著者

田中 智晃

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.4, pp.4_52-4_76, 2011 (Released:2014-05-23)

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This paper discusses issues related to the marketing strategy carried out by Nippon Gakki. In spite of numerous restrictions on sales, such as cost, size, and the need for periodical tuning and long training periods for users, the Japanese piano and organ market developed rapidly during the high economic growth period (1955-1973). What was behind the market expansion during this period? Mainly, it is attributed to three different factors: music education, credit sales, and the dealership system.Modern music education using instruments only began in the postwar period. The Japanese government officially announced the new school curriculum guidelines in 1958, which clearly stated that ‘students have to play the organ in school music class.’ This new curriculum boosted the demand for keyboard instruments, especially organs (reed organs). Around the same time, Nippon Gakki tried to further expand the market by encouraging early childhood music education, through the Yamaha music school.The second factor was the use of Yoyaku-hanbai (savings-type installment sales) which a Japanese sewing machine company created in the prewar period. This method was used by Nippon Gakki and Kawai Co. to enlarge the market to a wider income group. The third reason for the expansion was the dealership system of Nippon Gakki, which changed its system into a force that could achieve an ideal musical education, using the management resources of the dealership.Nippon Gakki grasped the trend of the times to firmly gain a competitive advantage; furthermore it constructed a stable marketing channel which was reinforced by the synergy of the three factors mentioned above, in addition to the territory system, the dealer-support system and the evolving sales force organization. This resulted in Japan becoming the largest piano and organ producer and consumer in the world.

著者

恩田 睦

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.3, pp.3_3-3_30, 2010 (Released:2014-05-23)

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The aim of this paper is to present the entrepreneurial activities of local enterprises during the pre-war period by analyzing the fund raising approach of Chichibu Railway Co., Ltd. between the early 1900s and mid 1920s. The funds raised were instrumental in the railway company's success in large-scale capital investments like the electrification and electric actuation of their train carriages in a short period of time. In conclusion, it was evident that the 2nd generation manager, Sadakichi Kakihara was not only able to expand business activities in the local areas, but also actively do so in Tokyo and raised funds with highly favorable standings.For the funds raised between 1900 and 1907, it was necessary to have collaterals for small sums of money borrowed at high interest rates for a short period from small-scale local banks situated along the railway lines that were concurrently run by the board of directors. The board of directors had to use their own securities or the company's stocks as collaterals. However, by relying solely on the local banks, it was unable to provide sufficient funds for the railway construction. It was during 1907, when Kakihara became the manager that he took the initiative to approach Tokyo's Eiichi Shibusawa for loan financing and the two entered into an agreement. The debt financing terms of Shibusawa, who had connections with banks in Tokyo, were such that there was sufficient funding with low-interest rate for the construction of the railways. In addition, the loan was for the long term.Subsequently, with regards to financing for the electrification works of the railway, Kakihara then raised funds from Bushu Bank which had been inaugurated as an external board. Although Chichibu Railway Co., Ltd. was able to increase profits, retained earnings for the company were reduced because of the increase in corporate dividend ratio. Due to Kakihara's business activities making inroads into Tokyo, success in large-scale capital investment with the funds raised was made possible.

著者

木下 なつき

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.2, pp.2_57-2_74, 2010 (Released:2014-05-23)

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This paper explores the early history of the life insurance company owned by African-Americans in California, focusing on their marketing strategy. The company, founded in 1925 as the Golden State Guarantee Fund, struggled to survive in the tough situation for Black Business, which was different from other black life insurance companies. California's small and lower-middle black communities made a life insurance business tough. According to the prior studies, successful black insurance business had to have a large and poor black population as in the Jim Crow South, or solidarity as in the ghetto North. They covered the organizational inefficiency that most of black business had.Because of the contrary condition in California, the Golden State Life had to develop their organizational capability in sales and marketing. George A. Beavers, Jr., one of the main founders, was in charge of both public relation and directing agency divisions as young community leader. While introducing some competitive ways to the agency management, Beavers took the advantage of community capitals on which most of their marketing activities were based in its early stages.Going between two opposite elements — competitiveness and community-consciousness, they finally made up their organization — “branch=team system.” While they developed team works inside each branch, all the branches competed the company-wide production contests. The concept came from baseball and other team sports. Organized sports gained high popularity and made an enthusiasm among African-Americans in the early 20th century. They helped the agents unite with each other and learn how to make organizational efforts in business.The Golden State Life's other marketing strategy was breaking into non-black market. Black people often shared residential and commercial spaces with other racial and ethnic groups in California. The company tried to meet the demands of the local communities, which were not limited to the blacks.

