著者

今田 竹千代

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.83-95, 1968-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

大畑 甚一

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.97-104, 1968-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

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Empiricism, traditionally, has analyzed 'the foundation' of empirical knowledge in terms of 'the Given' as an epistemological category. What is 'the foundation'? What meaning does it have?. Following W. Sellars, two requirements are postulated, i. e., (1) there is a structure of particular matter of fact that is non-inferentially known. (2) non-inferential knowledge about the structure is ultimate. In this direction, a consistent picture of empiricism is drawn. In this process, 'the Given' must be construed as immanent 'awareness', on which the edifice of empirical knowledge rests. Indeed, 'the Given' as its foundation is the Myth, but this assertion does not imply the rejection of the inner, non-verbal episodes of 'observing', 'impression' or 'idea'. A new epistemology is in future.

著者

瀬在 良男

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.105-117, 1968-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

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This paper is an introductory study for the behavioristic approach to value.I think, as the fundamental method of such an approach, it must be possible to understand the theory of value as follows ;(a) the theory of the preferential system of action.(b) the theory of the social system of action.The former (a) characterizes as the "selectiv-rejective behavior" the human behavior, and examines the value approach connected with the function of purpose and cognition in the human behavior from the standpoint of psycho-biological analysis of the value phenomenon.The latter (b) characterizes as the "role-taking behavior" the human behavior, and examines the value approach connected with the function of socialization in the human behavior from the standpoint of psycho-sociological analysis of the value phenomenon.In this paper, I treated as the subject of this paper a case of the latter (b).And, I verified, in this examination, the reason which is understood as the value is the social, the functional, and the normative from the following problems ;(1) the problem of selfhood and role-taking behavior(2) the problem of value-situation and process of "socialization" in the human behavior And, in the last of this paper, I found the following conclusion from this verification. Value theory is the theory of scientific inquiry of the "attitude".

著者

速川 治郎

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.119-131, 1968-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

竹崎 鼎輔

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.147-161, 1968-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

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Every science must be based on anthropology, not on philosophy. This is because every science is created by man; and philosophy forms part of anthropology-an anthropology of the inner sense.To explain the essence of mathematics from the viewpoint of anthropology, especially of anthropology of the inner sense, I have classified knowledge in general into five categories to define what kind of knowledge mathematics is: (1) natural knowledge and artificial knowledge; (2) knowledge of the outer sense and knowledge of the inner sense ; (3) knowledge as reality and knowledge as memory; (4) knowledge as image and knowledge as language; (5) inductive knowledge and deductive knowledge.To apply this classification to mathematical knowledge, we must clarify what mathematical entity is. The physiological transformation of images, an a priori cerebral function which plays a main role in the formation of recognition, serves as a clue to the understanding of the essence of mathematical knowledge.If one recognizes this function by the inner sense, one can grasp the inner relation of quantity as, natural knowledge by the inner sense. Artificial beings realized by this philosophical knowledge is natural mathematical entity. Elementary mathematics, therefore, is a natural science, the object of which is such entity.The basis of the validity of inductive mathematical knowledge lies in entity itself and agrees with the provabitity of mathematical knowledge by means of deduction from axiom (the principle of cre-ation). Mathematics is, in this sense, an ideal model of natural science.

著者

Max Bense

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.183-197, 1968-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

5

著者

石本 新 藤川 吉美

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.9-22, 1968-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

12

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This paper concerns the construction of a modal sentential calculus, which constitutes a subsystem of Lewis' S 1 and a decision method of the proposed calculus. The method represents a generalization of that rendered by McKinsey for Lewis' S 2 as well as for S 4 and is characterized by the construction of all the finite regular matrices containing not more than a certain number of elements specified by the given formula.

