著者

中川 敬一郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, no.1, pp.105-107, 1968-03-15 (Released:2009-11-11)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, no.1, pp.108-122, 1968-03-15 (Released:2009-11-11)

著者

雲財 寛

出版者

一般社団法人 日本科学教育学会

雑誌

科学教育研究 (ISSN:03864553)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.4, pp.211-212, 2020 (Released:2021-02-05)

著者

Xu Qiuyun

出版者

横浜国立大学

巻号頁・発行日

2017-03-24

著者

中村 秀子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, no.3, pp.38-68,iv, 1967-11-15 (Released:2009-11-11)

---

Raw silk was one of the major items of Japanese export at the beginning of Meiji period and the Italian and French machines were introduced into Japan for the purpose of modernizing the silk reeling industry. The Ono Company started to operate a large scale reeling machines of Italian type at its Miyamada Works in 1872. But on account of the lack of skill needed for handling the sophisticated machine, the output was small and the cost of production was inevitably quite high. Unstable supply of cocoon was another source of trouble for the Miyamada Works which eventually fell into financial difficulties in 1874.Almost all the silk reeling works of Western model had to suffer the same kind of difficulties. But the cotton industry, another textile industry that had introduced foreign machines aggressively almost from England, had achieved a brilliant success in establishing modern mills which were sufficiently competitive in international market. What was the reason for this difference between the two textile industries?

著者

栗田 真造

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, no.3, pp.69, 1967-11-15 (Released:2009-11-11)

著者

山口 和雄

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, no.1, pp.1-8, 1968-03-15 (Released:2009-11-11)

被引用文献数

1

---

All of the papers published in this number were read at the third annual conference of the Business History Society of Japan which was held at Waseda University on the 20th of November, 1967.In the opening address, Kazuo Yamaguchi emphasized the extent of the competition the western-style enterprises in Japan had to fight with foreigners before they were firmly established by the beginning of the 20th century, and he pointed out the six conditions required for their effective competition in the world market.The second speaker, Kanji Ishii, of the University of Tokyo, explained that there were two types of silk-reeling mills, the mills which produced the common grade of raw silk and the mills which specialized in fine raw silk, both being exported for the American market.He also emphasized that the patterns of behavior of the two mills, the Katakura of the former type and the Gunze of the latter, were quite different in financing, purchasing, and labor recruitment. The commentator, Naosuke Takamura of Yokohama National University, raised the question whether these two types were not related to the two different stages of development of the Japanese silk-reeling industry.Yoichiro Inoue of Hiroshima University followed the technological development of the Nagasaki Shipyard of the Mitsubishi Co. and concluded that the prosperity of the Nagasaki Shipyard was based on its technical superiority over the competitive yards. Shigeaki Yasuoka of Doshisha University commented that the technical aspect should have been discussed in closer relation with other management factors.Tsunehiko Yui, of Meiji University, reported on the Tokyo Marine Insurance Co. formed by Eiichi Shibuzawa and subscribed by some aristocrats, mostly former daimyos. He emphasized the role of Kenkichi Kagami, who led the company successfully through a number of difficulties, devising an effective method of calculation and skillfully exploring the world market.Toshimitsu Imuta of Osaka Municipal University suggested that the success of Tokyo Marine Insurance should also be considered in relation to the development of industrial enterprises, to the cooperation among the competitive insurance companies and finally to the generous government subsidies. The final reporter, Yoshio Togai of Senshu University, traced in detail various challenges the Mitsui Trading Co. had to respond to in its formative years.Keiichiro Nakagawa of Tokyo University asked for further clarification of the competitive situation between the general and specialized merchants on the one hand and between the shipping, insurance and/or foreign exchange functions of those general merchants and the same kind of subsidiary businesses operated by independent firms on the other.