著者

安部 悦生

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.3, pp.3_44-3_59, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

被引用文献数

1

著者

道重 一郎

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.1, pp.1_3-1_28, 2008 (Released:2011-10-18)

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In this paper, based on investigation of clothing retailers in eighteenth century London, I try to clarify the role of retailers in the consumer revolution and discern the degree of modernity of eighteenth century London retail shops.In eighteenth century England, there were splendid urban growth and development of shopping area in many towns and retailers of these areas began to display novel goods at their shop windows and tried to sell fashionable things. Especially in London, shopkeepers were strongly sensitive to fashion trends. A key to their business success was in understanding fashion trends and keeping up with the latest fashions. Active business conduct going along with fashion was decisive for shopkeepers in London and they played an important role in diffusion of new fashion trends.I have investigated trade cards of some London clothing retailers and the business records of a London milliner. They sold diverse clothes and ornaments, but focused their business on preparing and arranging fashionable dresses and hats. The main concern of Mary Holl, whose records I have investigated was to provide sales of lace or other ornaments and the service of stitching these ornaments into clothes as well as washing and mending clothes. They tried to provide customer satisfaction by offering services which adopted the latest fashions and also suited the middle class customer's identity.It is also clear from records of Mary Holl, and other documents, that the outer and inner appearance of shops were important elements to attract potential customers. Show windows displayed diverse goods and a tasteful shop façade could lure customers into the shops. Inside of many shops there was a special space for the favoured customers to rest while shopping. Shopping became a leisure activity in the late eighteenth century; it was a very important business strategy for shopkeepers to enhance customer satisfaction by preparing comfortable space, especially for female customers.In the late eighteenth century, at the onset of the consumer society, shopkeepers in London, such as Mary Holl, whose customers were mainly the middling sorts of people played a very important role in increasing the consumption and spreading fashion trends.

著者

菅原 歩

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.2, pp.3-29, 2007-09-25 (Released:2010-03-19)

参考文献数

110

著者

菊池 慶彦

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.1, pp.27-57, 2007-06-25 (Released:2010-03-19)

参考文献数

132

被引用文献数

1

著者

斎藤 功 菅野 峰明

出版者

The Association of Japanese Geographers

雑誌

Geographical review of Japan, Series B (ISSN:02896001)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.63, no.1, pp.48-59, 1990-06-30 (Released:2008-12-25)

参考文献数

17

被引用文献数

1 4

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武蔵蔵野台地の既存の集落の辺境に開かれた新田集落は,平地林の落ち葉等を活用し,耕種農業,ついで近郊農業を行ってきた。このような地域に新しい主要道路が開通することによって,農家は都市化への急速な対応を迫られるようになった。本稿では小平・田無・東久留米市の境界地帯を事例として,新青梅街道の開通により農民が都市化へいかなる対応をしたかを解明した。 農民の都市化への対応は,一般に通勤兼業が先行する。しかし,農地に執着する農民が,農地を道路や不動産業者に販売した場合,その代金は自宅の新築改築および広い敷地にアパートや貸家を建てて家作経営を行うものが多かった。ついで道路に沿う農地に対しては,道路関連産業の要請により,農地を販売するのではなく賃貸する者も現れた。賃貸の農地は,新車・中古自動車展示場やレストラン,資材置場や倉庫および流通センター等に活用された。 農地を活用した自営的な兼業としては,ゴルフ練習場などのスポージ施設経営が群を抜き,この狭い地域に6つのゴルフ練習場が設立され,わが国最大のゴルフ練習場集中地区となった。ゴルフ練習場ではバッティングセンターやテニスコートぽかりでなく,顧客のためにレストランやゴルフショップを併設する場合が多い。専門度の高いスポーツ施設経営者は,農業経営から離れ産業資本家に脱皮したといえる。 地価の高騰は,一般のサラリーマンに一戸建の家の購入を困難にさせているが,農家が賃貸マンションを建てたりしているので,人口密度は高くなる。しかも,自家用車の所有率が高いため,駐車場需要が高いので駐車場を経営している農家も多い。このように農家では,アパート・マンション・貸家等の家作経営や農地の賃貸など,何らかの農外収入を得ている。しかし,残存した農地では,スーパーマーケットと契約して野菜類を栽培したり,直売している。