著者

斎藤 晢朗

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.23-29, 1968-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

高松 鶴吉

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.31-44, 1968-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

4

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At the root of two-valued logic we use there is the assumption, which is usually not formulated explicitly, but is a basic one, and which is called the principle of two-values. This principle in twovalued logic corresponds to the principle of contradiction and the principle of the excluded middle. However, the principle of the syllogism in the usual (conjunctively transitive) formulation, and the principle of contradiction, of the excluded middle are only "possible" in three-valued logic. From this, three-valued logic are connected with a modal functor such as 'M' to be called "possible" (möglich). Furthermore, some laws of two-valued logic are false in three-valued logic, among others the law (a=a') = 0. From this fact results the absence of antinomies in three-valued logic.Thus any of many-valued logic from three-valued to infinitely many-valued is a proper part or a proper sublogic of two-valued logic, and the latter is a superlogic of the former.

著者

江藤 肇

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.45-54, 1968-10-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

6

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Some important parts of economics are formally stated in a finite manner in the sense that their syntax is given and that their theorems are proved without resorting to the compactness just under the assumptions the rational numbers and their arithmetical rules are finitely given. Firstly the syntax introduces the linear space spanned over the rational field which is shown to meet the so-called axioms of the linear space. The simplex algorithm of linear programming provides a finite tool to develop the linear algebra and its. geometric representation which, on the contrary, usually in nonfinite systems deduce it. The basic parts of the game theory and non-linear programming are shown to be expressible in a finite manner as well. Economic behaviors besides games are also seen to be expressed by finite mathematics. Lastly it is remarked that the integer programming algorithms as the most powerful tool for finite systems are finite.

著者

横濱 竜也

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, pp.208-218,259, 2007-10-30 (Released:2010-12-16)

参考文献数

16

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Why should subjects defer to and obey their ruler? This question which is taken seriously especially by civil disobedients, coustitutes the core of the problem of legitimacy, and inquiries of the answer to the question has been mainly done in the theories of political obligation. But standard theories of political obligation have not given enough attention to the moral character of vertical relationship between ruler and subjects and the basis of intrinsic value of the latter's deference to the former. Arguments from fairness regard the state as a social cooperation between the equal members, and as an instrument to supply goods indispensable for us, so they do not adequately recognize the intrinsic value of deference. One of the arguments from natural duty of justice appeals the needs of political institutions which administer stably in a specific territory the principles of justice, but they attach little importance to how the relation between ruler and subjects has formed, and how subjects consider that their ruler believes in good faith that his judgment is just. The reasons for ruler to care about the basis of his political authority and the reasons for subjects to take seriously the basis of their political obligation are essentially different, and we should treat them separately. But in spite of the difference, to the virtue of ruler who presents consistently his understanding of the common goods, subjects have a (strong) reason to defer because in his claim of consistency, ruler has to be open and accountable to dissentients who blame him for inconsistency.

著者

赤岩 順二

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, pp.219-228,258, 2007-10-30 (Released:2010-12-16)

参考文献数

47

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This essay offers an interpretation of Plato's Nomoi 842b-860e, from agricultural laws to the answer of Athenian Stranger who was himself raising the question whether legisla-tive activities are recommended or not. There are three parts in the essay. The first part (section I) shows that the agricultural legislation is well designed and could be seen as a prototype for the rest of legislation. The second part (section II) shows that the legislative story, from the beginning of Book IX to an objection by Cleinias (857 b), is regarded as an error, which shows a possi-ble misbehavior of criminal justice in a post agricultural society. The third and final part (section III) discusses about the question whether judicial and legislative activities themselves are included in the subject of a Socratic paradox, “No one willingly do wrong”, introduced by Athenian Stranger (860 d). This essay answers “yes”, according to interpretations in the first and second part of the study. If that is the case, Plato assigns the Socratic paradox to a roll preventing the deviance of criminal justice.