著者

高村 直助

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, no.1, pp.27-32, 1968-03-15 (Released:2009-11-11)

著者

井上 洋一郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, no.1, pp.33-50, 1968-03-15 (Released:2009-11-11)

著者

安岡 重明

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, no.1, pp.50-53, 1968-03-15 (Released:2009-11-11)

著者

由井 常彦

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, no.1, pp.54-66, 1968-03-15 (Released:2009-11-11)

著者

伊牟田 敏充

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, no.1, pp.66-71, 1968-03-15 (Released:2009-11-11)

著者

石井 寛治

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, no.1, pp.9-27, 1968-03-15 (Released:2009-11-11)

参考文献数

25

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, no.1, pp.136-169, 1967-07-30 (Released:2009-11-11)

著者

小林 袈裟治

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, no.2, pp.64-84,iii, 1967-09-30 (Released:2009-11-11)

---

This paper deals with a cotton manufacturing company in Manchester, New Hampshire, promoted by a group of entrepreneurs known as the “Boston Associates.” Started as a small establishment in the 1830's, this company had grown in the space of a century to one of the largest-scale and highest quality companies in the industry. But though the mills in Manchester were firmly established, the management of the company in Boston was totally unsuited to meeting the changing situation in the early 20th century. One of the causes of the company's bankruptcy in the 1930's was attributed to mismanagement by the executives.With an emphasis on the functions, respectively, of the company treasurer and of the local mill agent, this paper analyzes the relationship between decision-making and execution, and discusses some of the characteristics of business enterprises controlled by the so-called general entrepreneurs of 19th century America.

著者

寺谷 武明

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, no.2, pp.85-119,iv, 1967-09-30 (Released:2009-11-11)

---

Japan's protective policy towards its ship-building industry originated in the enactment of the Ship-Building Promotion Law in 1896. It was intended not to protect particular companies, but to increase the total building capacity of the country by offering premiums for the building of new steel ships larger than 700 tons gross. However, the response to this protective policy and its effects on individual businesses varied markedly depending on the particular circumstances of each ship-yard. This paper attempts to examine the characteristics of the response made by the Ishikawajima Ship-Building Yard to the new law, and the nature of the decisions made by Eiichi Shibusawa, chairman of the company, in the face both of opportunity and crisis.The Ishikawajima company built a large new yard at Uraga in response to the Promotion Law, but it was unable to utilize the yard to its full capacity because of the absence of intimate contacts with major shipping companies, and thus could not take advantage of the premiums offered by the new law. Shibusawa, quick to recognize his mistake, had the foresight to curtail the business, sell the new yard to a competitor, the Uraga Dock Company, established in 1896, and to expand his company's construction of machinery. As a result the company managed to escape total failure, and in a few years had entirely recovered financially. The Uraga Dock Co., meanwhile, was equally unable to take advantage of the huge yard it had bought from Ishikawajima, and its business, too, began to decline gradually.By contrast, both the Mitsubishi and Kawasaki Ship-Building Yard's kept intimate contact with the leading shipping companies, such as Nippon Yusen and Osaka Shosen, and were thus able to secure huge premiums and solidify their positions in the industry.

著者

ハイド フランシス・E

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, no.3, pp.1-7,i, 1967-11-15 (Released:2010-05-07)

---

Shipping industry is a fruitful field for business history studies. Earnings of shipping firms depend on the various factor such as the level of demand for the products carried, the effectiveness of competition on the structure of freight rates, the technical efficiency of the ship and the amount of shipping space on offer at a berth at any particular time in relation to the amount of cargo to be lifted.Over the past sixty years, the fluctuation of net earning from British shipping service has been very wide and the British shipowners maintained a competitive structure by building up reserves in good years from which to sustain building programmes during the poor years.By offering regular service, the Conference lines increased the commercial tempo of the countries which they served and safeguarded their capital by maintaining earning capacity, sustaining the efficiency of the shipping industry as a whole.Before 1939, the British fleets of cargo-liners were rebuilt twice. The first rebuilding, from 1885 to 1897, incorporated the change from compound to triple-expansion engines, the replacement of iron with steel, new system of ventilation and so on. The second reconstruction occurred between 1924 and 1929, switching from steam to diesel propulsion. The second change-over was less comprehensive because Britain was still a coal-based economy.For the shipping company which had a reasonably well diversified trade, it was still profitable to put capital into ships. If, however, a shipping line confined its activities to a limited number of routes, the investment of the company's resources in alternative enterprise would have been a prudent course to have taken.