著者

近藤 智子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.3, pp.27-43,98, 2005-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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In 1902, two girls were employed by Mitsukoshi department store. Since then, the number of salesgirls increased. The girls were called department store girl. Before the WW I, most of the salesgirls were true meaning girls, about 12-15 years old. They had started working right after graduating only primary school. They worked long long time every day. So they were considered very miserable.In the 1920's, department stores had changed their customer target. Since then, customers of middle classes increased. Many of them were families. At the same time, the salesgirls with decent images grew an important factor at department stores. They were thought to be well-educated and beautiful girls, so sometimes they were heroin of modern city. Many of salesgirls were from middle classes, and retired from their job by marriage. But they came back to department stores again with their family (her husband and children) as customers. It is so called reproduction of clients. The salesgirls were not only representative of modern culture, but also assisted with development of Japanese department stores. So department stores had become modern consumer's culture, and they also became women's workplace.

著者

呂 寅満

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.2, pp.3-25,98, 2005-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this article is to study the process and features of the so-called 'military transition' of the Japanese automobile firms during the wartime. 'Small vehicle' manufacturing sector and automobile sales sector were then repressed by the military government, for they were thought to be unfitted to military use. Therefore, these sectors were compelled to change their product item, otherwise to be closed and to supply their labor forces to the military sector. In the meanwhile, the vast amount of capital for constructing and enlarging the factories was required by firms in order to transit the product item. The main focus of this article lies in the analysis of financing the capital for restructuring by the firms concerned.Nihonnainenki established in 1932, was the 3rd manufacture of small vehicles for civil use. In the initial phase, the management of this firm possessed to the Nihonjidosha. But, in 1936, it was transferred to Terada Zinkichi who was the top management of Terada Zaibatsu. Because he was the active manager for the military production, Nihonnainenki rapidly enlarged the production capacity. Since 1938, on which wartime economy began, up until 1942, production focused to small vehicle for military use. However, since 1943, it shifted to airplane parts under the financial support by the Nihon Kogyo Ginko (Industrial Bank of Japan).Nihonjidosha established in 1909, was the largest automobile sales firm in the inter-war Japan. It was originated as a division of the Okura Zaibatsu, but Okura's influence to this firm became weaker and weaker. Initially, Nihonjidosha was reluctant for transiting the business and enlarging the capacity, although automobile sales sector was repressed. However since late 1943, the firm also started to produce tornado parts for navy, under the financial support by the Senji Kinyu Kinko (Wartime Finance Fund).In conclusion, the transition of Japanese automobile companies during the wartime from civil to military production could be performed only under the financial aegis of the public banking institutions. And, nothing explains better than the firm's managerial strategy that makes a distinction between Nihonnainenki and Nihojidosha.

著者

青地 正史

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.4, pp.49-75, 2003-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the corporate governance structure of non-zaibatu companies in 1920s Japan. Takahashi Kamekichi, Kabushikigaisha Boukoku Ron (1930), Tohou Denryoku Shi (Tohou Electric Power History, 1962) and so on, are very instructive. They observed that Japanese companies in those days operated on short-range planning and showed unusually high pay-out ratios, up to nearly 70%, neglecting sufficient internal reserves, depreciation, and investment for plants and equipment.This paper takes the so-called institutional approach, focusing especially on the accounting system and laws at that time and places special emphasis on the following two issues.First, surprisingly old Japanese companies used the market price accounting system from 1893 to 1949, as do today's Japanese companies since 2001. But the new market price accounting system is confined to only financial instruments, and valuation profits cannot be paid out as dividends. On the contrary, the old market price accounting covered all assets and valuation profits were appropriated as dividends. According to Takahashi (1930), Japanese companies in the 1920s gained valuation profits from fixed assets and clearance assets as well as stocks, and they paid almost all of them out as dividends. Consequently, they lacked in long-term planning and suffered from ineffective management. It is difficult to say that they were mature going concerns.Second, between 1893 and 1938, an accordance of ownership and control was commonly found within Japanese companies under the Commercial Law system, which stipulated that a director and auditor must be a stockholder. Moreover, there were both a few large block large shareholders and many small shareholders. On the one hand, the block shareholders occupied executive posts of the within the companies. According to Tohou Denryoku Shi, they enjoyed controlling the company profits. On the other hand, many small shareholders were silent or weak, and shareholders' meetings were meaningless, as today's are. Consequently, both could not work as monitors for their companies. It is evident that this sort of image of Japanese companies was quite different from Berle & Means's separation of ownership and control.In conclusion, the 1920s Japanese companies were not mature going concerns, and their shareholders did not function as monitors at all. Thus they cannot be classified as the Anglo-Saxon corporate types.