著者

中村 隆文

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, pp.229-242,258, 2007-10-30 (Released:2010-12-16)

参考文献数

34

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Locke's theory as a contractarian has a great influence on the debates about social justice between “liberalism” and “libertarianism” yet. Even have many differences of opinions in those, they almost depend on the “natural law” and “natural right” elaborated by Locke when he tried to defend the “liberty” against an authority of the king. This reason is that they believe Locke's natural jurisprudence and ideas of “liberty” and “right” are set in the Declaration of Independence. It's nothing to be surprised at this, so now I intend not to doubt this fact, and that, not to convict their debates as pointless. I suggest that “liberty”, “right” and “justice” can be also defended philosophically by a school of thought in the eighteenth century other than Locke's, no matter how we estimate his influence on the then America. Directly and frankly professing, I regard the Scottish Enlightenment as functioning that role in the century, and its significance has still lived under the debate about the idea of social justice. I place a special emphasis on the point that Scottish thinkers, especially David Hume and Adam Smith, had defended the America outside the theory of contractarianism involved with liberalism and Libertarianism. It shows that “justice” intrinsically exists in a relationship, in other words “convention” and it can not be discovered in the contractual lawmaking way but in the judiciary way reflecting sense of justice, or moral sense, because law of justice will be expanding over the domain of human rationality of economical worldview.

著者

大塚 滋

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, pp.142-149, 2007-10-30 (Released:2010-12-16)

著者

三本 卓也

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, pp.150-157,262, 2007-10-30 (Released:2010-12-16)

参考文献数

29

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In this article, I discuss two kinds of legal conceptions that Hohfeld described in his 1913 article: duty and privilege (or [unilateral] liberty). I focus on one specific interpretation that most readers seem to share; that is, the interpretation of Hohfeld as adopting a thesis ‘duty implies liberty’ (hereinafter T1). In order to assess the validity of T1, I think it necessary to stress the analogy between duty-liberty relations in Hohfeld's analysis on the one hand, and obligation-permission relations in deontic logic on the other. From this standpoint, T1 above equals a well-known thesis in deontic logic, which maintains that 'Op D Pp should be included as an axiom of a deontic system' (hereinafter T2). Moreover, T2 is closely related to yet another one, that is, `there exist logical relations between norms' (hereinafter T3). I argue that it is possible to interpret Hohfeld as denying T1 (contrary to currently dominant approach), and that this inter-pretation has its merits when it claims itself to be a system of deontic logic. After briefly summarizing what jural ‘opposites’ (in Hohfeld's term) mean, I argue that his own text becomes perfectly consistent when read as rejecting Tl. One might wonder if, logically speaking, Hohfeld's system thus interpreted is rich enough (as pointed out by Lindahl and others). I argue that it is, particularly when connected to the deontic system of von Wright's. Here, we must be aware that von Wright made, as time went by, at least three different kinds of arguments about T2 and T3. Of these three, particularly of note is, in my opinion, the system proposed in the third period. At that time, he contended that, while one should reject T3 (and hence T2), this never means the demise of deontic logic. To support this contention, he introduces ‘rationality’ standard, and thereby tries to reconstruct deontic logic from a new perspective. Based on this, I suggest that Hohfeld be understood as ‘von Wright in the third and (in my opinion) maturest period’, although this interpretation has several unsolved problems to be dealt with.

著者

早川 のぞみ

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, pp.158-167,261, 2007-10-30 (Released:2010-12-16)

参考文献数

29

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Ronald Dworkin's theory about the ‘moral reading’ of the Constituion has made an influence not only on legal theories but also on constitutional theories through our country. The feature of his theory is on the point that he understands the Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights, as a comprehensive system of abstract moral principles. My aim in this paper is to clarify the characteristics of his theory by comparing a very different type of theory, the ‘Originalism’. I also look at the abortion case. Examining how the two theories argue over this case, I try to discuss not only the signigficance about Dworkin' s theory, but also its problem as well.