著者

栗田 真造

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, no.1, pp.132-135, 1967-07-30 (Released:2009-11-11)

著者

高寺 貞男

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, no.2, pp.30-63,ii, 1967-09-30 (Released:2009-11-11)

---

The system of publicizing business balance sheets was introduced to Japan early in the Meiji period on two separate occasions. When the government transplanted the National Bank system from the United States to Japan, in the years 1873-75, it attempted to institutionalize financial statements as a means of controlling the activities of the new National Banks in Japan. Again, in 1883, in the course of introducing continental commercial law to Japan, the French and German system of financial statements was adopted as the core of the accounting system required by the new law.In the interval the British form of balance sheet prevailed, under the influence of the Meiji government, and terms such as karikata (“debtor”) or fusai-gimu (“liabilities and obligations”), and kashikata (“creditor”) or shisan-kenri (“assets and claims”) were prevalent. When the Continental system was applied, the term actif=Passiva, which properly meant “asset, ” and the term passif=Passiva, which meant “liability”, were translated respectively as kashikata (Cr) and karikata (Dr). These translations were authorized and established by the first commercial law, issued in 1890. Consequently, in spite of the application of the Continental form of balance sheet which listed the assets on the left hand and the liabilities and obligations on the right, the British form which listed the liabilities and capital on the left hand and the assets on the right had to be followed according to the commercial law.The two forms of balance sheet, Continental and British, continued to be valid side by side until the system was unified following the Continental pattern in the middle of the Taisho period, and the commercial law revised in 1922. In the meantime, however, debates on the appropriate form of balance sheet were frequent between the two schools, British and Continental. The controversy was similar to the dispute which arose among British accountants at the beginning of the 20th century concerning Table B of the Company Act of 1862.

著者

中川 敬一郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, no.3, pp.8-37,ii, 1967-11-15 (Released:2009-11-11)

---

The gate into modern industrial society is generally narrower for the follower than for the leader countries. Moreover, to catch up with the leader countries, the late-comers must pass this narrow gate more rapidly than did leader countries. Various segments and sectors in a backward economy are inevitably juxtaposed and the narrow gate forces all elements and sectors in the national economy. Therefore, the Meiji entrepreneurs in the course of industrialization tended to think and act rather with a broad and national horizon, considering the problems of various levels, sectors and units of the national economy. In short, the Meiji entrepreneurs were unable to secure their private profit unless those aspects of social interactions-social gains-were deliberated simultaneously.Such an organized aspect of Meiji entrepreneurship was particularly evident in foreign trade. Japan possessed no organization of foreign trade on the eve of industrialization. Therefore, the formation of powerful commercial enterprises had to precede the emergence of modern industrial production, and one of the results of such an evolution of commercial organization was the famous “general merchants” (sogoshosha), a unique feature in the modern industrial society of Japan. They had to perform the functions of bankers, exchange brokers, insurance brokers and sometimes even the function of shipping firms, and as such these multi-functional organizations gradually grew into big business. Through their world-wide network of branch offices, they explored the newest industrial techniques and surveyed market opportunities abroad. They proceeded at times to promote subsidiaries for the purpose of insustrializing the technology they imported and sometimes they purchased independent factories to assure the quantity of goods they were to export. Thus they truly became industrial organizers on a large scale. The “Zaibatsu” organization was the result of such an organized entrepreneurship executed by genral merchants.