著者

松下 元則

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.4, pp.76-101, 2003-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

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The purpose of this paper is to show the reason why Suntory was able to innovate on a distribution channel in the Shanghai Beer industry. Suntory has had strong marketing skills and high technology in beer production in Japan. From 1984, Suntory's Chinese Business began in earnest. China Jiangsu Suntory Foods became the number one beer maker of Jiangsu Province, and Suntory developed skills in the management of a Chinese beer company. These Chinese business skill work as the core competence of Suntory's business in China. In 1996, Suntory established Shanghai Suntory Brewing and started a beer business in Shanghai. Though the Chinese business skills worked well, they were not good enough to make Suntory Shanghai's top beer maker. The marketing skills and knowledge of the beer market's competence, which were obtained in Japan, were needed. From 1997, Chinese business skills combined with marketing skills helped the rapid increase in Suntory beer sales. Suntory has been the number one beer maker in Shanghai since 1999. Suntory's technology and management skills have been adjusted to the Chinese market and work well in China. The adjustment process distinguishes Suntory from others and contributed to Suntory's to success in distribution innovation.

著者

齊藤 毅憲

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.3, pp.86-96, 2002-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

長廣 利崇

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.2, pp.30-55, 2002-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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In most previous studies of the Japanese coal industrial history, it is assumed that small-scale coal mines were undeveloped. Large-scale coal mines, such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, were thought to have monopolized the market during the interwar period. However, there is almost no empirical study that analyzes small-scale coal mines. Therefore, this paper examines the case of Arate coal mine, under small-scale management in the coalfields of Chikuhou during the interwar period.The coal market share of Arate was greatly extended under the oligopoly of large-scale coal mines from 1930 to 1935. In this study, this factor is analyzed from three angles: a market, production, and finances.What should be emphasized is that Arate produced high-quality coal that was equal to that of large-scale coal mines. Arate operated under a labor-intensive system, using low wage earnings, and was became able to compete at the same production cost as large-scale coal mines.That is, Arate competed on an equal footing with large-scale coal mines, in both the market and production cost, and grew in management scale. This paper thus presents a critique of the historical image of small-scale coal mines as undeveloped.

著者

松本 純

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.2, pp.48-70, 2001-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The main purpose of this article is to clarify the British pattern of the introduction of technical instruction, analyzing the economic influence of the activity of the City and Guilds of London Institute for the Advancement of Technical Education at the end of the 19th century. This paper also focuses upon the fact that the City and Guilds attached importance to the opinion of small- and medium-scale merchants and manufacturers in Britain.As a first industrial nation, Britain had preserved entrenched institutional structures since the Industrial Revolution and as regards technical instruction, the state was reluctant to create the polytechnics and the scientific facilities like Germany. In Britain, on the whole, some voluntary societies, one of which was City and Guilds, endeavored to promote technical instruction throughout the 19th century.The conclusion of this paper can be summarized as follows. City and Guilds, which consisted of members of the Corporation of London and sixteen Livery Companies, conducted a nationwide technological exam for the various types of merchants and manufacturers and built the first technical college, Finsbury Technical College, in London. This college particularly attracted small- and medium-scale merchants and manufacturers who worked around London and coped with industrialization by relying upon their manual technologies. City and Guilds satisfied their needs concerning higher knowledge or information to catch up with the technical standards of their rivals. Moreover, they provided an opportunity to centralize the technical instruction system in Britain.

著者

菅原 歩

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.1, pp.84-103, 2001-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

平本 厚

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.2, pp.22-45, 2000-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The aim of this paper is to analyze the process by which Matsushita Electric branched out into radio manufacturing in the first half of 1930s and the organizational reform the company undertook as a result. The originality of Matsushita's divisional restructuring of 1933 is well known, and it was the earliest one to take place in Japan.In 1930, Matsushita, which had succeeded in the electrical appliance industry, decided to expand into radio manufacturing. Its founder Kohnosuke Matsushita wished to produce trouble-free radio sets, which seemed a promising idea as the radio market at that time was flooded with inferior products.It was, however, not easy to make Matsushita's dream a reality. The resulting radios were too idealistic and consequently too expensive, and Matsushita's radio business showed a considerable deficit. It forced the company to reorganize its radio business on July 1933 by integrating the manufacturing and the sales sections.Following the reorganization, Matsushita was able to develop new models that were suitable to market needs, and its radio business expanded rapidly. Leaning from this success, Matsushita introduced its multidivisional structure on March 1934. It is clear that Matsushita's creation of a multidivisional structure was based on the same logic as that of Du Pont and GM in 1920-21 which were analyzed by A.D. Chandler.