著者

伊佐 智子

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, pp.168-178,261, 2007-10-30 (Released:2010-12-16)

参考文献数

16

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In this paper, the reproductive rights are explained, at first, from its historical background, particularly in terms of the international declarations. Secondly, it shows this right should be a right to “reproduction”, because only women can choose whether to give a birth to a baby or not. A woman and fetus in her body are united on one side, but on the other independent. In this meaning a woman can choose to or not to give a birth to a baby with a responsibility towards the fetus. We should realize the importance, concerning society with decreasing birthrate. These rights must be a fundamental right for women as a moral and legal person. Finally, a nation has a moral and legal responsibility to fulfill and realize reproductive rights of women, then it leads to protect fetal life as well.

著者

吉岡 剛彦

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, pp.179-189,260, 2007-10-30 (Released:2010-12-16)

参考文献数

39

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This paper is about Arthur Kaufmann's legal philosophy. Especially it focuses upon his theories of “the right to cheap resistance, ” “the principle of tolerance, ” and “relational person, ” which Kaufmann took into much account in his later years. These theories are related to his basic thinking on ontology of law (right), legal hermeneutics, legal methodology. I will try to describe Kaufmann's design for “an ideal society” by my own evolutional interpretation of his legal philosophy. In this description I pay attention to his insistence that statutory law (positive law) should be moderate or last resort (ultima ratio). The ideal society in Kaufmann's legal thought is, I think, a society through which voices of people (minorities) raising objections to the status quo can be circulated surely, and in which other people pay respect to the voices and can be stimulated to break away from their present viewpoints by “another vision” of the society in the voices.

著者

石黒 太

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, pp.190-197,260, 2007-10-30 (Released:2010-12-16)

参考文献数

13

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In this paper, I try to articulate the core of John Rawls's theoretical shift from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism by examining his idea of democracy. Rawls's theory of justice gradually displays the democratic character. In Political Liberalism, he introduces the idea of Public Reason to his theory. This idea allegedly plays a significant role in Deliberative Democracy; therefore Rawls is regarded as one of the vanguards of Deliberative Democracy. But how can his liberal theory be consistent with his democratic shift? In my opinion, Political Liberalism differs from A Theory of Justice with regard to the place of democracy. In A Theory of Justice, democracy is derived from “Justice as Fairness”, whereas Political Liberalism presupposes the democratic arrangement, and “Justice as Fairness” is offered as the most reasonable conception of justice for our democratic society. Thus Political Liberalism admits that “Justice as Fairness” is but one example of a reasonable liberal conception of justice. This difference corresponds to shift in the way of justification of “Justice as Fairness”. In my point of view, “Justice as Fairness” in A Theory of Justice is justified through “Wide Reflective Equilibrium” (“in the case of one person”), whereas it is “Full Reflective Equilibrium” (“Wide and General Reflective Equilibrium”) that plays very important role in justification of “Justice as Fairness” in Political Liberalism. The latter Reflective Equilibrium includes dialogical moments. It is concluded that the place of democracy in his theory shifts with a change in the structure of the justification of “Justice as Fairness”, and his position in Political Liberalism can be interpreted as a dialogical approach to justice.

著者

稲田 恭明

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, pp.198-207,259, 2007-10-30 (Released:2010-12-16)

参考文献数

10

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This essay aims to explore the scope and limits of cosmopolitan citizenship, the most ambitious of the various conceptions of new citizenship which try to reconstruct the traditional concept of citizenship which has been closely connected with that of nationality. This conception is an attempt at revitalizing democracy by diversifying citizenship in accordance with the multiplied political decision-making processes under the circumstance that the autonomous competences of nation states are undermined under the pressure of economic globalization, and the state sover-eignty is being diffused both upwards and downwards. After surveying several important theories on cosmopolitan citizenship, we will review several criticisms against them. Those criticisms are mainly concerned with the preconditions which enable democratic deliberation, and the idea of democratizing transnational institutions. This new conception of citizenship requires both institutional and ethical approaches.