to industry. These indicate that the subcontact did not carry out the same managerial function throughout all the industries. Further, in spite of these seemingly different attitudes to wages and employment, they have one motive in common, i.e., to maintain the autonomy of skilled workers. Various facts can be interpretated more successfully by using a different framework rather than by subcontract. That is to use the idea of internalisation of production function and the transaction of labour to the manufacturing firms. In these respects, autonomy of skilled workers lies in the intermediate areas between the systematically organised workshops since the end of the nineteenth century and the sequential spot contracts of labour before the Industrial Revolution.

著者

岡崎 哲二

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.1, pp.36-65,ii, 1985-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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In 1934 Nippon Steel Co., the biggest iron and steel business at that time, was organized through the fusion of a state-owned enterprise (Yawata Iron Works) and six private enterprises. We shall study the background and the process of the fusion to make clear its implication for the development of the Japanese iron and steel industry.Our conclusions are as follows. Firstly, integrated production of iron and steel was not more profitable than discononected operation owing to the low price of steel scrap or pig iron and the high price of coal before 1932. However, after 1932 a fall in the exchange value of the yen changed this relation of raw material prices, which made integrated production more profitable than separate production.Secondly, the fusion plan made in 1930-31 lacked rational ground, .for the planned new enterprise, which was directed to expand integrated operations, would not contribute to reducing average costs in the iron and steel industry because of economic conditions before 1932, and would produce no commercial profit during the Showa Depression.Thirdly, on the other hand, the fusion plan made in 1932-33 had rational ground. The planned new enterprise would not only show a commercial profit but also was necessary to check the rise of average costs. For although integrated production would become more profitable as aforesaid, both Yawata Iron Works and the enterprises affiliated with the zaibatsu had financial difficulty in expanding it. The direct function of the fusion should be understood to solve that difficulty.

著者

金 東熙

出版者

University of Tokyo(東京大学)

巻号頁・発行日

2015

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審査委員会委員 : (主査)東京大学教授 川原 秀城, 東京大学教授 福井 玲, 東京大学教授 小島 毅, 東京大学教授 ミュラー アルバートチャールズ, 京都府立大学教授 中 純夫

著者

荒井 政治

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, no.2, pp.65-79, 1984-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)