著者

木山 実

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.3, pp.1-26, 2000-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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From its inception period, Mitsui Bussan (MB) actively recruited graduates of Shoho Koshujo (a business school, Hitotsubashi University) and other schools, and the posts of chiefs at overseas MB branches were occupied by the graduates around the 1890s. In fact, MB had already established branches in Shanghai, Hong-Kong, Paris, New York, London, Lyon, and Milan between 1877 and 1880. This paper aims to clarify who had taken charge of each branch and what career they had had before those posts were occupied by the graduates of such higher educational institutions as Shoho Koshujo.MB established the above seven offices mainly at the request of the Japanese government, which encouraged trade through Japanese trading merchants rather than through foreign trading houses. While the higher educational system was being established in Japan, MB struggled due to the shortage of Japanese staff who were able to cope with work in overseas offices. MB, however, did not entrust its overseas work to local merchants at its overseas branches. Instead, MB sought out capable Japanese nationals who had gone abroad to study, worked as overseas consular officials, or worked at international exhibitions as civil servants or private citizens. MB dispatched them to overseas branches as chief, and the graduates of the higher schools worked under them. Until those graduates were trained and promoted as branch chief, the staff recruited overseas played a temporary, yet important role in establishing the MB's overseas offices.

著者

太田原 準

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.4, pp.1-28, 2000-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

被引用文献数

2

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The Japanese motorcycle industry produces more than 70 percent of the world's motorcycles and enjoys the position of one of the most competitive industries in Japan. This case history aims to single out the distinctive characteristics of the industry and presents an economic analysis of its evolution from 1945 to 1965.After World War II, the market for motorcycles rapidly expanded when merchants employed them as a tool for lightweight transportation. New entry firms numbered over 200, which were mostly small- and medium-sized firms. The nature of motorcycle production then resembled bicycle making rather than automobile assembly. The entire process was basically a network of component suppliers and motorcycle manufacturers specializing in the final assembly. But Honda Motors first introduced mass production through an integrated system in its Saitama and Hamamatsu plants. This rapid expansion pushed Honda close to bankruptcy, owing to financial crises in 1954. By contrast, Tohatsu, a conservative but efficient firm, increased its market share to 20.2 percent in 1955 and became leader of the industry.While obtaining emergency financing from Mitsubishi Bank, Honda rationalized its management and plant system. Furthermore, Honda invested 7 billion -yen to build a new plant in Suzuka in 1960 in order to manufacture Super-Cub, which became a dominant model in emerging the moped market. This plant, which aimed to achieve the maximum production economy, was designed to produce only Super-Cubs and adopted a highly automated mass production system. This strategic decision by Honda resulted in increasing its market share from 18.9 percent in 1957 to 63.5 percent in 1963. Other small- and medium-sized firms were outclassed by the operation of Suzuka plant and were wiped out from the motorcycle market. This was the formation of oligo-polistic competition among the so-called Big Four and of the distinctive characteristics of the Japanese motorcycle industry, which is far larger in production size relative to all other nations and which brought the advantages of the scale economy.

著者

清水 剛

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.2, pp.1-21, 1999-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

参考文献数

39

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This paper explores the “longevity” of firms, particularly of big businesses in postwar Japan, and investigates some features of Japanese firms from this aspect.Organizational growth and decline process have been studied in organization theory and business history, though the quantitative aspect of this process has not been examined. I therefore studied this aspect by investigating the longevity of firms, based on studies of organizational ecology and related research. Consideration of longevity presents a new perspective from which to study the activities and organization of firms.From an analysis of the average number of years in which firms are ranked by total capital, and an event history analysis of the duration of listing in the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, I will show that big businesses in the postwar period have especially long lifetimes, and there is no “liability of newness” or “liability of aging” about them; that is, there is no relation between the duration of listing and the rate of elimination from the first section of TSE. Therefore, these big businesses can be regarded as stable entities. It seems reasonable to believe that this stability is related to the Japanese longterm employment system.I will also show that their longevity increased gradually in the postwar period, but not without fluctuation; it decreased in the first half of the 1960s. This seems to reflect the magnitude of economic change during this period, sometimes referred to as the “transformation period.”